1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
15 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
16 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
26 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
28 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
32 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
33 use crate::ln::channel_state::{ChannelShutdownState, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
34 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
35 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
36 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
37 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
38 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
43 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
44 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
45 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
46 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
47 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
48 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
49 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
50 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
53 use crate::prelude::*;
54 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
56 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
57 use crate::sync::Mutex;
58 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
60 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
63 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
64 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
66 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
70 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
71 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
74 pub struct AvailableBalances {
75 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
76 pub balance_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
78 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
80 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
81 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
83 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
84 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
87 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
89 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
91 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
92 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
93 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
94 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
95 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
96 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
98 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
102 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
103 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
104 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
105 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
108 /// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC.
110 enum InboundHTLCResolution {
111 /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined,
112 /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded.
114 // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up
115 // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable.
117 pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
119 /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed
120 /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both
121 /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed.
123 update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC,
127 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution,
129 (0, pending_htlc_status, required),
132 (0, update_add_htlc, required),
136 enum InboundHTLCState {
137 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
138 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
139 RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution),
140 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
141 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
142 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
143 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
144 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
145 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
146 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
147 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
148 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
149 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
150 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
151 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
153 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
154 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
155 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
156 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
157 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
158 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
159 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
160 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
161 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
162 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
163 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
164 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
165 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
166 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
168 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
169 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution),
170 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
171 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
172 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
173 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
174 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
175 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution),
177 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
178 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
180 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
181 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
182 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
183 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
184 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
185 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
186 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
187 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
190 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
191 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
193 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
194 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
195 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
196 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
197 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
198 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
199 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
200 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
201 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
202 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
203 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
204 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
205 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
210 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
214 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
215 state: InboundHTLCState,
218 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
219 enum OutboundHTLCState {
220 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
221 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
222 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
223 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
224 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
225 /// money back (though we won't), and,
226 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
227 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
228 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
229 /// we'll never get out of sync).
230 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
231 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
232 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
234 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
235 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
236 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
237 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
238 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
239 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
240 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
241 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
242 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
243 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
244 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
245 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
246 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
247 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
248 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
251 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
252 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
254 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
255 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
256 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
257 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
258 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
260 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
261 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
262 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
263 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
264 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
265 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
266 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
267 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
268 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
269 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
275 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
276 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
277 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
278 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
279 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
282 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
283 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
285 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
286 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
291 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
292 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
294 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
295 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
300 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
301 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
305 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
306 state: OutboundHTLCState,
308 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
309 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
312 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
313 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
314 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
315 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
319 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
321 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
322 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
323 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
324 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
327 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
332 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
337 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
341 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
342 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
343 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
344 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
345 struct $flag_type(u32);
350 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
353 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
355 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
358 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
361 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
362 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
365 Ok($flag_type(flags))
370 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
372 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
374 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
376 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
380 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
383 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
385 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
387 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
388 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
390 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
392 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
394 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
395 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
398 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
399 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
401 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
404 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
406 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
408 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
411 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
412 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
414 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
415 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
416 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
417 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
418 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
419 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
420 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
421 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
423 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
425 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
427 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
428 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
430 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
432 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
434 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
435 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
437 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
438 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
440 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
441 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
446 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
449 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
450 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
451 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
452 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
453 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
454 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
455 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
456 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
457 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
458 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
459 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
460 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
461 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
462 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
466 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
468 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
469 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
470 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
471 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
472 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
473 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
474 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
475 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
476 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
477 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
478 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
479 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
480 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
481 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
486 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
487 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
488 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
489 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
490 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
491 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
496 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
497 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
498 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
499 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
500 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
501 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
502 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
503 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
504 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
505 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
506 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
507 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
508 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
509 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
514 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
515 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
516 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
517 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
518 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
519 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
520 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
521 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
525 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
526 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
527 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
529 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
530 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
531 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
532 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
533 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
535 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
536 /// funding transaction to confirm.
537 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
538 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
540 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
541 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
542 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
546 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
547 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
549 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
552 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
561 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
563 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
567 fn $clear(&mut self) {
570 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
572 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
576 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
577 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
579 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
580 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
585 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
587 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
588 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
590 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
591 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
592 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
593 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
594 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
595 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
596 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
597 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
605 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
607 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
608 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
609 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
610 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
611 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
615 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
616 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
619 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
620 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
623 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
625 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
626 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
627 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
631 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
633 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
634 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
635 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
636 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
638 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
644 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
645 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
646 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
647 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
648 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
649 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
650 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
651 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
654 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
656 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
658 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
659 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
660 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
661 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
665 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
667 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
669 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
671 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
672 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
673 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
674 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
675 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
677 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
678 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
680 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
682 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
683 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
685 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
686 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
687 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
688 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
689 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
690 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
692 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
693 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
695 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
696 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
697 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
698 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
699 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
701 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
702 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
704 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
705 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
707 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
708 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
709 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
710 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
716 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
717 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
719 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
720 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
721 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
726 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
727 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
729 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
730 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
731 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
736 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
738 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
739 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
740 pub payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
743 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
744 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
745 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
746 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
747 record.payment_hash = self.payment_hash;
748 self.logger.log(record)
752 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
753 where L::Target: Logger {
754 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>, payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>) -> Self
755 where S::Target: SignerProvider
759 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
760 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
766 macro_rules! secp_check {
767 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
770 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
775 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
776 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
777 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
778 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
779 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
780 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
781 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
782 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
784 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
786 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
788 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
792 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
794 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
795 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
796 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
798 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
799 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
801 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
802 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
803 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
804 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
805 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
807 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
808 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
812 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
818 /// Current counts of various HTLCs, useful for calculating current balances available exactly.
820 pending_inbound_htlcs: usize,
821 pending_outbound_htlcs: usize,
822 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
823 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
824 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
825 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
826 outbound_holding_cell_msat: u64,
827 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
830 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
831 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
832 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
833 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
834 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
835 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
836 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
837 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
838 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
839 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
840 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
843 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
844 struct HTLCCandidate {
846 origin: HTLCInitiator,
850 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
858 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
860 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
862 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
863 htlc_value_msat: u64,
864 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
869 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
870 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
871 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
872 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
873 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
875 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
876 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
877 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
878 htlc_value_msat: u64,
880 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
881 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
885 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
886 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
887 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
888 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
889 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
890 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
891 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
892 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
893 pub pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
894 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
895 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
896 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
899 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
901 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
902 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
903 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
904 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
907 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
908 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
909 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
910 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
911 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
912 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
913 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
914 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
917 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
919 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
920 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
921 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
922 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
923 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
924 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
925 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
926 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
927 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
928 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
929 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
930 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
931 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
932 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
933 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
936 /// Tracks the transaction number, along with current and next commitment points.
937 /// This consolidates the logic to advance our commitment number and request new
938 /// commitment points from our signer.
939 #[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone)]
940 enum HolderCommitmentPoint {
941 // TODO: add a variant for before our first commitment point is retrieved
942 /// We've advanced our commitment number and are waiting on the next commitment point.
943 /// Until the `get_per_commitment_point` signer method becomes async, this variant
944 /// will not be used.
945 PendingNext { transaction_number: u64, current: PublicKey },
946 /// Our current commitment point is ready, we've cached our next point,
947 /// and we are not pending a new one.
948 Available { transaction_number: u64, current: PublicKey, next: PublicKey },
951 impl HolderCommitmentPoint {
952 pub fn new<SP: Deref>(signer: &ChannelSignerType<SP>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Self
953 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
955 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
956 transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
957 current: signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, secp_ctx),
958 next: signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, secp_ctx),
962 pub fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
963 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { .. } = self { true } else { false }
966 pub fn transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
968 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { transaction_number, .. } => *transaction_number,
969 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number, .. } => *transaction_number,
973 pub fn current_point(&self) -> PublicKey {
975 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { current, .. } => *current,
976 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { current, .. } => *current,
980 pub fn next_point(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
982 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { .. } => None,
983 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { next, .. } => Some(*next),
987 pub fn advance<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, signer: &ChannelSignerType<SP>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, logger: &L)
988 where SP::Target: SignerProvider, L::Target: Logger
990 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number, next, .. } = self {
991 *self = HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext {
992 transaction_number: *transaction_number - 1,
997 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { transaction_number, current } = self {
998 let next = signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(*transaction_number - 1, secp_ctx);
999 log_trace!(logger, "Retrieved next per-commitment point {}", *transaction_number - 1);
1000 *self = HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number: *transaction_number, current: *current, next };
1005 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1006 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1007 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1008 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1009 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1010 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1011 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1012 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1013 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1014 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1015 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1016 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1017 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1018 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1019 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1021 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1022 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1023 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1024 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1026 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1027 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1028 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1029 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1031 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1032 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1033 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1034 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1035 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1037 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1038 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1039 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1040 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1042 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1043 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1044 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1046 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1047 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1048 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1049 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1050 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1052 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1053 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1056 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1057 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1059 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1060 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1061 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1062 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1064 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1065 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1067 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1068 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1071 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1072 (0, update, required),
1075 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1076 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1077 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1078 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1079 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1080 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1081 UnfundedOutboundV2(OutboundV2Channel<SP>),
1082 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1083 UnfundedInboundV2(InboundV2Channel<SP>),
1084 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1087 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1088 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1089 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1091 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1093 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1094 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1095 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1096 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1097 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1098 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1099 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1103 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1105 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1106 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1107 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1108 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1109 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1110 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1111 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1116 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1117 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1118 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1119 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1120 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1122 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1123 /// in a timely manner.
1124 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1127 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1128 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1129 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1131 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1132 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1133 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1134 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1138 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1139 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1140 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1142 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1143 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1144 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1145 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1147 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1151 /// The current channel ID.
1152 channel_id: ChannelId,
1153 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1154 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1155 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1156 channel_state: ChannelState,
1158 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1159 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1161 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1162 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1163 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1165 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1166 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1167 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1168 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1170 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1171 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1173 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1175 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1176 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1177 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1179 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1180 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1181 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1183 holder_commitment_point: HolderCommitmentPoint,
1184 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1185 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1186 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1187 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1188 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1190 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1191 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1192 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1193 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1194 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1195 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1197 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1199 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1200 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1201 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1203 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1204 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1205 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1206 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1207 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1208 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1209 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1210 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1212 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1213 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1214 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1216 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1217 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1218 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1219 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1220 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1221 /// outbound or inbound.
1222 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1224 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1226 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1227 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1228 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1229 // HTLCs with similar state.
1230 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1231 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1232 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1233 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1234 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1235 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1236 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1237 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1238 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1239 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1241 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1242 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1243 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1245 update_time_counter: u32,
1247 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1248 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1249 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1250 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1251 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1252 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1254 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1255 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1257 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1258 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1259 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1260 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1262 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1263 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1265 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1267 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1269 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1270 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1271 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1272 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1273 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1275 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1276 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1278 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1279 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1280 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1282 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1283 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1284 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1285 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1286 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1287 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1288 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1289 pub(super) channel_creation_height: u32,
1291 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1294 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1296 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1299 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1301 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1304 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1306 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1308 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1309 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1312 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1314 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1316 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1317 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1319 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1321 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1322 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1323 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1325 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1327 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1328 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1329 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1331 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1332 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1333 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1335 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1337 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1339 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1340 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1341 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1342 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1344 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1345 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1346 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1348 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1349 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1350 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1352 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1353 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1354 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1355 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1356 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1357 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1358 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1359 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1361 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1362 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1363 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1364 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1365 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1367 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1368 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1370 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1371 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1372 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1373 /// unblock the state machine.
1375 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1376 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1377 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1379 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1380 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1381 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1383 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1384 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1385 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1386 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1387 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1388 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1389 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1390 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1392 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1393 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1395 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1396 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1397 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1399 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1400 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1401 // associated channel mapping.
1403 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1404 // to store all of them.
1405 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1407 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1408 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1409 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1410 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1411 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1413 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1414 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1416 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1417 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1419 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1420 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1422 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1423 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1425 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1427 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1429 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1430 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1431 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1434 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1435 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1436 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1437 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1438 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1439 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1440 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1442 config: &'a UserConfig,
1443 current_chain_height: u32,
1446 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1447 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1448 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1449 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1450 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1452 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1453 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1455 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1456 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1458 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1460 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
1461 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1463 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1465 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1466 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1467 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1469 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1470 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1473 // Check sanity of message fields:
1474 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1475 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1476 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1477 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1478 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1480 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1481 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1483 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1484 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1486 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1487 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1488 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1490 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1491 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1493 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1494 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1496 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1498 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1499 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1500 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1502 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1503 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1505 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1506 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1509 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1510 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1511 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1513 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1514 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1516 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1517 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1519 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1520 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1522 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1523 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1525 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1526 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1528 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1529 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1532 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1534 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1535 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1536 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1540 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1541 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1542 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1543 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1545 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1546 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1548 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1549 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1550 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1552 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1553 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1556 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1557 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1558 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1559 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1563 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1564 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1565 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1566 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1569 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1570 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1571 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1572 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1573 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1576 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1577 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1578 &Some(ref script) => {
1579 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1580 if script.len() == 0 {
1583 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1584 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1586 Some(script.clone())
1589 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1591 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1596 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1597 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1598 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1599 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1603 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1604 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1605 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1609 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1610 Ok(script) => script,
1611 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1614 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1615 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1617 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1620 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1623 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1625 let holder_signer = ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer);
1626 let holder_commitment_point = HolderCommitmentPoint::new(&holder_signer, &secp_ctx);
1628 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1630 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1633 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1634 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1636 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1641 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1643 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1644 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1645 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1646 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1648 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1651 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1654 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1657 holder_commitment_point,
1658 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1661 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1662 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1663 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1664 pending_update_fee: None,
1665 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1666 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1667 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1668 update_time_counter: 1,
1670 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1672 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1673 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1674 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1675 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1676 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1677 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1678 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1680 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1681 signer_pending_funding: false,
1684 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1685 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1686 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1687 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1689 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1690 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1691 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1692 closing_fee_limits: None,
1693 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1695 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1696 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1697 short_channel_id: None,
1698 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1700 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1701 channel_value_satoshis,
1702 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1703 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1704 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1705 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1706 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1707 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1708 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1709 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1710 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1711 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1714 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1716 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1717 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1718 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1719 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1720 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1721 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1722 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1724 funding_outpoint: None,
1725 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1727 funding_transaction: None,
1728 is_batch_funding: None,
1730 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1731 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1732 counterparty_node_id,
1734 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1736 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1738 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1739 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1741 announcement_sigs: None,
1743 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1744 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1745 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1746 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1748 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1749 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1751 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1752 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1754 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1755 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1757 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1758 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1763 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1765 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1771 fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
1772 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1773 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1774 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1775 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1776 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1777 funding_satoshis: u64,
1780 config: &'a UserConfig,
1781 current_chain_height: u32,
1782 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1783 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1784 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1785 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1786 holder_signer: <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner,
1787 pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1788 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, APIError>
1790 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1791 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1792 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1794 // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel
1795 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis;
1797 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1799 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1800 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1802 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1803 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1805 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1806 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1807 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1809 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1810 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1813 let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1814 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1816 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1817 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
1819 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
1821 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
1823 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1824 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
1825 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
1826 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1829 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1830 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1832 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1833 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1834 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1835 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1839 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1840 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1841 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1845 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1846 Ok(script) => script,
1847 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1850 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
1852 let holder_signer = ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer);
1853 let holder_commitment_point = HolderCommitmentPoint::new(&holder_signer, &secp_ctx);
1858 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1859 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1860 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1861 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1866 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1868 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1869 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1870 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
1871 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1873 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1874 channel_value_satoshis,
1876 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1879 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1882 holder_commitment_point,
1883 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1886 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1887 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1888 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1889 pending_update_fee: None,
1890 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1891 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1892 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1893 update_time_counter: 1,
1895 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1897 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1898 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1899 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1900 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1901 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1902 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1903 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1905 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1906 signer_pending_funding: false,
1908 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions
1909 // when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1910 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1911 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1912 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1913 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1915 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1916 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1917 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1918 closing_fee_limits: None,
1919 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1921 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1922 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1923 short_channel_id: None,
1924 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1926 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
1927 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1928 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1929 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1930 // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we
1931 // receive `accept_channel2`.
1932 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1933 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1934 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1935 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1936 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1937 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1938 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1939 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1941 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1943 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1944 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1945 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1946 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1947 counterparty_parameters: None,
1948 funding_outpoint: None,
1949 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1951 funding_transaction: None,
1952 is_batch_funding: None,
1954 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1955 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1956 counterparty_node_id,
1958 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1960 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1962 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1963 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1965 announcement_sigs: None,
1967 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1968 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1969 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1970 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1972 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1973 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1975 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1976 outbound_scid_alias,
1978 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1979 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1981 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1982 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1987 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1988 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1992 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1993 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1994 self.update_time_counter
1997 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1998 self.latest_monitor_update_id
2001 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2002 self.config.announced_channel
2005 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2006 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
2009 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2010 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2011 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
2012 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
2015 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2016 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2017 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
2020 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2021 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2022 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2023 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
2024 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
2025 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
2026 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
2029 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
2030 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
2031 match self.channel_state {
2032 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
2033 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
2034 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
2035 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2036 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
2037 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2038 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
2040 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
2042 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
2043 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
2047 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
2048 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
2049 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2050 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2051 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
2052 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2055 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2056 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2057 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
2061 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2062 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2063 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2064 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2065 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
2068 // Public utilities:
2070 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2074 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
2076 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
2077 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
2078 self.temporary_channel_id
2081 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2085 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2086 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2087 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
2091 /// Gets the channel's type
2092 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
2096 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
2098 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
2099 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2100 self.short_channel_id
2103 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2104 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2105 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
2108 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2109 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2110 self.outbound_scid_alias
2113 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2115 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2116 return &self.holder_signer
2119 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
2120 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
2121 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
2122 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
2123 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
2124 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
2127 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2128 /// get_funding_created.
2129 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2130 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
2133 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2134 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2135 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
2136 if conf_height > 0 {
2143 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2144 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
2145 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
2148 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2149 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
2150 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
2151 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2155 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2158 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2159 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2162 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2163 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2166 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2167 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2168 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2171 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2172 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2175 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2176 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2177 self.counterparty_node_id
2180 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2181 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2182 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2185 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2186 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2187 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2190 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2191 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2193 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2194 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2195 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2196 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2198 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2202 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2203 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2204 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2207 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2208 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2209 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2212 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2213 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2214 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2216 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2217 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2222 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2223 self.channel_value_satoshis
2226 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2227 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2230 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2231 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2234 fn get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate<F: Deref>(&self,
2235 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2236 ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
2237 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep)
2240 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self, limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw: u32) -> u64 {
2241 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2242 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2243 (limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw as u64).saturating_mul(multiplier)
2245 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2249 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2250 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2251 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2254 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2255 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2256 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2259 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2260 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2261 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2264 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2265 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2266 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2269 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2270 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2271 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2274 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2275 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2276 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2279 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2280 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2281 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2282 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2283 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2286 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2288 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2289 self.prev_config = None;
2293 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2294 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2298 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2299 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2300 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2301 let did_channel_update =
2302 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2303 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2304 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2305 if did_channel_update {
2306 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2307 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2308 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2309 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2311 self.config.options = *config;
2315 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2316 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2317 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2318 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2319 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2322 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2323 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2324 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2325 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2326 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2328 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2329 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2330 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2331 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2332 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2333 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2334 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2336 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2337 where L::Target: Logger
2339 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2340 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2341 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2343 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2344 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2345 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2346 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2348 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2349 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2350 if match update_state {
2351 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2352 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2353 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2354 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2355 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2357 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2361 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2362 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2363 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2365 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2367 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2368 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2369 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2371 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2372 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2373 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2374 transaction_output_index: None
2379 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2380 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2381 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2382 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2383 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2386 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2388 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2389 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2390 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2392 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2393 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2396 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2397 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2400 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2402 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2403 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2404 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2406 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2407 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2413 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2415 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2416 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2417 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2418 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2419 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2420 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2421 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2425 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2426 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2428 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2430 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2431 if generated_by_local {
2432 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2433 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2434 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2444 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2446 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2447 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2448 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2449 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2450 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2451 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2452 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2455 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2456 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2457 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2458 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2462 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2463 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2467 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2468 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2470 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2472 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2473 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2475 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2476 if !generated_by_local {
2477 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2485 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2486 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2487 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2488 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2489 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2490 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2491 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2492 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2494 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2496 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2497 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2498 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2499 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2501 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2503 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2504 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2505 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2506 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2509 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2510 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2511 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2512 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2514 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2517 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2518 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2519 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2520 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2522 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2525 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2526 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2531 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2532 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2537 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2539 let channel_parameters =
2540 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2541 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2542 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2549 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2552 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2553 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2554 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2555 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2563 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2564 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2565 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2566 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2571 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2572 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2573 /// our counterparty!)
2574 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2575 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2576 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2577 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
2578 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2579 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2580 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2582 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2586 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2587 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2588 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2589 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2590 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2591 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2592 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2594 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2597 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2598 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2599 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2600 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2601 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2604 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2605 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2608 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2612 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2613 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2614 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2615 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2616 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2617 // which are near the dust limit.
2618 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2619 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2620 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2621 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2622 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2624 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2625 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2627 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2628 cmp::max(feerate_per_kw + 2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2631 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2632 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2633 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2636 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending htlcs
2637 fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate: u32) -> HTLCStats {
2639 let uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors = self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
2641 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update);
2642 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors {
2645 (dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2646 dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2649 let mut on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2650 let mut on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2652 let mut on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2653 let mut on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2655 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2658 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2659 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2660 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2661 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2662 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2663 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2665 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2667 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2668 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2673 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2674 let mut outbound_holding_cell_msat = 0;
2675 let mut on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count = 0;
2676 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2678 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2679 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2680 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2681 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2682 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2683 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2685 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2687 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2688 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2692 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2693 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2694 pending_outbound_htlcs += 1;
2695 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2696 outbound_holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2697 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2698 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2700 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2702 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2703 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2705 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2711 // Include any mining "excess" fees in the dust calculation
2712 let excess_feerate_opt = outbound_feerate_update
2713 .or(self.pending_update_fee.map(|(fee, _)| fee))
2714 .unwrap_or(self.feerate_per_kw)
2715 .checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2716 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2717 let on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs =
2718 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs + on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs;
2719 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2720 commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs, &self.channel_type);
2721 if !self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2722 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2723 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2724 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2725 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2726 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2727 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2732 pending_inbound_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len(),
2733 pending_outbound_htlcs,
2734 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2735 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2736 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2737 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2738 outbound_holding_cell_msat,
2739 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count,
2743 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2744 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2745 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2746 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2747 match holding_cell_update {
2748 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2749 holding_cell_states.insert(
2751 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2754 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2755 holding_cell_states.insert(
2757 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2760 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2761 holding_cell_states.insert(
2763 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2767 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2770 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2771 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2774 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2775 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2777 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2778 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2779 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2780 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2781 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2782 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2783 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2784 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2785 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2786 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2793 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2794 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2795 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2796 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2799 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2800 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2802 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2803 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2804 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2805 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2806 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2807 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2808 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2809 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2810 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2811 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2814 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2815 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2821 } = *holding_cell_update {
2822 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2824 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2825 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2826 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2827 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2828 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2829 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2836 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2837 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2838 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2839 /// corner case properly.
2840 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2841 -> AvailableBalances
2842 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2844 let context = &self;
2845 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the case mentioned in the docs in general
2848 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
2849 let htlc_stats = context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2851 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2852 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2853 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2854 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2857 balance_msat -= htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat;
2859 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2860 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat)
2862 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2864 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2866 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2867 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2871 if context.is_outbound() {
2872 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2873 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2875 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2876 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2878 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2879 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2880 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2881 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2884 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2885 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2886 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2887 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2888 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2889 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2890 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2893 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2894 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2895 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2896 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2897 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2898 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2899 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2900 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2901 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2902 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2903 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2905 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2908 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2909 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2910 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2911 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2912 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2915 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2916 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2918 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2919 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2920 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat);
2922 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2923 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2924 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2925 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2929 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2931 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2932 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2933 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2934 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2935 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2936 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2937 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2939 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2940 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2942 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2943 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2944 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2947 let excess_feerate_opt = self.feerate_per_kw.checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2948 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2949 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
2950 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, &context.channel_type);
2951 let nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
2952 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
2953 if nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2954 // If adding an extra HTLC would put us over the dust limit in total fees, we cannot
2955 // send any non-dust HTLCs.
2956 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2960 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000) > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_add(1) {
2961 // Note that we don't use the `counterparty_tx_dust_exposure` (with
2962 // `htlc_dust_exposure_msat`) here as it only applies to non-dust HTLCs.
2963 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2964 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat));
2965 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2968 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2969 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2970 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2971 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
2972 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2975 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2976 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2977 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2979 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2983 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2984 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat);
2986 if htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
2987 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2991 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2992 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2993 - htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2994 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2996 outbound_capacity_msat,
2997 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2998 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
3003 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
3004 let context = &self;
3005 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
3008 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
3009 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
3011 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3012 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3014 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3015 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3017 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3018 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3019 let context = &self;
3020 assert!(context.is_outbound());
3022 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3025 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3026 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3028 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3029 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3031 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3032 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3034 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3035 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3039 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3040 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3046 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3047 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3048 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3051 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
3052 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
3053 included_htlcs += 1;
3056 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3057 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3061 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3062 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3063 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3064 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
3065 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
3066 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
3071 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3073 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
3074 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3079 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3080 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3084 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3085 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3086 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3089 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3090 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3092 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3093 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3094 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3096 total_pending_htlcs,
3097 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3098 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3099 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3101 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3102 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3103 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3105 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3107 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3112 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3113 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3115 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3116 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3118 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3119 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3121 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3122 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3123 let context = &self;
3124 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
3126 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3129 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3130 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3132 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3133 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3135 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3136 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3138 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3139 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3143 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3144 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3150 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3151 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3152 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3153 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3154 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3155 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3158 included_htlcs += 1;
3161 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3162 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3165 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3166 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3168 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3169 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3170 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3175 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3176 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3177 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3180 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3181 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3183 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3184 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3186 total_pending_htlcs,
3187 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3188 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3189 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3191 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3192 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3193 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3195 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3197 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3202 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3203 match self.channel_state {
3204 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3205 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3206 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3207 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3217 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3219 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3220 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3223 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3225 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3226 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3227 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3231 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3232 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3233 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3236 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3238 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3239 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3242 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3243 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3244 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3245 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3246 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3247 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3248 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3249 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3250 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3251 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3252 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3254 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3255 // return them to fail the payment.
3256 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3257 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3258 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3260 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3261 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3266 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3267 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3268 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3269 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3270 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3271 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3272 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3273 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3274 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3275 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3276 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3277 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3278 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3279 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3280 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3284 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3285 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3287 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3288 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3292 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3293 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3294 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3295 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3296 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3297 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3298 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3299 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3303 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3304 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3305 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3306 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3308 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3309 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3310 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3311 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3313 match &self.holder_signer {
3314 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3315 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3316 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3317 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3318 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3321 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3325 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3326 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3327 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3329 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3330 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3331 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3333 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3334 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3335 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3338 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3339 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3341 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3347 /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection
3348 /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a
3349 /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel.
3350 pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features<F: Deref>(
3351 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
3354 F::Target: FeeEstimator
3356 if !self.is_outbound() ||
3358 self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
3359 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
3364 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3365 // We've exhausted our options
3368 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
3369 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
3372 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
3373 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
3374 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
3375 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
3377 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3378 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
3379 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
3380 assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
3381 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
3382 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
3384 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
3386 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone();
3391 // Internal utility functions for channels
3393 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3394 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3395 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3397 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3399 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3400 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3401 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3403 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3406 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3408 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3411 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3412 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3413 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3415 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3417 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3418 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3419 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3420 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3421 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3424 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3425 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3426 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3427 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3428 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3429 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3430 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3433 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3434 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3436 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3438 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3439 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3440 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3441 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3442 // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3443 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3444 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3447 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3448 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3450 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3451 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3454 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3455 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3456 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3457 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3458 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3459 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3462 pub(crate) fn per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3463 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3464 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3465 let commitment_tx_fee = COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000;
3466 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3467 commitment_tx_fee + htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000
3473 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3474 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3475 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3476 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3477 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3478 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3479 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3480 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3481 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3482 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3483 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3484 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3487 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3488 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3489 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3490 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3491 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3492 pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3495 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3496 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3498 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3499 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3500 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3504 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3505 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3506 trait FailHTLCContents {
3507 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3508 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3509 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3510 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3512 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3513 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3514 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3515 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3517 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3518 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3520 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3521 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3524 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3525 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3526 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3527 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3530 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3531 failure_code: self.1
3534 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3535 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3537 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3538 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3540 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3541 failure_code: self.1
3546 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3547 fn name() -> &'static str;
3549 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3550 fn name() -> &'static str {
3554 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3555 fn name() -> &'static str {
3556 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3560 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3561 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3562 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: EcdsaChannelSigner
3564 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3565 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3566 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3567 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3569 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3570 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3572 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3574 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3575 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3576 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3577 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3579 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3580 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3584 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
3590 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3591 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3592 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3593 // outside of those situations will fail.
3594 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3598 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3603 1 + // script length (0)
3607 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3608 2 + // witness marker and flag
3609 1 + // witness element count
3610 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3611 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3612 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3613 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3614 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3615 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3617 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3618 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3619 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3625 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3626 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3627 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3628 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3630 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3631 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3632 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3634 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3635 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3636 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3637 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3638 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3639 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3642 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3643 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3646 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3647 value_to_holder = 0;
3650 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3651 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3652 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3653 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3655 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3656 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3659 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3660 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3663 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3666 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3667 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3669 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3671 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3672 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3673 where L::Target: Logger {
3674 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3675 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3676 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3677 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3678 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3679 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3680 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3681 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3685 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3686 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3687 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3688 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3690 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3691 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3694 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3695 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3696 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3698 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3699 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3700 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3701 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3702 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3703 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3704 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3706 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3707 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3708 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3710 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3711 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3713 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3716 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3717 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3721 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3725 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3726 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3727 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3728 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3729 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3730 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3733 // Now update local state:
3735 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3736 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3737 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3738 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3739 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3740 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3741 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3742 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3744 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3747 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3748 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3749 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3750 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3751 // do not not get into this branch.
3752 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3753 match pending_update {
3754 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3755 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3756 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3757 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3758 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3759 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3760 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3763 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3764 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3766 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3767 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3768 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3769 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3770 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3771 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3777 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3778 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3779 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3781 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3782 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3783 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3785 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3786 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3789 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3790 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3792 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3793 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3795 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3796 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3799 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3802 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3803 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3804 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3805 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3810 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3811 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3812 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3813 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3814 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3815 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3816 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3817 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3818 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3819 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3820 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3821 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3822 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3823 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3824 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3826 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3827 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3828 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3829 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3830 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3833 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3834 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3835 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3841 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3842 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3844 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3848 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3849 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3850 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3851 /// before we fail backwards.
3853 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3854 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3855 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3856 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3857 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3858 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3859 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3862 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3863 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3865 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3866 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3867 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3868 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3869 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3870 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3873 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3874 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3875 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3876 /// before we fail backwards.
3878 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3879 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3880 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3881 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3882 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3884 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3885 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3886 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3889 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3890 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3891 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3893 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3894 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3895 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3897 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3898 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3899 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3901 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3906 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3907 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
3913 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3914 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3915 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
3916 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
3917 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3921 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3922 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
3923 force_holding_cell = true;
3926 // Now update local state:
3927 if force_holding_cell {
3928 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3929 match pending_update {
3930 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3931 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3932 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3933 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3937 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3938 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3940 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3941 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3942 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
3948 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
3949 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
3953 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
3954 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
3956 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3957 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
3960 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
3963 // Message handlers:
3964 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3965 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3966 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3967 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3968 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3969 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3970 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3973 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3975 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3977 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3978 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3979 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3980 debug_assert!(matches!(
3981 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3983 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3984 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3987 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3988 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3990 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3991 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3992 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3993 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3995 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3998 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3999 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
4000 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
4003 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
4004 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
4005 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
4006 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
4007 // when routing outbound payments.
4008 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
4012 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
4013 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
4014 let mut check_reconnection = false;
4015 match &self.context.channel_state {
4016 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
4017 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
4018 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4019 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
4020 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4021 check_reconnection = true;
4022 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
4023 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
4024 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
4025 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
4026 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4028 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
4029 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4032 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4033 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
4034 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
4036 if check_reconnection {
4037 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
4038 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
4039 let expected_point =
4040 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4041 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
4043 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
4044 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
4045 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
4046 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
4047 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
4048 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
4050 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
4051 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
4052 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
4053 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
4054 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
4056 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
4057 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
4062 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4063 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4065 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4067 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger))
4070 pub fn update_add_htlc<F: Deref>(
4071 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
4072 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
4073 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
4074 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4075 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4077 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
4078 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
4079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4081 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4082 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4084 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4085 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
4087 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
4088 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4090 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
4091 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
4094 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4095 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4096 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
4097 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4099 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4100 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4103 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
4104 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
4105 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
4106 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
4107 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
4108 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
4109 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
4110 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
4111 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
4112 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
4113 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
4115 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
4116 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4117 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4118 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4119 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4120 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4124 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
4125 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
4126 let pending_remote_value_msat =
4127 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
4128 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
4129 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
4132 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
4133 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
4135 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
4136 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4137 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
4139 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4140 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4144 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4145 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
4147 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
4148 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
4152 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4153 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4157 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4158 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4159 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4160 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4161 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
4162 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4165 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
4166 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
4168 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
4169 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
4172 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4173 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
4174 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
4178 // Now update local state:
4179 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
4180 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4181 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4182 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
4183 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
4184 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
4185 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved {
4186 pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status
4192 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
4194 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
4195 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
4196 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4197 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
4198 let outcome = match check_preimage {
4199 None => fail_reason.into(),
4200 Some(payment_preimage) => {
4201 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4202 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4203 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4205 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4209 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4210 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4211 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4212 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4214 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4220 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4223 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4224 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4225 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4227 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4228 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4231 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4234 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4235 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4236 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4238 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4239 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4242 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4246 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4247 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4250 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4251 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4254 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4258 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4259 where L::Target: Logger
4261 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4264 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4265 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4267 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4271 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4273 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
4275 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, false, logger);
4276 let commitment_txid = {
4277 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4278 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4279 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4281 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4282 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4283 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4284 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4285 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4286 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4290 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4292 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4293 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4294 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4295 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4298 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4299 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4300 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4301 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4304 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4306 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4307 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4308 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4309 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4310 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4311 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4312 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4313 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4314 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4315 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4316 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4322 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4323 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4326 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4327 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4328 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4329 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4330 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4331 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4332 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4333 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4334 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4335 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4336 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4337 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4338 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4341 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4342 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4343 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4344 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4345 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4346 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4347 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4349 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4350 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4351 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4352 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4353 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4354 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4355 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4356 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4358 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4359 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4362 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4364 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4365 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4366 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4369 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4372 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4373 commitment_stats.tx,
4375 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4376 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4377 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4380 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4381 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4383 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4384 let mut need_commitment = false;
4385 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4386 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4387 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4388 need_commitment = true;
4392 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4393 let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state {
4394 Some(resolution.clone())
4396 if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution {
4397 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4398 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4399 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution);
4400 need_commitment = true;
4403 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4404 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4405 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4406 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4407 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4408 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4409 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4410 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4411 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4412 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4413 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4414 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4415 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4416 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4418 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4420 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4421 need_commitment = true;
4425 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4426 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4427 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4428 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4429 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4430 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4431 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4433 nondust_htlc_sources,
4435 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4438 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
4439 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4440 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4441 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4442 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4444 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4445 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4446 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4447 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4448 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4449 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4450 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4451 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4452 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4453 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4454 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4455 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4456 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4457 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4459 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4460 &self.context.channel_id);
4461 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4464 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4465 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4466 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4467 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4468 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4469 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4470 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4471 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4472 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4476 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4477 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4478 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4479 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4482 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4483 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4484 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4485 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4486 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4487 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4488 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4490 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4491 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4492 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4495 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4496 /// for our counterparty.
4497 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4498 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4499 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4500 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4502 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4503 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4504 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4505 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4507 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4508 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4509 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4510 updates: Vec::new(),
4511 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4514 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4515 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4516 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4517 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4518 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4519 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4520 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4521 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4522 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4523 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4524 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4525 // to rebalance channels.
4526 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4527 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4528 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4529 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4531 match self.send_htlc(
4532 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4533 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4535 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4538 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4539 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4540 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4541 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4542 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4543 // into the holding cell without ever being
4544 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4545 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4546 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4549 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4556 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4557 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4558 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4559 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4560 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4561 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4562 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4563 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4564 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4565 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4566 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4567 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4570 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4571 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4572 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4574 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4575 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4576 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4579 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4581 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4582 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4583 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4584 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4585 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4586 // for a full revocation before failing.
4587 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4588 update_fail_count += 1;
4590 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4592 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4597 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4598 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4600 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4601 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4606 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4607 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4608 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4609 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4610 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4612 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4613 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4614 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4616 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4617 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4623 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4624 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4625 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4626 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4627 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4628 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4629 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4630 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4631 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4633 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4634 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4636 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4637 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4639 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4640 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4643 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4645 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4646 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4647 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4651 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4652 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4653 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4654 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4655 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4656 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4657 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4658 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4659 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4662 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4664 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4665 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4668 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4669 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4670 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4671 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4673 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4675 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4680 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4681 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4682 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4683 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4684 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4685 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4686 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4687 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4688 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4690 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4693 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4694 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4695 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4696 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4697 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4698 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4699 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4700 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4701 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4703 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4704 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4707 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4708 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4709 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
4710 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4711 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4712 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4713 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4714 let mut require_commitment = false;
4715 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4718 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4719 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4720 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4721 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4723 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4724 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4725 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4726 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4727 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4728 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4730 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4734 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4735 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4736 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4737 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4738 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4740 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4741 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4742 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4747 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4748 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4750 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4754 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4755 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4757 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state {
4758 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4759 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution);
4760 require_commitment = true;
4761 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state {
4763 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } =>
4764 match pending_htlc_status {
4765 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4766 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4767 require_commitment = true;
4769 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4770 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4771 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4773 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4774 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4775 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4779 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4780 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash);
4781 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4782 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4785 InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => {
4786 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4787 pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc);
4788 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4794 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4795 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4796 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4797 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4798 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4800 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4801 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4802 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4803 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4804 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4805 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4806 require_commitment = true;
4810 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4812 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4813 match update_state {
4814 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4815 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4816 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4817 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4818 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4819 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4821 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4822 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4823 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4824 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4825 require_commitment = true;
4826 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4827 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4832 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4833 let release_state_str =
4834 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4835 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4836 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4837 if !release_monitor {
4838 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4839 update: monitor_update,
4841 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4843 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4848 self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds);
4850 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4851 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4852 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4853 if require_commitment {
4854 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4855 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4856 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4857 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4859 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4860 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4861 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4862 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4863 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4865 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4866 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4867 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4868 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4869 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4872 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4873 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4874 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4875 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4876 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4877 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4879 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4880 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4882 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4883 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4885 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4886 if require_commitment {
4887 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4889 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4890 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4891 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4892 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4894 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
4895 &self.context.channel_id(),
4896 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
4899 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4900 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4902 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
4903 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4905 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4906 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4912 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4913 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4914 /// commitment update.
4915 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4916 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4917 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4919 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4920 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4923 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4924 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4925 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4926 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4928 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4929 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4930 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4931 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4932 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4933 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4934 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4936 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4937 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4939 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4940 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4942 if !self.context.is_live() {
4943 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4946 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4947 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4948 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw), dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4949 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
4950 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, true, logger);
4951 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4952 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - htlc_stats.outbound_holding_cell_msat;
4953 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4954 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4955 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4959 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4960 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4961 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4962 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4965 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4966 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4970 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4971 force_holding_cell = true;
4974 if force_holding_cell {
4975 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4979 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4980 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4982 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4983 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4988 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4989 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4991 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4993 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4994 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4995 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4996 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5000 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5001 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
5002 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
5006 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
5007 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
5010 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
5011 // will be retransmitted.
5012 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
5013 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
5014 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
5016 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
5017 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5019 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
5020 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
5021 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
5022 // this HTLC accordingly
5023 inbound_drop_count += 1;
5026 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
5027 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
5028 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
5029 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
5032 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
5033 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
5034 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
5035 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
5036 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
5037 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
5042 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
5044 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5045 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
5046 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5047 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5051 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5052 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5053 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
5054 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
5055 // the update upon reconnection.
5056 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
5060 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5062 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
5063 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
5067 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
5068 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
5069 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
5070 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
5071 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
5072 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
5073 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
5075 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
5076 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
5077 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
5078 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
5079 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
5080 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
5081 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
5083 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
5084 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
5085 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
5086 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
5087 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
5088 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5089 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
5092 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
5093 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
5094 /// to the remote side.
5095 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5096 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5097 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
5098 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
5101 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5103 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
5104 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
5106 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
5107 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
5108 // first received the funding_signed.
5109 let mut funding_broadcastable =
5110 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
5111 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
5112 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
5114 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
5116 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
5117 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
5118 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5119 funding_broadcastable = None;
5122 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
5123 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
5124 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
5125 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
5126 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
5127 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
5128 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
5129 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
5130 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
5131 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
5132 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
5135 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
5137 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
5138 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
5139 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5140 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
5141 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5142 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
5143 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
5144 mem::swap(&mut pending_update_adds, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
5146 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5147 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5148 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5149 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5150 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5151 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, pending_update_adds,
5152 funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5156 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
5157 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5159 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
5160 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5162 if commitment_update.is_some() {
5163 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5166 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5167 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5168 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
5169 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
5170 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
5171 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5172 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
5173 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5174 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5175 pending_update_adds, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5179 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5180 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5182 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
5185 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5186 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5188 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
5190 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
5191 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5192 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
5193 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5194 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5195 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5196 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5198 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5200 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5201 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5202 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5207 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5209 #[cfg(async_signing)]
5210 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5211 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5212 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5214 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5215 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5217 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5218 self.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger)
5221 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5222 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5223 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5224 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5226 SignerResumeUpdates {
5233 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5234 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() <= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER + 2);
5235 // TODO: handle non-available case when get_per_commitment_point becomes async
5236 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
5237 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
5238 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() + 2);
5239 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5240 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5241 per_commitment_secret,
5242 next_per_commitment_point,
5244 next_local_nonce: None,
5248 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5249 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5250 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5251 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5252 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5253 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5255 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5256 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5257 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5258 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5259 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5260 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5261 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5262 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5263 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5264 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5265 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5270 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5271 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5273 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5274 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5275 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5276 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5277 reason: err_packet.clone()
5280 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5281 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5282 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5283 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5284 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5285 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5288 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5289 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5290 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5291 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5292 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5299 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5300 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5301 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5302 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5306 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5307 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5308 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5309 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5310 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5311 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5312 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5316 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5317 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5319 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5320 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5321 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5322 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5327 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5328 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5333 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5334 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5335 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5336 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5337 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5338 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5339 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5344 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5345 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5347 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5348 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5349 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5350 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5351 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5352 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5353 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5354 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5357 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5359 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5360 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5361 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5362 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5363 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5366 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5367 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5368 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5371 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1;
5372 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5373 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5374 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5375 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5376 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5377 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5379 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5380 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5381 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5382 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5383 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5386 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5387 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5388 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5389 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5390 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5391 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5392 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5393 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5397 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5398 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5399 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5400 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5401 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5402 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5403 our_commitment_transaction
5407 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5408 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5409 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5410 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5412 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5414 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger);
5416 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5417 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5418 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5419 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5420 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5421 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5423 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5424 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5425 channel_ready: None,
5426 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5427 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5428 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5432 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5433 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5434 channel_ready: Some(self.get_channel_ready()),
5435 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5436 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5437 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5441 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5442 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5443 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5445 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5446 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5447 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5450 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5453 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5454 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5455 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5456 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5457 our_commitment_transaction
5461 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5462 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5463 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5464 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5465 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5466 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5467 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5469 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5471 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == 1 {
5472 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5473 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
5476 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5477 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5478 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5480 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5483 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5484 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5485 raa: required_revoke,
5486 commitment_update: None,
5487 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5489 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5490 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5491 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5493 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5496 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5497 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5498 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5499 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5500 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5501 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5504 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5505 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5506 raa: required_revoke,
5507 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5508 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5511 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5512 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5513 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5514 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5515 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5518 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5519 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5520 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5521 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5526 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5527 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5528 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5529 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5531 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5533 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5535 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5536 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5537 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5538 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5539 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5540 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5541 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5542 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5544 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5545 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5546 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5547 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5548 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5550 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5551 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5552 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5553 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5556 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5557 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5558 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5559 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5560 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5561 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5562 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5563 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5564 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5565 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5566 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5567 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5568 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5569 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5570 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5572 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5575 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5576 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5579 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5580 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5581 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5582 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5583 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5584 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5587 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5588 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5589 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5590 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5591 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5592 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5593 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5595 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5601 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5602 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5603 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5604 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5606 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5607 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5608 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5609 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5610 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5611 return Ok((None, None, None));
5614 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5615 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5616 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5618 return Ok((None, None, None));
5621 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5622 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5623 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5624 return Ok((None, None, None));
5627 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5629 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5630 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5631 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5632 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5634 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5635 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5637 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5638 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5640 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5641 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5642 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5643 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5645 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5646 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5647 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5651 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5657 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5658 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5660 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5661 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5664 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5665 /// within our expected timeframe.
5667 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5668 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5669 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5672 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5675 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5676 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5680 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5681 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5683 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5684 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5686 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5687 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5688 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5689 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5690 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5692 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5693 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5694 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5697 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5699 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5700 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5703 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5704 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5705 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5708 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5711 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5712 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5713 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5714 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5716 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5719 assert!(send_shutdown);
5720 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5721 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5722 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5724 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5725 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5727 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5732 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5734 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5735 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5737 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5738 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5739 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5740 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5741 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5742 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5743 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5745 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5747 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5748 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5750 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5751 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5752 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5753 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5757 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5758 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5759 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5760 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5761 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5762 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5764 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5765 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5772 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5773 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5775 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5778 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5779 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5781 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5783 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5784 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5785 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5786 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5787 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5788 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5789 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5790 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5791 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5793 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5794 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5797 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5801 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5802 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5803 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5804 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5806 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5807 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5809 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5810 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5812 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5813 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5815 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5816 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5819 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5820 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5823 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5824 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5825 return Ok((None, None, None));
5828 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5829 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5830 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5831 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5833 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5835 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5838 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5839 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5840 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5841 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5842 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5846 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5847 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < Amount::from_sat(MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS) {
5848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5852 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5853 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5855 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5858 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5859 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5860 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5861 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5863 monitor_update: None,
5864 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5865 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5866 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5867 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5868 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5869 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5870 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5871 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5873 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5874 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5875 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5876 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
5880 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5882 macro_rules! propose_fee {
5883 ($new_fee: expr) => {
5884 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5885 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5887 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5890 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
5891 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5893 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5894 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5895 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5896 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5898 monitor_update: None,
5899 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5900 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5901 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5902 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5903 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5904 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5905 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5906 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5908 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5909 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5910 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5911 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5916 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5917 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5918 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5919 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5921 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5922 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5923 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5925 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5927 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5934 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5935 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5936 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5938 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5939 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5941 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5942 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5945 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5946 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5947 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5948 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5949 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5951 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5952 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5953 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5955 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5956 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5959 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5960 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5961 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5962 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5963 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5964 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5965 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5966 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5968 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5971 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5972 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5973 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5974 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5976 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5980 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5981 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5982 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5983 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5985 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5991 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5992 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5993 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5994 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5995 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5996 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5997 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5999 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
6000 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
6003 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
6005 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
6006 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
6012 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
6013 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
6014 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
6015 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
6016 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
6017 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6018 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
6020 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
6021 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
6028 pub fn can_accept_incoming_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6029 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L
6030 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)>
6032 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6035 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6036 return Err(("Shutdown was already sent", 0x4000|8))
6039 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
6040 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6041 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6042 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6045 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
6046 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
6047 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
6049 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
6050 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
6051 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6052 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6053 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6054 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6055 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6058 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
6059 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, &self.context.channel_type);
6060 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
6061 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
6062 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6063 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to tx fee dust at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6064 counterparty_tx_dust_exposure, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6065 return Err(("Exceeded our tx fee dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6069 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6070 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
6071 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6072 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6073 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
6074 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6075 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on holder commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6079 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6080 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
6085 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
6086 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6087 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6088 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6089 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6090 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6094 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
6095 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
6096 let pending_remote_value_msat =
6097 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
6099 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6100 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
6101 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
6102 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
6103 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
6104 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6105 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
6106 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6107 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
6109 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
6110 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
6111 return Err(("Fee spike buffer violation", 0x1000|7));
6118 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6119 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() + 1
6122 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6123 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
6126 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6127 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
6131 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
6132 &self.context.holder_signer
6136 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
6138 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6139 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
6140 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
6141 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6142 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6143 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
6145 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6147 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
6155 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6156 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
6160 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
6161 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
6162 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
6163 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
6166 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
6167 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
6168 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
6169 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
6172 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
6173 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
6174 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
6175 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
6176 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
6177 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
6180 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
6181 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
6182 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
6183 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
6184 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
6185 if !release_monitor {
6186 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
6195 /// On startup, its possible we detect some monitor updates have actually completed (and the
6196 /// ChannelManager was simply stale). In that case, we should simply drop them, which we do
6197 /// here after logging them.
6198 pub fn on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, loaded_mon_update_id: u64) {
6199 let channel_id = self.context.channel_id();
6200 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.retain(|update| {
6201 if update.update.update_id <= loaded_mon_update_id {
6204 "Dropping completed ChannelMonitorUpdate id {} on channel {} due to a stale ChannelManager",
6205 update.update.update_id,
6215 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
6216 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
6219 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
6220 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
6221 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
6223 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
6224 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
6226 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
6227 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
6229 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
6230 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
6231 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
6234 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
6235 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
6236 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
6237 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
6238 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
6239 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
6241 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
6242 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
6243 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
6245 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
6246 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
6247 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
6248 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
6249 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
6250 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
6256 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
6257 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
6258 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
6259 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
6262 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6263 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6264 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6267 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6268 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6269 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
6272 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
6273 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6274 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
6277 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
6278 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
6279 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
6280 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6281 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
6284 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
6285 self.context.channel_update_status
6288 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
6289 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6290 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
6293 fn check_get_channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady>
6294 where L::Target: Logger
6297 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
6298 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
6299 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
6303 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6304 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
6305 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
6308 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6312 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6313 // channel_ready yet.
6314 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6315 // TODO: set signer_pending_channel_ready
6316 log_debug!(logger, "Can't produce channel_ready: the signer is pending funding.");
6320 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6321 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6322 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6323 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6325 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6326 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6327 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6329 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6330 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6333 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6334 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6336 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6337 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6338 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6339 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6340 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6341 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6342 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6343 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6345 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6349 if !need_commitment_update {
6350 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: we do not need a commitment update");
6354 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6355 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: a monitor update is in progress. Setting monitor_pending_channel_ready.");
6356 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6360 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6361 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: the peer is disconnected.");
6365 // TODO: when get_per_commiment_point becomes async, check if the point is
6366 // available, if not, set signer_pending_channel_ready and return None
6368 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
6371 fn get_channel_ready(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReady {
6372 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
6373 msgs::ChannelReady {
6374 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6375 next_per_commitment_point: self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point(),
6376 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6380 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6381 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6382 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6383 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6384 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6385 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6386 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6388 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6391 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6392 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6393 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6394 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6395 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6396 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6397 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6398 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6399 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh() ||
6400 tx.output[txo_idx].value.to_sat() != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6401 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6402 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6403 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6404 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6405 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6406 // channel and move on.
6407 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6408 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6410 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6411 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6412 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6414 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6415 if !tx.is_coinbase() {
6416 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6417 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6418 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6419 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6420 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6421 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6426 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6427 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6428 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6429 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6430 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6433 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6434 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6435 if tx.is_coinbase() &&
6436 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6437 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6438 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6441 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6442 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6443 // may have already happened for this block).
6444 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height, logger) {
6445 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6446 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6447 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6450 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6451 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6452 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6453 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6461 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6462 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6463 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6464 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6466 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6467 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6470 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6472 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6473 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6474 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6475 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6477 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6480 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6483 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6484 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6485 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6486 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6488 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6491 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6492 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6493 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6495 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6496 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6498 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6499 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6500 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6508 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6510 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height, logger) {
6511 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6512 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6514 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6515 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6518 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6519 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6520 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6521 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6522 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6523 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6524 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6525 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6528 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6529 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6530 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6531 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6533 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6534 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6535 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6537 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6538 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6539 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6540 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6542 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6543 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6544 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6545 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6546 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6547 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6548 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6551 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6552 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6554 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6557 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6558 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6559 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6560 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6561 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6562 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6563 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6564 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6565 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6566 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6567 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6568 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6569 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6570 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6571 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6572 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6573 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6579 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6584 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6585 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6587 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6588 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6589 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6590 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6592 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6595 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6597 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6598 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6599 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6600 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6601 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6602 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6604 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6605 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6608 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6609 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6610 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6611 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6612 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6613 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6615 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6616 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6619 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6620 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6621 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6622 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6623 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6629 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6630 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6631 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6632 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6634 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6637 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6641 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6645 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6646 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6650 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6654 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6655 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6658 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6662 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6664 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6669 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6670 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6671 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6673 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6678 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6680 None => return None,
6683 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6685 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6686 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6688 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6689 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6692 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6698 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6700 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6701 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6702 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6703 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6704 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6705 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6706 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6708 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6709 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6710 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6711 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6712 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6713 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6714 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6715 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6716 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6717 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6718 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6719 contents: announcement,
6722 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6727 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6731 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6732 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6733 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6734 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6735 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6736 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6737 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6738 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6740 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6742 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6743 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6744 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6745 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6747 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6748 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6749 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6750 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6753 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6754 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6755 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6756 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6759 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6762 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6763 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6764 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6765 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6766 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6767 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6770 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6772 Err(_) => return None,
6774 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6775 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6780 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6781 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6782 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6783 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6784 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6785 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6786 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6787 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6788 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6789 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6790 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6791 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6792 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6793 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6794 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6795 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6798 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6801 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6802 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6803 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6804 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6805 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6806 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6807 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6808 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6809 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6811 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6812 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6813 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(),
6814 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6815 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6816 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6817 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6818 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6819 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6821 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6822 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6823 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6824 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6825 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6826 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6827 next_funding_txid: None,
6832 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6834 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6835 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6836 /// commitment update.
6838 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6839 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6840 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6841 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6842 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6843 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6844 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6847 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6848 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6849 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6851 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6852 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6857 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6858 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6860 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6862 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6863 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6865 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6866 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6867 /// regenerate them.
6869 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6870 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6872 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6873 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6874 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6875 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6876 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6877 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6878 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6879 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6881 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6882 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6883 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6885 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6887 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6888 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6889 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6892 if amount_msat == 0 {
6893 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6896 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
6897 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6898 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6899 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6902 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6903 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6904 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6907 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6908 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6909 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6910 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6911 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6912 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6913 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6914 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6917 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
6918 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
6919 payment_hash, amount_msat,
6920 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6921 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6922 else { "to peer" });
6924 if need_holding_cell {
6925 force_holding_cell = true;
6928 // Now update local state:
6929 if force_holding_cell {
6930 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6935 onion_routing_packet,
6942 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6943 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6945 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6947 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6953 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6954 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6955 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6959 onion_routing_packet,
6963 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6968 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6969 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6970 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6971 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6973 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6974 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6975 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6977 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6978 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6982 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6983 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6984 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6985 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6986 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6987 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6988 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6991 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6992 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6993 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
6994 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6995 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6996 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
6999 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
7001 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
7002 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7003 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
7004 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
7005 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
7007 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
7008 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
7011 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7012 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7013 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7014 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7015 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
7016 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
7017 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
7018 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7019 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7020 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
7021 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
7022 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
7024 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7026 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
7030 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
7031 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
7032 where L::Target: Logger
7034 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7035 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7036 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
7038 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7040 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7041 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
7042 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
7043 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
7044 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
7045 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
7046 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
7047 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
7048 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
7049 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
7050 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
7056 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
7059 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
7060 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
7061 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7062 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
7063 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7064 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7066 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7067 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7068 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
7070 match &self.context.holder_signer {
7071 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7072 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
7075 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
7076 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
7080 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
7081 &commitment_stats.tx,
7082 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
7083 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
7084 &self.context.secp_ctx,
7085 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
7087 htlc_signatures = res.1;
7089 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
7090 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
7091 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
7092 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7094 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
7095 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
7096 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
7097 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
7098 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
7099 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7103 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
7104 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7108 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7109 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
7111 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7117 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
7118 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
7120 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
7121 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
7122 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7123 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
7124 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7125 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7126 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
7127 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7129 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
7130 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
7131 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
7134 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
7135 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7136 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
7142 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
7144 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
7145 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7146 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
7147 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
7148 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
7150 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
7152 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
7158 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
7159 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
7160 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7161 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
7162 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
7164 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7165 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7166 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
7169 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
7170 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
7172 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
7173 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
7175 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
7176 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
7178 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
7179 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
7180 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
7183 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7186 // use override shutdown script if provided
7187 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
7188 Some(script) => script,
7190 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
7191 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7192 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
7193 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7197 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
7198 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7200 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
7205 // From here on out, we may not fail!
7206 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
7207 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
7208 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
7209 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
7211 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
7212 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7213 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7214 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7215 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7216 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
7217 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7219 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7221 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7222 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
7224 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
7225 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7226 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7229 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
7230 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
7231 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
7232 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
7233 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
7235 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
7236 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
7243 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
7244 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
7246 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
7249 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
7250 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
7251 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
7253 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
7254 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
7258 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
7262 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7263 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7264 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7265 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7268 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7269 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7270 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7271 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
7272 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
7273 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
7274 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7275 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7277 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
7278 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7279 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7280 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7281 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \
7282 implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
7285 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
7286 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7287 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7290 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7294 counterparty_node_id,
7296 channel_value_satoshis,
7300 current_chain_height,
7301 outbound_scid_alias,
7302 temporary_channel_id,
7303 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7308 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7313 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7314 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7315 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7316 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7317 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7318 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7319 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7320 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7321 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7323 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7328 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7329 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7330 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7333 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7334 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7335 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7336 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7339 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7341 next_local_nonce: None,
7345 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7346 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7347 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7348 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7349 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7350 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7351 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7352 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7353 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7354 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7355 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7358 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7359 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7361 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7363 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7364 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7365 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7366 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7369 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7370 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7372 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7374 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7375 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7377 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7378 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7379 if funding_transaction.is_coinbase() &&
7380 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7381 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7382 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7385 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7386 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7388 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7389 if funding_created.is_none() {
7390 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7391 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7393 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7394 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7395 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7396 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7404 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7405 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7406 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7407 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7408 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7409 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7411 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7413 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7414 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7417 /// Returns true if we can resume the channel by sending the [`msgs::OpenChannel`] again.
7418 pub fn is_resumable(&self) -> bool {
7419 !self.context.have_received_message() &&
7420 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER
7423 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7424 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7425 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7427 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7428 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7431 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7432 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7435 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
7436 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
7437 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7440 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7442 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7443 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7444 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7445 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7446 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7447 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7448 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7449 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7450 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7451 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7452 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7453 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7454 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7455 first_per_commitment_point,
7456 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7457 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7458 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7459 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7461 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7463 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7464 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7469 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7470 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7472 // Check sanity of message fields:
7473 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7474 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7476 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7479 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7480 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7482 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7483 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7485 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7486 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7488 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7489 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7490 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7492 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7493 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7494 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7496 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7497 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7498 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7500 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7501 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7503 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7504 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7507 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7508 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7509 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7511 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7512 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7514 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7515 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7517 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7518 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7520 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7521 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7523 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7524 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7526 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7527 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7530 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7531 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7532 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7534 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7535 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7537 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7538 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7539 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7541 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7542 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7545 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7546 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7547 &Some(ref script) => {
7548 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7549 if script.len() == 0 {
7552 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7553 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7555 Some(script.clone())
7558 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7560 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7565 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7566 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7567 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7568 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7569 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7571 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7572 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7574 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7577 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7578 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7579 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7580 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7581 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7582 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7585 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7586 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7587 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7590 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7591 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7593 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7594 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7596 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7601 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7602 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7603 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7604 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7605 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7609 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7610 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7612 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7613 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7615 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7616 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7617 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7618 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7621 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7623 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7624 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7625 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7626 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7628 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7629 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7631 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
7632 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7634 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7635 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7636 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7637 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7638 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7639 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7643 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7644 initial_commitment_tx,
7647 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7648 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7652 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7653 if validated.is_err() {
7654 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7657 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7658 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7659 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_p2wsh();
7660 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7661 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7662 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7663 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7664 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7665 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7666 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7667 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7668 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7670 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7671 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7672 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7673 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7674 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7675 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7676 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7677 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7679 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7680 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7681 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7683 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7685 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
7686 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7688 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7690 let mut channel = Channel {
7691 context: self.context,
7692 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7693 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7696 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger).is_some();
7697 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7698 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7701 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7703 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7704 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7705 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7706 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7707 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7712 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7713 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7714 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7715 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7718 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7719 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7720 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7721 common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7722 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7723 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7724 if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7725 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7726 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7729 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7730 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7731 // `static_remote_key`.
7732 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7733 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7735 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7736 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7737 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7739 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7740 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7741 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7743 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7745 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7746 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7747 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7753 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7754 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7755 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7756 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7757 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7758 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7759 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7760 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7761 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7762 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7763 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7766 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
7768 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7769 // support this channel type.
7770 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7772 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7773 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7774 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7775 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7776 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7777 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7778 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7782 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7786 counterparty_node_id,
7790 current_chain_height,
7795 counterparty_pubkeys,
7797 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7798 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7800 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7802 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7807 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7808 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7810 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7811 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7812 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7813 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7816 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7817 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7819 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7821 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7822 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7825 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7828 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7829 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7830 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7832 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7833 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7834 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
7835 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
7836 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7838 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7839 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7840 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7841 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7842 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7843 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7844 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7845 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7846 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7847 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7848 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7849 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7850 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7851 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7852 first_per_commitment_point,
7853 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7854 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7855 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7857 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7859 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7861 next_local_nonce: None,
7865 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7866 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7868 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7870 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7871 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7874 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7875 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7877 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
7878 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7879 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7880 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7881 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7882 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7883 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7884 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7885 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7886 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7887 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7889 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7892 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7893 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7894 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7898 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7899 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7902 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7903 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7905 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7906 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7908 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7910 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7911 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7912 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7913 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7916 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7917 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7918 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7919 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7920 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7922 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7924 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7925 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7926 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7929 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7930 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7931 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7935 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7936 initial_commitment_tx,
7939 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7940 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7943 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7944 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7947 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7949 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7950 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7951 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7952 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
7954 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7956 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7957 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_p2wsh();
7958 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7959 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7960 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7961 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7962 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7963 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7964 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7965 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7966 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7968 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7969 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7970 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7971 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7972 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7973 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7974 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7976 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7977 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7979 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7980 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7981 let mut channel = Channel {
7982 context: self.context,
7983 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7984 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7986 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger).is_some();
7987 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7989 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7993 // A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment.
7994 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7995 pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7996 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7997 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7998 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7999 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8002 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8003 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8004 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
8005 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8006 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64,
8007 user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64,
8008 funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget,
8009 ) -> Result<OutboundV2Channel<SP>, APIError>
8010 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8011 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8013 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id);
8014 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8015 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
8017 let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint));
8019 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8020 funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8022 let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target);
8023 let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height;
8026 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
8030 counterparty_node_id,
8036 current_chain_height,
8037 outbound_scid_alias,
8038 temporary_channel_id,
8039 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8044 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8045 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8046 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8047 their_funding_satoshis: 0,
8048 funding_tx_locktime,
8049 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8055 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
8056 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
8057 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
8058 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
8059 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
8060 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannelV2, ()>
8062 F::Target: FeeEstimator
8064 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
8065 Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash))
8068 pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8069 if self.context.have_received_message() {
8070 debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward");
8073 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8074 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8077 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8078 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(),
8079 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8080 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8081 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1,
8082 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8083 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8085 msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8086 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
8088 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8089 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8090 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8091 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8092 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8093 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8094 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8095 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8096 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8097 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8098 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8099 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8100 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8101 first_per_commitment_point,
8102 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
8103 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8104 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8105 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8107 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8109 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8110 second_per_commitment_point,
8111 locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime,
8112 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8117 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8118 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8119 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8120 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8121 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8122 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8125 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8126 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8127 /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
8128 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
8129 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
8130 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8131 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
8132 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
8133 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
8134 ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
8135 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8136 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8139 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
8140 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8141 channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
8142 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8143 channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8145 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
8146 // support this channel type.
8147 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
8148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
8149 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
8151 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
8153 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8154 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
8155 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
8156 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
8157 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
8158 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
8161 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
8165 counterparty_node_id,
8169 current_chain_height,
8175 counterparty_pubkeys,
8177 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8178 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8179 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
8180 msg.common_fields.clone(),
8182 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
8183 &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
8184 &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
8185 context.channel_id = channel_id;
8189 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8190 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8191 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8192 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
8193 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
8194 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8201 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
8202 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
8204 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8205 pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8206 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8207 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8210 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8211 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8213 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
8215 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8216 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8219 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8222 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8223 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8224 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8226 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8227 fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8228 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8229 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &self.context.secp_ctx);
8230 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8231 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8232 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8234 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8235 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8236 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8237 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8238 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8239 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8240 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8241 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8242 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8243 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8244 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8245 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8246 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8247 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8248 first_per_commitment_point,
8249 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8250 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8251 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8253 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8255 funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8256 second_per_commitment_point,
8257 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8261 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8262 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8264 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8266 pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8267 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8271 // Unfunded channel utilities
8273 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8274 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
8275 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
8276 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
8277 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
8278 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8279 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
8280 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
8281 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
8282 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
8285 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
8286 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
8287 // `only_static_remotekey`.
8288 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
8289 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
8290 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8296 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4;
8297 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8299 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8305 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8306 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8307 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8308 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8309 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8311 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8312 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8313 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8314 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8320 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8321 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8322 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8323 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8324 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8325 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8330 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8331 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8332 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8333 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8335 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8336 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8337 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8338 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8343 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8344 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8345 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8346 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8347 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8348 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8353 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8354 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8355 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8358 let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state {
8359 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)|
8360 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8361 matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. })
8365 SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8367 MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8369 write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8371 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8372 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8373 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8374 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8375 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8377 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8378 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8379 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8380 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8382 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8384 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8385 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8386 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8388 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8390 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8392 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8394 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8396 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8397 // deserialized from that format.
8398 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8399 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8400 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8402 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8404 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number().write(writer)?;
8405 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8406 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8408 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8409 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8410 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8411 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8414 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8415 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8416 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8419 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8420 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8421 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8422 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8424 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8425 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8427 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8428 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8429 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8434 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8437 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8439 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8440 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8441 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8446 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8449 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8452 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8454 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8459 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8460 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8461 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8463 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8464 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8465 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8466 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8467 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8468 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8469 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8471 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8473 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8475 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8478 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8479 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8480 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8483 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8485 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8486 preimages.push(preimage);
8488 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8489 reason.write(writer)?;
8491 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8493 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8494 preimages.push(preimage);
8496 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8497 reason.write(writer)?;
8500 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8501 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8504 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8505 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8506 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8507 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8508 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8509 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8511 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8512 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8513 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8516 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8517 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8518 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8519 source.write(writer)?;
8520 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8522 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8523 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8525 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8527 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8528 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8530 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8532 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8533 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8535 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8536 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8538 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8539 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8540 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8542 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8544 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8545 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8550 match self.context.resend_order {
8551 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8552 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8555 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8556 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8557 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8559 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8560 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8561 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8562 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8565 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8566 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8567 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8568 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8569 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8572 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8573 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8574 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8575 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8577 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8578 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8579 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8581 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8583 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8584 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8585 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8586 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8588 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8589 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8590 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8591 // consider the stale state on reload.
8594 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8595 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8596 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8598 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8599 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8600 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8602 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8603 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8605 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8606 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8607 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8609 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8610 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8612 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8615 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8616 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8617 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8619 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8622 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8623 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8625 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8626 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8627 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8629 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8631 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8633 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8635 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8636 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8637 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8638 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8639 htlc.write(writer)?;
8642 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8643 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8644 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8646 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8647 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8649 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8650 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8651 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8652 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8653 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8654 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8655 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8657 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8658 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8659 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8660 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8661 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8663 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8664 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8666 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8667 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8668 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8669 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8671 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8673 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None;
8674 if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
8675 monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
8678 // `current_point` will become optional when async signing is implemented.
8679 let cur_holder_commitment_point = Some(self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point());
8680 let next_holder_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.next_point();
8682 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8683 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8684 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8685 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8686 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8687 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8688 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8690 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8691 (2, chan_type, option),
8692 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8693 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8694 (5, self.context.config, required),
8695 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8696 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8697 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8698 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8699 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8700 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8701 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8702 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8703 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8704 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8705 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8706 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8707 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8708 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8709 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8710 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8711 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8712 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8713 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8714 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8715 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8716 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8717 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8718 (45, cur_holder_commitment_point, option),
8719 (47, next_holder_commitment_point, option),
8720 (49, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8727 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8728 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8730 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8731 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8733 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8734 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8735 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8737 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8738 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8739 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8740 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8742 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8744 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8745 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8746 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8747 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8748 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8750 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8751 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8754 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8755 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8756 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8758 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8760 let mut keys_data = None;
8762 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8763 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8764 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8765 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8766 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8767 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8768 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8769 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8770 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8771 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8775 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8776 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8777 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8780 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8782 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8783 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8784 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8786 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8788 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8789 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8790 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8791 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8792 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8793 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8794 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8795 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8797 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8798 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8800 Readable::read(reader)?
8802 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution)
8805 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8806 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8808 Readable::read(reader)?
8810 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution)
8812 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8813 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8814 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8819 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8820 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8821 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8822 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8823 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8824 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8825 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8826 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8827 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8828 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8829 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8830 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8832 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8833 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8836 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8837 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8840 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8841 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8843 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8845 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8846 blinding_point: None,
8850 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8851 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8852 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8853 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8854 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8855 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8856 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8857 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8858 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8859 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8860 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8861 blinding_point: None,
8863 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8864 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8865 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8867 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8868 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8869 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8871 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8875 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8876 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8877 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8878 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8881 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8882 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8883 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8885 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8886 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8887 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8888 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8891 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8892 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8893 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8894 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8897 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8899 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8901 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8902 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8903 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8904 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8906 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8907 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8908 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8909 // consider the stale state on reload.
8910 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8913 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8914 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8915 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8917 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8920 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8921 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8922 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8924 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8925 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8926 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8927 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8929 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8930 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8932 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8933 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8935 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8936 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8937 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8939 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8941 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8942 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8944 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8945 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8948 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8950 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8951 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8952 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8953 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8955 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8958 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8959 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8961 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8963 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8964 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8966 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8967 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8969 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8971 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8972 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
8973 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8975 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8976 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8977 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8981 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8982 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8983 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8985 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8991 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8992 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8993 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8994 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8995 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8996 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8997 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8998 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8999 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
9000 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
9002 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
9003 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
9004 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
9005 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
9006 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
9007 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
9008 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
9010 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
9011 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9012 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
9013 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
9015 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
9017 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9018 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9020 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
9022 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
9024 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9025 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9027 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
9028 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option<Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>> = None;
9030 let mut cur_holder_commitment_point_opt: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9031 let mut next_holder_commitment_point_opt: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9033 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9034 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
9035 (1, minimum_depth, option),
9036 (2, channel_type, option),
9037 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9038 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9039 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
9040 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
9041 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
9042 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
9043 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
9044 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
9045 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
9046 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
9047 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
9048 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
9049 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
9050 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9051 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
9052 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
9053 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
9054 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
9055 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
9056 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
9057 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9058 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9059 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
9060 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9061 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9062 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
9063 (45, cur_holder_commitment_point_opt, option),
9064 (47, next_holder_commitment_point_opt, option),
9065 (49, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
9068 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
9069 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
9070 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
9071 // required channel parameters.
9072 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
9073 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
9075 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
9077 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
9078 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9079 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
9080 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
9083 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
9084 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
9085 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9087 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9088 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9090 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9091 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9096 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
9097 if iter.next().is_some() {
9098 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9102 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
9103 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
9104 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
9105 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
9106 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
9109 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
9110 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
9111 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
9113 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9114 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9116 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
9117 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
9118 // separate u64 values.
9119 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
9121 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
9123 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
9124 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9125 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9126 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9128 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9129 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9131 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
9132 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9133 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9134 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
9135 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9138 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9139 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9141 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
9142 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9143 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9144 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9146 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9147 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9149 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
9150 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9151 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9152 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
9153 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9156 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9157 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9160 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
9161 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
9162 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
9163 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
9164 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
9165 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
9168 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9169 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9170 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
9172 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
9176 // If we're restoring this channel for the first time after an upgrade, then we require that the
9177 // signer be available so that we can immediately populate the current commitment point. Channel
9178 // restoration will fail if this is not possible.
9179 let holder_commitment_point = match (cur_holder_commitment_point_opt, next_holder_commitment_point_opt) {
9180 (Some(current), Some(next)) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9181 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, current, next
9183 (Some(current), _) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9184 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, current,
9185 next: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &secp_ctx),
9187 (_, _) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9188 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9189 current: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &secp_ctx),
9190 next: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &secp_ctx),
9195 context: ChannelContext {
9198 config: config.unwrap(),
9202 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
9203 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
9204 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
9207 temporary_channel_id,
9209 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
9211 channel_value_satoshis,
9213 latest_monitor_update_id,
9215 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
9216 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9219 holder_commitment_point,
9220 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
9223 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
9224 pending_inbound_htlcs,
9225 pending_outbound_htlcs,
9226 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
9230 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
9231 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
9232 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
9233 monitor_pending_forwards,
9234 monitor_pending_failures,
9235 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
9236 monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9238 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
9239 signer_pending_funding: false,
9242 holding_cell_update_fee,
9243 next_holder_htlc_id,
9244 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
9245 update_time_counter,
9248 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9249 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9250 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9251 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9253 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
9254 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
9255 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
9256 closing_fee_limits: None,
9257 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
9259 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
9260 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
9262 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
9264 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
9265 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
9266 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
9267 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
9268 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
9269 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
9270 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
9271 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
9272 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
9275 counterparty_forwarding_info,
9277 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
9278 funding_transaction,
9281 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
9282 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
9283 counterparty_node_id,
9285 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9289 channel_update_status,
9290 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
9294 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9295 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9296 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9297 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9299 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
9300 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
9302 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
9303 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
9304 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
9306 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9307 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9309 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9310 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
9312 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
9315 local_initiated_shutdown,
9317 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
9319 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9320 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
9328 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
9329 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
9330 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
9331 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, Version};
9332 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
9333 use bitcoin::network::Network;
9334 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
9335 use crate::ln::types::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
9336 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
9337 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
9338 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
9339 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
9340 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
9341 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
9342 use crate::ln::msgs;
9343 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
9344 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
9345 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
9346 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
9347 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9348 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9349 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9350 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9351 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9352 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9353 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9354 use crate::util::test_utils;
9355 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9356 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9357 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9358 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9359 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9360 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9361 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9362 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9363 use bitcoin::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion, WPubkeyHash};
9364 use crate::prelude::*;
9367 fn test_channel_state_order() {
9368 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9369 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9370 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9372 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9373 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9374 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9375 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9378 struct TestFeeEstimator {
9381 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9382 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9388 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9389 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9390 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9391 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9395 signer: InMemorySigner,
9398 impl EntropySource for Keys {
9399 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9402 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9403 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9405 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9407 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9408 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9411 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9415 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9417 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9418 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9419 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9420 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9421 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9424 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9425 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9426 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9427 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9431 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9432 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9433 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9437 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9438 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9439 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9440 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9443 let seed = [42; 32];
9444 let network = Network::Testnet;
9445 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9446 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9447 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9450 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9451 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9452 let config = UserConfig::default();
9453 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9454 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9455 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9457 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9458 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9462 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9463 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9465 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9466 let original_fee = 253;
9467 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9468 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9469 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9470 let seed = [42; 32];
9471 let network = Network::Testnet;
9472 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9474 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9475 let config = UserConfig::default();
9476 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9478 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9479 // same as the old fee.
9480 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9481 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9482 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9486 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9487 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9488 // dust limits are used.
9489 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9490 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9491 let seed = [42; 32];
9492 let network = Network::Testnet;
9493 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9494 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9495 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9497 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9498 // they have different dust limits.
9500 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9501 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9502 let config = UserConfig::default();
9503 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9505 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9506 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9507 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9508 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9509 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9511 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9512 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9513 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9514 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9515 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9517 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9518 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9519 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9520 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9522 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9523 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9524 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9526 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9527 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9528 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9530 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9531 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9532 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9534 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9535 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9536 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9537 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9540 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9542 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9543 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9544 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9545 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9546 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9547 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9548 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9549 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9550 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9552 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9553 blinding_point: None,
9556 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9557 // the dust limit check.
9558 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9559 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9560 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9561 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9563 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9564 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9565 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9566 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9567 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9568 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9569 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9573 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9574 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9575 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9576 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9577 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9578 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9579 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9580 let seed = [42; 32];
9581 let network = Network::Testnet;
9582 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9584 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9585 let config = UserConfig::default();
9586 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9588 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9589 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9591 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9592 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9593 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9594 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9595 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9596 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9598 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9599 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9600 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9601 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9602 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9604 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9606 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9607 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9608 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9609 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9610 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9612 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9613 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9614 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9615 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9616 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9620 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9621 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9622 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9623 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9624 let seed = [42; 32];
9625 let network = Network::Testnet;
9626 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9627 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9628 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9630 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9632 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9633 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9634 let config = UserConfig::default();
9635 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9637 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9638 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9639 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9640 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9642 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9643 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9644 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9646 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9647 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9648 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9649 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9651 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9652 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9653 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9655 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9656 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9657 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9659 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9660 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9661 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9662 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9663 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9664 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9665 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9667 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9669 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9670 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9671 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9672 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9673 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9677 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9678 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9679 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9680 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9681 let seed = [42; 32];
9682 let network = Network::Testnet;
9683 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9684 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9685 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9687 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9688 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9689 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9690 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9691 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9692 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9693 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9694 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9696 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9697 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9698 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9699 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9700 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9701 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9703 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9704 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9705 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9706 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9708 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9710 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9711 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9712 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9713 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9714 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9715 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9717 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9718 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9719 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9720 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9722 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9723 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9724 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9725 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9726 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9728 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9729 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9731 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9732 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9733 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9735 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9736 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9737 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9738 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9739 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9741 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9742 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9744 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9745 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9746 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9750 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9752 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9753 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9754 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9756 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9757 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9758 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9759 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9761 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9762 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9763 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9765 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9767 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9768 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9771 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9772 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9773 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9774 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9775 let seed = [42; 32];
9776 let network = Network::Testnet;
9777 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9778 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9779 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9782 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9783 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9784 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9786 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9787 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9789 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9790 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9791 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9793 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9794 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9796 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9798 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9799 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9801 // Channel Negotiations failed
9802 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9803 assert!(result.is_err());
9808 fn channel_update() {
9809 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9810 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9811 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9812 let seed = [42; 32];
9813 let network = Network::Testnet;
9814 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9815 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9816 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9818 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9819 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9820 let config = UserConfig::default();
9821 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9823 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9824 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9825 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9826 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9827 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9829 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9830 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9831 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9832 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9833 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9835 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9836 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9837 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9838 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9840 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9841 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9842 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9844 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9845 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9846 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9848 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9849 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9850 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9852 short_channel_id: 0,
9855 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9856 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9857 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9859 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9860 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9862 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9864 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9866 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9867 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9868 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9869 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9871 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9872 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9873 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9875 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9878 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9882 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9883 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9885 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9886 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9887 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9888 let seed = [42; 32];
9889 let network = Network::Testnet;
9890 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9891 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9893 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9894 let config = UserConfig::default();
9895 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9896 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9897 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9899 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9900 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9901 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9903 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9904 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9905 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9907 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9908 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9909 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9910 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9911 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9914 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9916 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9917 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9918 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9919 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9923 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9924 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9925 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9927 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9930 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9932 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9933 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9934 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9935 blinding_point: None,
9937 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9938 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9940 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9943 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9946 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9948 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9951 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9952 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9953 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9955 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9956 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9959 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9960 blinding_point: None,
9962 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9963 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
9966 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9967 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
9969 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9970 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
9972 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
9975 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
9976 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
9977 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
9978 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
9979 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
9980 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9981 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
9982 } = &mut dummy_add {
9983 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
9984 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
9986 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
9987 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
9988 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
9990 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
9993 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
9995 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
9996 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
9997 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
9998 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
9999 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
10000 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
10001 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
10002 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
10005 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
10007 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
10008 use bitcoin::sighash;
10009 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
10010 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
10011 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
10012 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
10013 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
10014 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
10015 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
10016 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
10017 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
10018 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
10019 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
10020 use crate::sync::Arc;
10021 use core::str::FromStr;
10022 use hex::DisplayHex;
10024 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
10025 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
10026 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
10027 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10029 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
10031 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10032 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10033 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10034 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10035 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10037 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
10038 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
10044 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10045 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
10046 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
10048 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10049 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10050 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
10051 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
10052 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10053 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
10055 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
10057 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
10058 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
10059 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
10060 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
10061 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
10062 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
10064 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
10065 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
10066 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
10067 selected_contest_delay: 144
10069 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
10070 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
10072 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
10073 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10075 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10076 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
10078 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10079 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10081 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
10082 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
10083 // build_commitment_transaction.
10084 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
10085 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10086 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10087 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
10088 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
10090 macro_rules! test_commitment {
10091 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10092 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10093 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
10097 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
10098 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10099 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10100 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
10104 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
10105 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
10106 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
10108 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
10109 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
10111 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
10112 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
10114 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
10116 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
10117 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
10118 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10119 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10120 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
10121 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
10122 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
10124 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
10125 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10126 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
10127 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10129 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10130 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
10131 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
10133 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
10135 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
10136 commitment_tx.clone(),
10137 counterparty_signature,
10138 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
10139 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
10140 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
10142 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10143 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
10145 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10146 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
10147 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
10149 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
10150 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
10153 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
10154 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10156 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
10157 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
10158 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
10159 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
10160 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
10161 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
10162 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_digest(sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap().as_raw_hash().to_byte_array());
10163 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
10165 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
10168 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
10169 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
10170 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
10174 assert!(preimage.is_some());
10177 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
10178 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
10179 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
10180 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
10181 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
10182 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
10184 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
10185 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
10186 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
10187 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
10188 htlc: htlc.clone(),
10189 preimage: preimage.clone(),
10190 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
10191 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10192 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
10193 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
10195 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10196 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
10197 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
10198 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
10199 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
10200 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
10202 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
10206 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
10207 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
10208 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
10209 "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", {});
10211 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10212 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
10214 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
10215 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
10216 "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", {});
10218 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10219 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
10220 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
10221 "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", {});
10223 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10224 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10226 amount_msat: 1000000,
10228 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10229 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10231 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10234 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10235 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10237 amount_msat: 2000000,
10239 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10240 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10242 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10245 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10246 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10248 amount_msat: 2000000,
10250 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10251 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10252 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10253 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10254 blinding_point: None,
10256 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10259 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10260 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10262 amount_msat: 3000000,
10264 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10265 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10266 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10267 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10268 blinding_point: None,
10270 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10273 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10274 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10276 amount_msat: 4000000,
10278 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10279 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10281 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10285 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10286 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10287 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
10289 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
10290 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
10291 "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", {
10294 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
10295 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
10296 "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" },
10299 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
10300 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
10301 "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" },
10304 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
10305 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
10306 "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" },
10309 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
10310 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
10311 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b03000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c13630147304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac748701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
10314 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
10315 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
10316 "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" }
10319 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10320 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10321 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
10323 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
10324 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
10325 "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", {
10328 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
10329 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
10330 "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" },
10333 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
10334 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
10335 "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" },
10338 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
10339 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
10340 "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" },
10343 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
10344 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
10345 "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" },
10348 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10349 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10350 "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" }
10353 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10354 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10355 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10357 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10358 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10359 "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", {
10362 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10363 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10364 "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" },
10367 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10368 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10369 "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" },
10372 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10373 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10374 "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" },
10377 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10378 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10379 "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" }
10382 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10383 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10384 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10385 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10387 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10388 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10389 "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", {
10392 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10393 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10394 "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" },
10397 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10398 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10399 "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" },
10402 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10403 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10404 "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" },
10407 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10408 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10409 "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" }
10412 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10413 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10414 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10415 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10417 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10418 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10419 "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", {
10422 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10423 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10424 "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" },
10427 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10428 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10429 "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" },
10432 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10433 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10434 "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" },
10437 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10438 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10439 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
10442 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10443 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10444 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10446 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10447 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10448 "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", {
10451 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10452 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10453 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10456 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10457 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10458 "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" },
10461 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10462 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10463 "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" }
10466 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10467 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10468 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10470 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10471 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10472 "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", {
10475 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10476 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10477 "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" },
10480 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10481 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10482 "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" },
10485 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10486 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10487 "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" }
10490 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10491 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10492 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10494 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10495 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10496 "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", {
10499 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10500 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10501 "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" },
10504 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10505 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10506 "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" }
10509 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10510 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10511 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10512 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10513 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10514 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10516 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10517 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10518 "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", {
10521 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10522 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10523 "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" },
10526 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10527 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10528 "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" }
10531 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10532 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10533 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10534 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10535 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10537 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10538 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10539 "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", {
10542 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10543 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10544 "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" },
10547 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10548 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10549 "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" }
10552 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10553 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10554 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10556 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10557 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10558 "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", {
10561 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10562 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10563 "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" }
10566 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10567 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10568 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10569 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10570 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10572 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10573 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10574 "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", {
10577 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10578 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10579 "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" }
10582 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10583 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10584 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10585 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10586 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10588 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10589 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10590 "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", {
10593 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10594 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10595 "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" }
10598 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10599 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10600 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10601 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10603 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10604 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10605 "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", {});
10607 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10608 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10609 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10610 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10611 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10613 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10614 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10615 "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", {});
10617 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10618 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10619 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10620 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10621 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10623 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10624 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10625 "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", {});
10627 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10628 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10629 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10631 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10632 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10633 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
10635 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10636 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10637 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10638 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10639 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10641 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10642 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10643 "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", {});
10645 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10646 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10647 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10648 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10649 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10651 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10652 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10653 "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", {});
10655 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10656 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10657 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10658 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10659 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10660 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10662 amount_msat: 2000000,
10664 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10665 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10667 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10670 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10671 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10672 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10674 amount_msat: 5000001,
10676 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10677 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10678 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10679 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10680 blinding_point: None,
10682 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10685 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10686 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10688 amount_msat: 5000000,
10690 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10691 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10692 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10693 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10694 blinding_point: None,
10696 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10700 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10701 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10702 "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", {
10705 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10706 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10707 "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" },
10709 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10710 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10711 "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" },
10713 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10714 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10715 "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" }
10718 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10719 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10720 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10721 "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", {
10724 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10725 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10726 "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" },
10728 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10729 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10730 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40300000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c8347304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568f9010000" },
10732 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10733 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10734 "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" }
10739 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10740 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10742 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10743 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10744 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10745 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10747 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10748 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10749 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10751 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10752 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10754 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10755 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10757 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10758 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10759 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10763 fn test_key_derivation() {
10764 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10765 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10767 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10768 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10770 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10771 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10773 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10774 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10776 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10777 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10779 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10780 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10782 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10783 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10787 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10788 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10789 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10790 let seed = [42; 32];
10791 let network = Network::Testnet;
10792 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10793 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10795 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10796 let config = UserConfig::default();
10797 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10798 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10800 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10801 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10803 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10804 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10805 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10806 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10807 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10808 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10809 assert!(res.is_ok());
10813 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10814 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10815 // resulting `channel_type`.
10816 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10817 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10818 let network = Network::Testnet;
10819 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10820 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10822 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10823 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10825 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10826 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10828 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10829 // need to signal it.
10830 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10831 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10832 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10833 &config, 0, 42, None
10835 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10837 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10838 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10839 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10841 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10842 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10843 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10847 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10848 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10849 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10850 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10851 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10854 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10855 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10859 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10860 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10861 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10862 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10863 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10864 let network = Network::Testnet;
10865 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10866 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10868 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10869 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10871 let config = UserConfig::default();
10873 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10874 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10875 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10876 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10877 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10879 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10880 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10881 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10885 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10886 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10887 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
10889 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10890 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10891 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10892 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10893 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10894 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10896 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10900 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10901 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10903 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10904 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10905 let network = Network::Testnet;
10906 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10907 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10909 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10910 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10912 let config = UserConfig::default();
10914 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10915 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10916 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10917 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10918 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10919 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10920 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10921 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10923 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10924 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10925 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10926 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10927 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10928 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10932 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10933 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10935 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10936 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10937 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10938 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10940 assert!(res.is_err());
10942 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10943 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10944 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10946 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10947 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10948 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10951 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10953 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10954 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10955 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10956 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10959 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10960 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10962 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
10963 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
10965 assert!(res.is_err());
10969 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
10970 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10971 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10972 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10973 let seed = [42; 32];
10974 let network = Network::Testnet;
10975 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10976 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
10977 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10979 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10980 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
10981 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
10982 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
10984 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
10985 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10986 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10991 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11001 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11002 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
11003 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11008 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
11009 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11015 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
11018 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
11019 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
11020 &accept_channel_msg,
11021 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
11022 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11025 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
11026 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
11027 let tx = Transaction {
11028 version: Version::ONE,
11029 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
11033 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
11036 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
11039 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
11040 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
11041 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
11042 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11043 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
11044 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
11048 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11049 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11057 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
11058 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
11059 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
11060 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
11062 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
11063 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11070 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
11071 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
11072 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
11073 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
11074 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
11076 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
11077 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
11078 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
11086 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
11087 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
11090 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
11091 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
11092 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
11093 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0, &&logger).is_some());