1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
15 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
16 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
26 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
28 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
32 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
33 use crate::ln::channel_state::{ChannelShutdownState, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
34 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
35 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
36 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
37 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
38 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
43 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
44 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
45 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
46 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
47 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
48 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
49 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
50 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
53 use crate::prelude::*;
54 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
56 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
57 use crate::sync::Mutex;
58 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
60 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
63 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
64 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
66 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
70 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
71 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
74 pub struct AvailableBalances {
75 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
76 pub balance_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
78 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
80 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
81 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
83 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
84 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
87 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
89 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
91 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
92 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
93 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
94 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
95 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
96 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
98 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
102 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
103 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
104 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
105 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
108 /// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC.
110 enum InboundHTLCResolution {
111 /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined,
112 /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded.
114 // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up
115 // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable.
117 pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
119 /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed
120 /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both
121 /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed.
123 update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC,
127 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution,
129 (0, pending_htlc_status, required),
132 (0, update_add_htlc, required),
136 enum InboundHTLCState {
137 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
138 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
139 RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution),
140 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
141 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
142 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
143 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
144 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
145 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
146 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
147 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
148 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
149 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
150 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
151 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
153 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
154 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
155 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
156 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
157 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
158 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
159 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
160 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
161 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
162 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
163 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
164 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
165 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
166 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
168 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
169 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution),
170 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
171 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
172 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
173 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
174 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
175 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution),
177 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
178 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
180 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
181 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
182 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
183 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
184 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
185 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
186 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
187 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
190 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
191 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
193 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
194 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
195 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
196 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
197 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
198 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
199 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
200 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
201 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
202 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
203 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
204 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
205 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
210 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
214 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
215 state: InboundHTLCState,
218 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
219 enum OutboundHTLCState {
220 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
221 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
222 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
223 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
224 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
225 /// money back (though we won't), and,
226 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
227 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
228 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
229 /// we'll never get out of sync).
230 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
231 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
232 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
234 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
235 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
236 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
237 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
238 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
239 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
240 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
241 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
242 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
243 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
244 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
245 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
246 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
247 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
248 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
251 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
252 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
254 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
255 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
256 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
257 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
258 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
260 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
261 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
262 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
263 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
264 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
265 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
266 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
267 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
268 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
269 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
275 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
276 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
277 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
278 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
279 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
282 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
283 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
285 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
286 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
291 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
292 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
294 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
295 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
300 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
301 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
305 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
306 state: OutboundHTLCState,
308 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
309 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
312 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
313 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
314 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
315 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
319 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
321 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
322 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
323 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
324 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
327 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
332 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
337 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
341 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
342 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
343 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
344 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
345 struct $flag_type(u32);
350 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
353 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
355 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
358 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
361 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
362 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
365 Ok($flag_type(flags))
370 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
372 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
374 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
376 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
380 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
383 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
385 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
387 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
388 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
390 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
392 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
394 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
395 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
398 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
399 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
401 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
404 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
406 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
408 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
411 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
412 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
414 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
415 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
416 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
417 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
418 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
419 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
420 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
421 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
423 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
425 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
427 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
428 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
430 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
432 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
434 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
435 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
437 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
438 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
440 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
441 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
446 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
449 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
450 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
451 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
452 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
453 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
454 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
455 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
456 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
457 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
458 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
459 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
460 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
461 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
462 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
466 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
468 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
469 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
470 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
471 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
472 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
473 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
474 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
475 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
476 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
477 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
478 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
479 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
480 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
481 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
486 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
487 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
488 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
489 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
490 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
491 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
496 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
497 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
498 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
499 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
500 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
501 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
502 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
503 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
504 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
505 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
506 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
507 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
508 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
509 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
514 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
515 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
516 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
517 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
518 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
519 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
520 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
521 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
525 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
526 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
527 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
529 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
530 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
531 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
532 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
533 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
535 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
536 /// funding transaction to confirm.
537 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
538 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
540 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
541 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
542 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
546 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
547 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
549 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
552 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
561 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
563 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
567 fn $clear(&mut self) {
570 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
572 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
576 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
577 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
579 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
580 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
585 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
587 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
588 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
590 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
591 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
592 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
593 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
594 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
595 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
596 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
597 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
605 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
607 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
608 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
609 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
610 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
611 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
615 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
616 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
619 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
620 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
623 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
625 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
626 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
627 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
631 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
633 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
634 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
635 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
636 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
638 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
644 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
645 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
646 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
647 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
648 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
649 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
650 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
651 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
654 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
656 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
658 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
659 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
660 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
661 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
665 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
667 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
669 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
671 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
672 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
673 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
674 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
675 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
677 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
678 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
680 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
682 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
683 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
685 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
686 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
687 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
688 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
689 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
690 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
692 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
693 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
695 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
696 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
697 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
698 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
699 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
701 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
702 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
704 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
705 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
707 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
708 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
709 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
710 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
713 Close((String, ClosureReason)),
716 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
717 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
719 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
720 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
721 &ChannelError::Close((ref e, _)) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
726 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
727 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
729 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
730 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
731 &ChannelError::Close((ref e, _)) => write!(f, "{}", e),
737 pub(super) fn close(err: String) -> Self {
738 ChannelError::Close((err.clone(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err }))
742 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
744 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
745 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
746 pub payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
749 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
750 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
751 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
752 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
753 record.payment_hash = self.payment_hash;
754 self.logger.log(record)
758 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
759 where L::Target: Logger {
760 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>, payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>) -> Self
761 where S::Target: SignerProvider
765 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
766 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
772 macro_rules! secp_check {
773 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
776 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close($err)),
781 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
782 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
783 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
784 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
785 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
786 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
787 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
788 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
790 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
792 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
794 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
798 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
800 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
801 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
802 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
804 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
805 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
807 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
808 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
809 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
810 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
811 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
813 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
814 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
818 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
824 /// Current counts of various HTLCs, useful for calculating current balances available exactly.
826 pending_inbound_htlcs: usize,
827 pending_outbound_htlcs: usize,
828 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
829 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
830 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
831 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
832 outbound_holding_cell_msat: u64,
833 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
836 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
837 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
838 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
839 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
840 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
841 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
842 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
843 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
844 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
845 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
846 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
849 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
850 struct HTLCCandidate {
852 origin: HTLCInitiator,
856 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
864 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
866 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
868 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
869 htlc_value_msat: u64,
870 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
875 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
876 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
877 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
878 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
879 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
881 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
882 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
883 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
884 htlc_value_msat: u64,
886 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
887 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
891 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
892 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
893 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
894 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
895 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
896 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
897 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
898 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
899 pub pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
900 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
901 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
902 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
905 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
907 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
908 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
909 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
910 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
913 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
914 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
915 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
916 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
917 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
918 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
919 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
920 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
923 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
925 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
926 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
927 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
928 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
929 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
930 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
931 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
932 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
933 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
934 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
935 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
936 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
937 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
938 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
939 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
942 /// Tracks the transaction number, along with current and next commitment points.
943 /// This consolidates the logic to advance our commitment number and request new
944 /// commitment points from our signer.
945 #[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone)]
946 enum HolderCommitmentPoint {
947 // TODO: add a variant for before our first commitment point is retrieved
948 /// We've advanced our commitment number and are waiting on the next commitment point.
949 /// Until the `get_per_commitment_point` signer method becomes async, this variant
950 /// will not be used.
951 PendingNext { transaction_number: u64, current: PublicKey },
952 /// Our current commitment point is ready, we've cached our next point,
953 /// and we are not pending a new one.
954 Available { transaction_number: u64, current: PublicKey, next: PublicKey },
957 impl HolderCommitmentPoint {
958 pub fn new<SP: Deref>(signer: &ChannelSignerType<SP>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Self
959 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
961 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
962 transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
963 current: signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, secp_ctx),
964 next: signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, secp_ctx),
968 pub fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
969 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { .. } = self { true } else { false }
972 pub fn transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
974 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { transaction_number, .. } => *transaction_number,
975 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number, .. } => *transaction_number,
979 pub fn current_point(&self) -> PublicKey {
981 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { current, .. } => *current,
982 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { current, .. } => *current,
986 pub fn next_point(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
988 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { .. } => None,
989 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { next, .. } => Some(*next),
993 pub fn advance<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, signer: &ChannelSignerType<SP>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, logger: &L)
994 where SP::Target: SignerProvider, L::Target: Logger
996 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number, next, .. } = self {
997 *self = HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext {
998 transaction_number: *transaction_number - 1,
1003 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { transaction_number, current } = self {
1004 let next = signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(*transaction_number - 1, secp_ctx);
1005 log_trace!(logger, "Retrieved next per-commitment point {}", *transaction_number - 1);
1006 *self = HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number: *transaction_number, current: *current, next };
1011 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1012 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1013 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1014 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1015 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1016 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1017 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1018 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1019 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1020 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1021 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1022 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1023 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1024 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1025 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1027 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1028 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1029 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1030 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1032 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1033 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1034 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1035 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1037 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1038 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1039 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1040 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1041 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1043 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1044 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1045 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1046 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1048 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1049 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1050 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1052 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1053 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1054 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1055 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1056 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1058 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1059 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1062 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1063 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1065 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1066 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1067 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1068 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1070 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1071 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1073 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1074 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1077 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1078 (0, update, required),
1081 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1082 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1083 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1084 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1085 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1086 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1087 UnfundedOutboundV2(OutboundV2Channel<SP>),
1088 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1089 UnfundedInboundV2(InboundV2Channel<SP>),
1090 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1093 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1094 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1095 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1097 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1099 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1100 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1101 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1102 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1103 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1104 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1105 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1109 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1111 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1112 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1113 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1114 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1115 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1116 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1117 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1122 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1123 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1124 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1125 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1126 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1128 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1129 /// in a timely manner.
1130 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1133 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1134 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1135 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1137 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1138 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1139 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1140 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1144 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1145 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1146 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1148 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1149 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1150 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1151 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1153 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1157 /// The current channel ID.
1158 channel_id: ChannelId,
1159 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1160 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1161 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1162 channel_state: ChannelState,
1164 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1165 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1167 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1168 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1169 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1171 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1172 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1173 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1174 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1176 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1177 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1179 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1181 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1182 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1183 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1185 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1186 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1187 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1189 holder_commitment_point: HolderCommitmentPoint,
1190 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1191 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1192 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1193 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1194 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1196 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1197 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1198 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1199 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1200 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1201 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1203 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1205 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1206 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1207 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1209 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1210 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1211 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1212 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1213 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1214 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1215 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1216 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1218 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1219 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1220 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1222 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1223 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1224 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1225 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1226 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1227 /// outbound or inbound.
1228 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1230 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1232 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1233 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1234 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1235 // HTLCs with similar state.
1236 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1237 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1238 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1239 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1240 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1241 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1242 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1243 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1244 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1245 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1247 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1248 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1249 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1251 update_time_counter: u32,
1253 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1254 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1255 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1256 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1257 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1258 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1260 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1261 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1263 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1264 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1265 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1266 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1268 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1269 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1271 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1273 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1275 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1276 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1277 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1278 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1279 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1281 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1282 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1284 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1285 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1286 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1288 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1289 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1290 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1291 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1292 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1293 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1294 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1295 pub(super) channel_creation_height: u32,
1297 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1300 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1302 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1305 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1307 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1310 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1312 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1314 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1315 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1318 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1320 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1322 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1323 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1325 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1327 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1328 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1329 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1331 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1333 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1334 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1335 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1337 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1338 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1339 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1341 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1343 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1345 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1346 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1347 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1348 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1350 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1351 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1352 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1354 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1355 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1356 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1358 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1359 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1360 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1361 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1362 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1363 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1364 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1365 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1367 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1368 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1369 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1370 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1371 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1373 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1374 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1376 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1377 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1378 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1379 /// unblock the state machine.
1381 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1382 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1383 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1385 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1386 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1387 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1389 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1390 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1391 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1392 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1393 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1394 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1395 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1396 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1398 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1399 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1401 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1402 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1403 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1405 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1406 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1407 // associated channel mapping.
1409 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1410 // to store all of them.
1411 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1413 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1414 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1415 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1416 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1417 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1419 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1420 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1422 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1423 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1425 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1426 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1428 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1429 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1431 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1433 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1435 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1436 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1437 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1440 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1441 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1442 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1443 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1444 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1445 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1446 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1448 config: &'a UserConfig,
1449 current_chain_height: u32,
1452 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1453 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1454 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1455 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1456 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1458 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1459 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1461 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1462 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1464 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1466 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
1467 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1469 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1471 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1472 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1473 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1475 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1476 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1479 // Check sanity of message fields:
1480 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1481 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
1482 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1483 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1484 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1486 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1487 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1489 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1490 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1492 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1493 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1494 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1496 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1497 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1499 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1500 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1502 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1504 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1505 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1506 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1508 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1509 return Err(ChannelError::close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1511 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1512 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1515 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1516 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1517 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1519 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1520 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1522 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1523 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1525 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1526 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1528 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1529 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1531 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1532 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1534 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1535 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1538 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1540 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1541 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1542 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1546 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1547 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1548 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1549 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1551 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1552 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1554 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1555 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1556 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1558 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1559 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1562 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1563 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1564 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1565 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1569 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1570 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1571 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1572 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1575 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1576 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1577 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1578 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1579 return Err(ChannelError::close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1582 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1583 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1584 &Some(ref script) => {
1585 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1586 if script.len() == 0 {
1589 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1590 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1592 Some(script.clone())
1595 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1597 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1602 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1603 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1604 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1605 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1609 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1610 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1611 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1615 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1616 Ok(script) => script,
1617 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1620 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1621 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1623 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1626 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1629 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1631 let holder_signer = ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer);
1632 let holder_commitment_point = HolderCommitmentPoint::new(&holder_signer, &secp_ctx);
1634 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1636 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1639 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1640 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1642 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1647 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1649 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1650 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1651 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1652 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1654 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1657 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1660 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1663 holder_commitment_point,
1664 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1667 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1668 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1669 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1670 pending_update_fee: None,
1671 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1672 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1673 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1674 update_time_counter: 1,
1676 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1678 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1679 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1680 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1681 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1682 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1683 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1684 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1686 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1687 signer_pending_funding: false,
1690 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1691 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1692 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1693 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1695 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1696 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1697 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1698 closing_fee_limits: None,
1699 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1701 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1702 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1703 short_channel_id: None,
1704 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1706 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1707 channel_value_satoshis,
1708 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1709 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1710 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1711 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1712 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1713 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1714 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1715 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1716 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1717 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1720 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1722 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1723 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1724 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1725 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1726 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1727 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1728 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1730 funding_outpoint: None,
1731 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1733 funding_transaction: None,
1734 is_batch_funding: None,
1736 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1737 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1738 counterparty_node_id,
1740 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1742 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1744 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1745 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1747 announcement_sigs: None,
1749 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1750 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1751 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1752 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1754 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1755 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1757 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1758 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1760 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1761 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1763 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1764 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1769 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1771 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1777 fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
1778 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1779 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1780 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1781 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1782 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1783 funding_satoshis: u64,
1786 config: &'a UserConfig,
1787 current_chain_height: u32,
1788 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1789 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1790 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1791 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1792 holder_signer: <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner,
1793 pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1794 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, APIError>
1796 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1797 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1798 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1800 // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel
1801 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis;
1803 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1805 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1806 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1808 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1809 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1811 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1812 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1813 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1815 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1816 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1819 let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1820 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1822 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1823 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
1825 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
1827 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
1829 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1830 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
1831 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
1832 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1835 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1836 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1838 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1839 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1840 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1841 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1845 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1846 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1847 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1851 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1852 Ok(script) => script,
1853 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1856 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
1858 let holder_signer = ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer);
1859 let holder_commitment_point = HolderCommitmentPoint::new(&holder_signer, &secp_ctx);
1864 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1865 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1866 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1867 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1872 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1874 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1875 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1876 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
1877 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1879 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1880 channel_value_satoshis,
1882 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1885 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1888 holder_commitment_point,
1889 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1892 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1893 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1894 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1895 pending_update_fee: None,
1896 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1897 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1898 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1899 update_time_counter: 1,
1901 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1903 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1904 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1905 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1906 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1907 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1908 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1909 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1911 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1912 signer_pending_funding: false,
1914 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions
1915 // when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1916 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1917 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1918 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1919 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1921 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1922 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1923 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1924 closing_fee_limits: None,
1925 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1927 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1928 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1929 short_channel_id: None,
1930 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1932 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
1933 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1934 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1935 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1936 // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we
1937 // receive `accept_channel2`.
1938 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1939 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1940 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1941 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1942 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1943 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1944 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1945 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1947 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1949 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1950 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1951 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1952 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1953 counterparty_parameters: None,
1954 funding_outpoint: None,
1955 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1957 funding_transaction: None,
1958 is_batch_funding: None,
1960 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1961 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1962 counterparty_node_id,
1964 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1966 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1968 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1969 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1971 announcement_sigs: None,
1973 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1974 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1975 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1976 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1978 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1979 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1981 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1982 outbound_scid_alias,
1984 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1985 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1987 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1988 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1993 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1994 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1998 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1999 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
2000 self.update_time_counter
2003 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2004 self.latest_monitor_update_id
2007 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2008 self.config.announced_channel
2011 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2012 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
2015 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2016 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2017 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
2018 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
2021 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2022 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2023 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
2026 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2027 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2028 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2029 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
2030 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
2031 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
2032 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
2035 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
2036 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
2037 match self.channel_state {
2038 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
2039 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
2040 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
2041 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2042 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
2043 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2044 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
2046 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
2048 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
2049 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
2053 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
2054 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
2055 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2056 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2057 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
2058 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2061 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2062 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2063 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
2067 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2068 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2069 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2070 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2071 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
2074 // Public utilities:
2076 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2080 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
2082 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
2083 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
2084 self.temporary_channel_id
2087 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2091 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2092 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2093 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
2097 /// Gets the channel's type
2098 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
2102 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
2104 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
2105 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2106 self.short_channel_id
2109 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2110 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2111 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
2114 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2115 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2116 self.outbound_scid_alias
2119 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2121 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2122 return &self.holder_signer
2125 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2127 pub fn get_mut_signer(&mut self) -> &mut ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2128 return &mut self.holder_signer
2131 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
2132 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
2133 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
2134 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
2135 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
2136 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
2139 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2140 /// get_funding_created.
2141 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2142 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
2145 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2146 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2147 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
2148 if conf_height > 0 {
2155 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2156 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
2157 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
2160 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2161 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
2162 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
2163 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2167 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2170 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2171 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2174 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2175 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2178 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2179 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2180 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2183 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2184 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2187 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2188 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2189 self.counterparty_node_id
2192 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2193 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2194 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2197 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2198 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2199 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2202 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2203 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2205 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2206 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2207 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2208 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2210 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2214 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2215 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2216 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2219 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2220 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2221 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2224 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2225 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2226 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2228 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2229 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2234 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2235 self.channel_value_satoshis
2238 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2239 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2242 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2243 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2246 fn get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate<F: Deref>(&self,
2247 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2248 ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
2249 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep)
2252 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self, limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw: u32) -> u64 {
2253 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2254 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2255 (limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw as u64).saturating_mul(multiplier)
2257 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2261 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2262 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2263 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2266 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2267 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2268 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2271 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2272 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2273 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2276 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2277 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2278 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2281 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2282 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2283 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2286 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2287 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2288 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2291 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2292 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2293 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2294 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2295 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2298 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2300 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2301 self.prev_config = None;
2305 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2306 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2310 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2311 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2312 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2313 let did_channel_update =
2314 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2315 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2316 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2317 if did_channel_update {
2318 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2319 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2320 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2321 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2323 self.config.options = *config;
2327 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2328 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2329 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2330 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2331 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2334 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2335 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2336 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2337 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2338 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2340 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2341 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2342 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2343 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2344 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2345 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2346 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2348 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2349 where L::Target: Logger
2351 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2352 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2353 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2355 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2356 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2357 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2358 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2360 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2361 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2362 if match update_state {
2363 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2364 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2365 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2366 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2367 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2369 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2373 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2374 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2375 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2377 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2379 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2380 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2381 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2383 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2384 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2385 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2386 transaction_output_index: None
2391 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2392 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2393 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2394 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2395 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2398 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2400 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2401 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2402 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2404 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2405 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2408 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2409 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2412 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2414 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2415 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2416 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2418 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2419 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2425 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2427 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2428 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2429 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2430 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2431 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2432 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2433 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2437 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2438 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2440 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2442 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2443 if generated_by_local {
2444 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2445 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2446 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2456 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2458 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2459 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2460 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2461 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2462 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2463 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2464 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2467 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2468 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2469 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2470 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2474 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2475 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2479 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2480 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2482 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2484 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2485 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2487 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2488 if !generated_by_local {
2489 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2497 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2498 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2499 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2500 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2501 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2502 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2503 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2504 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2506 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2508 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2509 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2510 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2511 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2513 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2515 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2516 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2517 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2518 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2521 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2522 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2523 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2524 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2526 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2529 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2530 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2531 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2532 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2534 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2537 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2538 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2543 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2544 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2549 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2551 let channel_parameters =
2552 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2553 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2554 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2561 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2564 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2565 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2566 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2567 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2575 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2576 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2577 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2578 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2583 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2584 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2585 /// our counterparty!)
2586 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2587 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2588 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2589 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
2590 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2591 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2592 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2594 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2598 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2599 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2600 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2601 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2602 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2603 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2604 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2606 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2609 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2610 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2611 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2612 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2613 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2616 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2617 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2620 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2624 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2625 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2626 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2627 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2628 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2629 // which are near the dust limit.
2630 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2631 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2632 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2633 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2634 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2636 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2637 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2639 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2640 cmp::max(feerate_per_kw + 2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2643 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2644 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2645 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2648 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending htlcs
2649 fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate: u32) -> HTLCStats {
2651 let uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors = self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
2653 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update);
2654 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors {
2657 (dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2658 dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2661 let mut on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2662 let mut on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2664 let mut on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2665 let mut on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2667 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2670 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2671 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2672 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2673 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2674 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2675 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2677 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2679 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2680 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2685 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2686 let mut outbound_holding_cell_msat = 0;
2687 let mut on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count = 0;
2688 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2690 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2691 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2692 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2693 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2694 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2695 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2697 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2699 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2700 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2704 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2705 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2706 pending_outbound_htlcs += 1;
2707 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2708 outbound_holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2709 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2710 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2712 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2714 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2715 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2717 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2723 // Include any mining "excess" fees in the dust calculation
2724 let excess_feerate_opt = outbound_feerate_update
2725 .or(self.pending_update_fee.map(|(fee, _)| fee))
2726 .unwrap_or(self.feerate_per_kw)
2727 .checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2728 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2729 let on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs =
2730 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs + on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs;
2731 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2732 commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs, &self.channel_type);
2733 if !self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2734 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2735 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2736 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2737 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2738 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2739 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2744 pending_inbound_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len(),
2745 pending_outbound_htlcs,
2746 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2747 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2748 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2749 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2750 outbound_holding_cell_msat,
2751 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count,
2755 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2756 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2757 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2758 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2759 match holding_cell_update {
2760 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2761 holding_cell_states.insert(
2763 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2766 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2767 holding_cell_states.insert(
2769 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2772 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2773 holding_cell_states.insert(
2775 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2779 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2782 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2783 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2786 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2787 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2789 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2790 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2791 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2792 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2793 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2794 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2795 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2796 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2797 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2798 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2805 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2806 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2807 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2808 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2811 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2812 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2814 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2815 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2816 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2817 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2818 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2819 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2820 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2821 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2822 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2823 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2826 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2827 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2833 } = *holding_cell_update {
2834 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2836 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2837 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2838 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2839 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2840 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2841 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2848 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2849 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2850 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2851 /// corner case properly.
2852 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2853 -> AvailableBalances
2854 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2856 let context = &self;
2857 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the case mentioned in the docs in general
2860 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
2861 let htlc_stats = context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2863 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2864 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2865 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2866 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2869 balance_msat -= htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat;
2871 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2872 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat)
2874 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2876 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2878 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2879 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2883 if context.is_outbound() {
2884 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2885 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2887 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2888 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2890 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2891 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2892 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2893 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2896 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2897 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2898 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2899 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2900 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2901 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2902 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2905 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2906 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2907 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2908 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2909 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2910 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2911 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2912 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2913 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2914 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2915 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2917 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2920 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2921 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2922 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2923 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2924 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2927 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2928 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2930 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2931 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2932 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat);
2934 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2935 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2936 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2937 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2941 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2943 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2944 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2945 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2946 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2947 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2948 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2949 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2951 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2952 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2954 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2955 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2956 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2959 let excess_feerate_opt = self.feerate_per_kw.checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2960 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2961 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
2962 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, &context.channel_type);
2963 let nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
2964 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
2965 if nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2966 // If adding an extra HTLC would put us over the dust limit in total fees, we cannot
2967 // send any non-dust HTLCs.
2968 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2972 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000) > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_add(1) {
2973 // Note that we don't use the `counterparty_tx_dust_exposure` (with
2974 // `htlc_dust_exposure_msat`) here as it only applies to non-dust HTLCs.
2975 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2976 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat));
2977 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2980 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2981 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2982 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2983 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
2984 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2987 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2988 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2989 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2991 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2995 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2996 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat);
2998 if htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
2999 available_capacity_msat = 0;
3003 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
3004 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
3005 - htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat as i64
3006 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
3008 outbound_capacity_msat,
3009 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
3010 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
3015 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
3016 let context = &self;
3017 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
3020 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
3021 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
3023 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3024 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3026 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3027 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3029 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3030 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3031 let context = &self;
3032 assert!(context.is_outbound());
3034 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3037 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3038 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3040 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3041 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3043 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3044 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3046 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3047 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3051 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3052 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3058 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3059 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3060 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3063 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
3064 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
3065 included_htlcs += 1;
3068 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3069 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3073 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3074 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3075 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3076 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
3077 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
3078 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
3083 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3085 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
3086 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3091 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3092 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3096 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3097 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3098 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3101 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3102 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3104 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3105 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3106 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3108 total_pending_htlcs,
3109 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3110 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3111 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3113 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3114 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3115 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3117 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3119 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3124 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3125 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3127 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3128 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3130 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3131 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3133 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3134 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3135 let context = &self;
3136 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
3138 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3141 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3142 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3144 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3145 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3147 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3148 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3150 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3151 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3155 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3156 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3162 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3163 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3164 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3165 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3166 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3167 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3170 included_htlcs += 1;
3173 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3174 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3177 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3178 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3180 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3181 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3182 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3187 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3188 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3189 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3192 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3193 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3195 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3196 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3198 total_pending_htlcs,
3199 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3200 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3201 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3203 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3204 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3205 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3207 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3209 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3214 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3215 match self.channel_state {
3216 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3217 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3218 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3219 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3229 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3231 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3232 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3235 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3237 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3238 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3239 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3243 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3244 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3245 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3248 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3250 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3251 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3254 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3255 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3256 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3257 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3258 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3259 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3260 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3261 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3262 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3263 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3264 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3266 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3267 // return them to fail the payment.
3268 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3269 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3270 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3272 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3273 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3278 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3279 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3280 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3281 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3282 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3283 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3284 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3285 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3286 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3287 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3288 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3289 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3290 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3291 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3292 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3296 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3297 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3299 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3300 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3304 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3305 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3306 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3307 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3308 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3309 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3310 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3311 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3315 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3316 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3317 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3318 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3320 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3321 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3322 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3323 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3325 match &self.holder_signer {
3326 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3327 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3328 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3329 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3330 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3333 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3337 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3338 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3339 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3341 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3342 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3343 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3345 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3346 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3347 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3350 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3351 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3353 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3359 /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection
3360 /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a
3361 /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel.
3362 pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features<F: Deref>(
3363 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
3366 F::Target: FeeEstimator
3368 if !self.is_outbound() ||
3370 self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
3371 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
3376 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3377 // We've exhausted our options
3380 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
3381 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
3384 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
3385 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
3386 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
3387 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
3389 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3390 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
3391 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
3392 assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
3393 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
3394 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
3396 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
3398 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone();
3403 // Internal utility functions for channels
3405 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3406 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3407 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3409 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3411 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3412 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3413 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3415 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3418 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3420 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3423 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3424 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3425 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3427 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3429 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3430 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3431 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3432 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3433 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3436 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3437 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3438 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3439 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3440 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3441 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3442 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3445 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3446 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3448 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3450 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3451 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3452 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3453 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3454 // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3455 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3456 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3459 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3460 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3462 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3463 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3466 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3467 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3468 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3469 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3470 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3471 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3474 pub(crate) fn per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3475 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3476 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3477 let commitment_tx_fee = COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000;
3478 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3479 commitment_tx_fee + htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000
3485 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3486 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3487 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3488 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3489 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3490 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3491 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3492 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3493 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3494 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3495 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3496 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3499 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3500 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3501 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3502 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3503 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3504 pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3507 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3508 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3510 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3511 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3512 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3516 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3517 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3518 trait FailHTLCContents {
3519 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3520 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3521 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3522 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3524 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3525 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3526 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3527 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3529 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3530 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3532 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3533 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3536 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3537 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3538 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3539 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3542 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3543 failure_code: self.1
3546 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3547 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3549 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3550 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3552 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3553 failure_code: self.1
3558 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3559 fn name() -> &'static str;
3561 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3562 fn name() -> &'static str {
3566 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3567 fn name() -> &'static str {
3568 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3572 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3573 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3574 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: EcdsaChannelSigner
3576 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3577 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3578 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3579 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3581 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3582 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3584 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3586 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3587 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3588 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3589 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3591 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3592 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3596 return Err(ChannelError::Close((format!(
3597 "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit
3598 ), ClosureReason::PeerFeerateTooLow {
3599 peer_feerate_sat_per_kw: feerate_per_kw,
3600 required_feerate_sat_per_kw: lower_limit,
3607 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3608 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3609 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3610 // outside of those situations will fail.
3611 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3615 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3620 1 + // script length (0)
3624 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3625 2 + // witness marker and flag
3626 1 + // witness element count
3627 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3628 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3629 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3630 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3631 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3632 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3634 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3635 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3636 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3642 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3643 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3644 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3645 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3647 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3648 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3649 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3651 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3652 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3653 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3654 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3655 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3656 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3659 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3660 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3663 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3664 value_to_holder = 0;
3667 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3668 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3669 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3670 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3672 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3673 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3676 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3677 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3680 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3683 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3684 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3686 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3688 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3689 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3690 where L::Target: Logger {
3691 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3692 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3693 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3694 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3695 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3696 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3697 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3698 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3702 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3703 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3704 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3705 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3707 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3708 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3711 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3712 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3713 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3715 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3716 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3717 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3718 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3719 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3720 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3721 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3723 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3724 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3725 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3727 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3728 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3730 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3733 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3734 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3738 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3742 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3743 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3744 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3745 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3746 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3747 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3750 // Now update local state:
3752 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3753 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3754 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3755 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3756 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3757 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3758 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3759 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3761 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3764 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3765 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3766 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3767 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3768 // do not not get into this branch.
3769 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3770 match pending_update {
3771 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3772 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3773 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3774 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3775 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3776 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3777 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3780 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3781 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3783 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3784 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3785 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3786 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3787 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3788 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3794 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3795 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3796 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3798 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3799 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3800 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3802 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3803 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3806 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3807 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3809 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3810 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3812 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3813 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3816 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3819 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3820 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3821 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3822 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3827 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3828 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3829 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3830 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3831 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3832 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3833 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3834 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3835 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3836 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3837 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3838 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3839 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3840 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3841 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3843 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3844 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3845 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3846 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3847 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3850 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3851 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3852 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3858 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3859 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3861 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3865 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3866 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3867 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3868 /// before we fail backwards.
3870 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3871 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3872 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3873 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3874 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3875 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3876 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3879 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3880 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3882 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3883 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3884 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3885 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3886 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3887 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3890 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3891 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3892 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3893 /// before we fail backwards.
3895 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3896 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3897 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3898 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3899 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3901 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3902 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3903 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3906 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3907 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3908 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3910 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3911 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3912 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3914 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3915 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3916 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3918 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3923 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3924 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
3930 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3931 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3932 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
3933 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
3934 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3938 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3939 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
3940 force_holding_cell = true;
3943 // Now update local state:
3944 if force_holding_cell {
3945 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3946 match pending_update {
3947 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3948 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3949 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3950 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3954 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3955 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3957 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3958 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3959 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
3965 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
3966 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
3970 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
3971 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
3973 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3974 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
3977 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
3980 // Message handlers:
3981 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3982 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3983 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3984 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3985 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3986 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3987 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3990 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3992 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3994 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3995 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3996 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3997 debug_assert!(matches!(
3998 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
4000 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4001 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
4004 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
4005 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
4007 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4008 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4009 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
4010 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
4012 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4015 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4016 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
4017 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
4020 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
4021 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
4022 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
4023 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
4024 // when routing outbound payments.
4025 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
4029 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
4030 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
4031 let mut check_reconnection = false;
4032 match &self.context.channel_state {
4033 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
4034 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
4035 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4036 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
4037 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4038 check_reconnection = true;
4039 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
4040 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
4041 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
4042 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
4043 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4045 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
4046 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4049 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4050 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
4051 _ => return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
4053 if check_reconnection {
4054 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
4055 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
4056 let expected_point =
4057 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4058 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
4060 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
4061 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
4062 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
4063 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
4064 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
4065 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
4067 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
4068 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
4069 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
4070 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
4071 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
4073 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
4074 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
4079 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4080 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4082 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4084 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger))
4087 pub fn update_add_htlc<F: Deref>(
4088 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
4089 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
4090 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
4091 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4092 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4094 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
4095 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
4096 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4098 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4099 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4101 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4102 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
4104 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
4105 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4107 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
4108 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
4111 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4112 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4113 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
4114 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4116 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4117 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4120 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
4121 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
4122 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
4123 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
4124 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
4125 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
4126 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
4127 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
4128 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
4129 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
4130 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
4132 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
4133 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4134 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4135 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4136 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4137 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4141 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
4142 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
4143 let pending_remote_value_msat =
4144 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
4145 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
4146 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
4149 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
4150 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
4152 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
4153 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4154 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
4156 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4157 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4161 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4162 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
4164 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
4165 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
4169 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4170 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4174 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4175 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4176 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4177 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4178 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
4179 return Err(ChannelError::close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4182 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
4183 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
4185 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
4186 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
4189 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4190 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
4191 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
4195 // Now update local state:
4196 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
4197 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4198 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4199 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
4200 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
4201 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
4202 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved {
4203 pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status
4209 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
4211 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
4212 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
4213 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4214 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
4215 let outcome = match check_preimage {
4216 None => fail_reason.into(),
4217 Some(payment_preimage) => {
4218 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4219 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4220 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4222 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4226 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4227 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4228 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4229 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4231 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4232 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4237 Err(ChannelError::close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4240 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4241 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4242 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4244 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4245 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4248 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4251 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4252 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4253 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4255 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4256 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4259 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4263 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4264 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4265 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4267 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4268 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4271 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4275 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4276 where L::Target: Logger
4278 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4279 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4281 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4282 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4284 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4285 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4288 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4290 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
4292 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, false, logger);
4293 let commitment_txid = {
4294 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4295 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4296 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4298 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4299 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4300 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4301 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4302 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4303 return Err(ChannelError::close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4307 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4309 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4310 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4311 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4312 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4315 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4316 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4317 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4318 return Err(ChannelError::close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4321 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4323 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4324 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4325 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4326 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4327 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4328 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4329 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4330 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4331 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4332 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4333 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4339 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4340 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4343 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4344 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4345 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4346 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4347 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4348 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4349 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4350 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4351 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4352 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4353 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4354 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4355 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4358 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4359 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4360 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4361 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4362 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4363 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4364 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4366 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4367 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4368 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4369 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4370 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4371 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4372 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4373 return Err(ChannelError::close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4375 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4376 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4379 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4381 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4382 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4383 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4386 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4389 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4390 commitment_stats.tx,
4392 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4393 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4394 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4397 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4398 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4400 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4401 let mut need_commitment = false;
4402 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4403 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4404 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4405 need_commitment = true;
4409 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4410 let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state {
4411 Some(resolution.clone())
4413 if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution {
4414 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4415 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4416 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution);
4417 need_commitment = true;
4420 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4421 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4422 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4423 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4424 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4425 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4426 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4427 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4428 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4429 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4430 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4431 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4432 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4433 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4435 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4437 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4438 need_commitment = true;
4442 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4443 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4444 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4445 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4446 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4447 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4448 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4450 nondust_htlc_sources,
4452 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4455 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
4456 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4457 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4458 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4459 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4461 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4462 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4463 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4464 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4465 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4466 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4467 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4468 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4469 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4470 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4471 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4472 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4473 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4474 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4476 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4477 &self.context.channel_id);
4478 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4481 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4482 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4483 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4484 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4485 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4486 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4487 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4488 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4489 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4493 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4494 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4495 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4496 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4499 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4500 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4501 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4502 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4503 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4504 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4505 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4507 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4508 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4509 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4512 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4513 /// for our counterparty.
4514 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4515 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4516 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4517 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4519 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4520 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4521 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4522 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4524 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4525 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4526 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4527 updates: Vec::new(),
4528 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4531 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4532 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4533 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4534 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4535 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4536 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4537 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4538 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4539 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4540 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4541 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4542 // to rebalance channels.
4543 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4544 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4545 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4546 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4548 match self.send_htlc(
4549 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4550 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4552 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4555 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4556 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4557 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4558 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4559 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4560 // into the holding cell without ever being
4561 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4562 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4563 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4566 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4573 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4574 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4575 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4576 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4577 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4578 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4579 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4580 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4581 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4582 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4583 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4584 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4587 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4588 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4589 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4591 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4592 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4593 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4596 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4598 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4599 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4600 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4601 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4602 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4603 // for a full revocation before failing.
4604 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4605 update_fail_count += 1;
4607 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4609 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4614 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4615 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4617 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4618 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4623 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4624 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4625 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4626 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4627 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4629 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4630 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4631 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4633 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4634 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4640 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4641 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4642 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4643 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4644 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4645 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4646 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4647 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4648 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4650 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4651 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4653 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4654 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4656 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4657 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4660 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4662 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4663 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4664 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4668 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4669 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4670 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4671 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4672 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4673 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4674 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4675 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4676 return Err(ChannelError::close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4679 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4681 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4682 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4685 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4686 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4687 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4688 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4690 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4692 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4697 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4698 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4699 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4700 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4701 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4702 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4703 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4704 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4705 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4707 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4710 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4711 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4712 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4713 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4714 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4715 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4716 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4717 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4718 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4720 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4721 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4724 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4725 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4726 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
4727 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4728 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4729 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4730 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4731 let mut require_commitment = false;
4732 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4735 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4736 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4737 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4738 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4740 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4741 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4742 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4743 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4744 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4745 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4747 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4751 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4752 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4753 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4754 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4755 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4757 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4758 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4759 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4764 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4765 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4767 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4771 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4772 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4774 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state {
4775 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4776 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution);
4777 require_commitment = true;
4778 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state {
4780 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } =>
4781 match pending_htlc_status {
4782 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4783 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4784 require_commitment = true;
4786 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4787 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4788 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4790 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4791 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4792 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4796 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4797 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash);
4798 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4799 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4802 InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => {
4803 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4804 pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc);
4805 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4811 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4812 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4813 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4814 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4815 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4817 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4818 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4819 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4820 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4821 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4822 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4823 require_commitment = true;
4827 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4829 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4830 match update_state {
4831 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4832 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4833 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4834 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4835 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4836 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4838 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4839 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4840 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4841 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4842 require_commitment = true;
4843 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4844 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4849 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4850 let release_state_str =
4851 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4852 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4853 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4854 if !release_monitor {
4855 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4856 update: monitor_update,
4858 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4860 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4865 self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds);
4867 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4868 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4869 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4870 if require_commitment {
4871 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4872 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4873 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4874 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4876 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4877 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4878 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4879 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4880 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4882 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4883 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4884 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4885 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4886 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4889 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4890 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4891 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4892 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4893 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4894 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4896 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4897 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4899 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4900 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4902 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4903 if require_commitment {
4904 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4906 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4907 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4908 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4909 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4911 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
4912 &self.context.channel_id(),
4913 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
4916 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4917 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4919 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
4920 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4922 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4923 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4929 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4930 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4931 /// commitment update.
4932 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4933 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4934 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4936 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4937 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4940 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4941 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4942 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4943 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4945 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4946 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4947 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4948 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4949 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4950 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4951 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4953 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4954 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4956 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4957 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4959 if !self.context.is_live() {
4960 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4963 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4964 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4965 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw), dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4966 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
4967 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, true, logger);
4968 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4969 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - htlc_stats.outbound_holding_cell_msat;
4970 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4971 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4972 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4976 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4977 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4978 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4979 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4982 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4983 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4987 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4988 force_holding_cell = true;
4991 if force_holding_cell {
4992 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4996 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4997 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4999 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5000 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5005 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
5006 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
5008 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
5010 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
5011 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5012 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5013 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5017 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5018 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
5019 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
5023 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
5024 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
5027 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
5028 // will be retransmitted.
5029 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
5030 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
5031 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
5033 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
5034 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5036 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
5037 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
5038 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
5039 // this HTLC accordingly
5040 inbound_drop_count += 1;
5043 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
5044 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
5045 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
5046 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
5049 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
5050 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
5051 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
5052 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
5053 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
5054 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
5059 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
5061 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5062 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
5063 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5064 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5068 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5069 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5070 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
5071 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
5072 // the update upon reconnection.
5073 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
5077 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5079 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
5080 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
5084 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
5085 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
5086 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
5087 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
5088 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
5089 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
5090 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
5092 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
5093 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
5094 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
5095 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
5096 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
5097 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
5098 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
5100 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
5101 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
5102 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
5103 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
5104 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
5105 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5106 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
5109 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
5110 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
5111 /// to the remote side.
5112 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5113 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5114 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
5115 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
5118 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5120 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
5121 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
5123 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
5124 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
5125 // first received the funding_signed.
5126 let mut funding_broadcastable =
5127 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
5128 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
5129 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
5131 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
5133 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
5134 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
5135 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5136 funding_broadcastable = None;
5139 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
5140 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
5141 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
5142 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
5143 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
5144 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
5145 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
5146 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
5147 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
5148 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
5149 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
5152 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
5154 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
5155 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
5156 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5157 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
5158 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5159 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
5160 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
5161 mem::swap(&mut pending_update_adds, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
5163 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5164 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5165 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5166 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5167 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5168 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, pending_update_adds,
5169 funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5173 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
5174 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5176 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
5177 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5179 if commitment_update.is_some() {
5180 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5183 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5184 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5185 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
5186 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
5187 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
5188 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5189 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
5190 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5191 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5192 pending_update_adds, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5196 pub fn check_for_stale_feerate<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, min_feerate: u32) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> {
5197 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5198 // While its possible our fee is too low for an outbound channel because we've been
5199 // unable to increase the fee, we don't try to force-close directly here.
5202 if self.context.feerate_per_kw < min_feerate {
5204 "Closing channel as feerate of {} is below required {} (the minimum required rate over the past day)",
5205 self.context.feerate_per_kw, min_feerate
5207 Err(ClosureReason::PeerFeerateTooLow {
5208 peer_feerate_sat_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
5209 required_feerate_sat_per_kw: min_feerate,
5216 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5217 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5219 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5220 return Err(ChannelError::close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
5222 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5223 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5225 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
5227 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
5228 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5229 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
5230 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5231 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5232 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5233 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5234 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5235 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5237 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5238 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5239 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5244 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5246 #[cfg(async_signing)]
5247 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5248 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5249 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5251 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5252 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5254 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5255 self.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger)
5258 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5259 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5260 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5261 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5263 SignerResumeUpdates {
5270 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5271 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() <= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER + 2);
5272 // TODO: handle non-available case when get_per_commitment_point becomes async
5273 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
5274 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
5275 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() + 2);
5276 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5277 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5278 per_commitment_secret,
5279 next_per_commitment_point,
5281 next_local_nonce: None,
5285 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5286 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5287 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5288 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5289 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5290 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5292 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5293 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5294 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5295 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5296 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5297 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5298 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5299 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5300 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5301 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5302 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5307 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5308 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5310 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5311 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5312 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5313 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5314 reason: err_packet.clone()
5317 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5318 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5319 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5320 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5321 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5322 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5325 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5326 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5327 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5328 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5329 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5336 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5337 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5338 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5339 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5343 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5344 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5345 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5346 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5347 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5348 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5349 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5353 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5354 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5356 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5357 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5358 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5359 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5364 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5365 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5370 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5371 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5372 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5373 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5374 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5375 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5376 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5381 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5382 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5384 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5385 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5386 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5387 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5388 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5389 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5390 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5391 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5394 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5396 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5397 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5398 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5399 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5400 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5403 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5404 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5405 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5408 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1;
5409 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5410 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5411 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5412 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5413 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5414 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5416 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5417 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5418 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5419 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5420 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5423 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5424 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5425 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5426 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5427 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5428 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5429 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5430 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5434 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5435 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5436 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5437 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5438 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5439 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5440 our_commitment_transaction
5444 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5445 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5446 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5447 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5449 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5451 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger);
5453 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5454 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5455 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5456 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5457 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5458 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5460 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5461 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5462 channel_ready: None,
5463 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5464 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5465 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5469 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5470 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5471 channel_ready: Some(self.get_channel_ready()),
5472 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5473 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5474 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5478 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5479 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5480 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5482 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5483 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5484 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5487 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5490 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5491 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
5492 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5493 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5494 our_commitment_transaction
5498 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5499 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5500 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5501 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5502 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5503 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5504 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5506 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5508 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == 1 {
5509 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5510 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
5513 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5514 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5515 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5517 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5520 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5521 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5522 raa: required_revoke,
5523 commitment_update: None,
5524 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5526 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5527 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5528 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5530 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5533 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5534 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5535 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5536 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5537 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5538 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5541 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5542 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5543 raa: required_revoke,
5544 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5545 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5548 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5549 Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
5550 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5551 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5552 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5555 Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
5556 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5557 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5558 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5563 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5564 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5565 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5566 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5568 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5570 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5572 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5573 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5574 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5575 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5576 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5577 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5578 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5579 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5581 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5582 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5583 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5584 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5585 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5587 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5588 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5589 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5590 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5593 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5594 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5595 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5596 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5597 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5598 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5599 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5600 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5601 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5602 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5603 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5604 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5605 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5606 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5607 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5609 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5612 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5613 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5616 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5617 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5618 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5619 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5620 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5621 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5624 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5625 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5626 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5627 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5628 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5629 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5630 return Err(ChannelError::close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5632 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5638 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5639 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5640 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5641 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5643 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5644 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5645 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5646 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5647 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5648 return Ok((None, None, None));
5651 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5652 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5653 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5655 return Ok((None, None, None));
5658 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5659 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5660 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5661 return Ok((None, None, None));
5664 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5666 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5667 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5668 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5669 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5671 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5672 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5674 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5675 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5677 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5678 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5679 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5680 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5682 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5683 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5684 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5688 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5694 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5695 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5697 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5698 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5701 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5702 /// within our expected timeframe.
5704 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5705 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5706 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5709 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5712 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5713 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5717 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5718 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5720 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5721 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5723 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5724 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5725 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5726 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5727 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5729 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5730 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5731 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5734 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5736 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5737 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5740 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5741 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5742 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5745 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5748 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5749 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5750 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5751 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5753 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5756 assert!(send_shutdown);
5757 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5758 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5759 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5761 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5762 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5764 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5769 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5771 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5772 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5774 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5775 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5776 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5777 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5778 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5779 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5780 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5782 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5784 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5785 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5787 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5788 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5789 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5790 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5794 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5795 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5796 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5797 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5798 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5799 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5801 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5802 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5809 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5810 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5812 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5815 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5816 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5818 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5820 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5821 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5822 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5823 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5824 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5825 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5826 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5827 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5828 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5830 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5831 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5834 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5838 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5839 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5840 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5841 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5843 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5844 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5846 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5847 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5849 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5850 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5852 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5853 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5856 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5857 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5860 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5861 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5862 return Ok((None, None, None));
5865 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5866 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5867 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5868 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5870 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5872 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5875 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5876 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5877 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5878 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5879 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5883 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5884 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < Amount::from_sat(MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS) {
5885 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5889 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5890 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5892 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5895 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5896 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5897 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5898 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5900 monitor_update: None,
5901 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5902 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5903 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5904 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5905 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5906 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5907 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5908 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5910 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5911 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5912 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5913 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
5917 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5919 macro_rules! propose_fee {
5920 ($new_fee: expr) => {
5921 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5922 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5924 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5927 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
5928 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5930 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5931 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5932 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5933 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5935 monitor_update: None,
5936 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5937 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5938 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5939 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5940 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5941 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5942 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5943 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5945 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5946 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5947 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5948 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5953 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5954 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5955 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5956 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5958 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5959 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5960 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5962 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5964 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5971 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5972 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5973 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5975 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5976 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5978 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5979 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5982 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5983 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5984 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5985 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5986 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5988 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5989 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5990 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5992 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5993 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5996 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5997 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5998 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5999 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
6000 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
6001 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6002 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
6003 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6005 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6008 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
6009 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6010 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
6011 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6013 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6017 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6018 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6019 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6020 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6022 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6028 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
6029 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
6030 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6031 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
6032 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
6033 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
6034 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
6036 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
6037 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
6040 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
6042 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
6043 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
6049 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
6050 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
6051 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
6052 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
6053 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
6054 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6055 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
6057 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
6058 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
6065 pub fn can_accept_incoming_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6066 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L
6067 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)>
6069 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6072 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6073 return Err(("Shutdown was already sent", 0x4000|8))
6076 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
6077 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6078 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6079 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6082 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
6083 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
6084 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
6086 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
6087 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
6088 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6089 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6090 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6091 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6092 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6095 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
6096 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, &self.context.channel_type);
6097 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
6098 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
6099 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6100 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to tx fee dust at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6101 counterparty_tx_dust_exposure, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6102 return Err(("Exceeded our tx fee dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6106 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6107 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
6108 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6109 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6110 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
6111 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6112 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on holder commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6116 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6117 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
6122 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
6123 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6124 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6125 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6126 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6127 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6131 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
6132 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
6133 let pending_remote_value_msat =
6134 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
6136 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6137 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
6138 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
6139 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
6140 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
6141 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6142 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
6143 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6144 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
6146 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
6147 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
6148 return Err(("Fee spike buffer violation", 0x1000|7));
6155 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6156 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() + 1
6159 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6160 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
6163 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6164 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
6168 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
6169 &self.context.holder_signer
6173 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
6175 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6176 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
6177 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
6178 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6179 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6180 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
6182 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6184 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
6192 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6193 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
6197 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
6198 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
6199 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
6200 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
6203 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
6204 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
6205 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
6206 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
6209 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
6210 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
6211 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
6212 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
6213 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
6214 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
6217 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
6218 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
6219 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
6220 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
6221 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
6222 if !release_monitor {
6223 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
6232 /// On startup, its possible we detect some monitor updates have actually completed (and the
6233 /// ChannelManager was simply stale). In that case, we should simply drop them, which we do
6234 /// here after logging them.
6235 pub fn on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, loaded_mon_update_id: u64) {
6236 let channel_id = self.context.channel_id();
6237 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.retain(|update| {
6238 if update.update.update_id <= loaded_mon_update_id {
6241 "Dropping completed ChannelMonitorUpdate id {} on channel {} due to a stale ChannelManager",
6242 update.update.update_id,
6252 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
6253 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
6256 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
6257 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
6258 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
6260 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
6261 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
6263 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
6264 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
6266 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
6267 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
6268 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
6271 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
6272 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
6273 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
6274 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
6275 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
6276 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
6278 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
6279 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
6280 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
6282 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
6283 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
6284 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
6285 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
6286 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
6287 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
6293 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
6294 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
6295 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
6296 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
6299 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6300 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6301 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6304 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6305 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6306 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
6309 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
6310 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6311 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
6314 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
6315 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
6316 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
6317 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6318 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
6321 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
6322 self.context.channel_update_status
6325 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
6326 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6327 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
6330 fn check_get_channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady>
6331 where L::Target: Logger
6334 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
6335 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
6336 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
6340 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6341 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
6342 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
6345 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6349 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6350 // channel_ready yet.
6351 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6352 // TODO: set signer_pending_channel_ready
6353 log_debug!(logger, "Can't produce channel_ready: the signer is pending funding.");
6357 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6358 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6359 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6360 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6362 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6363 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6364 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6366 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6367 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6370 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6371 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6373 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6374 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6375 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6376 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6377 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6378 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6379 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6380 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6382 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6386 if !need_commitment_update {
6387 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: we do not need a commitment update");
6391 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6392 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: a monitor update is in progress. Setting monitor_pending_channel_ready.");
6393 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6397 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6398 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: the peer is disconnected.");
6402 // TODO: when get_per_commiment_point becomes async, check if the point is
6403 // available, if not, set signer_pending_channel_ready and return None
6405 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
6408 fn get_channel_ready(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReady {
6409 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
6410 msgs::ChannelReady {
6411 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6412 next_per_commitment_point: self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point(),
6413 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6417 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6418 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6419 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6420 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6421 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6422 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6423 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6425 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6428 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6429 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6430 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6431 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6432 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6433 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6434 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6435 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6436 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh() ||
6437 tx.output[txo_idx].value.to_sat() != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6438 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6439 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6440 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6441 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6442 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6443 // channel and move on.
6444 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6445 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6447 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6448 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6449 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6451 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6452 if !tx.is_coinbase() {
6453 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6454 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6455 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6456 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6457 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6458 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6463 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6464 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6465 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6466 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6467 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6470 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6471 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6472 if tx.is_coinbase() &&
6473 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6474 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6475 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6478 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6479 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6480 // may have already happened for this block).
6481 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height, logger) {
6482 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6483 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6484 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6487 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6488 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6489 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6490 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6498 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6499 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6500 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6501 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6503 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6504 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6507 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6509 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6510 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6511 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6512 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6514 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6517 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6520 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6521 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6522 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6523 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6525 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6528 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6529 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6530 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6532 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6533 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6535 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6536 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6537 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6545 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6547 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height, logger) {
6548 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6549 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6551 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6552 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6555 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6556 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6557 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6558 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6559 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6560 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6561 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6562 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6565 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6566 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6567 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6568 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6570 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6571 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6572 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6574 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6575 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6576 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6577 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6579 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6580 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6581 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6582 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6583 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6584 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6585 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6588 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6589 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6591 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6594 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6595 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6596 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6597 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6598 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6599 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6600 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6601 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6602 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6603 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6604 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6605 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6606 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6607 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6608 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6609 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6610 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6616 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6621 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6622 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6624 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6625 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6626 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6627 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6629 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6632 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6634 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6635 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6636 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6637 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6638 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6639 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6641 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6642 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6645 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6646 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6647 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6648 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6649 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6650 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6652 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6653 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6656 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6657 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6658 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6659 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6660 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6666 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6667 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6668 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6669 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6671 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6674 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6678 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6682 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6683 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6687 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6691 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6692 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6695 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6699 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6701 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6706 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6707 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6708 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6710 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6715 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6717 None => return None,
6720 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6722 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6723 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6725 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6726 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6729 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6735 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6737 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6738 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6739 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6740 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6741 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6742 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6743 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6745 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6746 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6747 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6748 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6749 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6750 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6751 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6752 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6753 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6754 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6755 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6756 contents: announcement,
6759 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6764 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6768 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6769 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6770 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6771 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6772 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6773 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6774 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6775 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6777 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6779 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6780 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
6781 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6782 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6784 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6785 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
6786 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6787 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6790 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6791 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6792 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6793 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6796 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6799 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6800 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6801 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6802 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6803 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6804 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6807 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6809 Err(_) => return None,
6811 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6812 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6817 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6818 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6819 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6820 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6821 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6822 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6823 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6824 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6825 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6826 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6827 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6828 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6829 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6830 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6831 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6832 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6835 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6838 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6839 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6840 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6841 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6842 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6843 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6844 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6845 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6846 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6848 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6849 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6850 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(),
6851 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6852 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6853 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6854 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6855 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6856 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6858 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6859 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6860 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6861 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6862 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6863 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6864 next_funding_txid: None,
6869 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6871 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6872 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6873 /// commitment update.
6875 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6876 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6877 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6878 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6879 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6880 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6881 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6884 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6885 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6886 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6888 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6889 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6894 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6895 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6897 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6899 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6900 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6902 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6903 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6904 /// regenerate them.
6906 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6907 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6909 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6910 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6911 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6912 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6913 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6914 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6915 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6916 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6918 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6919 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6920 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6922 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6924 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6925 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6926 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6929 if amount_msat == 0 {
6930 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6933 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
6934 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6935 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6936 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6939 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6940 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6941 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6944 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6945 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6946 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6947 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6948 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6949 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6950 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6951 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6954 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
6955 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
6956 payment_hash, amount_msat,
6957 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6958 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6959 else { "to peer" });
6961 if need_holding_cell {
6962 force_holding_cell = true;
6965 // Now update local state:
6966 if force_holding_cell {
6967 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6972 onion_routing_packet,
6979 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6980 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6982 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6984 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6990 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6991 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6992 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6996 onion_routing_packet,
7000 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
7005 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
7006 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
7007 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
7008 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
7010 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7011 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
7012 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
7014 if let Some(state) = new_state {
7015 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7019 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7020 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
7021 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7022 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
7023 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
7024 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
7025 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
7028 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7029 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
7030 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
7031 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
7032 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
7033 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
7036 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
7038 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
7039 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7040 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
7041 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
7042 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
7044 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
7045 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
7048 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7049 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7050 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7051 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7052 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
7053 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
7054 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
7055 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7056 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7057 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
7058 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
7059 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
7061 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7063 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
7067 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
7068 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
7069 where L::Target: Logger
7071 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7072 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7073 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
7075 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7077 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7078 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
7079 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
7080 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
7081 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
7082 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
7083 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
7084 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
7085 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
7086 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
7087 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
7093 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
7096 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
7097 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
7098 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7099 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
7100 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7101 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7103 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7104 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7105 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
7107 match &self.context.holder_signer {
7108 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7109 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
7112 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
7113 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
7117 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
7118 &commitment_stats.tx,
7119 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
7120 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
7121 &self.context.secp_ctx,
7122 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
7124 htlc_signatures = res.1;
7126 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
7127 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
7128 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
7129 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7131 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
7132 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
7133 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
7134 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
7135 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
7136 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7140 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
7141 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7145 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7146 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
7148 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7154 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
7155 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
7157 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
7158 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
7159 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7160 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
7161 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7162 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7163 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
7164 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7166 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
7167 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
7168 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
7171 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
7172 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7173 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
7179 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
7181 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
7182 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7183 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
7184 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
7185 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
7187 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
7189 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
7195 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
7196 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
7197 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7198 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
7199 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
7201 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7202 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7203 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
7206 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
7207 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
7209 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
7210 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
7212 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
7213 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
7215 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
7216 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
7217 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
7220 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7223 // use override shutdown script if provided
7224 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
7225 Some(script) => script,
7227 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
7228 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7229 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
7230 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7234 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
7235 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7237 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
7242 // From here on out, we may not fail!
7243 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
7244 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
7245 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
7246 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
7248 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
7249 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7250 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7251 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7252 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7253 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
7254 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7256 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7258 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7259 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
7261 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
7262 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7263 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7266 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
7267 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
7268 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
7269 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
7270 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
7272 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
7273 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
7280 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
7281 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
7283 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
7286 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
7287 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
7288 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
7290 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
7291 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
7295 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
7299 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7300 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7301 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7302 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7305 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7306 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7307 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7308 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
7309 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
7310 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
7311 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7312 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7314 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
7315 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7316 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7317 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7318 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \
7319 implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
7322 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
7323 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7324 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7327 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7331 counterparty_node_id,
7333 channel_value_satoshis,
7337 current_chain_height,
7338 outbound_scid_alias,
7339 temporary_channel_id,
7340 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7345 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7350 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7351 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7352 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7353 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7354 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7355 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7356 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7357 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7358 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7360 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7365 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7366 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7367 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7370 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7371 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7372 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7373 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7376 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7378 next_local_nonce: None,
7382 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7383 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7384 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7385 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7386 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7387 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7388 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7389 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7390 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7391 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7392 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7395 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7396 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7398 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7400 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7401 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7402 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7403 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7406 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7407 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7409 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7411 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7412 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7414 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7415 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7416 if funding_transaction.is_coinbase() &&
7417 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7418 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7419 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7422 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7423 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7425 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7426 if funding_created.is_none() {
7427 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7428 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7430 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7431 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7432 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7433 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7441 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7442 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7443 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7444 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7445 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7446 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7448 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7450 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7451 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7454 /// Returns true if we can resume the channel by sending the [`msgs::OpenChannel`] again.
7455 pub fn is_resumable(&self) -> bool {
7456 !self.context.have_received_message() &&
7457 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER
7460 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7461 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7462 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7464 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7465 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7468 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7469 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7472 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
7473 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
7474 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7477 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7479 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7480 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7481 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7482 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7483 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7484 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7485 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7486 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7487 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7488 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7489 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7490 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7491 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7492 first_per_commitment_point,
7493 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7494 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7495 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7496 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7498 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7500 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7501 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7506 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7507 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7509 // Check sanity of message fields:
7510 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7511 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7513 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7514 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7516 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7517 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7519 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7520 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7522 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7523 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7525 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7526 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7527 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7529 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7530 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7531 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7533 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7534 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7535 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7537 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7538 return Err(ChannelError::close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7540 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7541 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7544 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7545 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7546 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7548 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7549 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7551 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7552 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7554 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7555 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7557 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7558 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7560 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7561 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7563 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7564 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7567 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7568 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7569 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7571 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7572 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7574 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7575 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7576 return Err(ChannelError::close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7578 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7579 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7582 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7583 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7584 &Some(ref script) => {
7585 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7586 if script.len() == 0 {
7589 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7590 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7592 Some(script.clone())
7595 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7597 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7602 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7603 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7604 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7605 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7606 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7608 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7609 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7611 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7614 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7615 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7616 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7617 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7618 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7619 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7622 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7623 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7624 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7627 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7628 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7630 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7631 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7633 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7638 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7639 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7640 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7641 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7642 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7646 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7647 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7649 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7650 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7652 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7653 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7654 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7655 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7658 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7660 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7661 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7662 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7663 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7665 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7666 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7668 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
7669 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7671 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7672 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7673 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7674 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7675 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7676 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7680 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7681 initial_commitment_tx,
7684 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7685 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7689 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7690 if validated.is_err() {
7691 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7694 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7695 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7696 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_p2wsh();
7697 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7698 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7699 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7700 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7701 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7702 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7703 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7704 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7705 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7707 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7708 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7709 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7710 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7711 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7712 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7713 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7714 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7716 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7717 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7718 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7720 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7722 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
7723 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7725 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7727 let mut channel = Channel {
7728 context: self.context,
7729 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7730 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7733 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger).is_some();
7734 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7735 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7738 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7740 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7741 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7742 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7743 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7744 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7749 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7750 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7751 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7752 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7755 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7756 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7757 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7758 common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7759 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7760 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7761 if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7762 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7763 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7766 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7767 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7768 // `static_remote_key`.
7769 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7770 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7772 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7773 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7774 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7776 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7777 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7778 return Err(ChannelError::close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7780 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7782 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7783 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7784 return Err(ChannelError::close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7790 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7791 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7792 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7793 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7794 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7795 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7796 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7797 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7798 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7799 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7800 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7803 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
7805 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7806 // support this channel type.
7807 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7809 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7810 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7811 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7812 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7813 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7814 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7815 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7819 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7823 counterparty_node_id,
7827 current_chain_height,
7832 counterparty_pubkeys,
7834 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7835 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7837 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7839 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7844 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7845 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7847 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7848 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7849 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7850 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7853 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7854 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7856 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7858 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7859 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7862 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7865 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7866 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7867 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7869 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7870 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7871 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
7872 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
7873 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7875 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7876 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7877 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7878 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7879 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7880 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7881 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7882 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7883 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7884 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7885 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7886 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7887 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7888 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7889 first_per_commitment_point,
7890 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7891 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7892 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7894 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7896 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7898 next_local_nonce: None,
7902 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7903 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7905 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7907 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7908 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7911 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7912 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7914 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
7915 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7916 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7917 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7918 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7919 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7920 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7921 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7922 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7923 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7924 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7926 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7929 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7930 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7931 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7935 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7936 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7939 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7940 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7942 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7943 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7945 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7947 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7948 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7949 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7950 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7953 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7954 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7955 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7956 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7957 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7959 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7961 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7962 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7963 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7966 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7967 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7968 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7972 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7973 initial_commitment_tx,
7976 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7977 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7980 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7981 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7984 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7986 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7987 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7988 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7989 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
7991 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7993 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7994 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_p2wsh();
7995 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7996 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7997 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7998 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7999 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
8000 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8001 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
8002 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
8003 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8005 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
8006 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
8007 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
8008 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
8009 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8010 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
8011 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
8013 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
8014 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
8016 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
8017 // `ChannelMonitor`.
8018 let mut channel = Channel {
8019 context: self.context,
8020 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8021 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
8023 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger).is_some();
8024 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
8026 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
8030 // A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8031 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8032 pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8033 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8034 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8035 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8036 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8039 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8040 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8041 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
8042 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8043 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64,
8044 user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64,
8045 funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget,
8046 ) -> Result<OutboundV2Channel<SP>, APIError>
8047 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8048 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8050 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id);
8051 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8052 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
8054 let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint));
8056 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8057 funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8059 let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target);
8060 let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height;
8063 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
8067 counterparty_node_id,
8073 current_chain_height,
8074 outbound_scid_alias,
8075 temporary_channel_id,
8076 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8081 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8082 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8083 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8084 their_funding_satoshis: 0,
8085 funding_tx_locktime,
8086 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8092 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
8093 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
8094 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
8095 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
8096 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
8097 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannelV2, ()>
8099 F::Target: FeeEstimator
8101 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
8102 Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash))
8105 pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8106 if self.context.have_received_message() {
8107 debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward");
8110 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8111 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8114 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8115 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(),
8116 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8117 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8118 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1,
8119 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8120 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8122 msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8123 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
8125 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8126 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8127 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8128 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8129 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8130 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8131 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8132 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8133 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8134 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8135 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8136 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8137 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8138 first_per_commitment_point,
8139 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
8140 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8141 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8142 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8144 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8146 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8147 second_per_commitment_point,
8148 locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime,
8149 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8154 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8155 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8156 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8157 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8158 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8159 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8162 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8163 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8164 /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
8165 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
8166 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
8167 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8168 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
8169 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
8170 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
8171 ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
8172 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8173 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8176 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
8177 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8178 channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
8179 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8180 channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8182 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
8183 // support this channel type.
8184 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
8185 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
8186 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
8188 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
8190 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8191 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
8192 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
8193 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
8194 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
8195 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
8198 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
8202 counterparty_node_id,
8206 current_chain_height,
8212 counterparty_pubkeys,
8214 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8215 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8216 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
8217 msg.common_fields.clone(),
8219 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
8220 &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
8221 &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
8222 context.channel_id = channel_id;
8226 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8227 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8228 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8229 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
8230 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
8231 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8238 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
8239 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
8241 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8242 pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8243 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8244 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8247 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8248 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8250 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
8252 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8253 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8256 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8259 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8260 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8261 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8263 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8264 fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8265 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8266 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &self.context.secp_ctx);
8267 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8268 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8269 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8271 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8272 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8273 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8274 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8275 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8276 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8277 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8278 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8279 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8280 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8281 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8282 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8283 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8284 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8285 first_per_commitment_point,
8286 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8287 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8288 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8290 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8292 funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8293 second_per_commitment_point,
8294 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8298 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8299 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8301 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8303 pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8304 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8308 // Unfunded channel utilities
8310 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8311 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
8312 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
8313 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
8314 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
8315 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8316 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
8317 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
8318 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
8319 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
8322 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
8323 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
8324 // `only_static_remotekey`.
8325 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
8326 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
8327 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8333 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4;
8334 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8336 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8342 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8343 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8344 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8345 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8346 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8348 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8349 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8350 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8351 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8357 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8358 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8359 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8360 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8361 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8362 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8367 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8368 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8369 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8370 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8372 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8373 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8374 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8375 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8380 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8381 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8382 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8383 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8384 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8385 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8390 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8391 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8392 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8395 let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state {
8396 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)|
8397 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8398 matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. })
8402 SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8404 MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8406 write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8408 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8409 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8410 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8411 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8412 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8414 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8415 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8416 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8417 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8419 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8421 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8422 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8423 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8425 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8427 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8429 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8431 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8433 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8434 // deserialized from that format.
8435 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8436 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8437 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8439 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8441 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number().write(writer)?;
8442 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8443 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8445 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8446 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8447 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8448 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8451 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8452 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8453 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8456 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8457 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8458 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8459 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8461 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8462 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8464 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8465 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8466 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8471 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8474 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8476 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8477 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8478 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8483 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8486 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8489 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8491 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8496 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8497 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8498 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8500 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8501 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8502 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8503 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8504 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8505 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8506 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8508 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8510 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8512 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8515 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8516 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8517 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8520 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8522 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8523 preimages.push(preimage);
8525 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8526 reason.write(writer)?;
8528 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8530 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8531 preimages.push(preimage);
8533 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8534 reason.write(writer)?;
8537 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8538 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8541 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8542 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8543 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8544 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8545 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8546 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8548 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8549 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8550 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8553 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8554 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8555 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8556 source.write(writer)?;
8557 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8559 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8560 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8562 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8564 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8565 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8567 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8569 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8570 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8572 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8573 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8575 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8576 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8577 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8579 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8581 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8582 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8587 match self.context.resend_order {
8588 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8589 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8592 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8593 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8594 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8596 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8597 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8598 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8599 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8602 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8603 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8604 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8605 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8606 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8609 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8610 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8611 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8612 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8614 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8615 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8616 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8618 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8620 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8621 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8622 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8623 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8625 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8626 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8627 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8628 // consider the stale state on reload.
8631 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8632 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8633 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8635 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8636 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8637 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8639 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8640 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8642 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8643 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8644 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8646 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8647 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8649 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8652 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8653 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8654 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8656 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8659 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8660 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8662 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8663 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8664 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8666 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8668 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8670 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8672 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8673 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8674 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8675 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8676 htlc.write(writer)?;
8679 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8680 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8681 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8683 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8684 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8686 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8687 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8688 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8689 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8690 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8691 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8692 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8694 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8695 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8696 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8697 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8698 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8700 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8701 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8703 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8704 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8705 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8706 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8708 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8710 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None;
8711 if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
8712 monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
8715 // `current_point` will become optional when async signing is implemented.
8716 let cur_holder_commitment_point = Some(self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point());
8717 let next_holder_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.next_point();
8719 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8720 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8721 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8722 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8723 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8724 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8725 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8727 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8728 (2, chan_type, option),
8729 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8730 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8731 (5, self.context.config, required),
8732 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8733 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8734 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8735 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8736 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8737 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8738 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8739 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8740 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8741 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8742 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8743 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8744 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8745 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8746 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8747 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8748 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8749 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8750 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8751 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8752 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8753 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8754 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8755 (45, cur_holder_commitment_point, option),
8756 (47, next_holder_commitment_point, option),
8757 (49, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8764 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8765 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8767 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8768 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8770 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8771 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8772 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8774 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8775 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8776 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8777 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8779 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8781 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8782 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8783 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8784 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8785 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8787 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8788 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8791 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8792 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8793 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8795 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8797 let mut keys_data = None;
8799 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8800 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8801 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8802 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8803 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8804 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8805 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8806 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8807 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8808 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8812 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8813 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8814 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8817 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8819 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8820 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8821 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8823 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8825 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8826 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8827 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8828 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8829 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8830 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8831 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8832 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8834 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8835 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8837 Readable::read(reader)?
8839 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution)
8842 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8843 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8845 Readable::read(reader)?
8847 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution)
8849 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8850 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8851 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8856 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8857 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8858 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8859 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8860 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8861 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8862 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8863 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8864 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8865 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8866 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8867 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8869 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8870 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8873 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8874 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8877 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8878 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8880 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8882 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8883 blinding_point: None,
8887 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8888 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8889 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8890 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8891 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8892 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8893 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8894 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8895 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8896 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8897 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8898 blinding_point: None,
8900 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8901 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8902 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8904 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8905 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8906 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8908 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8912 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8913 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8914 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8915 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8918 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8919 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8920 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8922 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8923 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8924 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8925 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8928 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8929 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8930 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8931 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8934 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8936 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8938 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8939 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8940 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8941 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8943 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8944 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8945 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8946 // consider the stale state on reload.
8947 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8950 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8951 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8952 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8954 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8957 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8958 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8959 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8961 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8962 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8963 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8964 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8966 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8967 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8969 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8970 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8972 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8973 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8974 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8976 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8978 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8979 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8981 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8982 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8985 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8987 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8988 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8989 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8990 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8992 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8995 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8996 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8998 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
9000 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
9001 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9003 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9004 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
9006 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
9008 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9009 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
9010 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9012 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9013 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
9014 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
9018 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
9019 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
9020 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
9022 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
9028 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
9029 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
9030 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
9031 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
9032 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
9033 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
9034 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
9035 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
9036 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
9037 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
9039 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
9040 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
9041 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
9042 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
9043 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
9044 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
9045 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
9047 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
9048 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9049 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
9050 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
9052 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
9054 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9055 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9057 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
9059 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
9061 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9062 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9064 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
9065 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option<Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>> = None;
9067 let mut cur_holder_commitment_point_opt: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9068 let mut next_holder_commitment_point_opt: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9070 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9071 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
9072 (1, minimum_depth, option),
9073 (2, channel_type, option),
9074 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9075 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9076 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
9077 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
9078 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
9079 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
9080 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
9081 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
9082 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
9083 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
9084 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
9085 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
9086 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
9087 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9088 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
9089 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
9090 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
9091 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
9092 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
9093 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
9094 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9095 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9096 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
9097 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9098 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9099 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
9100 (45, cur_holder_commitment_point_opt, option),
9101 (47, next_holder_commitment_point_opt, option),
9102 (49, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
9105 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
9106 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
9107 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
9108 // required channel parameters.
9109 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
9110 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
9112 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
9114 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
9115 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9116 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
9117 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
9120 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
9121 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
9122 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9124 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9125 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9127 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9128 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9133 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
9134 if iter.next().is_some() {
9135 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9139 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
9140 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
9141 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
9142 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
9143 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
9146 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
9147 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
9148 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
9150 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9151 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9153 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
9154 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
9155 // separate u64 values.
9156 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
9158 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
9160 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
9161 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9162 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9163 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9165 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9166 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9168 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
9169 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9170 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9171 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
9172 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9175 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9176 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9178 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
9179 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9180 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9181 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9183 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9184 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9186 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
9187 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9188 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9189 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
9190 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9193 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9194 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9197 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
9198 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
9199 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
9200 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
9201 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
9202 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
9205 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9206 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9207 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
9209 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
9213 // If we're restoring this channel for the first time after an upgrade, then we require that the
9214 // signer be available so that we can immediately populate the current commitment point. Channel
9215 // restoration will fail if this is not possible.
9216 let holder_commitment_point = match (cur_holder_commitment_point_opt, next_holder_commitment_point_opt) {
9217 (Some(current), Some(next)) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9218 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, current, next
9220 (Some(current), _) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9221 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, current,
9222 next: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &secp_ctx),
9224 (_, _) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9225 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9226 current: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &secp_ctx),
9227 next: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &secp_ctx),
9232 context: ChannelContext {
9235 config: config.unwrap(),
9239 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
9240 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
9241 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
9244 temporary_channel_id,
9246 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
9248 channel_value_satoshis,
9250 latest_monitor_update_id,
9252 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
9253 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9256 holder_commitment_point,
9257 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
9260 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
9261 pending_inbound_htlcs,
9262 pending_outbound_htlcs,
9263 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
9267 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
9268 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
9269 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
9270 monitor_pending_forwards,
9271 monitor_pending_failures,
9272 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
9273 monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9275 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
9276 signer_pending_funding: false,
9279 holding_cell_update_fee,
9280 next_holder_htlc_id,
9281 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
9282 update_time_counter,
9285 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9286 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9287 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9288 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9290 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
9291 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
9292 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
9293 closing_fee_limits: None,
9294 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
9296 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
9297 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
9299 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
9301 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
9302 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
9303 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
9304 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
9305 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
9306 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
9307 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
9308 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
9309 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
9312 counterparty_forwarding_info,
9314 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
9315 funding_transaction,
9318 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
9319 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
9320 counterparty_node_id,
9322 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9326 channel_update_status,
9327 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
9331 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9332 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9333 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9334 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9336 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
9337 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
9339 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
9340 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
9341 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
9343 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9344 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9346 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9347 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
9349 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
9352 local_initiated_shutdown,
9354 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
9356 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9357 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
9365 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
9366 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
9367 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
9368 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, Version};
9369 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
9370 use bitcoin::network::Network;
9371 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
9372 use crate::ln::types::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
9373 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
9374 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
9375 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
9376 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
9377 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
9378 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
9379 use crate::ln::msgs;
9380 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
9381 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
9382 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
9383 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
9384 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9385 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9386 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9387 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9388 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9389 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9390 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9391 use crate::util::test_utils;
9392 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9393 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9394 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9395 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9396 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9397 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9398 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9399 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9400 use bitcoin::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion, WPubkeyHash};
9401 use crate::prelude::*;
9404 fn test_channel_state_order() {
9405 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9406 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9407 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9409 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9410 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9411 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9412 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9415 struct TestFeeEstimator {
9418 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9419 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9425 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9426 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9427 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9428 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9432 signer: InMemorySigner,
9435 impl EntropySource for Keys {
9436 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9439 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9440 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9442 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9444 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9445 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9448 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9452 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9454 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9455 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9456 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9457 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9458 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9461 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9462 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9463 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9464 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9468 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9469 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9470 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9474 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9475 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9476 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9477 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9480 let seed = [42; 32];
9481 let network = Network::Testnet;
9482 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9483 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9484 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9487 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9488 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9489 let config = UserConfig::default();
9490 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9491 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9492 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9494 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9495 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9499 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9500 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9502 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9503 let original_fee = 253;
9504 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9505 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9506 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9507 let seed = [42; 32];
9508 let network = Network::Testnet;
9509 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9511 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9512 let config = UserConfig::default();
9513 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9515 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9516 // same as the old fee.
9517 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9518 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9519 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9523 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9524 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9525 // dust limits are used.
9526 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9527 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9528 let seed = [42; 32];
9529 let network = Network::Testnet;
9530 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9531 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9532 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9534 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9535 // they have different dust limits.
9537 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9538 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9539 let config = UserConfig::default();
9540 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9542 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9543 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9544 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9545 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9546 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9548 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9549 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9550 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9551 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9552 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9554 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9555 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9556 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9557 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9559 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9560 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9561 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9563 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9564 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9565 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9567 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9568 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9569 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9571 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9572 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9573 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9574 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9577 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9579 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9580 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9581 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9582 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9583 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9584 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9585 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9586 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9587 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9589 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9590 blinding_point: None,
9593 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9594 // the dust limit check.
9595 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9596 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9597 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9598 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9600 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9601 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9602 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9603 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9604 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9605 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9606 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9610 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9611 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9612 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9613 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9614 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9615 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9616 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9617 let seed = [42; 32];
9618 let network = Network::Testnet;
9619 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9621 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9622 let config = UserConfig::default();
9623 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9625 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9626 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9628 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9629 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9630 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9631 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9632 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9633 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9635 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9636 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9637 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9638 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9639 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9641 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9643 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9644 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9645 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9646 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9647 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9649 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9650 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9651 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9652 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9653 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9657 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9658 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9659 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9660 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9661 let seed = [42; 32];
9662 let network = Network::Testnet;
9663 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9664 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9665 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9667 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9669 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9670 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9671 let config = UserConfig::default();
9672 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9674 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9675 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9676 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9677 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9679 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9680 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9681 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9683 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9684 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9685 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9686 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9688 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9689 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9690 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9692 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9693 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9694 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9696 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9697 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9698 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9699 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9700 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9701 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9702 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9704 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9706 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9707 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9708 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9709 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9710 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9714 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9715 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9716 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9717 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9718 let seed = [42; 32];
9719 let network = Network::Testnet;
9720 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9721 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9722 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9724 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9725 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9726 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9727 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9728 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9729 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9730 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9731 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9733 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9734 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9735 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9736 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9737 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9738 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9740 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9741 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9742 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9743 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9745 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9747 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9748 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9749 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9750 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9751 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9752 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9754 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9755 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9756 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9757 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9759 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9760 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9761 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9762 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9763 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9765 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9766 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9768 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9769 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9770 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9772 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9773 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9774 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9775 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9776 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9778 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9779 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9781 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9782 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9783 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9787 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9789 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9790 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9791 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9793 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9794 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9795 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9796 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9798 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9799 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9800 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9802 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9804 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9805 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9808 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9809 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9810 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9811 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9812 let seed = [42; 32];
9813 let network = Network::Testnet;
9814 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9815 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9816 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9819 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9820 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9821 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9823 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9824 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9826 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9827 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9828 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9830 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9831 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9833 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9835 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9836 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9838 // Channel Negotiations failed
9839 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9840 assert!(result.is_err());
9845 fn channel_update() {
9846 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9847 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9848 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9849 let seed = [42; 32];
9850 let network = Network::Testnet;
9851 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9852 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9853 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9855 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9856 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9857 let config = UserConfig::default();
9858 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9860 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9861 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9862 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9863 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9864 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9866 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9867 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9868 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9869 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9870 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9872 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9873 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9874 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9875 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9877 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9878 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9879 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9881 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9882 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9883 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9885 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9886 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9887 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9889 short_channel_id: 0,
9892 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9893 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9894 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9896 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9897 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9899 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9901 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9903 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9904 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9905 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9906 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9908 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9909 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9910 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9912 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9915 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9919 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9920 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9922 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9923 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9924 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9925 let seed = [42; 32];
9926 let network = Network::Testnet;
9927 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9928 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9930 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9931 let config = UserConfig::default();
9932 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9933 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9934 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9936 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9937 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9938 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9940 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9941 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9942 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9944 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9945 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9946 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9947 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9948 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9951 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9953 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9954 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9955 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9956 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9960 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9961 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9962 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9964 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9967 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9969 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9970 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9971 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9972 blinding_point: None,
9974 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9975 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9977 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9980 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9983 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9985 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9988 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9989 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9990 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9992 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9993 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9996 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9997 blinding_point: None,
9999 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
10000 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
10003 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
10004 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
10006 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
10007 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
10009 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
10012 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
10013 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
10014 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
10015 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
10016 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
10017 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
10018 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
10019 } = &mut dummy_add {
10020 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
10021 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
10022 } else { panic!() }
10023 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
10024 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
10025 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
10027 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
10030 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
10032 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
10033 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
10034 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
10035 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
10036 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
10037 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
10038 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
10039 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
10042 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
10044 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
10045 use bitcoin::sighash;
10046 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
10047 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
10048 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
10049 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
10050 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
10051 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
10052 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
10053 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
10054 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
10055 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
10056 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
10057 use crate::sync::Arc;
10058 use core::str::FromStr;
10059 use hex::DisplayHex;
10061 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
10062 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
10063 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
10064 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10066 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
10068 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10069 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10070 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10071 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10072 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10074 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
10075 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
10081 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10082 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
10083 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
10085 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10086 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10087 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
10088 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
10089 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10090 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
10092 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
10094 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
10095 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
10096 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
10097 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
10098 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
10099 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
10101 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
10102 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
10103 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
10104 selected_contest_delay: 144
10106 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
10107 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
10109 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
10110 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10112 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10113 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
10115 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10116 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10118 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
10119 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
10120 // build_commitment_transaction.
10121 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
10122 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10123 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10124 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
10125 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
10127 macro_rules! test_commitment {
10128 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10129 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10130 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
10134 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
10135 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10136 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10137 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
10141 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
10142 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
10143 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
10145 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
10146 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
10148 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
10149 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
10151 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
10153 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
10154 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
10155 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10156 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10157 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
10158 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
10159 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
10161 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
10162 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10163 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
10164 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10166 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10167 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
10168 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
10170 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
10172 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
10173 commitment_tx.clone(),
10174 counterparty_signature,
10175 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
10176 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
10177 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
10179 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10180 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
10182 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10183 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
10184 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
10186 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
10187 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
10190 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
10191 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10193 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
10194 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
10195 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
10196 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
10197 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
10198 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
10199 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_digest(sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap().as_raw_hash().to_byte_array());
10200 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
10202 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
10205 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
10206 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
10207 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
10211 assert!(preimage.is_some());
10214 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
10215 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
10216 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
10217 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
10218 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
10219 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
10221 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
10222 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
10223 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
10224 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
10225 htlc: htlc.clone(),
10226 preimage: preimage.clone(),
10227 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
10228 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10229 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
10230 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
10232 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10233 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
10234 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
10235 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
10236 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
10237 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
10239 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
10243 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
10244 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
10245 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
10246 "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", {});
10248 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10249 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
10251 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
10252 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
10253 "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", {});
10255 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10256 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
10257 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
10258 "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", {});
10260 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10261 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10263 amount_msat: 1000000,
10265 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10266 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10268 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10271 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10272 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10274 amount_msat: 2000000,
10276 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10277 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10279 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10282 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10283 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10285 amount_msat: 2000000,
10287 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10288 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10289 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10290 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10291 blinding_point: None,
10293 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10296 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10297 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10299 amount_msat: 3000000,
10301 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10302 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10303 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10304 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10305 blinding_point: None,
10307 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10310 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10311 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10313 amount_msat: 4000000,
10315 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10316 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10318 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10322 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10323 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10324 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
10326 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
10327 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
10328 "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", {
10331 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
10332 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
10333 "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" },
10336 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
10337 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
10338 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10341 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
10342 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
10343 "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" },
10346 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
10347 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
10348 "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" },
10351 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
10352 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
10353 "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" }
10356 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10357 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10358 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
10360 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
10361 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
10362 "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", {
10365 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
10366 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
10367 "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" },
10370 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
10371 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
10372 "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" },
10375 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
10376 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
10377 "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" },
10380 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
10381 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
10382 "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" },
10385 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10386 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10387 "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" }
10390 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10391 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10392 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10394 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10395 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10396 "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", {
10399 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10400 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10401 "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" },
10404 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10405 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10406 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d38412401473044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
10409 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10410 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10411 "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" },
10414 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10415 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10416 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be01483045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
10419 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10420 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10421 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10422 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10424 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10425 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10426 "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", {
10429 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10430 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10431 "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" },
10434 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10435 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10436 "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" },
10439 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10440 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10441 "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" },
10444 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10445 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10446 "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" }
10449 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10450 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10451 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10452 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10454 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10455 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10456 "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", {
10459 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10460 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10461 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10464 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10465 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10466 "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" },
10469 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10470 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10471 "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" },
10474 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10475 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10476 "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" }
10479 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10480 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10481 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10483 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10484 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10485 "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", {
10488 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10489 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10490 "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" },
10493 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10494 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10495 "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" },
10498 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10499 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10500 "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" }
10503 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10504 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10505 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10507 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10508 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10509 "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", {
10512 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10513 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10514 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de84500148304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e015430101008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10517 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10518 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10519 "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" },
10522 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10523 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10524 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd020000000000000000019a090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b014830450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
10527 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10528 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10529 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10531 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10532 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10533 "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", {
10536 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10537 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10538 "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" },
10541 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10542 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10543 "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" }
10546 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10547 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10548 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10549 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10550 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10551 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10553 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10554 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10555 "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", {
10558 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10559 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10560 "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" },
10563 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10564 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10565 "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" }
10568 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10569 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10570 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10571 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10572 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10574 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10575 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10576 "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", {
10579 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10580 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10581 "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" },
10584 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10585 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10586 "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" }
10589 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10590 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10591 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10593 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10594 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10595 "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", {
10598 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10599 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10600 "0200000000010120060e4a29579d429f0f27c17ee5f1ee282f20d706d6f90b63d35946d8f3029a0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a01483045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
10603 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10604 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10605 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10606 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10607 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10609 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10610 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10611 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80054a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aa28b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d01483045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c22837701475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10614 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10615 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10616 "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" }
10619 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10620 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10621 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10622 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10623 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10625 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10626 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10627 "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", {
10630 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10631 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10632 "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" }
10635 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10636 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10637 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10638 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10640 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10641 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10642 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
10644 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10645 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10646 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10647 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10648 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10650 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10651 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10652 "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", {});
10654 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10655 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10656 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10657 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10658 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10660 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10661 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10662 "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", {});
10664 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10665 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10666 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10668 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10669 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10670 "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", {});
10672 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10673 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10674 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10675 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10676 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10678 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10679 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10680 "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", {});
10682 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10683 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10684 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10685 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10686 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10688 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10689 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10690 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
10692 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10693 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10694 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10695 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10696 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10697 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10699 amount_msat: 2000000,
10701 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10702 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10704 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10707 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10708 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10709 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10711 amount_msat: 5000001,
10713 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10714 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10715 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10716 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10717 blinding_point: None,
10719 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10722 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10723 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10725 amount_msat: 5000000,
10727 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10728 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10729 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10730 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10731 blinding_point: None,
10733 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10737 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10738 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10739 "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", {
10742 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10743 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10744 "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" },
10746 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10747 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10748 "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" },
10750 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10751 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10752 "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" }
10755 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10756 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10757 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10758 "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", {
10761 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10762 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10763 "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" },
10765 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10766 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10767 "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" },
10769 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10770 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10771 "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" }
10776 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10777 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10779 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10780 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10781 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10782 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10784 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10785 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10786 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10788 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10789 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10791 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10792 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10794 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10795 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10796 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10800 fn test_key_derivation() {
10801 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10802 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10804 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10805 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10807 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10808 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10810 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10811 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10813 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10814 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10816 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10817 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10819 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10820 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10824 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10825 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10826 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10827 let seed = [42; 32];
10828 let network = Network::Testnet;
10829 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10830 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10832 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10833 let config = UserConfig::default();
10834 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10835 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10837 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10838 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10840 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10841 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10842 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10843 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10844 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10845 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10846 assert!(res.is_ok());
10850 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10851 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10852 // resulting `channel_type`.
10853 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10854 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10855 let network = Network::Testnet;
10856 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10857 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10859 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10860 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10862 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10863 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10865 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10866 // need to signal it.
10867 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10868 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10869 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10870 &config, 0, 42, None
10872 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10874 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10875 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10876 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10878 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10879 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10880 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10884 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10885 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10886 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10887 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10888 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10891 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10892 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10896 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10897 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10898 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10899 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10900 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10901 let network = Network::Testnet;
10902 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10903 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10905 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10906 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10908 let config = UserConfig::default();
10910 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10911 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10912 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10913 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10914 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10916 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10917 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10918 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10922 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10923 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10924 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
10926 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10927 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10928 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10929 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10930 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10931 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10933 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10937 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10938 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10940 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10941 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10942 let network = Network::Testnet;
10943 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10944 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10946 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10947 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10949 let config = UserConfig::default();
10951 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10952 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10953 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10954 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10955 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10956 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10957 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10958 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10960 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10961 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10962 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10963 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10964 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10965 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10969 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10970 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10972 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10973 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10974 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10975 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10977 assert!(res.is_err());
10979 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10980 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10981 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10983 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10984 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10985 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10988 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10990 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10991 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10992 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10993 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10996 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10997 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10999 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
11000 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
11002 assert!(res.is_err());
11006 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
11007 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
11008 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
11009 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11010 let seed = [42; 32];
11011 let network = Network::Testnet;
11012 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
11013 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
11014 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
11016 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
11017 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
11018 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
11019 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
11021 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
11022 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11023 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11028 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11038 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11039 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
11040 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11045 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
11046 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11052 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
11055 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
11056 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
11057 &accept_channel_msg,
11058 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
11059 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11062 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
11063 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
11064 let tx = Transaction {
11065 version: Version::ONE,
11066 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
11070 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
11073 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
11076 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
11077 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
11078 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
11079 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11080 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
11081 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
11085 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11086 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11094 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
11095 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
11096 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
11097 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
11099 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
11100 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11107 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
11108 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
11109 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
11110 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
11111 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
11113 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
11114 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
11115 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
11123 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
11124 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
11127 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
11128 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
11129 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
11130 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0, &&logger).is_some());