1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
436 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
437 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
438 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
439 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
440 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
441 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
442 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
443 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
444 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
445 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
446 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
447 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
448 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
449 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
451 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
452 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
453 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
454 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
456 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
457 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
458 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
459 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
461 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
462 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
463 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
464 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
465 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
467 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
468 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
469 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
470 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
472 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
473 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
474 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
476 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
477 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
478 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
479 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
480 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
482 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
483 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
485 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
486 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
488 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
492 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
493 (0, update, required),
494 (2, blocked, required),
497 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
498 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
499 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
502 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
503 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
504 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
505 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
507 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
508 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
509 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
510 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
512 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
516 channel_id: [u8; 32],
517 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
520 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
521 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
523 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
524 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
525 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
527 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
528 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
529 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
530 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
532 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
533 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
535 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
537 holder_signer: Signer,
538 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
539 destination_script: Script,
541 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
542 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
543 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
545 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
546 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
547 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
548 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
549 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
550 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
552 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
553 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
554 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
555 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
556 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
557 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
559 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
561 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
562 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
563 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
565 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
566 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
567 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
568 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
569 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
570 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
571 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
573 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
575 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
576 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
577 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
578 // HTLCs with similar state.
579 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
580 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
581 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
582 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
583 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
584 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
585 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
586 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
587 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
590 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
591 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
592 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
594 update_time_counter: u32,
596 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
597 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
598 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
599 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
600 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
601 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
603 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
604 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
606 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
607 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
608 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
609 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
611 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
612 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
614 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
616 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
618 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
619 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
620 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
621 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
622 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
623 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
625 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
626 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
627 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
628 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
629 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
631 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
632 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
633 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
634 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
635 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
636 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
637 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
638 channel_creation_height: u32,
640 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
643 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
645 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
648 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
650 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
653 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
655 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
657 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
658 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
661 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
663 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
665 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
666 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
668 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
670 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
671 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
672 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
674 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
676 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
677 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
679 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
680 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
681 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
683 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
685 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
687 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
688 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
689 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
690 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
692 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
693 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
694 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
696 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
697 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
698 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
700 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
701 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
702 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
703 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
704 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
705 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
706 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
707 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
709 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
710 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
711 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
712 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
713 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
715 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
716 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
718 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
719 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
720 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
721 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
722 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
723 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
724 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
725 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
727 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
728 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
730 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
731 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
732 // the channel's funding UTXO.
734 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
735 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
736 // associated channel mapping.
738 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
739 // to store all of them.
740 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
742 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
743 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
744 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
745 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
746 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
748 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
749 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
751 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
752 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
754 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
755 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
756 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
758 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
759 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
760 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
761 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
762 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
765 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
766 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
768 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
769 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
770 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
774 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
776 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
777 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
778 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
779 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
783 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
785 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
787 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
789 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
790 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
791 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
792 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
793 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
795 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
796 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
798 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
800 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
801 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
803 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
804 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
805 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
806 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
807 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
808 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
810 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
811 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
813 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
814 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
815 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
816 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
817 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
819 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
820 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
822 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
823 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
825 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
826 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
827 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
828 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
834 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
835 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
837 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
838 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
839 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
844 macro_rules! secp_check {
845 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
848 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
853 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
854 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
855 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
856 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
858 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
860 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
861 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
862 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
864 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
867 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
869 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
872 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
873 /// required by us according to the configured or default
874 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
876 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
878 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
879 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
880 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
881 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
882 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
885 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
886 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
887 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
888 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
889 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
890 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
891 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
894 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
895 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
898 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
899 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
900 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
901 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
902 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
903 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
904 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
905 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
906 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
907 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
910 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
911 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
912 // `only_static_remotekey`.
914 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
915 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
916 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
917 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
924 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
925 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
926 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
927 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
928 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
929 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
930 // We've exhausted our options
933 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
934 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
937 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
938 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
939 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
940 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
942 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
943 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
944 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
945 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
946 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
947 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
949 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
951 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
955 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
956 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
957 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
958 outbound_scid_alias: u64
959 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
960 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
961 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
962 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
964 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
965 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
966 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
967 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
969 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
970 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
972 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
973 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
975 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
976 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
977 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
979 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
980 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
982 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
983 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
984 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
985 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
986 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
989 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
990 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
992 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
994 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
995 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
996 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
997 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1000 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1001 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1003 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1004 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1005 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1006 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1010 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1011 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1012 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1016 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1017 Ok(script) => script,
1018 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1021 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1026 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1027 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1028 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1029 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1034 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1036 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1037 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1038 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1039 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1041 channel_value_satoshis,
1043 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1046 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1049 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1050 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1053 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1054 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1055 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1056 pending_update_fee: None,
1057 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1058 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1059 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1060 update_time_counter: 1,
1062 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1064 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1065 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1066 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1067 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1068 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1069 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1071 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1072 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1073 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1074 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1076 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1077 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1078 closing_fee_limits: None,
1079 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1081 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1083 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1084 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1085 short_channel_id: None,
1086 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1088 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1089 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1090 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1091 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1092 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1093 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1094 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1095 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1096 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1097 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1098 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1099 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1101 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1103 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1104 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1105 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1106 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1107 counterparty_parameters: None,
1108 funding_outpoint: None,
1109 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1110 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1112 funding_transaction: None,
1114 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1115 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1116 counterparty_node_id,
1118 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1120 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1122 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1123 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1125 announcement_sigs: None,
1127 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1128 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1129 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1130 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1132 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1134 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1135 outbound_scid_alias,
1137 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1138 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1140 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1141 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1146 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1150 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1151 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1152 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1154 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1155 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1156 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1157 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1158 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1159 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1160 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1161 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1163 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1164 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1165 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1166 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1167 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1168 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1169 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1170 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1172 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1173 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1182 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1183 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1184 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1185 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1186 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1187 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1188 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1189 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1190 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1191 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1192 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1195 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1197 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1198 // support this channel type.
1199 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1200 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1201 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1204 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1205 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1206 // `static_remote_key`.
1207 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1208 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1210 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1211 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1214 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1217 channel_type.clone()
1219 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1220 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1225 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1227 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1228 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1229 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1230 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1231 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1232 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1233 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1234 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1235 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1238 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1242 // Check sanity of message fields:
1243 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1244 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1246 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1247 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1249 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1252 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1253 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1254 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1256 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1259 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1262 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1264 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1265 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1266 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1268 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1271 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1272 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1275 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1276 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1279 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1282 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1285 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1288 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1291 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1292 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1294 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1298 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1300 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1301 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1306 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1307 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1308 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1309 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1310 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1312 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1315 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1316 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1317 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1319 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1323 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1324 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1325 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1326 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1327 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1328 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1331 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1332 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1333 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1334 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1335 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1338 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1339 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1340 &Some(ref script) => {
1341 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1342 if script.len() == 0 {
1345 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1346 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1348 Some(script.clone())
1351 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1358 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1359 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1360 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1361 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1365 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1366 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1367 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1371 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1372 Ok(script) => script,
1373 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1376 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1377 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1379 let chan = Channel {
1382 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1383 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1385 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1390 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1392 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1393 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1394 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1395 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1398 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1401 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1404 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1405 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1406 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1408 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1409 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1410 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1411 pending_update_fee: None,
1412 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1413 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1414 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1415 update_time_counter: 1,
1417 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1419 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1420 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1421 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1422 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1423 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1424 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1426 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1427 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1428 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1429 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1431 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1432 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1433 closing_fee_limits: None,
1434 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1436 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1438 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1439 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1440 short_channel_id: None,
1441 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1443 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1444 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1445 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1446 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1447 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1448 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1449 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1450 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1451 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1452 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1453 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1454 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1455 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1457 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1459 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1460 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1461 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1462 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1463 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1464 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1465 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1467 funding_outpoint: None,
1468 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1469 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1471 funding_transaction: None,
1473 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1474 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1475 counterparty_node_id,
1477 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1479 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1481 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1482 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1484 announcement_sigs: None,
1486 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1487 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1488 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1489 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1491 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1493 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1494 outbound_scid_alias,
1496 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1497 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1499 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1500 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1505 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1511 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1512 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1513 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1514 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1515 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1517 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1518 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1519 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1520 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1521 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1522 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1523 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1525 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1526 where L::Target: Logger
1528 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1529 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1530 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1532 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1533 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1534 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1535 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1537 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1538 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1539 if match update_state {
1540 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1541 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1542 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1543 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1544 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1546 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1550 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1551 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1552 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1553 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1555 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1556 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1557 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1559 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1560 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1561 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1562 transaction_output_index: None
1567 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1568 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1569 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1570 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1571 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1574 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1576 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1577 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1578 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1580 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1581 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1584 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1585 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1588 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1590 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1591 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1592 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1594 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1595 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1601 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1602 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1603 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1604 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1605 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1606 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1607 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1611 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1612 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1614 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1616 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1617 if generated_by_local {
1618 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1619 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1628 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1630 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1631 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1632 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1633 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1634 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1635 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1636 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1639 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1640 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1641 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1642 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1646 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1647 preimages.push(preimage);
1651 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1652 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1654 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1656 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1657 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1659 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1660 if !generated_by_local {
1661 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1669 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1670 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1671 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1672 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1673 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1674 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1675 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1676 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1678 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1680 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1681 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1682 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1683 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1685 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1687 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1688 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1689 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1690 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1693 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1694 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1695 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1696 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1698 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1701 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1702 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1703 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1704 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1706 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1709 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1710 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1715 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1716 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1721 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1723 let channel_parameters =
1724 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1725 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1726 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1729 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1734 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1737 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1738 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1739 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1740 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1742 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1743 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1744 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1752 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1753 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1759 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1760 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1761 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1762 // outside of those situations will fail.
1763 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1767 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1772 1 + // script length (0)
1776 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1777 2 + // witness marker and flag
1778 1 + // witness element count
1779 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1780 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1781 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1782 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1783 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1784 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1786 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1787 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1788 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1794 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1795 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1796 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1797 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1799 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1800 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1801 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1803 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1804 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1805 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1806 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1807 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1808 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1811 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1812 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1815 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1816 value_to_holder = 0;
1819 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1820 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1821 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1822 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1824 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1825 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1828 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1829 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1833 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1834 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1835 /// our counterparty!)
1836 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1837 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1838 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1839 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1840 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1841 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1842 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1844 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1848 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1849 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1850 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1851 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1852 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1853 //may see payments to it!
1854 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1855 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1856 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1858 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1861 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1862 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1863 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1864 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1865 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1868 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1871 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1872 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1874 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1876 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1877 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1878 where L::Target: Logger {
1879 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1880 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1881 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1882 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1883 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1884 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1885 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1886 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1890 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1891 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1892 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1893 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1895 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1896 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1898 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1900 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1902 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1903 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1904 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1906 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1907 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1908 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1909 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1910 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1912 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1913 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1914 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1916 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1917 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1919 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1922 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1923 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1927 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1931 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1932 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1933 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1934 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1935 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1936 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1939 // Now update local state:
1941 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1942 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1943 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1944 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1945 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1946 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1947 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1951 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1952 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1953 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1954 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1955 // do not not get into this branch.
1956 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1957 match pending_update {
1958 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1959 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1960 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1961 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1962 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1963 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1964 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1967 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1968 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1969 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1970 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1971 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1972 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1973 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1979 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1980 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1981 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1983 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1984 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1985 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1987 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1988 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1991 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1992 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1994 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1995 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1997 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1998 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2001 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2004 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2005 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2006 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2007 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2012 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2013 let release_cs_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2014 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2015 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2016 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2017 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2018 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2019 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2020 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2021 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2022 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2023 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2024 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2025 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2026 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2027 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2028 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2030 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2032 let insert_pos = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2033 .unwrap_or(self.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2034 let new_mon_id = self.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2035 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2036 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2037 self.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2038 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2040 for held_update in self.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2041 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2044 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2045 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2046 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2047 update, blocked: true,
2052 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2053 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2054 monitor_update: &self.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2055 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2059 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2063 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2064 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2065 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2066 /// before we fail backwards.
2068 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2069 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2070 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2071 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2072 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2073 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2074 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2077 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2078 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2079 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2080 /// before we fail backwards.
2082 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2083 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2084 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2085 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2086 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2087 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2088 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2090 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2092 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2093 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2094 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2096 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2097 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2098 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2100 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2101 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2102 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2104 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2109 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2110 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2116 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2117 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2118 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2119 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2120 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2124 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2125 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2126 force_holding_cell = true;
2129 // Now update local state:
2130 if force_holding_cell {
2131 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2132 match pending_update {
2133 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2134 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2135 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2136 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2140 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2141 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2142 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2143 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2149 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2150 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2151 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2157 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2159 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2160 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2163 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2164 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2165 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2170 // Message handlers:
2172 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2173 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2175 // Check sanity of message fields:
2176 if !self.is_outbound() {
2177 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2179 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2182 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2183 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2185 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2188 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2189 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2191 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2193 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2195 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2196 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2199 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2200 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2201 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2203 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2206 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2210 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2211 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2214 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2217 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2220 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2223 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2226 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2229 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2233 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2234 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2235 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2237 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2238 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2240 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2241 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2242 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2244 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2247 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2248 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2249 &Some(ref script) => {
2250 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2251 if script.len() == 0 {
2254 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2255 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2257 Some(script.clone())
2260 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2267 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2268 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2269 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2270 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2271 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2273 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2274 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2276 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2279 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2280 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2281 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2282 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2283 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2284 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2287 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2288 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2289 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2292 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2293 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2295 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2296 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2301 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2302 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2304 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2305 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2307 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2308 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2309 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2310 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2311 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2312 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2313 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2314 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2315 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2318 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2319 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2321 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2322 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2323 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2324 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2326 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2327 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2329 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2330 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2333 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2334 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2337 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2338 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2339 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2341 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2344 if self.is_outbound() {
2345 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2347 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2348 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2349 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2351 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2353 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2354 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2356 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2357 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2358 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2359 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2362 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2363 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2364 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2365 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2366 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2368 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2370 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2371 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2372 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2375 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2376 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2377 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2381 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2382 initial_commitment_tx,
2385 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2386 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2389 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2390 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2392 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2394 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2395 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2396 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2397 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2398 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2399 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2400 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2401 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2402 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2403 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2404 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2406 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2408 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2410 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2411 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2412 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2413 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2415 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2417 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2418 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2420 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2421 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2424 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2425 }, channel_monitor))
2428 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2429 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2430 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2431 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2432 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2434 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2437 if !self.is_outbound() {
2438 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2440 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2441 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2443 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2444 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2445 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2446 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2449 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2451 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2452 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2453 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2454 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2456 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2457 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2459 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2460 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2462 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2463 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2464 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2465 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2466 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2467 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2471 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2472 initial_commitment_tx,
2475 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2476 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2479 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2480 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2483 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2484 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2485 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2486 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2487 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2488 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2489 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2490 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2491 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2492 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2493 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2494 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2496 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2498 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2500 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2501 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2502 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2503 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2505 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2507 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2508 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2512 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2513 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2515 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2516 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2517 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2518 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2520 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2523 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2524 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2525 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2528 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2529 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2530 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2531 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2532 // when routing outbound payments.
2533 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2537 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2539 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2540 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2541 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2542 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2543 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2544 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2545 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2546 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2547 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2549 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2550 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2551 let expected_point =
2552 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2553 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2555 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2556 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2557 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2558 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2559 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2560 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2562 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2563 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2564 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2565 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2566 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2568 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2569 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2573 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2576 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2577 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2579 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2581 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2584 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2585 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2586 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2587 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2593 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2594 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2595 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2596 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2597 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2598 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2599 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2600 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2601 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2604 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2607 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2608 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2609 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2611 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2612 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2613 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2614 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2615 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2616 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2618 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2619 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2625 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2626 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2627 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2628 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2629 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2630 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2631 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2632 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2633 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2636 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2639 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2640 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2641 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2643 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2644 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2645 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2646 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2647 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2648 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2650 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2651 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2655 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2656 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2657 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2658 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2659 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2660 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2661 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2663 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2664 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2666 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2673 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2674 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2675 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2676 /// corner case properly.
2677 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2678 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2679 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2681 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2682 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2683 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2684 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2687 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2689 let outbound_capacity_msat = self.value_to_self_msat
2690 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2692 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2694 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2696 if self.is_outbound() {
2697 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2698 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2700 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2701 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2703 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2704 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2705 if !self.opt_anchors() {
2706 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
2709 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2710 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2711 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2712 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2714 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2715 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2716 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2717 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
2718 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2719 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2720 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2721 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2722 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2723 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2725 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2729 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2730 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2731 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2732 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2734 outbound_capacity_msat,
2735 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(available_capacity_msat as i64,
2736 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2737 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2743 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2744 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2747 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2748 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2749 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2750 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2751 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2752 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2755 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2756 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2758 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2759 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2762 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2763 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2764 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2766 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2767 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2769 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2772 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2773 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2775 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2776 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2778 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2779 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2781 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2782 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2786 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2787 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2793 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2794 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2795 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2798 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2799 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2800 included_htlcs += 1;
2803 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2804 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2808 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2809 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2810 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2811 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2812 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2813 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2818 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2820 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2821 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2826 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2827 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2831 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2832 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2833 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2836 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2837 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2839 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2840 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2841 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2843 total_pending_htlcs,
2844 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2845 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2846 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2848 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2849 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2850 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2852 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2854 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2859 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2860 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2861 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2863 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2864 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2866 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2869 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2870 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2872 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2873 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2875 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2876 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2878 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2879 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2883 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2884 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2890 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2891 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2892 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2893 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2894 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2895 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2898 included_htlcs += 1;
2901 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2902 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2905 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2906 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2908 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2909 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2910 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2915 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2916 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2917 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2920 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2921 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2923 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2924 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2926 total_pending_htlcs,
2927 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2928 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2929 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2931 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2932 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2933 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2935 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2937 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2942 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2943 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2944 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2945 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2946 if local_sent_shutdown {
2947 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2949 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2950 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2951 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2952 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2954 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2955 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2957 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2958 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2960 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2961 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2963 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2964 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2967 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2968 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2969 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2970 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2972 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2973 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2975 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2976 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2977 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2978 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2979 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2980 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2981 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2982 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2983 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2984 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2985 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2987 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2988 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2989 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2990 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2991 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2992 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2996 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2999 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3000 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
3001 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
3003 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3004 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3005 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3006 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3007 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3008 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3009 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3013 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3014 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3015 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3016 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3017 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3018 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3019 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3023 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3024 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3025 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3026 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3027 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3028 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3031 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3032 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3033 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3034 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3035 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3037 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3038 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3041 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3042 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3045 if !self.is_outbound() {
3046 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3047 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
3048 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
3049 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
3050 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
3051 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
3052 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
3053 // sensitive to fee spikes.
3054 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3055 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3056 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3057 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3058 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3059 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3060 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3063 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3064 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3065 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3066 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3067 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3070 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3071 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3073 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3074 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3077 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3078 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3079 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3083 // Now update local state:
3084 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3085 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3086 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3087 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3088 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3089 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3090 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3095 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3097 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3098 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3099 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3100 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3101 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3102 None => fail_reason.into(),
3103 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3104 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3105 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3106 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3108 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3112 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3113 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3114 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3115 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3117 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3118 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3123 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3126 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3127 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3130 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3131 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3134 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3137 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3138 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3139 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3141 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3142 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3145 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3149 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3150 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3151 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3153 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3157 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3161 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3162 where L::Target: Logger
3164 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3165 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3167 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3170 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3171 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3174 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3176 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3178 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3179 let commitment_txid = {
3180 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3181 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3182 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3184 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3185 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3186 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3187 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3188 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3193 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3195 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3196 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3197 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3198 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3201 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3202 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3203 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3207 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3209 if self.is_outbound() {
3210 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3211 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3212 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3213 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3214 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3215 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3216 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3217 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3218 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3219 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3225 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3226 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3229 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3230 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3231 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3232 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3233 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3234 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3235 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3236 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3237 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3238 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3239 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3240 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3241 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3244 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3245 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3246 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3247 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3248 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3249 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3250 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3252 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3253 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3254 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3255 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3256 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3257 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3258 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3261 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3262 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3265 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3267 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3268 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3269 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3272 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3275 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3276 commitment_stats.tx,
3278 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3279 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3280 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3283 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3284 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3286 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3287 let mut need_commitment = false;
3288 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3289 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3290 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3291 need_commitment = true;
3295 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3296 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3297 Some(forward_info.clone())
3299 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3300 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3301 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3302 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3303 need_commitment = true;
3306 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3307 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3308 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3309 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3310 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3311 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3312 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3313 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3314 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3315 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3316 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3317 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3318 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3319 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3321 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3323 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3324 need_commitment = true;
3328 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3329 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3330 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3331 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3332 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3333 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3335 nondust_htlc_sources,
3339 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3340 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3341 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3342 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3344 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3345 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3346 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3347 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3348 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3349 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3350 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3351 // includes the right HTLCs.
3352 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3353 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3354 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3355 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3356 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3357 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3359 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3360 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3361 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3364 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3365 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3366 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3367 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3368 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3369 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3370 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3371 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3372 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3376 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3377 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3378 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3379 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3382 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3383 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3384 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3385 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3386 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3387 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3388 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3389 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3392 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3393 /// for our counterparty.
3394 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3395 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3396 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3397 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3398 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3400 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3401 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3402 updates: Vec::new(),
3405 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3406 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3407 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3408 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3409 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3410 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3411 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3412 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3413 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3414 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3415 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3416 // to rebalance channels.
3417 match &htlc_update {
3418 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3419 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3420 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3423 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3424 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3425 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3426 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3427 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3428 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3429 // into the holding cell without ever being
3430 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3431 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3432 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3435 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3441 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3442 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3443 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3444 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3445 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3446 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3447 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3448 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3449 (msg, monitor_update)
3450 } else { unreachable!() };
3451 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3452 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3454 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3455 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3456 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3457 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3458 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3459 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3460 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3461 // for a full revocation before failing.
3462 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3465 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3467 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3474 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3475 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3477 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3478 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3483 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3484 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3485 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3486 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3487 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3489 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3490 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3491 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3493 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3494 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3500 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3501 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3502 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3503 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3504 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3505 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3506 where L::Target: Logger,
3508 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3509 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3511 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3512 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3514 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3515 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3518 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3520 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3521 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3522 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3526 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3527 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3528 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3529 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3530 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3531 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3532 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3533 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3534 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3537 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3539 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3540 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3543 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3544 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3546 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3548 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3549 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3550 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3551 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3552 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3553 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3554 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3555 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3559 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3560 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3561 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3562 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3563 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3564 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3565 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3566 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3568 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3569 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3572 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3573 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3574 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3575 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3576 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3577 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3578 let mut require_commitment = false;
3579 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3582 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3583 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3584 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3586 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3587 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3588 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3589 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3590 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3591 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3596 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3597 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3598 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3599 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3600 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3602 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3603 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3604 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3609 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3610 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3612 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3616 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3617 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3619 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3620 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3621 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3622 require_commitment = true;
3623 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3624 match forward_info {
3625 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3626 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3627 require_commitment = true;
3629 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3630 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3631 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3633 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3634 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3635 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3639 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3640 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3641 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3642 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3648 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3649 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3650 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3651 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3653 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3654 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3655 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3656 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3657 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3658 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3659 require_commitment = true;
3663 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3665 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3666 match update_state {
3667 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3668 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3669 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3670 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3671 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3673 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3674 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3675 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3676 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3677 require_commitment = true;
3678 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3679 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3684 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3685 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3686 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3687 if require_commitment {
3688 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3689 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3690 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3691 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3692 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3693 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3694 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3695 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3696 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3698 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3699 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3700 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3701 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3702 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3705 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3706 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3707 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3708 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3709 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3710 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3711 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3713 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3714 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3716 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3717 if require_commitment {
3718 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3720 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3721 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3722 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3723 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3725 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3726 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3727 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3728 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3730 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3731 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3732 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3738 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3739 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3740 /// commitment update.
3741 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3742 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3743 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3746 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3747 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3748 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3749 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3751 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3752 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3753 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3754 if !self.is_outbound() {
3755 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3757 if !self.is_usable() {
3758 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3760 if !self.is_live() {
3761 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3764 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3765 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3766 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3767 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3768 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3769 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3770 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3771 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3772 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3773 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3777 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3778 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3779 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3780 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3781 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3784 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3785 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3789 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3790 force_holding_cell = true;
3793 if force_holding_cell {
3794 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3798 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3799 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3801 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3802 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3807 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3808 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3810 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3812 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3813 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3814 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3815 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3819 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3820 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3821 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3825 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3826 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3829 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3830 // will be retransmitted.
3831 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3832 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3833 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3835 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3836 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3838 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3839 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3840 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3841 // this HTLC accordingly
3842 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3845 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3846 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3847 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3848 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3851 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3852 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3853 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3854 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3855 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3856 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3861 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3863 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3864 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3865 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3866 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3870 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3871 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3872 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3873 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3874 // the update upon reconnection.
3875 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3879 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3880 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3883 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3884 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3885 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3886 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3887 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3888 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3889 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3891 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3892 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3893 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3894 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3895 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3896 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3897 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3899 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3900 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3901 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3902 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3903 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3904 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3905 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3908 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3909 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3910 /// to the remote side.
3911 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3912 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3913 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3914 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3917 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3919 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3920 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3921 let mut found_blocked = false;
3922 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3923 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3924 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3928 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3929 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3930 // first received the funding_signed.
3931 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3932 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3933 self.funding_transaction.take()
3935 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3936 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3937 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3938 funding_broadcastable = None;
3941 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3942 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3943 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3944 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3945 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3946 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3947 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3948 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3949 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3950 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3951 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3952 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3953 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3954 next_per_commitment_point,
3955 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3959 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3961 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3962 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3963 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3964 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3965 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3966 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3968 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3969 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3970 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3971 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3972 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3973 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3977 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3978 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3980 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3981 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3984 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3985 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3986 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3987 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3988 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3989 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3990 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3991 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3992 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3996 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3997 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3999 if self.is_outbound() {
4000 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4002 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4003 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4005 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4006 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
4008 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4009 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4010 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
4011 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
4012 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4013 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
4014 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4015 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4016 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4017 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4018 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4019 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4020 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4022 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4023 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4024 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4030 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4031 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4032 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4033 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4034 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4035 per_commitment_secret,
4036 next_per_commitment_point,
4038 next_local_nonce: None,
4042 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
4043 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4044 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4045 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4046 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4048 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4049 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4050 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4051 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4052 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4053 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4054 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4055 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4056 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4061 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4062 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4064 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4065 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4066 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4067 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4068 reason: err_packet.clone()
4071 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4072 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4073 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4074 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4075 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4076 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4079 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4080 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4081 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4082 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4083 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4090 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4091 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4092 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4093 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4097 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4098 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4099 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4100 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4101 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4102 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4106 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4107 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4109 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4110 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4111 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4112 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4113 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4114 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4115 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4116 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4119 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4121 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4122 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4123 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4124 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4125 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4128 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4129 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4130 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
4133 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4134 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4135 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4136 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4137 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4138 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4140 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4141 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4142 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4143 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4144 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4147 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4148 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4149 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4150 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4151 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4152 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4153 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4154 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4158 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4159 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4160 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4161 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4163 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4167 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4168 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4169 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4171 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4172 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4173 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4174 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4175 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4179 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4181 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4182 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4183 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4184 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4185 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4186 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4188 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4189 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4190 channel_ready: None,
4191 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4192 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4193 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4197 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4198 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4199 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4200 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4201 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4202 next_per_commitment_point,
4203 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4205 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4206 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4207 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4211 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4212 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4213 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4215 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4216 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4217 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4220 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4223 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4226 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4227 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4228 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4229 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4230 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4232 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4233 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4234 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4235 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4236 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4237 next_per_commitment_point,
4238 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4242 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4243 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4244 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4246 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4249 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4250 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4251 raa: required_revoke,
4252 commitment_update: None,
4253 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4255 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4256 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4257 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4259 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4262 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4263 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4264 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4265 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4266 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4267 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4270 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4271 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4272 raa: required_revoke,
4273 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4274 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4278 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4282 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4283 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4284 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4285 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4287 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4289 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4291 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4292 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4293 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4294 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4295 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4296 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4298 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4299 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4300 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4301 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4302 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4304 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4305 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4306 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4307 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4310 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4311 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4312 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4313 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4314 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4315 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4316 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4317 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4318 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4319 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4320 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4321 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4322 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4323 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4324 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4326 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4329 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4330 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4333 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4334 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4335 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4336 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4337 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4338 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4339 self.channel_state &
4340 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4341 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4342 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4343 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4346 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4347 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4348 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4349 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4350 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4351 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4352 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4354 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4360 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4361 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4362 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4363 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4365 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4366 return Ok((None, None));
4369 if !self.is_outbound() {
4370 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4371 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4373 return Ok((None, None));
4376 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4378 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4379 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4380 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4381 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4383 let sig = self.holder_signer
4384 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4385 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4387 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4388 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4389 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4390 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4392 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4393 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4394 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4399 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4400 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4401 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4402 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4404 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4405 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4407 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4408 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4409 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4410 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4413 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4414 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4415 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4418 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4420 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4421 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4424 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4425 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4426 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4429 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4432 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4433 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4434 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4435 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4437 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4440 assert!(send_shutdown);
4441 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4442 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4443 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4445 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4446 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4448 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4453 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4455 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4456 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4458 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4459 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4460 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4461 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4462 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4463 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4466 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4467 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4468 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4471 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4472 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4473 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4474 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4478 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4479 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4480 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4481 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4482 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4483 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4485 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4486 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4493 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4494 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4496 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4499 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4500 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4502 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4504 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4505 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4506 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4507 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4508 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4509 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4510 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4511 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4512 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4514 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4515 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4518 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4522 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4523 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4524 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4525 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4527 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4528 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4530 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4531 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4533 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4534 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4536 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4537 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4540 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4541 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4544 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4545 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4546 return Ok((None, None));
4549 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4550 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4551 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4552 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4554 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4556 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4559 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4560 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4561 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4562 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4563 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4567 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4568 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4569 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4573 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4574 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4575 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4576 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4577 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4578 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4579 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4583 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4585 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4586 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4587 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4588 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4590 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4593 let sig = self.holder_signer
4594 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4595 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4597 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4598 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4599 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4600 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4604 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4605 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4606 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4607 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4609 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4610 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4611 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4617 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4618 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4619 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4621 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4622 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4624 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4625 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4628 if !self.is_outbound() {
4629 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4630 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4631 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4632 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4634 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4635 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4636 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4638 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4639 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4642 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4643 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4644 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4645 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4646 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4647 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4648 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4649 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4651 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4654 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4655 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4656 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4657 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4659 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4663 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4664 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4665 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4666 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4668 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4674 // Public utilities:
4676 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4680 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4682 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4683 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4684 self.temporary_channel_id
4687 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4691 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4692 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4693 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4697 /// Gets the channel's type
4698 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4702 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4703 /// is_usable() returns true).
4704 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4705 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4706 self.short_channel_id
4709 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4710 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4711 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4714 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4715 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4716 self.outbound_scid_alias
4718 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4719 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4720 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4721 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4722 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4725 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4726 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4727 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4728 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4731 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4732 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4733 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4736 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4737 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4738 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4739 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4743 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4746 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4747 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4750 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4751 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4754 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4755 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4756 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4759 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4760 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4763 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4764 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4765 self.counterparty_node_id
4768 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4769 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4770 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4773 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4774 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4775 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4778 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4779 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4781 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4782 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4783 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4784 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4786 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4790 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4791 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4792 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4795 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4796 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4797 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4800 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4801 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4802 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4804 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4805 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4810 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4811 self.channel_value_satoshis
4814 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4815 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4818 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4819 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4822 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4823 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4826 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4827 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4828 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4831 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4832 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4833 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4836 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4837 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4838 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4841 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4842 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4843 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4846 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4847 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4848 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4851 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4852 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4853 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4856 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4857 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4858 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4859 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4860 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4863 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4865 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4866 self.prev_config = None;
4870 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4871 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4875 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4876 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4877 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4878 let did_channel_update =
4879 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4880 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4881 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4882 if did_channel_update {
4883 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4884 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4885 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4886 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4888 self.config.options = *config;
4892 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4893 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4894 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4895 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4896 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4897 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4898 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4900 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4901 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4904 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4906 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4907 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4913 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4914 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4915 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4916 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4917 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4918 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4919 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4921 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4922 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4929 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4933 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4934 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4935 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4936 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4937 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4938 // which are near the dust limit.
4939 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4940 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4941 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4942 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4943 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4945 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4946 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4948 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4951 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4952 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4955 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4956 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4959 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4960 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4964 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4969 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4971 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4972 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4973 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4974 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4975 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4976 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4978 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4980 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4988 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4989 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4993 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4994 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4995 self.update_time_counter
4998 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4999 self.latest_monitor_update_id
5002 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
5003 self.config.announced_channel
5006 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
5007 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
5010 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
5011 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5012 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
5013 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
5016 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
5017 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
5018 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
5021 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
5022 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5023 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
5024 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
5025 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
5028 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
5029 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
5030 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5031 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
5032 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
5035 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5036 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5037 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5038 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
5041 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5042 if self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5043 self.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5046 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5047 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5048 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5049 for i in 0..self.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
5050 if self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
5051 self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
5052 return Some((&self.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
5053 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5059 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5060 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5061 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5062 let release_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5063 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5064 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5069 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5070 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5072 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5073 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5074 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5075 if release_monitor { self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5078 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5079 self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5082 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5083 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5086 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
5087 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
5088 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
5091 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5092 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5093 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5095 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5096 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5097 if self.channel_state &
5098 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5099 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5100 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5101 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5102 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5105 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5106 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5107 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5108 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5109 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5110 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5112 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5113 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5114 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5116 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5117 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5118 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5119 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5120 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5121 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5127 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5128 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5129 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5132 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5133 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5134 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5137 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5138 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5139 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5142 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5143 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5144 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5145 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5146 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5147 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5152 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5153 self.channel_update_status
5156 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5157 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5158 self.channel_update_status = status;
5161 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5163 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5164 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5165 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5169 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5170 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5171 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5174 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5178 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5179 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5180 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5182 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5183 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5184 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5186 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5187 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5190 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5191 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5192 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5193 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5194 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5195 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5196 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5197 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5198 self.channel_state);
5200 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5204 if need_commitment_update {
5205 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5206 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5207 let next_per_commitment_point =
5208 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5209 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5210 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5211 next_per_commitment_point,
5212 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5216 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5222 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5223 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5224 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5225 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5226 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5227 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5228 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5230 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5233 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5234 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5235 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5236 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5237 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5238 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5239 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5240 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5241 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5242 if self.is_outbound() {
5243 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5244 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5245 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5246 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5247 // channel and move on.
5248 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5249 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5251 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5252 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5253 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5255 if self.is_outbound() {
5256 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5257 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5258 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5259 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5260 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5261 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5265 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5266 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5267 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5268 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5269 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5273 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5274 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5275 // may have already happened for this block).
5276 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5277 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5278 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5279 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5282 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5283 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5284 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5285 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5293 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5294 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5295 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5296 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5298 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5299 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5302 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5304 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5305 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5306 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5307 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5309 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5312 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5315 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5316 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5317 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5318 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5320 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5323 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5324 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5325 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5327 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5328 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5330 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5331 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5332 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5340 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5342 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5343 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5344 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5346 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5347 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5350 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5351 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5352 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5353 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5354 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5355 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5356 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5357 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5358 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5361 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5362 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5363 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5364 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5366 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5367 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5368 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5370 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5371 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5372 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5373 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5375 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5376 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5377 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5378 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5379 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5380 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5381 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5384 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5385 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5387 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5390 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5391 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5392 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5393 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5394 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5395 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5396 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5397 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5398 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5399 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5400 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5401 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5402 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5403 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5404 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5405 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5406 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5412 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5417 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5418 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5420 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5421 if !self.is_outbound() {
5422 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5424 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5425 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5428 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5429 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5432 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5433 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5437 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5438 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5439 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5440 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5441 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5442 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5443 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5444 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5445 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5446 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5447 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5448 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5449 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5450 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5451 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5452 first_per_commitment_point,
5453 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5454 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5455 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5456 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5458 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5462 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5463 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5466 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5467 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5468 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5469 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5472 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5473 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5475 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5476 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5477 if self.is_outbound() {
5478 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5480 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5481 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5483 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5484 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5486 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5487 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5490 self.user_id = user_id;
5491 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5493 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5496 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5497 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5498 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5500 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5501 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5502 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5503 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5505 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5506 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5507 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5508 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5509 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5510 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5511 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5512 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5513 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5514 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5515 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5516 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5517 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5518 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5519 first_per_commitment_point,
5520 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5521 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5522 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5524 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5526 next_local_nonce: None,
5530 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5531 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5533 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5535 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5536 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5539 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5540 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5541 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5542 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5543 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5544 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5547 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5548 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5549 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5550 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5551 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5552 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5553 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5554 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5555 if !self.is_outbound() {
5556 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5558 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5559 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5561 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5562 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5563 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5564 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5567 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5568 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5570 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5573 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5574 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5579 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5581 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5583 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5584 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5585 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5587 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5588 temporary_channel_id,
5589 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5590 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5593 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5595 next_local_nonce: None,
5599 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5600 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5601 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5602 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5604 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5607 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5608 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5609 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5610 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5611 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5612 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5614 if !self.is_usable() {
5615 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5618 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5619 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5620 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5621 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5623 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5624 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5626 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5627 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5628 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5629 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5630 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5631 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5637 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5638 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5639 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5640 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5642 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5645 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5649 if !self.is_usable() {
5653 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5654 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5658 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5662 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5663 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5666 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5670 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5672 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5677 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5679 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5684 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5686 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5687 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5688 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5689 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5690 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5694 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5696 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5697 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5698 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5699 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5700 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5701 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5702 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5704 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5705 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5706 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5707 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5708 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5709 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5710 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5711 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5712 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5713 contents: announcement,
5716 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5720 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5721 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5722 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5723 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5724 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5725 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5726 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5727 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5729 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5731 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5732 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5733 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5734 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5736 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5737 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5738 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5739 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5742 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5743 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5744 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5745 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5748 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5751 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5752 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5753 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5754 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5755 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5756 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5759 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5761 Err(_) => return None,
5763 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5764 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5769 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5770 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5771 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5772 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5773 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5774 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5775 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5776 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5777 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5778 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5779 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5780 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5781 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5782 let remote_last_secret = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5783 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5784 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5787 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5790 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5791 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5792 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5793 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5794 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5795 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5796 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5797 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5799 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5800 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5801 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5802 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5803 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5804 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5805 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5806 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5807 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5809 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5810 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5811 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5812 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5813 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5814 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5815 next_funding_txid: None,
5820 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5822 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5823 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5824 /// commitment update.
5826 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5827 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5828 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5829 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5831 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5832 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5834 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5835 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5840 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5841 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5843 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5845 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5846 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5848 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5849 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5850 /// regenerate them.
5852 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5853 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5855 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5856 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5857 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5858 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5859 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5860 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5862 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5863 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5864 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5867 if amount_msat == 0 {
5868 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5871 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5872 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5875 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5876 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5877 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5878 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5879 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5880 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5881 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5882 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5885 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5886 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5887 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5888 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5890 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5891 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5892 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5895 if !self.is_outbound() {
5896 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5897 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5898 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5899 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5900 let remote_balance_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat).saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
5901 if remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5902 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5906 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5909 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5910 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5911 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5913 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5914 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5915 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5916 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5917 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5918 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5922 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5923 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5924 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5925 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5926 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5927 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5931 let holder_balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat
5932 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
5933 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5934 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5935 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5938 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5939 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5940 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5941 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5943 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5944 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5945 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5948 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5949 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5950 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5951 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5952 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5953 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5956 let need_holding_cell = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5957 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5958 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5959 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5960 else { "to peer" });
5962 if need_holding_cell {
5963 force_holding_cell = true;
5966 // Now update local state:
5967 if force_holding_cell {
5968 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5973 onion_routing_packet,
5978 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5979 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5981 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5983 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5987 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5988 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5989 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5993 onion_routing_packet,
5995 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6000 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6001 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6002 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6003 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6005 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6006 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6007 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6009 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6010 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6014 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6015 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6016 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6017 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6018 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6019 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6020 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6023 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6024 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6025 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
6026 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6027 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6028 self.pending_update_fee = None;
6031 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6033 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6034 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6035 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6037 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6038 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6041 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6042 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6043 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6044 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6045 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6046 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6047 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6048 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
6051 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
6055 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
6056 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6057 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6058 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6060 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6062 if !self.is_outbound() {
6063 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6064 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6065 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6066 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6067 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6068 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
6069 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6070 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
6071 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
6072 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6078 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
6081 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6082 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6083 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6084 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6085 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6086 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6088 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6089 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6090 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6091 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6094 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6095 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6099 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
6100 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6102 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6104 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6105 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6106 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6107 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6109 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6110 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6111 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6112 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6113 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6114 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6118 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6119 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6123 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6124 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6127 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6128 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6130 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6131 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6132 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6133 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6134 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6137 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6138 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6139 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6145 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6146 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6147 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6150 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6151 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6154 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6155 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6156 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6157 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6163 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6164 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6166 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6167 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6168 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6169 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6170 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6171 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6172 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6173 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6174 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6177 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6178 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6179 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6181 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6182 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6185 if self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6186 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6188 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6189 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6190 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6193 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6194 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6195 let mut chan_closed = false;
6196 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6200 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6202 None if !chan_closed => {
6203 // use override shutdown script if provided
6204 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6205 Some(script) => script,
6207 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6208 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6209 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6210 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6214 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6215 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6217 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6223 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6224 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6225 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6226 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6228 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6230 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6232 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6233 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6234 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6235 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6236 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6237 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6240 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6241 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6242 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6245 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6246 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6247 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6250 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6251 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6252 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6253 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6254 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6256 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6257 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6264 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6265 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6267 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6270 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6271 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6272 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6273 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6274 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6275 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6276 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6277 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6278 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6279 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6280 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6282 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6283 // return them to fail the payment.
6284 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6285 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6286 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6288 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6289 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6294 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6295 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6296 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6297 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6298 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6299 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6300 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6301 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6302 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6303 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6304 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6305 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6306 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6311 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6312 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6313 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6316 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6317 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6318 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6320 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6321 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6325 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6329 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6330 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6332 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6338 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6339 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6340 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6341 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6342 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6344 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6345 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6346 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6347 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6353 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6354 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6355 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6356 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6357 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6358 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6363 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6364 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6365 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6366 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6368 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6369 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6370 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6371 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6376 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6377 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6378 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6379 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6380 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6381 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6386 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6387 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6388 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6391 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6393 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6394 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6395 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6396 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6397 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6399 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6400 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6401 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6402 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6404 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6405 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6406 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6408 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6410 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6411 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6412 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6413 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6414 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6415 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6417 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6418 // deserialized from that format.
6419 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6420 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6421 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6423 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6425 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6426 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6427 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6429 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6430 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6431 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6432 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6435 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6436 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6437 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6440 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6441 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6442 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6443 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6445 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6446 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6448 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6450 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6452 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6454 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6457 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6459 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6464 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6466 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6467 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6468 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6469 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6470 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6471 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6472 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6474 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6476 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6478 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6481 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6482 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6483 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6486 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6488 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6489 preimages.push(preimage);
6491 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6492 reason.write(writer)?;
6494 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6496 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6497 preimages.push(preimage);
6499 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6500 reason.write(writer)?;
6505 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6506 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6508 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6510 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6511 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6512 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6513 source.write(writer)?;
6514 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6516 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6518 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6519 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6521 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6523 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6524 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6529 match self.resend_order {
6530 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6531 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6534 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6535 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6536 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6538 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6539 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6540 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6541 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6544 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6545 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6546 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6547 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6548 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6551 if self.is_outbound() {
6552 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6553 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6554 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6556 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6557 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6558 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6560 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6562 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6563 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6564 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6565 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6567 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6568 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6569 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6570 // consider the stale state on reload.
6573 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6574 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6575 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6577 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6578 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6579 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6581 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6582 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6584 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6585 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6586 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6588 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6589 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6591 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6594 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6595 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6596 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6598 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6601 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6602 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6604 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6605 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6606 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6608 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6610 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6612 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6614 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6615 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6616 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6617 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6618 htlc.write(writer)?;
6621 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6622 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6623 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6625 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6626 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6628 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6629 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6630 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6631 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6632 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6633 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6634 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6636 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6637 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6638 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6639 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6640 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6642 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6643 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6645 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6646 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6647 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6648 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6650 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6652 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6653 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6654 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6655 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6656 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6657 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6658 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6660 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6661 (2, chan_type, option),
6662 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6663 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6664 (5, self.config, required),
6665 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6666 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6667 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6668 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6669 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6670 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6671 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6672 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6673 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6674 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6675 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6676 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6677 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6678 (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6679 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6680 (33, self.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6687 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6688 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6690 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6691 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6693 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6694 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6695 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6697 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6698 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6699 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6700 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6702 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6704 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6705 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6706 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6707 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6708 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6710 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6711 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6714 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6715 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6716 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6718 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6720 let mut keys_data = None;
6722 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6723 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6724 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6725 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6726 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6727 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6728 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6729 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6730 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6731 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6735 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6736 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6737 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6740 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6742 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6743 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6744 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6746 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6748 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6749 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6750 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6751 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6752 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6753 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6754 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6755 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6756 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6757 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6758 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6759 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6760 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6765 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6766 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6767 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6768 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6769 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6770 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6771 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6772 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6773 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6774 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6775 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6776 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6778 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6779 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6782 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6783 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6786 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6787 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6789 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6794 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6795 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6796 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6797 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6798 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6799 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6800 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6801 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6802 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6803 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6805 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6806 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6807 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6809 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6810 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6811 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6813 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6817 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6818 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6819 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6820 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6823 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6824 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6825 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6827 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6828 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6829 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6830 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6833 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6834 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6835 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6836 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6839 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6841 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6843 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6844 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6845 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6846 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6848 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6849 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6850 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6851 // consider the stale state on reload.
6852 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6855 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6856 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6857 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6859 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6862 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6863 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6864 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6866 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6867 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6868 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6869 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6871 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6872 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6874 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6875 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6877 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6878 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6879 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6881 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6883 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6884 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6886 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6887 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6890 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6892 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6893 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6894 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6895 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6897 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6900 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6901 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6903 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6905 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6906 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6908 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6909 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6911 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6913 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6914 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6915 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6917 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6918 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6919 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6923 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6924 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6925 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6927 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6933 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6934 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6935 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6936 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6937 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6938 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6939 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6940 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6941 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6942 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6944 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6945 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6946 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6947 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6948 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6949 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
6950 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6952 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6953 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6954 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6955 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
6957 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
6959 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6960 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6961 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6962 (2, channel_type, option),
6963 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6964 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6965 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6966 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6967 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6968 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6969 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6970 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6971 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6972 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6973 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6974 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6975 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6976 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6977 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6978 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6979 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
6980 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6981 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6984 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6985 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6986 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6987 // required channel parameters.
6988 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6989 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6990 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6992 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6994 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6995 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6996 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6997 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7000 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7001 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7002 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7004 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7005 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7007 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7008 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7013 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7014 if iter.next().is_some() {
7015 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7019 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7020 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7021 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7022 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7023 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7026 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7027 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7029 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7030 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7031 // separate u64 values.
7032 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7034 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7039 config: config.unwrap(),
7043 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7044 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7045 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7048 temporary_channel_id,
7050 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7052 channel_value_satoshis,
7054 latest_monitor_update_id,
7057 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7060 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7061 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7064 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7065 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7066 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7067 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7071 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7072 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7073 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7074 monitor_pending_forwards,
7075 monitor_pending_failures,
7076 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7079 holding_cell_update_fee,
7080 next_holder_htlc_id,
7081 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7082 update_time_counter,
7085 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7086 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7087 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7088 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7090 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7091 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7092 closing_fee_limits: None,
7093 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7095 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7097 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7098 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7100 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7102 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7103 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7104 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7105 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7106 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7107 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7108 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7109 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7110 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7113 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7115 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7116 funding_transaction,
7118 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7119 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7120 counterparty_node_id,
7122 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7126 channel_update_status,
7127 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7131 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7132 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7133 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7134 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7136 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7138 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7139 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7140 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7142 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7143 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7145 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7146 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7148 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7151 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7159 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7160 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7161 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7162 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7163 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7165 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7166 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7168 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7169 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7170 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7171 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7172 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7173 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7174 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7175 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7176 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7177 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7178 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7179 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7180 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7181 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7182 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7183 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7184 use crate::util::test_utils;
7185 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7186 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7187 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7188 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7189 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7190 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7191 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7192 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7193 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7194 use crate::prelude::*;
7196 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7199 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7200 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7206 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7207 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7208 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7209 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7213 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7214 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7215 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7216 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7217 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7218 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7219 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7223 signer: InMemorySigner,
7226 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7227 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7230 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7231 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7233 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7234 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7237 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7241 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7243 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7244 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7245 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7246 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7247 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7250 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7251 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7252 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7253 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7257 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7258 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7259 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7263 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7264 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7265 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7266 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7268 let seed = [42; 32];
7269 let network = Network::Testnet;
7270 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7271 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7272 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7275 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7276 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7277 let config = UserConfig::default();
7278 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7279 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7280 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7282 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7283 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7287 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7288 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7290 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7291 let original_fee = 253;
7292 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7293 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7294 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7295 let seed = [42; 32];
7296 let network = Network::Testnet;
7297 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7299 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7300 let config = UserConfig::default();
7301 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7303 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7304 // same as the old fee.
7305 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7306 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7307 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7311 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7312 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7313 // dust limits are used.
7314 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7315 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7316 let seed = [42; 32];
7317 let network = Network::Testnet;
7318 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7319 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7321 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7322 // they have different dust limits.
7324 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7325 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7326 let config = UserConfig::default();
7327 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7329 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7330 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7331 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7332 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7333 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7335 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7336 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7337 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7338 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7339 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7341 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7342 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7343 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7345 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7346 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7347 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7348 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7351 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7353 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7354 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7355 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7356 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7357 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7358 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7359 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7360 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7361 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7365 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7366 // the dust limit check.
7367 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7368 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7369 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7370 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7372 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7373 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7374 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7375 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7376 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7377 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7378 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7382 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7383 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7384 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7385 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7386 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7387 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7388 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7389 let seed = [42; 32];
7390 let network = Network::Testnet;
7391 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7393 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7394 let config = UserConfig::default();
7395 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7397 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7398 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7400 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7401 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7402 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7403 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7404 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7405 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7407 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7408 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7409 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7410 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7411 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7413 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7415 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7416 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7417 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7418 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7419 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7421 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7422 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7423 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7424 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7425 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7429 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7430 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7431 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7432 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7433 let seed = [42; 32];
7434 let network = Network::Testnet;
7435 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7436 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7437 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7439 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7441 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7442 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7443 let config = UserConfig::default();
7444 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7446 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7447 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7448 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7449 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7451 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7452 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7453 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7455 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7456 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7457 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7458 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7460 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7461 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7462 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7464 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7465 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7467 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7468 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7469 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7470 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7471 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7472 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7473 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7475 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7477 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7478 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7479 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7480 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7481 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7485 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7486 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7487 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7488 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7489 let seed = [42; 32];
7490 let network = Network::Testnet;
7491 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7492 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7493 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7495 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7496 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7497 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7498 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7499 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7500 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7501 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7502 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7504 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7505 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7506 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7507 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7508 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7509 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7511 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7512 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7513 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7514 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7516 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7518 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7519 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7520 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7521 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7522 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7523 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7525 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7526 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7527 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7528 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7530 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7531 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7532 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7533 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7534 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7536 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7537 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7539 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7540 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7541 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7543 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7544 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7545 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7546 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7547 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7549 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7550 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7552 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7553 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7554 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7558 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7560 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7561 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7562 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7564 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7565 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7566 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7567 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7569 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7570 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7571 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7573 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7575 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7576 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7579 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7580 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7581 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7582 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7583 let seed = [42; 32];
7584 let network = Network::Testnet;
7585 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7586 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7587 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7590 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7591 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7592 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7594 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7595 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7597 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7598 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7599 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7601 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7602 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7604 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7606 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7607 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7609 // Channel Negotiations failed
7610 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7611 assert!(result.is_err());
7616 fn channel_update() {
7617 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7618 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7619 let seed = [42; 32];
7620 let network = Network::Testnet;
7621 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7622 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7624 // Create a channel.
7625 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7626 let config = UserConfig::default();
7627 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7628 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7629 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7630 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7632 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7633 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7634 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7636 short_channel_id: 0,
7639 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7640 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7641 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7643 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7644 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7646 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7648 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7650 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7651 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7652 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7653 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7655 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7656 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7657 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7659 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7663 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7665 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7666 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7667 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7668 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7669 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7670 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7671 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7672 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7673 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7674 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7675 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7676 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7677 use crate::sync::Arc;
7679 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7680 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7681 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7682 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7684 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7686 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7687 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7688 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7689 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7690 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7692 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7693 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7699 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7700 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7701 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7703 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7704 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7705 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7706 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7707 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7708 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7710 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7712 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7713 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7714 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7715 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7716 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7717 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7719 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7720 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7721 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7722 selected_contest_delay: 144
7724 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7725 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7727 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7728 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7730 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7731 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7733 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7734 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7736 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7737 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7738 // build_commitment_transaction.
7739 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7740 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7741 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7742 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7743 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7745 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7746 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7747 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7748 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7752 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7753 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7754 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7755 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7759 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7760 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7761 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7763 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7764 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7766 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7767 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7769 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7771 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7772 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7773 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7774 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7775 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7776 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7777 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7779 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7780 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7781 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7782 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7784 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7785 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7786 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7788 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7790 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7791 commitment_tx.clone(),
7792 counterparty_signature,
7793 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7794 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7795 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7797 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7798 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7800 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7801 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7802 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7804 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7805 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7808 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7809 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7811 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7812 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7813 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7814 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7815 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7816 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7817 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7818 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7820 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7823 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7824 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7825 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7829 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7832 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7833 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7834 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7836 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7837 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7838 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7839 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7840 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7841 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7842 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7843 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7845 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7849 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7850 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7851 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7852 "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", {});
7854 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7855 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7857 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7858 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7859 "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", {});
7861 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7862 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7863 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7864 "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", {});
7866 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7867 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7869 amount_msat: 1000000,
7871 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7872 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7874 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7877 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7878 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7880 amount_msat: 2000000,
7882 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7883 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7885 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7888 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7889 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7891 amount_msat: 2000000,
7893 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7894 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7895 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7897 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7900 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7901 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7903 amount_msat: 3000000,
7905 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7906 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7907 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7909 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7912 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7913 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7915 amount_msat: 4000000,
7917 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7918 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7920 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7924 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7925 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7926 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7928 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7929 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7930 "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", {
7933 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7934 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7935 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b00000000000000000001e8030000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b014730440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
7938 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7939 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7940 "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" },
7943 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7944 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7945 "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" },
7948 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7949 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7950 "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" },
7953 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7954 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7955 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7958 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7959 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7960 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7962 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7963 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7964 "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", {
7967 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7968 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7969 "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" },
7972 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7973 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7974 "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" },
7977 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7978 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7979 "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" },
7982 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7983 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7984 "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" },
7987 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7988 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7989 "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" }
7992 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7993 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7994 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7996 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7997 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7998 "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", {
8001 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8002 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8003 "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" },
8006 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8007 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8008 "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" },
8011 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8012 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8013 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8016 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8017 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8018 "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" }
8021 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8022 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8023 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8024 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8026 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8027 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8028 "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", {
8031 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8032 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8033 "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" },
8036 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8037 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8038 "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" },
8041 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8042 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8043 "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" },
8046 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8047 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8048 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320005000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc61583483045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8051 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8052 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8053 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8054 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8056 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8057 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8058 "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", {
8061 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8062 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8063 "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" },
8066 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8067 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8068 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8071 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8072 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8073 "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" },
8076 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8077 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8078 "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" }
8081 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8082 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8083 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8085 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8086 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8087 "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", {
8090 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8091 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8092 "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" },
8095 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8096 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8097 "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" },
8100 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8101 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8102 "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" }
8105 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8106 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8107 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8109 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8110 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8111 "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", {
8114 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8115 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8116 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de84500148304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e015430101008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8119 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8120 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8121 "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" },
8124 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8125 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8126 "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" }
8129 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8130 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8131 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8133 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8134 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8135 "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", {
8138 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8139 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8140 "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" },
8143 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8144 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8145 "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" }
8148 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8149 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8150 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8151 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8153 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8154 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8155 "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", {
8158 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8159 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8160 "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" },
8163 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8164 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8165 "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" }
8168 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8169 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8170 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8171 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8173 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8174 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8175 "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", {
8178 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8179 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8180 "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" },
8183 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8184 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8185 "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" }
8188 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8189 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8190 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8192 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8193 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8194 "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", {
8197 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8198 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8199 "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" }
8202 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8203 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8204 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8205 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8207 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8208 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8209 "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", {
8212 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8213 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8214 "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" }
8217 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8218 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8219 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8220 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8222 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8223 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8224 "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", {
8227 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8228 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8229 "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" }
8232 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8233 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8234 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8235 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8237 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8238 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8239 "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", {});
8241 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8242 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8243 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8244 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8246 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8247 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8248 "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", {});
8250 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8251 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8252 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8253 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8255 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8256 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8257 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8259 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8260 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8261 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8263 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8264 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8265 "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", {});
8267 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8268 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8269 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8270 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8272 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8273 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8274 "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", {});
8276 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8277 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8278 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8279 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8281 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8282 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8283 "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", {});
8285 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8286 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8287 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8288 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8289 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8290 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8292 amount_msat: 2000000,
8294 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8295 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8297 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8300 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8301 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8302 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8304 amount_msat: 5000001,
8306 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8307 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8308 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8310 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8313 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8314 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8316 amount_msat: 5000000,
8318 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8319 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8320 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8322 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8326 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8327 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8328 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a69f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c0147304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8331 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8332 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8333 "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" },
8335 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8336 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8337 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec01000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a01483045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
8339 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8340 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8341 "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" }
8344 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8345 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8346 "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", {
8349 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8350 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8351 "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" },
8353 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8354 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8355 "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" },
8357 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8358 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8359 "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" }
8364 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8365 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8367 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8368 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8369 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8370 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8372 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8373 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8374 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8376 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8377 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8379 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8380 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8382 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8383 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8384 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8388 fn test_key_derivation() {
8389 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8390 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8392 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8393 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8395 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8396 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8398 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8399 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8401 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8402 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8404 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8405 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8407 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8408 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8410 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8411 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8415 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8416 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8417 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8418 let seed = [42; 32];
8419 let network = Network::Testnet;
8420 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8421 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8423 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8424 let config = UserConfig::default();
8425 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8426 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8428 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8429 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8431 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8432 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8433 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8434 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8435 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8436 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8437 assert!(res.is_ok());
8442 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8443 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8444 // resulting `channel_type`.
8445 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8446 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8447 let network = Network::Testnet;
8448 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8449 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8451 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8452 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8454 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8455 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8457 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8458 // need to signal it.
8459 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8460 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8461 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8464 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8466 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8467 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8468 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8470 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8471 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8472 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8475 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8476 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8477 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8478 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8479 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8482 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8483 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8488 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8489 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8490 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8491 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8492 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8493 let network = Network::Testnet;
8494 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8495 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8497 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8498 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8500 let config = UserConfig::default();
8502 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8503 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8504 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8505 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8506 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8508 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8509 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8510 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8513 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8514 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8515 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8517 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8518 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8519 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8520 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8521 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8522 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8524 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8529 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8530 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8532 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8533 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8534 let network = Network::Testnet;
8535 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8536 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8538 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8539 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8541 let config = UserConfig::default();
8543 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8544 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8545 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8546 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8547 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8548 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8549 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8550 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8552 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8553 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8554 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8555 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8556 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8557 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8560 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8561 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8563 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8564 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8565 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8566 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8568 assert!(res.is_err());
8570 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8571 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8572 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8574 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8575 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8576 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8579 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8581 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8582 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8583 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8584 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8587 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8588 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8590 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8591 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8593 assert!(res.is_err());