1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
34 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
35 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
36 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
38 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
39 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
41 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
42 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
43 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
46 use crate::prelude::*;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
49 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
50 use crate::sync::Mutex;
51 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 pub struct AvailableBalances {
66 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
67 pub balance_msat: u64,
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
78 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
80 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
81 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
82 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
83 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
84 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
85 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
87 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
91 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
92 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
93 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
94 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
97 enum InboundHTLCState {
98 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
99 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
100 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
102 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
103 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
104 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
105 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
106 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
107 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
108 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
109 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
110 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
111 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
112 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
114 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
115 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
116 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
118 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
119 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
120 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
122 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
123 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
124 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
125 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
126 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
127 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
129 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
130 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
131 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
132 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
133 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
134 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
135 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
139 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
141 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
142 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
143 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
144 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
145 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
146 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
147 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
148 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
151 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
155 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
156 state: InboundHTLCState,
159 enum OutboundHTLCState {
160 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
161 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
162 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
163 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
164 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
165 /// money back (though we won't), and,
166 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
167 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
168 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
169 /// we'll never get out of sync).
170 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
171 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
172 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
174 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
175 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
176 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
177 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
178 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
179 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
180 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
181 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
182 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
187 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
188 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
193 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
194 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
197 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
198 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
200 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
201 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
206 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
207 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
209 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
215 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
219 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
220 state: OutboundHTLCState,
224 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
225 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
226 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
235 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
245 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
246 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
247 /// move on to ChannelReady.
248 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
249 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
250 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
252 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
253 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
254 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
255 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
256 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
257 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
258 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
260 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
261 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
262 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
264 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
265 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
266 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
271 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
272 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
274 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
275 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
276 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
277 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
278 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
279 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
280 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
281 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
282 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
284 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
285 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
286 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
287 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
288 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
289 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
290 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
291 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
292 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
293 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
294 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
295 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
297 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
298 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
300 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
302 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
303 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
304 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
305 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
306 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
307 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
308 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
309 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
311 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
313 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
315 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
319 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
321 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
322 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
323 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
325 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
326 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
328 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
329 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
330 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
331 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
332 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
334 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
335 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
339 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
345 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
348 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
349 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
350 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 holding_cell_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
355 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
356 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
357 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
358 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
359 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
360 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
361 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
362 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
363 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
367 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
368 struct HTLCCandidate {
370 origin: HTLCInitiator,
374 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
382 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
384 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
386 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
387 htlc_value_msat: u64,
388 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
393 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
394 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
395 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
396 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
397 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
399 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
400 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
401 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
402 htlc_value_msat: u64,
403 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
404 /// in the holding cell).
405 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
414 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
420 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
423 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
424 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
425 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
426 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
427 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
428 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
429 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
430 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
431 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
432 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
436 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
437 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
438 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
439 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
440 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
441 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
442 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
443 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
446 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
447 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
448 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
449 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
450 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
451 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
452 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
453 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
454 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
455 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
456 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
457 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
458 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
459 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
460 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
462 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
463 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
464 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
465 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
467 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
468 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
469 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
470 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
472 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
473 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
474 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
475 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
476 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
478 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
479 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
480 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
481 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
483 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
484 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
485 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
487 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
488 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
489 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
490 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
491 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
493 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
494 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
495 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
498 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
499 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
500 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
501 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
503 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
504 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
505 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
506 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
508 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
512 channel_id: [u8; 32],
515 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
516 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
518 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
519 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
520 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
522 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
523 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
524 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
525 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
527 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
528 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
530 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
532 holder_signer: Signer,
533 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
534 destination_script: Script,
536 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
537 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
538 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
540 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
541 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
542 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
543 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
544 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
545 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
547 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
548 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
549 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
550 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
551 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
552 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
554 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
556 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
557 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
558 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
559 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
560 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
561 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
563 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
565 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
566 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
567 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
568 // HTLCs with similar state.
569 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
570 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
571 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
572 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
573 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
574 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
575 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
576 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
577 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
580 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
581 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
582 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
584 update_time_counter: u32,
586 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
587 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
588 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
589 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
590 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
591 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
593 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
594 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
596 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
597 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
598 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
599 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
601 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
602 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
604 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
606 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
608 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
609 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
610 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
611 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
612 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
613 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
615 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
616 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
617 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
618 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
619 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
621 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
622 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
623 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
624 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
625 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
626 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
627 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
628 channel_creation_height: u32,
630 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
633 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
635 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
638 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
640 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
643 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
648 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
651 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
653 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
655 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
656 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
658 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
660 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
661 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
664 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
666 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
667 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
669 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
670 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
671 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
673 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
675 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
677 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
678 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
679 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
680 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
682 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
683 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
684 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
686 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
687 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
688 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
690 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
691 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
692 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
693 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
694 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
695 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
697 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
699 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
700 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
701 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
702 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
703 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
705 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
706 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
708 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
709 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
710 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
711 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
712 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
713 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
714 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
715 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
717 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
718 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
720 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
721 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
722 // the channel's funding UTXO.
724 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
725 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
726 // associated channel mapping.
728 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
729 // to store all of them.
730 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
732 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
733 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
734 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
735 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
736 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
738 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
739 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
741 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
742 /// [`KeysInterface::derive_channel_signer`].
743 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
746 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
747 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
749 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
750 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
751 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
755 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
757 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
758 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
760 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
764 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
766 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
768 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
770 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
771 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
772 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
773 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
774 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
776 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
777 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
779 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
781 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
782 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
784 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
785 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
786 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
787 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
788 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
789 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
791 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
792 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
794 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
795 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
796 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
797 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
798 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
800 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
801 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
803 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
804 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
806 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
807 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
808 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
809 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
815 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
816 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
818 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
819 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
820 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
825 macro_rules! secp_check {
826 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
829 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
834 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
835 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
836 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
837 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
839 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
841 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
842 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
843 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
845 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
848 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
850 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
853 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
854 /// required by us according to the configured or default
855 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
857 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
859 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
860 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
861 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
862 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
863 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
866 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
867 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
868 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
869 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
870 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
871 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
872 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
875 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
876 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
879 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
880 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
881 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
882 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
883 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
884 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
885 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
886 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
891 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
892 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
893 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
894 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
895 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
896 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
897 // We've exhausted our options
900 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
901 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
905 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
906 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
907 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
908 outbound_scid_alias: u64
909 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
910 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
911 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
913 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
915 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
916 let channel_keys_id = keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
917 let holder_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
918 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
920 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
921 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
923 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
924 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
926 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
927 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
928 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
930 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
931 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
933 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
934 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
935 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
936 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
937 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
940 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
942 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
943 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
944 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
945 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
948 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
949 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
951 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
952 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
955 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
956 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
957 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
964 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
965 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
966 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
967 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
972 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
974 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
975 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
976 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
978 channel_value_satoshis,
980 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
983 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
984 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
986 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
987 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
990 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
991 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
992 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
993 pending_update_fee: None,
994 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
995 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
996 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
997 update_time_counter: 1,
999 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1001 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1002 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1003 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1004 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1005 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1006 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1008 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1009 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1010 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1011 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1013 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1014 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1015 closing_fee_limits: None,
1016 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1018 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1020 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1021 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1022 short_channel_id: None,
1023 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1025 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1026 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1027 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1028 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1029 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1030 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1031 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1032 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1033 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1034 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1035 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1037 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1039 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1040 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1041 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1042 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1043 counterparty_parameters: None,
1044 funding_outpoint: None,
1045 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1046 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1048 funding_transaction: None,
1050 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1051 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1052 counterparty_node_id,
1054 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1056 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1058 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1059 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1061 announcement_sigs: None,
1063 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1064 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1065 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1066 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1068 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1070 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1071 outbound_scid_alias,
1073 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1075 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1076 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1078 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1083 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1084 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1085 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1087 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1088 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1089 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1090 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1091 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1092 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1093 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1094 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1096 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1097 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1098 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1099 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1100 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1101 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1102 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1103 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1105 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1106 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1110 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1115 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1116 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1117 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1118 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1119 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1120 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1121 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1122 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1123 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1126 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1127 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1129 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1130 // support this channel type.
1131 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1132 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1133 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1136 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1137 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1140 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1141 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1142 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1143 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1144 // publicly announced.
1145 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1146 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1150 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1151 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1154 channel_type.clone()
1156 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1158 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1162 let channel_keys_id = keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1163 let holder_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1164 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1165 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1166 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1167 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1168 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1169 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1170 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1173 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1174 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1177 // Check sanity of message fields:
1178 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1179 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1181 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1182 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1184 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1187 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1188 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1189 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1191 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1194 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1195 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1197 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1199 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1200 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1201 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1203 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1206 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1210 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1211 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1214 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1217 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1220 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1223 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1226 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1229 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1233 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1235 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1236 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1241 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1242 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1243 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1244 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1245 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1247 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1250 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1251 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1252 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1254 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1255 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1258 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1259 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1260 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1261 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1262 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1266 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1267 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1268 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1269 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1273 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1274 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1275 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1276 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1277 if script.len() == 0 {
1280 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1283 Some(script.clone())
1286 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1287 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1288 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1293 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1294 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1297 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1298 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1299 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1303 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1304 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1306 let chan = Channel {
1309 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1310 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1312 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1317 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1319 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1320 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1321 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1324 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1327 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1328 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1330 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1331 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1332 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1334 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1335 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1336 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1337 pending_update_fee: None,
1338 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1339 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1340 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1341 update_time_counter: 1,
1343 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1345 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1346 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1347 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1348 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1349 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1350 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1352 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1353 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1354 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1355 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1357 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1358 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1359 closing_fee_limits: None,
1360 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1362 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1364 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1365 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1366 short_channel_id: None,
1367 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1369 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1370 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1371 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1372 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1373 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1374 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1375 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1376 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1377 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1378 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1379 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1380 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1382 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1384 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1385 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1386 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1387 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1388 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1389 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1390 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1392 funding_outpoint: None,
1393 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1394 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1396 funding_transaction: None,
1398 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1399 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1400 counterparty_node_id,
1402 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1404 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1406 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1407 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1409 announcement_sigs: None,
1411 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1412 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1413 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1414 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1416 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1418 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1419 outbound_scid_alias,
1421 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1423 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1424 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1433 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1434 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1435 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1436 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1437 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1439 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1440 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1441 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1442 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1443 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1444 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1445 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1447 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1448 where L::Target: Logger
1450 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1451 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1452 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1454 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1455 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1456 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1457 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1459 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1460 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1461 if match update_state {
1462 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1463 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1464 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1465 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1466 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1468 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1472 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1473 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1474 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1475 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1477 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1478 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1479 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1481 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1482 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1483 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1484 transaction_output_index: None
1489 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1490 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1491 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1492 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1493 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1496 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1498 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1499 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1500 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1502 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1503 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1506 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1507 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1510 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1512 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1513 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1514 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1516 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1517 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1523 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1524 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1525 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1526 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1527 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1528 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1529 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1533 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1534 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1536 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1538 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1539 if generated_by_local {
1540 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1541 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1550 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1552 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1553 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1554 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1555 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1556 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1557 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1558 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1561 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1562 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1563 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1564 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1568 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1569 preimages.push(preimage);
1573 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1574 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1576 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1578 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1579 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1581 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1582 if !generated_by_local {
1583 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1591 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1592 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1593 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1594 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1595 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1596 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1597 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1598 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1600 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1602 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1603 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1604 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1605 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1607 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1609 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1610 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1611 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1612 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1615 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1616 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1617 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1618 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1620 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1623 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1624 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1625 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1626 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1628 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1631 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1632 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1637 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1638 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1643 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1645 let channel_parameters =
1646 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1647 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1648 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1651 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1656 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1659 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1660 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1661 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1662 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1664 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1665 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1666 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1674 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1675 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1681 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1682 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1683 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1684 // outside of those situations will fail.
1685 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1689 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1694 1 + // script length (0)
1698 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1699 2 + // witness marker and flag
1700 1 + // witness element count
1701 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1702 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1703 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1704 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1705 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1706 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1708 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1709 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1710 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1716 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1717 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1718 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1719 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1721 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1722 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1723 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1725 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1726 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1727 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1728 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1729 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1730 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1733 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1734 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1737 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1738 value_to_holder = 0;
1741 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1742 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1743 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1744 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1746 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1747 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1750 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1751 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1755 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1756 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1757 /// our counterparty!)
1758 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1759 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1760 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1761 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1762 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1763 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1764 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1766 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1770 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1771 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1772 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1773 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1774 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1775 //may see payments to it!
1776 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1777 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1778 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1780 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1783 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1784 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1785 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1786 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1787 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1790 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1793 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1794 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1796 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1798 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1799 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1800 where L::Target: Logger {
1801 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1802 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1803 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1804 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1805 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1806 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1807 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1808 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1812 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1813 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1814 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1815 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1817 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1818 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1820 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1822 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1824 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1825 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1826 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1828 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1829 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1830 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1831 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1832 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1834 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1835 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1836 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1838 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1839 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1841 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1844 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1845 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1849 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1853 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1854 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1855 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1856 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1857 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1858 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1861 // Now update local state:
1863 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1864 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1865 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1866 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1867 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1868 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1869 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1873 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1874 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1875 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1876 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1877 // do not not get into this branch.
1878 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1879 match pending_update {
1880 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1881 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1882 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1883 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1884 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1885 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1886 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1889 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1890 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1891 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1892 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1893 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1894 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1895 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1901 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1902 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1903 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1905 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1906 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1907 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1909 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1910 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1913 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1914 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1916 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1917 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1919 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1920 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1923 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1926 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1927 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1928 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1929 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1934 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1935 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1936 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1937 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1938 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1941 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1942 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1943 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1944 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1945 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1947 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1948 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1949 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1953 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1954 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1955 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1956 /// before we fail backwards.
1957 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1958 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1959 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1960 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1961 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1963 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1965 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1966 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1967 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1969 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1970 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1971 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1973 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1974 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1975 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1977 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1982 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1983 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1989 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1990 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1991 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1992 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1993 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1997 // Now update local state:
1998 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1999 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2000 match pending_update {
2001 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2002 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2003 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2004 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2008 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2009 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2010 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2011 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2017 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2018 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2019 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2025 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2027 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2028 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2031 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2032 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2033 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2038 // Message handlers:
2040 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2041 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2043 // Check sanity of message fields:
2044 if !self.is_outbound() {
2045 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2047 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2048 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2050 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2051 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2053 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2054 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2056 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2057 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2059 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2060 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2061 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2063 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2064 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2065 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2067 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2068 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2071 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2072 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2074 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2075 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2078 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2079 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2080 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2082 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2083 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2085 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2086 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2088 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2091 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2092 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2094 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2097 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2098 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2101 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2102 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2103 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2105 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2106 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2108 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2111 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2112 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2113 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2114 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2115 if script.len() == 0 {
2118 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2121 Some(script.clone())
2124 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2125 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2126 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2131 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2132 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2133 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2134 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2135 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2137 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2138 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2140 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2143 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2144 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2145 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2146 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2147 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2148 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2151 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2152 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2153 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2156 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2157 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2159 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2160 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2165 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2166 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2168 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2169 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2171 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2172 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2173 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2174 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2175 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2176 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2177 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2178 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2179 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2182 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2183 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2185 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2186 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2187 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2188 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2190 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2191 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2193 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2194 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2197 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2198 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2201 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2202 if self.is_outbound() {
2203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2205 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2206 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2207 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2209 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2211 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2214 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2215 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2216 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2217 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2220 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2221 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2222 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2223 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2224 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2226 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2228 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2229 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2233 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2234 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2235 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2239 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2240 initial_commitment_tx,
2243 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2244 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2247 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2248 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2250 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2252 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2253 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2254 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2255 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2256 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2257 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2258 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2259 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2260 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2262 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2264 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2266 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2267 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2268 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2269 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2271 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2273 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2274 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2276 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2279 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2280 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2281 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2282 if !self.is_outbound() {
2283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2285 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2286 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2288 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2289 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2290 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2291 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2294 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2296 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2297 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2298 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2299 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2301 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2302 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2304 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2305 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2307 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2308 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2309 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2310 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2311 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2312 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2316 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2317 initial_commitment_tx,
2320 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2321 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2324 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2325 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2328 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2329 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2330 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2331 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2332 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2333 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2334 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2335 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2336 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2337 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2339 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2341 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2343 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2344 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2345 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2346 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2348 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2350 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2353 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2354 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2356 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2357 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2358 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2359 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2362 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2363 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2364 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2365 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2366 // when routing outbound payments.
2367 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2371 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2373 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2374 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2375 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2376 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2377 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2378 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2379 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2380 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2381 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2383 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2384 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2385 let expected_point =
2386 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2387 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2389 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2391 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2392 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2393 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2394 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2395 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2397 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2398 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2402 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2405 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2406 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2408 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2410 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2413 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2414 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2415 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2416 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2422 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2423 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2424 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2425 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2426 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2427 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2428 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2429 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2430 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2433 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2436 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2437 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2438 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2440 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2441 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2442 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2443 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2444 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2445 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2447 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2448 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2454 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2455 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2456 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2457 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2458 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2459 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2460 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2461 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2462 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2465 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2468 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2469 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2470 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2472 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2473 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2474 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2475 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2476 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2477 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2479 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2480 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2484 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2485 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2486 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2487 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2488 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2489 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2490 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2492 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2493 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2495 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2502 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2503 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2504 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2505 /// corner case properly.
2506 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2507 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2508 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2510 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2511 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2512 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2513 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2516 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2518 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2519 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2520 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2523 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2524 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2525 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2526 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2528 outbound_capacity_msat,
2529 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2530 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2531 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2537 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2538 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2541 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2542 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2543 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2544 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2545 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2546 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2549 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2550 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2552 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2553 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2556 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2557 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2558 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2560 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2561 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2563 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2566 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2567 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2569 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2570 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2572 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2573 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2575 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2576 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2580 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2581 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2587 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2588 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2589 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2592 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2593 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2594 included_htlcs += 1;
2597 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2598 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2602 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2603 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2604 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2605 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2606 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2607 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2612 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2614 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2615 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2620 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2621 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2625 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2626 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2627 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2630 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2631 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2633 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2634 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2635 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2637 total_pending_htlcs,
2638 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2639 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2640 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2642 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2643 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2644 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2646 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2648 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2653 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2654 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2655 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2657 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2658 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2660 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2663 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2664 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2666 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2667 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2669 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2670 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2672 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2673 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2677 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2678 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2684 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2685 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2686 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2687 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2688 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2689 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2692 included_htlcs += 1;
2695 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2696 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2699 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2700 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2702 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2703 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2704 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2709 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2710 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2711 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2714 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2715 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2717 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2718 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2720 total_pending_htlcs,
2721 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2722 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2723 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2725 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2726 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2727 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2729 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2731 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2736 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2737 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2738 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2739 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2740 if local_sent_shutdown {
2741 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2743 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2744 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2745 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2746 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2748 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2749 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2751 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2752 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2754 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2755 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2757 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2758 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2761 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2762 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2763 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2764 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2766 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2767 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2769 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2770 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2771 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2772 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2773 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2774 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2775 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2776 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2777 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2778 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2779 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2781 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2782 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2783 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2784 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2785 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2786 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2790 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2793 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2794 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2795 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2797 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2798 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2799 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2800 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2801 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2802 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2803 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2807 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2808 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2809 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2810 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2811 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2812 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2813 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2817 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2818 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2819 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2820 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2821 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2822 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2825 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2826 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2827 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2828 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2829 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2831 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2832 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2835 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2836 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2839 if !self.is_outbound() {
2840 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2841 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2842 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2843 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2844 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2845 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2846 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2847 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2848 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2849 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2850 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2851 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2852 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2853 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2854 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2857 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2858 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2859 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2860 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2861 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2864 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2865 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2867 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2868 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2871 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2872 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2873 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2877 // Now update local state:
2878 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2879 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2880 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2881 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2882 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2883 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2884 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2889 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2891 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2892 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2893 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2894 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2895 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2896 None => fail_reason.into(),
2897 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2898 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2899 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2900 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2902 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2906 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2907 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2908 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2909 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2911 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2912 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2917 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2920 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2921 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2922 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2924 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2925 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2928 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2931 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2932 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2933 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2935 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2936 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2939 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2943 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2944 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2945 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2947 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2948 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2951 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2955 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2956 where L::Target: Logger
2958 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2959 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2961 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2962 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2964 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2965 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2968 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2970 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2972 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2973 let commitment_txid = {
2974 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2975 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2976 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2978 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2979 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2980 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2981 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2982 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2983 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2987 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2989 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2990 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2991 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2992 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2995 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2996 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2997 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2998 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
3001 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3003 if self.is_outbound() {
3004 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3005 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3006 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3007 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3008 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3009 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3010 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3011 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3012 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3013 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3019 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3020 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3023 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3024 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3025 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3026 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3027 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3028 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3029 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3031 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3032 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3033 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3034 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3035 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3036 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3037 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3038 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3040 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3042 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3046 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3047 commitment_stats.tx,
3049 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3050 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3051 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3054 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3055 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3056 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3057 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3059 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3060 let mut need_commitment = false;
3061 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3062 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3063 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3064 need_commitment = true;
3068 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3069 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3070 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3071 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3072 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3073 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3077 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3078 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3079 Some(forward_info.clone())
3081 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3082 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3083 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3084 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3085 need_commitment = true;
3088 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3089 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3090 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3091 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3092 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3093 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3094 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3095 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3096 need_commitment = true;
3100 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3101 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3102 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3103 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3105 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3106 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3107 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3108 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3109 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3110 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3111 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3112 // includes the right HTLCs.
3113 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3114 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3115 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3116 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3117 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3118 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3120 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3121 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3122 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3125 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3126 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3127 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3128 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3129 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3130 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3131 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3132 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3133 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3137 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3138 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3140 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3141 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3142 per_commitment_secret,
3143 next_per_commitment_point,
3144 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3147 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3148 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3149 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3150 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3151 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3152 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3153 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3154 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3157 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
3158 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
3159 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3160 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3161 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3162 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3163 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3165 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3166 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3167 updates: Vec::new(),
3170 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3171 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3172 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3173 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3174 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3175 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3176 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3177 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3178 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3179 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3180 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3181 // to rebalance channels.
3182 match &htlc_update {
3183 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3184 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
3185 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3188 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3189 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3190 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3191 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3192 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3193 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3194 // into the holding cell without ever being
3195 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3196 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3197 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3200 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3206 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3207 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3208 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3209 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3210 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3211 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3212 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3213 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3214 (msg, monitor_update)
3215 } else { unreachable!() };
3216 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3217 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3219 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3220 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
3221 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3222 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3223 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
3224 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
3225 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
3226 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
3227 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3230 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3232 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3239 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3240 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3242 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3243 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
3248 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3249 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3250 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3251 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3252 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3254 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3255 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3256 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3258 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3260 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3262 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3265 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3267 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3271 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3272 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3273 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3274 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3275 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3276 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3277 where L::Target: Logger,
3279 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3280 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3282 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3285 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3286 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3289 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3291 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3292 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3293 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3297 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3298 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3299 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3300 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3301 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3302 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3303 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3304 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3305 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3308 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3310 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3311 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3314 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3315 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3317 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3319 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3320 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3321 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3322 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3323 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3324 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3325 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3326 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3330 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3331 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3332 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3333 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3334 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3335 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3336 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3337 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3339 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3340 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3343 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3344 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3345 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3346 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3347 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3348 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3349 let mut require_commitment = false;
3350 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3353 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3354 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3355 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3357 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3358 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3359 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3360 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3361 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3362 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3367 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3368 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3369 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3370 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3371 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3373 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3374 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3375 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3380 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3381 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3383 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3387 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3388 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3390 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3391 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3392 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3393 require_commitment = true;
3394 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3395 match forward_info {
3396 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3397 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3398 require_commitment = true;
3400 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3401 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3402 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3404 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3405 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3406 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3410 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3411 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3412 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3413 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3419 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3420 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3421 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3422 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3424 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3425 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3426 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3427 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3428 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3429 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3430 require_commitment = true;
3434 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3436 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3437 match update_state {
3438 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3439 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3440 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3441 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3442 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3444 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3445 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3446 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3447 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3448 require_commitment = true;
3449 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3450 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3455 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3456 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3457 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3458 if require_commitment {
3459 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3460 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3461 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3462 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3463 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3464 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3465 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3466 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3467 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3469 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3470 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3471 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3472 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3473 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3474 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3475 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3477 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3481 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3482 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3483 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3484 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3485 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3487 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3488 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3489 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3492 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3493 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3494 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3495 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3498 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3499 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3500 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3501 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3503 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3506 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3507 if require_commitment {
3508 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3510 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3511 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3512 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3513 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3515 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3516 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3518 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3519 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3520 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3522 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3526 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3527 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3528 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3531 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3533 commitment_update: None,
3534 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3535 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3536 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3543 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3544 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3545 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3546 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3547 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3548 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3549 if !self.is_outbound() {
3550 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3552 if !self.is_usable() {
3553 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3555 if !self.is_live() {
3556 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3559 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3560 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3561 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3562 let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; };
3563 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3564 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3565 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3566 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3567 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3568 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3572 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3573 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3574 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3575 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3576 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3579 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3580 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3584 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3585 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3589 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3590 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3592 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3593 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3598 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3599 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3600 Some(update_fee) => {
3601 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3602 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3608 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3609 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3611 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3613 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3614 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3615 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3616 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3620 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3621 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3622 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3626 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3627 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3630 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3631 // will be retransmitted.
3632 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3633 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3634 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3636 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3637 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3639 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3640 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3641 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3642 // this HTLC accordingly
3643 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3646 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3647 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3648 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3649 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3652 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3653 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3654 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3655 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3656 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3657 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3662 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3664 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3665 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3666 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3667 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3671 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3672 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3673 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3674 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3675 // the update upon reconnection.
3676 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3680 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3681 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3684 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3685 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3686 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3687 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3688 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3689 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3691 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3692 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3693 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3694 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3695 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3696 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3698 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3699 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3700 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3701 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3702 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3703 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3704 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3707 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3708 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3709 /// to the remote side.
3710 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3711 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3712 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3714 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3715 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3716 // first received the funding_signed.
3717 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3718 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3719 self.funding_transaction.take()
3721 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3722 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3723 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3724 funding_broadcastable = None;
3727 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3728 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3729 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3730 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3731 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3732 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3733 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3734 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3735 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3736 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3737 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3738 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3739 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3740 next_per_commitment_point,
3741 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3745 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3747 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3748 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3749 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3750 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3751 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3752 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3754 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3755 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3756 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3757 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3758 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3759 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3763 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3764 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3766 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3767 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3770 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3771 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3772 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3773 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3774 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3775 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3776 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3777 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3778 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3782 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3783 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3785 if self.is_outbound() {
3786 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3788 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3789 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3791 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3792 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3794 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3795 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3796 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3797 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3798 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3799 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3800 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3801 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3802 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3803 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3804 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3805 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3806 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3808 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3809 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3810 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3816 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3817 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3818 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3819 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3820 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3821 per_commitment_secret,
3822 next_per_commitment_point,
3826 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3827 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3828 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3829 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3830 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3832 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3833 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3834 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3835 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3836 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3837 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3838 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3839 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3840 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3845 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3846 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3848 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3849 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3850 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3851 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3852 reason: err_packet.clone()
3855 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3856 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3857 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3858 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3859 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3860 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3863 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3864 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3865 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3866 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3867 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3874 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3875 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3876 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3877 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3881 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3882 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3883 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3884 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3885 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3886 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3890 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3891 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3893 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3894 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3895 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3896 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3897 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3898 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3899 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3900 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3901 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3902 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3903 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3904 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3907 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3908 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3909 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3912 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3913 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3914 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3915 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3916 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3917 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3918 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3919 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3921 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3922 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3923 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3924 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3925 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3928 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3929 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3930 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3931 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3932 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3933 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3934 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3935 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3938 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3942 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3943 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3944 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3945 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3947 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3951 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3952 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3953 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3955 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3956 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3957 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3958 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3959 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3963 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
3965 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3966 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3967 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3968 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3969 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3970 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3972 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3973 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3974 channel_ready: None,
3975 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3976 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3977 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3981 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3982 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3983 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3984 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3985 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3986 next_per_commitment_point,
3987 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3989 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3990 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3991 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3995 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3996 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3997 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3999 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4000 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4001 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4004 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4010 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4011 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4012 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4013 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4014 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4016 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4017 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4018 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4019 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4020 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4021 next_per_commitment_point,
4022 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4026 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4027 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4028 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4030 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4033 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4034 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4035 raa: required_revoke,
4036 commitment_update: None,
4037 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4039 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4040 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4041 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4043 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4046 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4047 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4048 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4049 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4050 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4051 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4054 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4055 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4056 raa: required_revoke,
4057 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4058 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4062 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4066 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4067 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4068 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4069 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4071 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4073 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4075 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4076 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4077 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4078 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4079 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4080 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4082 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4083 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4084 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4085 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4086 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4088 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4089 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4090 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4091 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4094 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4095 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4096 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4097 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4098 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4099 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4100 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4101 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4102 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4103 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4104 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4105 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4106 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4107 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4108 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4110 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4113 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4114 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4117 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4118 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4119 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4120 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4121 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4122 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4123 self.channel_state &
4124 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4125 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4126 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4127 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4130 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4131 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4132 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4133 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4134 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4135 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4136 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4138 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4144 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4145 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4146 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4147 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4149 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4150 return Ok((None, None));
4153 if !self.is_outbound() {
4154 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4155 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4157 return Ok((None, None));
4160 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4162 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4163 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4164 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4165 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4167 let sig = self.holder_signer
4168 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4169 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4171 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4172 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4173 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4174 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4176 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4177 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4178 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4183 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4184 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4185 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4186 where K::Target: KeysInterface
4188 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4191 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4192 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4193 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4194 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4197 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4198 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4199 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4202 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4204 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4205 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4208 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4209 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4210 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4213 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4216 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4217 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4218 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4219 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4221 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4224 assert!(send_shutdown);
4225 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4226 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4229 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4234 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4236 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4237 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4239 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4240 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4241 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4242 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4243 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4244 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4248 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4249 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4250 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4251 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4255 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4256 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4257 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4258 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4259 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4260 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4262 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4263 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4270 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4271 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4273 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4276 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4277 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4279 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4281 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4282 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4283 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4284 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4285 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4286 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4287 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4288 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4289 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4291 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4292 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4295 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4299 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4300 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4301 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4302 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4304 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4305 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4307 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4310 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4311 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4313 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4314 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4317 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4318 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4321 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4322 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4323 return Ok((None, None));
4326 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4327 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4328 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4329 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4331 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4333 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4336 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4337 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4338 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4339 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4340 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4344 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4345 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4346 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4350 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4351 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4352 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4353 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4354 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4355 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4356 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4360 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4362 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4363 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4364 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4365 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4367 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4370 let sig = self.holder_signer
4371 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4372 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4374 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4375 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4376 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4377 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4381 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4382 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4383 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4384 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4386 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4387 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4388 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4394 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4395 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4396 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4398 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4399 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4401 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4402 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4405 if !self.is_outbound() {
4406 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4407 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4408 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4409 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4411 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4412 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4413 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4415 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4416 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4419 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4420 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4421 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4422 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4423 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4424 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4425 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4426 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4428 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4431 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4432 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4433 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4434 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4436 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4440 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4441 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4442 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4443 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4445 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4451 // Public utilities:
4453 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4457 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4461 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4462 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4463 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4467 /// Gets the channel's type
4468 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4472 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4473 /// is_usable() returns true).
4474 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4475 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4476 self.short_channel_id
4479 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4480 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4481 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4484 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4485 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4486 self.outbound_scid_alias
4488 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4489 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4490 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4491 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4492 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4495 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4496 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4497 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4498 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4501 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4502 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4503 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4506 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4507 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4508 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4509 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4513 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4516 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4517 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4520 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4521 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4524 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4525 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4526 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4529 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4530 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4533 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4534 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4535 self.counterparty_node_id
4538 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4539 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4540 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4543 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4544 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4545 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4548 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4549 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4551 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4552 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4553 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4554 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4556 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4560 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4561 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4562 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4565 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4566 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4567 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4570 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4571 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4572 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4574 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4575 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4580 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4581 self.channel_value_satoshis
4584 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4585 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4588 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4589 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4592 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4593 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4596 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4597 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4598 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4601 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4602 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4603 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4606 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4607 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4608 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4611 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4612 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4613 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4614 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4615 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4618 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4620 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4621 self.prev_config = None;
4625 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4626 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4630 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4631 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4632 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4633 let did_channel_update =
4634 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4635 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4636 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4637 if did_channel_update {
4638 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4639 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4640 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4641 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4643 self.config.options = *config;
4647 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4648 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4649 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4650 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4651 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4652 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4653 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4655 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4656 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4659 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4661 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4662 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4668 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4669 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4670 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4671 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4672 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4673 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4674 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4676 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4677 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4684 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4688 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4689 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4690 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4691 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4692 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4693 // which are near the dust limit.
4694 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4695 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4696 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4697 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4698 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4700 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4701 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4703 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4706 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4707 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4710 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4711 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4714 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4715 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4719 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4724 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4726 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4727 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4728 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4729 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4730 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4731 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4733 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4735 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4743 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4744 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4748 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4749 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4750 self.update_time_counter
4753 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4754 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4757 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4758 self.config.announced_channel
4761 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4762 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4765 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4766 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4767 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4768 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4771 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4772 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4773 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4776 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4777 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4778 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4779 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4780 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4783 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4784 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4785 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4786 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4787 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4790 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4791 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4792 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4793 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4796 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4797 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4798 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4801 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4802 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4803 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4805 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4806 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4807 if self.channel_state &
4808 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4809 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4810 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4811 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4812 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4815 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4816 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4817 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4818 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4819 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4820 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4822 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4823 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4824 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4826 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4827 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4828 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4829 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4830 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4831 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4837 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4838 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4839 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4842 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4843 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4844 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4847 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4848 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4849 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4852 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4853 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4854 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4855 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4856 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4857 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4862 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4863 self.channel_update_status
4866 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4867 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4868 self.channel_update_status = status;
4871 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4873 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4874 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4875 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4879 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4880 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4881 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4884 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4888 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4889 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4890 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4892 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4893 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4894 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4896 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4897 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4900 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4901 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4902 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4903 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4904 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4905 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4906 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4907 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4908 self.channel_state);
4910 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4914 if need_commitment_update {
4915 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4916 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4917 let next_per_commitment_point =
4918 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4919 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4920 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4921 next_per_commitment_point,
4922 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4926 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4932 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4933 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4934 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4935 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4936 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4937 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4938 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4939 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4940 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4941 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4942 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4943 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4944 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4945 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4946 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4947 if self.is_outbound() {
4948 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4949 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4950 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4951 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4952 // channel and move on.
4953 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4954 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4956 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4957 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4958 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4960 if self.is_outbound() {
4961 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4962 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4963 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4964 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4965 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4966 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4970 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4971 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4972 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4973 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4974 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4978 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4979 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4980 // may have already happened for this block).
4981 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4982 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4983 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
4984 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4987 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4988 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4989 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4990 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4998 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4999 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5000 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5001 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5003 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5004 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5007 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5009 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
5010 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5011 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
5014 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
5015 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5016 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5017 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5018 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5020 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5021 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5023 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5024 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5025 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5033 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5035 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5036 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5037 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5039 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5040 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5043 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5044 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5045 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5046 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5047 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5048 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5049 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5050 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5051 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5054 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5055 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5056 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5057 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5059 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5060 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5061 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5063 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5064 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5065 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5066 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5068 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5069 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5070 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5071 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5072 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5073 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5074 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5077 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5078 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5080 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5083 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5084 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5085 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5086 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5087 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5088 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5089 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5090 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5091 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5092 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5093 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5094 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5095 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5096 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5097 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5098 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5099 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5105 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5110 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5111 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5113 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5114 if !self.is_outbound() {
5115 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5117 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5118 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5121 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5122 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5125 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5126 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5130 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5131 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5132 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5133 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5134 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5135 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5136 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5137 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5138 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5139 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5140 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5141 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5142 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5143 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5144 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5145 first_per_commitment_point,
5146 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5147 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5148 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5149 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5151 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5155 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5156 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5159 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5160 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5161 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5162 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5165 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5166 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5168 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5169 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5170 if self.is_outbound() {
5171 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5173 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5174 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5176 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5177 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5179 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5180 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5183 self.user_id = user_id;
5184 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5186 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5189 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5190 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5191 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5193 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5194 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5195 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5196 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5198 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5199 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5200 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5201 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5202 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5203 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5204 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5205 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5206 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5207 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5208 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5209 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5210 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5211 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5212 first_per_commitment_point,
5213 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5214 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5215 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5217 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5221 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5222 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5224 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5226 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5227 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5230 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5231 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5232 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5233 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5234 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5235 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5238 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5239 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5240 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5241 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5242 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5243 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5244 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5245 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5246 if !self.is_outbound() {
5247 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5249 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5250 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5252 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5253 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5254 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5255 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5258 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5259 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5261 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5264 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5265 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5270 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5272 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5274 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5275 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5276 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5278 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5279 temporary_channel_id,
5280 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5281 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5286 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5287 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5288 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5289 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5291 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5294 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5295 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5296 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5297 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5299 if !self.is_usable() {
5300 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5303 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5305 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5306 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
5308 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5309 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5310 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5311 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5312 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5313 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5319 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5320 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5321 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5325 if !self.is_usable() {
5329 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5330 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5334 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5338 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5339 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5342 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5346 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5348 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5353 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5355 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5356 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5357 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5358 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5359 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5363 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5365 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5366 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5367 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5369 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5370 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5371 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5372 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5373 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5374 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5375 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5376 contents: announcement,
5379 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5383 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5384 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5385 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5386 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5387 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5389 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5391 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5392 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5393 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5394 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5396 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5397 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5398 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5399 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5402 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5403 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5404 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5405 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5408 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5411 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5412 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5413 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5414 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5417 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5419 Err(_) => return None,
5421 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5422 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5427 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5428 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5429 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5430 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5431 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5432 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5433 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5434 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5435 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5436 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5437 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5438 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5439 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5440 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5441 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5442 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5443 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5444 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5445 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5448 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5449 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5450 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5451 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5454 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5455 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5456 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5457 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5458 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5459 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5460 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5461 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5463 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5464 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5465 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5466 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5467 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5468 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5469 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5470 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5471 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5473 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5479 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5481 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5482 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5484 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5486 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5487 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5489 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5490 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5491 /// regenerate them.
5493 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
5495 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
5496 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5497 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5498 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5500 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5501 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5502 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5505 if amount_msat == 0 {
5506 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5509 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5510 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5513 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5514 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5515 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5516 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5517 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5518 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5519 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5520 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5523 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5524 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5525 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5526 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5528 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5529 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5530 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5533 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
5534 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5535 if !self.is_outbound() {
5536 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5537 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5538 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5539 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5540 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5541 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5545 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5548 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5549 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5550 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5552 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5553 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5554 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5555 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5556 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5557 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5561 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5562 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5563 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5564 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5565 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5566 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5570 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5571 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5572 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5575 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5576 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5577 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5578 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5580 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5581 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5584 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5585 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5586 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5587 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5588 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5591 // Now update local state:
5592 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5593 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5598 onion_routing_packet,
5603 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5604 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5606 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5608 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5612 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5613 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5614 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5618 onion_routing_packet,
5620 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5625 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
5626 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
5627 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
5628 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
5629 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5630 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5631 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
5633 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
5634 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
5636 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
5637 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5639 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) {
5640 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5642 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
5643 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5644 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5645 have_updates = true;
5647 if have_updates { break; }
5649 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5650 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5651 have_updates = true;
5653 if have_updates { break; }
5656 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
5658 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
5660 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5661 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5662 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5663 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5664 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5666 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5667 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5668 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5670 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5671 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5675 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5676 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5677 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5678 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5679 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5680 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5681 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5684 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5685 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5686 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5687 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5688 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5689 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5692 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5694 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5695 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5696 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5697 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5698 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5699 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5701 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5704 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5705 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5708 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5709 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5710 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5711 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5712 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5713 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5714 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5715 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5718 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5719 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5722 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5723 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5724 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5725 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5726 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5727 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5728 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5730 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5732 if !self.is_outbound() {
5733 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5734 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5735 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5736 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5737 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5738 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5739 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5740 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5741 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5742 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5749 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5750 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5754 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5755 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5757 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5759 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5760 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5761 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5762 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5764 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5765 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5766 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5767 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5768 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5769 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5773 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5774 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5777 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5780 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5781 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5782 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5784 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5785 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
5786 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5787 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5788 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5794 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5795 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5796 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5799 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5800 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5801 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5803 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5804 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5805 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5806 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5812 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5813 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5814 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5815 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5816 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
5817 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5818 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5819 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5822 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5823 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5824 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5826 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5827 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5830 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5831 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5832 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5835 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5838 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5839 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5840 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5842 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5847 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5848 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5849 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5850 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5852 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5854 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5856 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5857 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5858 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5859 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5860 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5861 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5865 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5866 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5867 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5870 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5871 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5872 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5873 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5874 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5876 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5877 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5884 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5887 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5888 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5889 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5890 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5891 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5892 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5893 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5894 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5895 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5896 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5897 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5899 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5900 // return them to fail the payment.
5901 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5902 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5903 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5905 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5906 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5911 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5912 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5913 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5914 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5915 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5916 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5917 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5918 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5919 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5920 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5921 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5922 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5923 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5928 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5929 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5930 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5933 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&HTLCSource> {
5934 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5935 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5937 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, .. } => { Some(source) }
5941 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| &htlc.source))
5945 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
5946 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5948 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5954 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5955 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5956 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5957 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5958 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5960 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5961 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5962 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5963 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5969 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5970 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5971 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5972 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5973 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5974 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5979 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5980 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5981 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
5982 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
5984 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5985 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5986 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
5987 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
5992 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5993 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5994 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5995 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5996 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
5997 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6002 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6003 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6004 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6007 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6009 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6010 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6011 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6012 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6013 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6015 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6016 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6017 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6018 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6020 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6021 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6022 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6024 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6026 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6027 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6028 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6029 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6030 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6031 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6033 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6034 // deserialized from that format.
6035 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6036 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6037 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6039 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6041 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6042 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6043 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6045 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6046 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6047 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6048 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6051 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6052 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6053 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6056 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6057 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6058 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6059 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6061 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6062 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6064 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6066 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6068 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6070 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6073 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6075 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6080 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6082 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6083 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6084 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6085 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6086 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6087 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6088 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6090 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6092 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6094 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6097 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6098 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6099 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6102 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6104 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6105 preimages.push(preimage);
6107 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6108 reason.write(writer)?;
6110 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6112 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6113 preimages.push(preimage);
6115 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6116 reason.write(writer)?;
6121 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6122 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6124 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6126 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6127 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6128 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6129 source.write(writer)?;
6130 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6132 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6134 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6135 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6137 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6139 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6140 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6145 match self.resend_order {
6146 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6147 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6150 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6151 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6152 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6154 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6155 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6156 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6157 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6160 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6161 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6162 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6163 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6164 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6167 if self.is_outbound() {
6168 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6169 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6170 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6172 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6173 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6174 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6176 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6178 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6179 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6180 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6181 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6183 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6184 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6185 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6186 // consider the stale state on reload.
6189 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6190 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6191 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6193 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6194 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6195 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6197 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6198 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6200 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6201 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6202 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6204 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6205 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6207 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6210 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6211 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6212 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6214 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6217 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6218 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6220 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6221 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6222 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6224 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6226 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6228 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6230 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6231 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6232 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6233 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6234 htlc.write(writer)?;
6237 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6238 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6239 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6241 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6242 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6244 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6245 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6246 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6247 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6248 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6249 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6250 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6252 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6253 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6254 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6255 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6256 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6258 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6260 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6261 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6262 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6263 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6265 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6266 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6267 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6268 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6269 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6270 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6271 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6273 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6274 (2, chan_type, option),
6275 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6276 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6277 (5, self.config, required),
6278 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6279 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6280 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6281 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6282 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6283 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6284 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6285 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6286 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6287 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6288 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6289 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6296 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6297 impl<'a, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>
6298 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
6299 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6300 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6301 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6303 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6304 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6305 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6306 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6308 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6310 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6311 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6312 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6313 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6314 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6316 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6317 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6320 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6321 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6322 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6324 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6326 let mut keys_data = None;
6328 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6329 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6330 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6331 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6332 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6333 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6334 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6335 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6336 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6337 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6341 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6342 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6343 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6346 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6348 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6349 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6350 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6352 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6353 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6354 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6355 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6356 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6357 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6358 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6359 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6360 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6361 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6362 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6363 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6364 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6365 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6370 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6371 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6372 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6373 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6374 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6375 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6376 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6377 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6378 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6379 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6380 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6381 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6383 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6384 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6387 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6388 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6391 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6392 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6394 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6399 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6400 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6401 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6402 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6403 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6404 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6405 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6406 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6407 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6408 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6410 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6411 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6412 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6414 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6415 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6416 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6418 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6422 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6423 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6424 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6425 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6428 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6429 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6430 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6432 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6433 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6434 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6435 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6438 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6439 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6440 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6441 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6444 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6446 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6448 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6449 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6450 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6451 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6453 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6454 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6455 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6456 // consider the stale state on reload.
6457 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6460 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6461 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6462 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6464 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6467 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6468 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6469 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6471 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6472 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6473 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6474 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6476 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6477 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6479 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6480 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6482 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6483 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6484 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6486 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6488 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6489 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6491 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6492 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6495 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6497 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6498 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6499 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6500 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6502 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6505 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6506 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6508 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6510 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6511 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6513 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6514 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6516 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6518 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6519 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6520 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6522 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6523 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6524 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6528 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6529 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6530 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6532 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6538 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6539 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6540 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6541 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6542 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6543 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6544 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6545 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6546 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6547 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6549 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6550 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6551 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6552 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6553 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6554 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6556 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6557 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6559 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6560 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6561 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6562 (2, channel_type, option),
6563 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6564 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6565 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6566 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6567 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6568 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6569 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6570 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6571 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6572 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6573 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6574 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6575 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6576 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6577 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6580 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6581 let mut holder_signer = keys_source.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6582 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6583 // required channel parameters.
6584 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6585 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6586 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6588 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6590 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6591 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6592 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6593 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6596 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6597 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6598 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6600 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6601 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6603 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6604 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6609 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6610 if iter.next().is_some() {
6611 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6615 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6616 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6617 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6618 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6619 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6622 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6623 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6624 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6627 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6628 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6630 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6631 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6632 // separate u64 values.
6633 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6638 config: config.unwrap(),
6642 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6643 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6644 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6648 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6650 channel_value_satoshis,
6652 latest_monitor_update_id,
6655 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6658 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6659 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6662 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6663 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6664 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6668 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6669 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6670 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6671 monitor_pending_forwards,
6672 monitor_pending_failures,
6673 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6676 holding_cell_update_fee,
6677 next_holder_htlc_id,
6678 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6679 update_time_counter,
6682 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6683 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6684 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6685 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6687 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6688 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6689 closing_fee_limits: None,
6690 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6692 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6694 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6695 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6697 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6699 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6700 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6701 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6702 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6703 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6704 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6705 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6706 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6707 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6710 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6712 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6713 funding_transaction,
6715 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6716 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6717 counterparty_node_id,
6719 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6723 channel_update_status,
6724 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6728 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6729 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6730 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6731 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6733 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6735 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6736 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6737 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6739 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6741 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6742 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6744 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6753 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6754 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6755 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6756 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6757 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6759 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6760 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6761 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6762 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6763 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6764 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6765 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6766 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6767 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6768 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6769 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6770 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6771 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6772 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6773 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6774 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6775 use crate::util::test_utils;
6776 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6777 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6778 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6779 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6780 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6781 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6782 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6783 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6784 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6785 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6786 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6787 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6788 use crate::prelude::*;
6790 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6793 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6794 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6800 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6801 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6802 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6803 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6807 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6808 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6809 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6810 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6811 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6812 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6813 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6817 signer: InMemorySigner,
6819 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6820 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6822 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6823 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6824 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6825 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6826 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6827 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6828 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6829 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6832 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6833 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6834 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6835 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6838 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6839 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6841 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6844 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6845 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6846 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6849 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6850 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6851 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6855 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6856 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6857 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6858 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6860 let seed = [42; 32];
6861 let network = Network::Testnet;
6862 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6863 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6864 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6867 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6868 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6869 let config = UserConfig::default();
6870 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6871 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6872 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6874 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6875 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6879 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6880 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6882 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6883 let original_fee = 253;
6884 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6885 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6886 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6887 let seed = [42; 32];
6888 let network = Network::Testnet;
6889 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6891 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6892 let config = UserConfig::default();
6893 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6895 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6896 // same as the old fee.
6897 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6898 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6899 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6903 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6904 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6905 // dust limits are used.
6906 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6907 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6908 let seed = [42; 32];
6909 let network = Network::Testnet;
6910 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6911 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6913 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6914 // they have different dust limits.
6916 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6917 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6918 let config = UserConfig::default();
6919 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6921 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6922 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6923 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6924 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6925 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6927 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6928 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6929 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6930 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6931 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6933 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6934 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6935 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6937 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6938 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6939 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6940 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6943 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6945 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6946 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6947 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6948 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6949 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6951 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6952 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6953 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6954 payment_secret: None,
6955 payment_params: None,
6959 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6960 // the dust limit check.
6961 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6962 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6963 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6964 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6966 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6967 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6968 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6969 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6970 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6971 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6972 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6976 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6977 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6978 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6979 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6980 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6981 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
6982 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6983 let seed = [42; 32];
6984 let network = Network::Testnet;
6985 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6987 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6988 let config = UserConfig::default();
6989 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6991 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
6992 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
6994 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
6995 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6996 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6997 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6998 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6999 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7001 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7002 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7003 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7004 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7005 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7007 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7009 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7010 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7011 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7012 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7013 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7015 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7016 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7017 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7018 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7019 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7023 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7024 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7025 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7026 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7027 let seed = [42; 32];
7028 let network = Network::Testnet;
7029 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7030 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7031 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7033 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7035 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7036 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7037 let config = UserConfig::default();
7038 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7040 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7041 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7042 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7043 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7045 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7046 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7047 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
7049 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7050 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7051 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7052 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7054 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7055 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7056 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
7058 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7059 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
7061 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7062 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7063 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7064 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7065 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7066 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7067 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7068 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7069 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7074 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7076 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7077 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7078 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7079 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7080 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7081 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7082 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7089 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7090 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7091 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7092 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7093 let seed = [42; 32];
7094 let network = Network::Testnet;
7095 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7096 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7097 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7099 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7100 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7101 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7102 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7103 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7104 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7105 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7106 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7108 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7109 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7110 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7111 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7112 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7113 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7115 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7116 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7117 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7118 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7120 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7122 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7123 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7124 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7125 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7126 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7127 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7129 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7130 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7131 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7132 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7134 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7135 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7136 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7137 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7138 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7140 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7141 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7143 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7144 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7145 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7147 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7148 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7149 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7150 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7151 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7153 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7154 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7156 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7157 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7158 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7162 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7164 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7165 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7166 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7168 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7169 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7170 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7171 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7173 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7174 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7175 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7177 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7179 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7180 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7183 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7184 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7185 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7186 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7187 let seed = [42; 32];
7188 let network = Network::Testnet;
7189 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7190 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7191 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7194 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7195 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7196 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7198 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7199 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7201 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7202 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7203 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7205 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7206 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7208 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7210 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7211 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7213 // Channel Negotiations failed
7214 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7215 assert!(result.is_err());
7220 fn channel_update() {
7221 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7222 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7223 let seed = [42; 32];
7224 let network = Network::Testnet;
7225 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7226 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7228 // Create a channel.
7229 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7230 let config = UserConfig::default();
7231 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7232 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7233 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7234 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7236 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7237 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7238 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7240 short_channel_id: 0,
7243 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7244 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7245 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7247 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7248 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7250 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7252 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7254 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7255 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7256 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7257 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7259 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7260 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7261 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7263 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7267 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7269 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7270 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7271 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7272 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7273 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7274 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7275 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7276 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7277 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7278 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7279 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7280 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7281 use crate::sync::Arc;
7283 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7284 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7285 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7286 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7288 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7290 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7291 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7292 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7293 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7294 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7295 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7297 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7298 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7303 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7304 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7305 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7307 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7308 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7309 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7310 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7311 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7312 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7314 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7316 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7317 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7318 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7319 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7320 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7321 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7323 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7324 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7325 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7326 selected_contest_delay: 144
7328 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7329 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7331 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7332 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7334 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7335 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7337 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7338 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7340 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7341 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7342 // build_commitment_transaction.
7343 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7344 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7345 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7346 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7347 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
7349 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7350 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7351 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7352 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7356 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7357 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7358 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7359 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7363 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7364 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7365 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7367 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7368 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7370 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7371 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7373 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7375 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7376 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7377 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7378 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7379 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7380 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7381 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7383 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7384 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7385 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7386 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7388 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7389 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7390 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7392 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7394 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7395 commitment_tx.clone(),
7396 counterparty_signature,
7397 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7398 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7399 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7401 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7402 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7404 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7405 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7406 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7408 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7409 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7412 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7413 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7415 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7416 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7417 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7418 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7419 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7420 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7421 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7422 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7424 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7427 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7428 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7429 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7433 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7436 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7437 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7438 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7440 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7441 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7442 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7443 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7444 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7445 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7446 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7447 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7449 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7453 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7454 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7456 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7457 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7458 "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", {});
7460 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7461 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7462 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7463 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a508b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f701483045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7465 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7466 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7468 amount_msat: 1000000,
7470 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7471 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7473 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7476 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7477 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7479 amount_msat: 2000000,
7481 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7482 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7484 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7487 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7488 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7490 amount_msat: 2000000,
7492 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7493 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7494 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7496 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7499 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7500 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7502 amount_msat: 3000000,
7504 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7505 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7506 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7508 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7511 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7512 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7514 amount_msat: 4000000,
7516 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7517 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7519 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7523 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7524 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7525 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7527 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7528 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7529 "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", {
7532 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7533 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7534 "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" },
7537 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7538 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7539 "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" },
7542 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7543 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7544 "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" },
7547 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7548 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7549 "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" },
7552 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7553 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7554 "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" }
7557 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7558 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7559 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7561 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7562 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7563 "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", {
7566 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7567 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7568 "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" },
7571 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7572 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7573 "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" },
7576 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7577 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7578 "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" },
7581 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7582 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7583 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe030000000000000000010c0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c6401483045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7586 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7587 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7588 "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" }
7591 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7592 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7593 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7595 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7596 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7597 "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", {
7600 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7601 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7602 "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" },
7605 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7606 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7607 "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" },
7610 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7611 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7612 "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" },
7615 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7616 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7617 "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" }
7620 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7621 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7622 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7623 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7625 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7626 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7627 "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", {
7630 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7631 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7632 "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" },
7635 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7636 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7637 "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" },
7640 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7641 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7642 "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" },
7645 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7646 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7647 "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" }
7650 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7651 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7652 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7653 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7655 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7656 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7657 "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", {
7660 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7661 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7662 "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" },
7665 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7666 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7667 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7670 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7671 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7672 "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" },
7675 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7676 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7677 "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" }
7680 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7681 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7682 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7684 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7685 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7686 "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", {
7689 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7690 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7691 "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" },
7694 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7695 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7696 "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" },
7699 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7700 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7701 "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" }
7704 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7705 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7706 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7708 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7709 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7710 "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", {
7713 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7714 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7715 "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" },
7718 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7719 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7720 "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" },
7723 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7724 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7725 "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" }
7728 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7729 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7730 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7732 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7733 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7734 "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", {
7737 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7738 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7739 "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" },
7742 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7743 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7744 "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" }
7747 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7748 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7749 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7750 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7752 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7753 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7754 "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", {
7757 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7758 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7759 "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" },
7762 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7763 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7764 "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" }
7767 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7768 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7769 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7770 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7772 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7773 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7774 "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", {
7777 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7778 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7779 "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" },
7782 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7783 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7784 "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" }
7787 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7788 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7789 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7791 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7792 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7793 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484eb936a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e101483045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7796 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7797 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7798 "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" }
7801 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7802 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7803 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7804 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7806 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7807 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7808 "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", {
7811 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7812 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7813 "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" }
7816 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7817 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7818 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7819 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7821 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7822 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7823 "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", {
7826 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7827 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7828 "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" }
7831 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7832 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7833 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7834 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7836 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7837 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7838 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7840 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7841 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7842 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7843 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7845 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7846 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7847 "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", {});
7849 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7850 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7851 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7852 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7854 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7855 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7856 "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", {});
7858 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7859 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7860 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7862 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7863 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7864 "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", {});
7866 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7867 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7868 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7869 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7871 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7872 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7873 "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", {});
7875 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7876 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7877 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7878 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7880 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7881 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7882 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7884 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7885 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7886 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7887 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7888 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7889 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7891 amount_msat: 2000000,
7893 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7894 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7896 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7899 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7900 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7901 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7903 amount_msat: 5000000,
7905 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7906 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7907 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7909 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7912 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7913 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7915 amount_msat: 5000000,
7917 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7918 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7919 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7921 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7925 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7926 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7927 "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", {
7930 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7931 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7932 "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" },
7934 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7935 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7936 "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" },
7938 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7939 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7940 "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" }
7943 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7944 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7945 "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", {
7948 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
7949 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
7950 "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" },
7952 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
7953 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
7954 "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" },
7956 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
7957 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
7958 "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" }
7963 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7964 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7966 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7967 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7968 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7969 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7971 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7972 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7973 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7975 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7976 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7978 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7979 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7981 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
7982 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
7983 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
7987 fn test_key_derivation() {
7988 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
7989 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7991 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7992 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7994 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
7995 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
7997 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7998 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8000 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
8001 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8003 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
8004 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8006 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
8007 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8009 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
8010 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8014 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8015 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8016 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8017 let seed = [42; 32];
8018 let network = Network::Testnet;
8019 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8020 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8022 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8023 let config = UserConfig::default();
8024 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8025 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8027 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8028 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8030 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8031 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8032 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8033 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8034 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8035 assert!(res.is_ok());