1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
30 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
34 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
35 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
36 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use util::transaction_utils;
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
42 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
43 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
48 use core::convert::TryFrom;
50 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", debug_assertions))]
52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
56 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
63 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
66 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
68 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
70 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
71 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
72 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
73 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
74 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
75 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
77 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
81 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
82 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
83 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
84 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
87 enum InboundHTLCState {
88 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
89 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
90 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
91 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
92 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
93 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
94 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
95 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
96 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
97 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
98 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
99 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
100 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
101 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
102 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
104 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
105 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
106 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
107 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
108 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
109 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
110 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
111 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
112 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
113 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
114 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
115 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
116 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
117 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
119 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
120 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
121 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
122 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
123 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
124 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
125 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
126 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
128 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
129 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
131 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
132 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
133 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
134 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
135 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
136 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
137 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
138 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
141 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
145 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
146 state: InboundHTLCState,
149 enum OutboundHTLCState {
150 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
151 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
152 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
153 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
154 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
155 /// money back (though we won't), and,
156 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
157 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
158 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
159 /// we'll never get out of sync).
160 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
161 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
162 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
164 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
165 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
166 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
167 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
168 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
169 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
170 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
171 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
172 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
173 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
174 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
175 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
176 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
177 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
178 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
181 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
185 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
186 state: OutboundHTLCState,
190 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
191 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
192 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
196 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
198 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
201 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
206 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
210 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
211 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
212 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
213 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
214 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
215 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
216 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
218 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
219 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
220 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
221 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
222 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
223 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
224 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
226 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
227 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
228 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
230 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
231 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
232 TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
233 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
234 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
235 OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
237 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
238 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
240 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
241 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
242 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
243 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
244 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
245 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
246 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
247 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
248 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
250 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
251 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
252 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
253 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
254 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
255 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
256 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
257 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
258 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
259 /// us their shutdown.
260 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
261 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
262 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
263 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
265 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
266 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
268 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
270 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
271 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
272 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
273 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
274 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
275 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
276 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
277 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
279 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
281 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
283 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
287 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
293 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
296 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
297 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
298 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
301 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
302 struct HTLCCandidate {
304 origin: HTLCInitiator,
308 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
316 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
317 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
318 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
319 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
320 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
321 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
322 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
323 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
324 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
325 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
326 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
329 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
331 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
333 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
334 htlc_value_msat: u64,
335 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
340 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
341 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
342 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
343 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
344 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
346 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
347 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
348 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
349 htlc_value_msat: u64,
350 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
351 /// in the holding cell).
352 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
354 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
355 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
359 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
360 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
361 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
362 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
363 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
364 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
365 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
366 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
367 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
368 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
369 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
371 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
373 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
375 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
376 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
377 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
380 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
381 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
382 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
383 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
384 pub(crate) config: ChannelConfig,
385 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
386 config: ChannelConfig,
390 channel_id: [u8; 32],
392 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
393 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
395 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
397 holder_signer: Signer,
398 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
399 destination_script: Script,
401 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
402 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
403 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
405 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
406 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
407 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
408 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
409 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
410 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
412 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
413 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
414 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
415 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
416 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
417 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
419 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
421 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
422 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
423 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
424 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
425 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
427 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
429 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
430 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
431 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
432 // HTLCs with similar state.
433 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
434 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
435 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
436 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
437 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
438 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
439 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
440 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
441 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
442 update_time_counter: u32,
445 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
446 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
447 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
448 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
449 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
450 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
452 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
454 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
455 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
456 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
457 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
459 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
461 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
463 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
465 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
467 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
468 //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
469 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
470 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
471 // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
472 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
473 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
475 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
477 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
478 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
479 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
481 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
483 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
484 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
486 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
487 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
488 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
490 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
492 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
494 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
496 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
497 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
498 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
500 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
501 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
502 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
503 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
504 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
505 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
506 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
507 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
509 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
510 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
511 /// funding_locked *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
512 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the funding_locked
513 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
515 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
516 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
518 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
519 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
520 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
521 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
522 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
523 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
524 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
525 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
528 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
529 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
531 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
532 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
533 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
537 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
540 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
542 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
544 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
546 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
548 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
550 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
552 /// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
553 /// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
554 /// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
555 /// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
556 /// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
557 /// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
558 /// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
559 /// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
560 pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
562 /// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
563 /// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
564 /// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
565 /// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
566 pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
568 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
569 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
570 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
571 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
574 CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
577 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
578 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
580 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
581 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
582 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
587 macro_rules! secp_check {
588 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
591 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
596 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
597 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
598 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
599 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
602 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
605 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
606 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
607 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
608 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
612 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
613 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
614 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
616 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
617 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
618 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
620 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
621 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
623 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
624 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
625 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
627 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
628 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
630 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
631 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
632 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
635 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
637 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
638 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
640 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
641 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
644 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
645 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
646 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
652 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
654 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
655 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
657 channel_value_satoshis,
659 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
662 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
663 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
665 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
666 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
667 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
669 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
670 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
671 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
672 pending_update_fee: None,
673 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
674 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
675 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
676 update_time_counter: 1,
678 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
680 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
681 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
682 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
683 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
684 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
686 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
687 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
688 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
689 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
691 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
693 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
694 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
695 short_channel_id: None,
697 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
698 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
699 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
700 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
701 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
702 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
703 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
704 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
705 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
707 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
709 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
710 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
711 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
712 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
713 counterparty_parameters: None,
714 funding_outpoint: None
716 funding_transaction: None,
718 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
719 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
720 counterparty_node_id,
722 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
724 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
726 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
728 announcement_sigs: None,
730 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
731 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
732 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
733 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
735 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
737 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
738 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
742 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
743 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
745 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
746 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
747 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
749 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
750 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
751 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
752 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
753 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
754 fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
755 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
756 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
761 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
762 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
763 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
764 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
765 F::Target: FeeEstimator
767 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
768 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
769 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
770 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
771 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
772 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
773 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
774 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
776 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
778 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
779 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
782 // Check sanity of message fields:
783 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
784 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
786 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
787 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
789 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
790 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
791 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
793 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
794 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
796 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
797 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
799 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
800 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
801 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
803 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
805 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
806 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
807 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
809 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
810 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
812 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
813 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
816 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
817 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
818 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
820 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
821 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
823 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
824 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
826 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
827 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
829 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
830 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
832 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
833 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
835 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
836 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
839 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
841 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
842 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
843 if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
847 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
848 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
850 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
852 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
853 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
854 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
856 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
857 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
859 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
860 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
863 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
864 // for full fee payment
865 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
866 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
867 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
868 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
871 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
872 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
873 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
874 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
877 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
878 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
879 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
880 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
881 if script.len() == 0 {
884 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), their_features)) {
885 Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
886 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))),
890 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
891 &OptionalField::Absent => {
892 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
897 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
898 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
901 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
902 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
903 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
907 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
908 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
912 config: local_config,
914 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
915 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
918 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
921 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
922 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
924 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
925 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
926 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
928 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
929 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
930 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
931 pending_update_fee: None,
932 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
933 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
934 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
935 update_time_counter: 1,
937 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
939 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
940 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
941 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
942 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
943 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
945 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
946 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
947 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
948 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
950 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
952 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
953 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
954 short_channel_id: None,
956 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
957 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
958 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
959 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
960 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
961 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
962 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
963 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
964 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
965 minimum_depth: Some(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth),
967 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
969 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
970 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
971 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
972 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
973 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
974 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
975 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
977 funding_outpoint: None
979 funding_transaction: None,
981 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
982 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
983 counterparty_node_id,
985 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
987 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
989 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
991 announcement_sigs: None,
993 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
994 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
995 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
996 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
998 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1000 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1001 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1007 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1008 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1009 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1010 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1011 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1013 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1014 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1015 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1016 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1017 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1018 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1019 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1020 /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
1021 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
1022 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the fourth return value, but not the third, and
1023 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the fourth return value.
1025 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, u32, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1026 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1027 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1028 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1030 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1031 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1032 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1033 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1035 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1036 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1037 if match update_state {
1038 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1039 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1040 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1041 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1042 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1044 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1048 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1049 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1050 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1051 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1053 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1054 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1055 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1057 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1058 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1059 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1060 transaction_output_index: None
1065 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1066 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1067 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1068 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1069 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1070 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1071 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1073 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1074 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1077 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1078 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1079 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1080 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1082 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1083 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1089 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1090 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1091 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1092 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1093 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1094 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1095 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1099 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1100 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1102 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1104 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1105 if generated_by_local {
1106 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1107 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1116 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1117 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1118 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1119 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1120 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1121 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1122 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1126 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1127 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1129 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1131 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
1132 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1134 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
1135 if !generated_by_local {
1136 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1144 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1145 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1146 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1147 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1148 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1149 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1150 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1151 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1153 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1155 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1156 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1157 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1158 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1160 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1162 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1163 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1164 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1165 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1168 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1169 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1170 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1172 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1175 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1176 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1178 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1179 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1184 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1185 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1190 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1192 let channel_parameters =
1193 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1194 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1195 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1200 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1203 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1204 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1205 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1206 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1208 (tx, feerate_per_kw, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1212 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1213 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1214 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1215 // outside of those situations will fail.
1216 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1220 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1225 1 + // script length (0)
1229 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1230 2 + // witness marker and flag
1231 1 + // witness element count
1232 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1233 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1234 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1235 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1236 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1237 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1239 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1240 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1241 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1247 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1249 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1251 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1252 script_sig: Script::new(),
1253 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1254 witness: Vec::new(),
1259 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1260 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1261 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1262 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1264 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1265 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1266 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1268 if value_to_self < 0 {
1269 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1270 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1271 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1272 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1273 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1276 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1277 txouts.push((TxOut {
1278 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1279 value: value_to_remote as u64
1283 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1284 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1285 txouts.push((TxOut {
1286 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1287 value: value_to_self as u64
1291 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1293 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1294 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1295 outputs.push(out.0);
1303 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1306 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1307 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1311 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1312 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1313 /// our counterparty!)
1314 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1315 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1316 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1317 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1318 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1319 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1320 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1322 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1326 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1327 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1328 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1329 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1330 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1331 //may see payments to it!
1332 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1333 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1334 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1336 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1339 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1340 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1341 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1342 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1343 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1346 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1347 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1348 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1349 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1351 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1352 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1354 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1356 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1358 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1359 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1360 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1362 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1363 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1364 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1365 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1366 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1368 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1369 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1370 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1372 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1373 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1375 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1378 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1379 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1383 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1387 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1388 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1389 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1390 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1391 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1392 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1395 // Now update local state:
1397 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1398 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1399 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1400 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1401 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1402 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1403 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1407 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1408 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1409 match pending_update {
1410 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1411 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1412 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1413 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1414 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1415 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1416 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1419 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1420 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1421 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1422 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1423 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1424 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1425 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1431 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1432 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1433 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1435 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1436 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1437 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1439 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1440 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1443 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1444 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1446 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1447 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1449 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1450 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1453 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1456 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1457 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1458 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1459 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1464 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1465 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1466 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1467 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1468 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1471 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1472 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1473 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1474 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1475 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1477 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1478 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1479 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1483 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1484 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1485 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1486 /// before we fail backwards.
1487 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1488 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1489 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1490 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1491 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1493 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1495 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1496 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1497 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1499 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1500 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1501 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1503 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1504 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1505 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1507 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1512 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1513 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1519 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1520 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1521 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1522 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1523 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1527 // Now update local state:
1528 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1529 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1530 match pending_update {
1531 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1532 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1533 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1534 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1538 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1539 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1540 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1541 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1547 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1548 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1549 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1555 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1557 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1558 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1561 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1562 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1563 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1568 // Message handlers:
1570 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1571 // Check sanity of message fields:
1572 if !self.is_outbound() {
1573 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1575 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1576 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1578 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1579 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1581 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1582 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1584 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1585 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1587 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1588 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1589 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1591 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1592 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1593 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1595 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1596 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1597 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1599 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1600 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1602 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1603 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1606 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1607 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1608 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1610 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1611 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1613 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1614 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1616 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1617 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1619 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1620 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1622 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1623 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1625 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1626 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1628 if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
1629 // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
1630 // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
1632 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
1635 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1636 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1637 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1638 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1639 if script.len() == 0 {
1642 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), their_features)) {
1643 Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
1644 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))),
1648 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1649 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1650 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1655 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1656 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1657 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
1658 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1659 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1660 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
1662 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1663 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1664 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1665 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1666 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1667 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1670 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1671 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1672 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1675 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1676 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1678 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1683 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1684 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1686 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1687 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).0;
1689 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1690 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1691 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1692 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1693 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
1694 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
1695 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
1696 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1697 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1700 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1701 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
1703 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1704 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1705 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1706 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1708 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1709 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1711 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1712 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1715 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1716 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1719 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1720 if self.is_outbound() {
1721 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1723 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1724 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1725 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1727 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1729 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1730 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1731 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1732 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1735 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1736 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1737 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
1738 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1739 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1741 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1743 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1744 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1745 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1748 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1749 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1750 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1754 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1755 initial_commitment_tx,
1758 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1759 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1762 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1764 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1765 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1766 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1767 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1768 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1769 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1770 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1771 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1772 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1774 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1776 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1778 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1779 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1780 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1781 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1783 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1785 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1786 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1788 }, channel_monitor))
1791 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1792 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1793 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1794 if !self.is_outbound() {
1795 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1797 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1798 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1800 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1801 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1802 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1803 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1806 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1808 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1809 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
1810 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1811 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1813 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1814 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1816 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1817 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).0;
1819 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1820 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1821 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1822 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1823 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1824 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1828 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1829 initial_commitment_tx,
1832 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1833 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1837 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1838 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1839 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1840 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1841 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1842 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1843 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1844 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1845 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1846 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1848 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1850 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1852 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1853 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1854 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1855 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1857 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1859 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1862 pub fn funding_locked<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1863 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1864 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
1865 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
1868 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1870 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1871 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1872 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1873 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1874 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1875 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1876 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1877 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1878 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1879 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1880 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1881 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1882 if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1883 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1885 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1888 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1891 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1892 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1894 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1899 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1900 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1901 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1902 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1903 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1904 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1905 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1908 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1909 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1910 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1911 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1912 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1913 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1915 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1916 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1922 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1923 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1924 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1925 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1926 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1927 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1928 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1931 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1932 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1933 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1934 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1935 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1936 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1938 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1939 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1943 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1944 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1945 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1946 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1947 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1948 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1950 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1951 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1958 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1959 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1960 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1961 /// corner case properly.
1962 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1963 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1965 cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1966 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1967 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1968 - Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64 * 1000,
1970 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1971 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1972 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
1977 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1978 (Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
1979 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1982 // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1983 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1984 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1985 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1986 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1987 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1990 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1991 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1992 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1994 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1995 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1997 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1998 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2000 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2001 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2003 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2004 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2008 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2009 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2015 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2016 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2017 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2020 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2021 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2022 included_htlcs += 1;
2025 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2026 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2030 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2031 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2032 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2033 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2034 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2035 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2040 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2042 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2043 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2048 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2049 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2053 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2054 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2055 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2058 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2059 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2061 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2062 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2063 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2065 total_pending_htlcs,
2066 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2067 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2068 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2070 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2071 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2072 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2074 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2076 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2081 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2082 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2083 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2085 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2086 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2088 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2089 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2091 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2092 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2094 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2095 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2099 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2100 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2106 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2107 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2108 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2109 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2110 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2111 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2114 included_htlcs += 1;
2117 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2118 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2121 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2122 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2124 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2125 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2126 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2131 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2132 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2133 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2136 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2137 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2139 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2140 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2142 total_pending_htlcs,
2143 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2144 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2145 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2147 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2148 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2149 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2151 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2153 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2158 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2159 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2160 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2161 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2162 if local_sent_shutdown {
2163 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
2165 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2166 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2167 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2170 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2171 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2173 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2174 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2176 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2177 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2179 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2180 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2183 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2184 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2185 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2188 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2189 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2190 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2192 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2193 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2194 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2195 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2196 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2197 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2198 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2199 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2200 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2201 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2202 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2204 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2205 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2206 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
2207 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2208 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
2209 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2213 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2214 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2215 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2216 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2217 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2218 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2219 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2223 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2224 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2225 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2226 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2227 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2228 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2229 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2233 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2234 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2235 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2236 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2237 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2238 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2241 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2242 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2243 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2244 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2245 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2247 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2251 let chan_reserve_msat =
2252 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2253 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2254 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2257 if !self.is_outbound() {
2258 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2259 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2260 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2261 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2262 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2263 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2264 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2265 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2266 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2267 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2268 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2269 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2270 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2271 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2272 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2275 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2276 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2277 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2278 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2279 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2282 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2285 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2286 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2289 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2290 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2291 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2295 // Now update local state:
2296 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2297 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2298 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2299 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2300 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2301 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2302 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2307 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2309 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2310 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2311 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2312 match check_preimage {
2314 Some(payment_hash) =>
2315 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2316 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2320 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2321 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2322 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2323 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2325 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2326 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2331 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2334 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2335 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2336 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2338 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2339 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2342 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2343 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2346 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2347 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2350 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2351 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2354 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2358 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2359 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2360 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2362 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2363 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2366 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2370 pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2371 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2374 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2375 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2377 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2378 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2380 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2381 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2384 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2386 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2388 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw) = {
2389 let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2390 let commitment_txid = {
2391 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2392 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2393 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2395 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2396 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2397 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2398 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2399 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2400 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2404 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.3.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2405 (commitment_tx.2, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid, commitment_tx.1)
2408 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2409 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2410 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2411 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2413 if update_fee { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); }
2414 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2416 let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2417 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2418 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2421 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2423 if self.is_outbound() {
2424 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2425 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2426 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2427 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2428 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2429 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2430 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2431 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2432 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2433 assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2439 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2440 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2443 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2444 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2445 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2446 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2447 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw,
2448 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc,
2449 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2451 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2452 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2453 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2454 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2455 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2456 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2457 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2459 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2461 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2465 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2468 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2469 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2470 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2473 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2474 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2476 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2477 let mut need_commitment = false;
2478 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
2479 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2480 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2481 need_commitment = true;
2485 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2486 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2487 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2488 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2489 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2490 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2494 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2495 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2496 Some(forward_info.clone())
2498 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2499 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2500 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2501 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2502 need_commitment = true;
2505 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2506 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2507 Some(fail_reason.take())
2509 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2510 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2511 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2512 need_commitment = true;
2516 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2517 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2518 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2519 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2521 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2522 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2523 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2524 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2525 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2526 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2527 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2528 // includes the right HTLCs.
2529 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2530 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2531 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2532 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2533 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2534 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2536 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2537 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2538 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2539 // re-send the message on restoration)
2540 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2543 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2544 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2545 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2546 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2547 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2548 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2549 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2550 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2551 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2553 } else if !need_commitment {
2554 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2555 } else { (None, None) };
2557 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2558 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2560 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2561 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2562 per_commitment_secret,
2563 next_per_commitment_point,
2564 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2567 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
2568 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
2569 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
2570 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2571 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
2572 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2573 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
2574 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
2577 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2578 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2579 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2580 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2581 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2582 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
2583 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2585 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2586 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2587 updates: Vec::new(),
2590 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2591 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2592 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2593 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2594 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2595 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2596 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2597 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2598 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2599 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2600 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2601 // to rebalance channels.
2602 match &htlc_update {
2603 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2604 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2605 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2608 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2609 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
2610 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2611 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2612 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2613 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2614 // into the holding cell without ever being
2615 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2616 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2617 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2620 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2626 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2627 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
2628 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
2629 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
2630 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
2631 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
2632 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
2633 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2634 (msg, monitor_update)
2635 } else { unreachable!() };
2636 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2637 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2639 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2640 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
2641 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
2642 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
2643 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
2644 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
2645 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
2646 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
2647 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
2650 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2652 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2659 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2660 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2662 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
2663 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2664 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
2665 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2666 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2667 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2673 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2674 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2675 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2676 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2677 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2679 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
2680 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
2681 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
2683 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2685 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2687 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2690 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2692 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2696 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2697 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2698 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2699 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2700 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2701 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2702 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2705 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2706 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2708 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2709 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2711 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2712 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2715 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2716 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2717 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2721 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2722 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2723 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2724 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2725 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2726 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2727 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2728 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2729 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2732 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2734 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2735 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2738 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2739 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2740 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2741 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2742 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2743 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2744 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2745 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2749 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2750 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2751 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2752 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2753 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2754 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2755 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2756 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2758 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2759 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2760 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2761 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2762 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2763 let mut require_commitment = false;
2764 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2767 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2768 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2769 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2771 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2772 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2773 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2774 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2775 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2776 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2781 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2782 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2783 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2784 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2785 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2787 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2788 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2793 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2794 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2796 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2800 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2801 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2803 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2804 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2805 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2806 require_commitment = true;
2807 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2808 match forward_info {
2809 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2810 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2811 require_commitment = true;
2813 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2814 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2815 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2817 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2818 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2819 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2823 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2824 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2825 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2826 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2832 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2833 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2834 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2835 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2837 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2838 Some(fail_reason.take())
2840 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2841 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2842 require_commitment = true;
2846 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2848 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2849 match update_state {
2850 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
2851 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
2852 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
2853 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2854 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2856 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
2857 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
2858 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2859 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
2860 require_commitment = true;
2861 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2862 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2867 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2868 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2869 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2870 if require_commitment {
2871 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2872 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2873 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2874 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2875 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2876 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2877 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2878 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2879 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2881 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2882 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2883 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2884 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2887 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2888 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2889 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2890 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2891 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2893 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2894 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2895 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2898 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2899 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2900 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2901 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2903 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2905 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2906 if require_commitment {
2907 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2909 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2910 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2911 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2912 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2914 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
2915 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2916 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2917 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2918 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2920 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2923 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2925 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2926 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2933 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2934 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2935 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2936 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2937 if !self.is_outbound() {
2938 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2940 if !self.is_usable() {
2941 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2943 if !self.is_live() {
2944 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2947 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
2948 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2952 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2953 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
2955 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2956 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2961 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2962 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2963 Some(update_fee) => {
2964 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2965 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2971 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
2972 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
2974 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2976 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2977 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2978 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2979 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2982 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2983 // will be retransmitted.
2984 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2986 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2987 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2989 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2990 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2991 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2992 // this HTLC accordingly
2993 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2996 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2997 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2998 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2999 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3002 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3003 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3004 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3005 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3006 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3007 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3012 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3014 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3015 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3016 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3017 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3021 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3022 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3023 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3024 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3025 // the update upon reconnection.
3026 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3030 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3031 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3034 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
3035 /// updates are partially paused.
3036 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
3037 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
3038 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
3039 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
3040 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
3041 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
3042 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
3043 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
3044 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
3045 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3046 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
3047 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3048 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
3051 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3052 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3053 /// to the remote side.
3054 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
3055 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3056 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3058 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
3059 self.funding_transaction.take()
3062 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
3063 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
3064 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
3065 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
3066 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
3067 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
3068 assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3069 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
3070 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3071 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3072 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3073 next_per_commitment_point,
3077 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
3078 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3079 let mut failures = Vec::new();
3080 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3082 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3083 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3084 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3085 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3088 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3089 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3091 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3092 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3095 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3096 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3097 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3098 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3099 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3100 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3101 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3102 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
3105 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3106 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3108 if self.is_outbound() {
3109 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3111 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3112 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3114 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3115 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate();
3117 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3118 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3119 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3120 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3121 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3122 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3123 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3124 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3125 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3126 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3127 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3128 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3129 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3131 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3132 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3133 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3139 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3140 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3141 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3142 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3143 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3144 per_commitment_secret,
3145 next_per_commitment_point,
3149 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3150 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3151 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3152 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3153 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3155 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3156 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3157 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3158 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3159 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3160 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3161 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3162 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3163 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3168 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3169 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3171 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3172 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3173 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3174 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3175 reason: err_packet.clone()
3178 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3179 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3180 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3181 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3182 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3183 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3186 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3187 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3188 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3189 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3190 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3197 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3198 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3199 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3200 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3204 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3205 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3206 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3207 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3208 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3209 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3213 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3214 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3215 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3216 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3217 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3218 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3219 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3220 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3223 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3224 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3225 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3228 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3229 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3230 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3231 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3232 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3233 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3234 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3235 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3237 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3238 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
3239 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
3243 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3247 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3248 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3249 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3251 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3252 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3253 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3254 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3255 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3259 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3260 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
3261 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
3262 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3263 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
3266 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3267 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3270 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
3271 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3272 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3273 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3274 next_per_commitment_point,
3275 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3278 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3279 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3280 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
3282 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3283 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3284 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3287 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3290 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3293 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3294 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3295 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3296 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3297 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3299 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3300 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3301 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3302 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3303 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3304 next_per_commitment_point,
3308 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3309 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3310 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3312 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3315 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3316 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3317 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3318 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3320 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3321 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3322 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3323 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3324 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3326 Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3327 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3331 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3333 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3334 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3335 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3337 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3340 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3341 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3342 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3345 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3347 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3351 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3352 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3354 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3355 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3356 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3360 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3361 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3362 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3364 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3365 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3366 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3368 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3369 let sig = self.holder_signer
3370 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3372 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3373 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3375 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3376 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3377 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3378 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3379 signature: sig.unwrap(),
3383 pub fn shutdown<F: Deref, K: Deref>(
3384 &mut self, fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
3385 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3387 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3388 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
3390 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3391 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3393 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3394 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3395 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3396 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3397 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3399 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3400 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3401 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3404 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3406 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match ShutdownScript::try_from((msg.scriptpubkey.clone(), their_features)) {
3407 Ok(script) => script.into_inner(),
3408 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex()))),
3411 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3412 if Some(&shutdown_scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3413 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", shutdown_scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3416 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3419 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
3420 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
3421 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3422 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3424 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
3427 assert!(send_shutdown);
3428 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
3429 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
3430 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
3432 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3437 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3439 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3440 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3442 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
3443 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3444 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3445 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3446 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
3447 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3451 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
3452 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3453 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3454 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3458 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3459 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3460 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3461 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3462 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3463 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3465 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3466 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3473 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3474 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3476 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3479 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3480 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3481 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3482 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3484 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3486 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3487 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3488 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3489 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3490 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3492 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3493 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3495 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3496 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3498 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3501 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3502 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3504 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3505 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3507 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3508 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3510 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3511 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3513 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3514 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3517 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3518 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3519 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3520 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3522 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3524 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3527 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3528 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3529 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3530 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3531 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3535 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3536 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3537 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3538 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3539 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3540 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3541 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3542 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3543 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3544 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3545 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3549 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3550 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3551 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3552 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3553 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3554 let sig = self.holder_signer
3555 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3556 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3557 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3558 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3559 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3560 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3561 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3567 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3568 if self.is_outbound() {
3569 let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3570 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3571 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3572 if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3573 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3576 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3579 min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3581 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3582 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3583 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3584 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3587 propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3590 let sig = self.holder_signer
3591 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3592 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3593 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3594 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3595 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3597 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3598 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3600 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3601 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3602 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3604 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3607 // Public utilities:
3609 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3613 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
3617 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3618 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3619 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3623 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3624 /// is_usable() returns true).
3625 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3626 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3627 self.short_channel_id
3630 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3631 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3632 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3633 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3636 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3637 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3640 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3641 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3644 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
3645 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
3646 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
3649 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3650 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3653 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3654 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3655 self.counterparty_node_id
3658 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3660 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3661 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3664 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3665 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3667 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3668 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3669 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3670 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3672 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3676 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3677 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3678 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3681 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3682 self.channel_value_satoshis
3685 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3686 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3689 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3690 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3693 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3694 self.config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
3697 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3701 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3702 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
3703 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
3704 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
3705 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
3706 // which are near the dust limit.
3707 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3708 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3709 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
3711 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
3714 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3715 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3718 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3719 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3722 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3723 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3727 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3732 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3734 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3735 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3736 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
3737 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3738 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3739 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3741 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3743 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3751 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3752 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3756 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3757 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3758 self.update_time_counter
3761 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3762 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3765 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3766 self.config.announced_channel
3769 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3770 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3773 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3774 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3775 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
3776 self.config.forwarding_fee_base_msat
3779 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3780 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3781 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3784 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3785 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3786 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3787 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3788 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3791 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3792 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3793 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3794 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3795 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
3798 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3799 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3800 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3801 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3804 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3805 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3806 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3809 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3810 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3811 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3812 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3813 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3814 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3819 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
3820 self.channel_update_status
3823 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
3824 self.channel_update_status = status;
3827 fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
3828 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3832 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3833 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
3834 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
3837 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
3841 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3842 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3843 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3845 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3846 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3847 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3849 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3850 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3852 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3853 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3855 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3859 if need_commitment_update {
3860 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3861 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3862 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3863 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3864 next_per_commitment_point,
3867 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3873 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
3874 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
3875 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
3876 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
3877 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3878 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3879 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3880 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3881 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
3882 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
3883 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3884 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3885 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3886 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3887 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3888 if self.is_outbound() {
3889 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3890 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3891 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3892 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3893 // channel and move on.
3894 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3895 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3897 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3898 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3899 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3900 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
3903 if self.is_outbound() {
3904 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3905 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3906 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3907 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3908 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3909 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3913 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
3914 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
3915 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3916 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3917 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3921 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
3922 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
3923 // may have already happened for this block).
3924 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3925 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3926 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
3929 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3930 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3931 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3932 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3933 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3934 data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
3943 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
3944 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
3945 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3946 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3948 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3949 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3952 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3954 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L)
3955 -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3956 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3957 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
3958 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3960 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3961 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
3962 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3970 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
3972 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3973 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3974 return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
3977 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3978 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
3979 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
3980 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3981 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3982 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
3983 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
3984 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
3985 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
3988 // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
3989 // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
3990 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
3991 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
3992 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap() as i64 / 2 {
3993 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3994 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3995 data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations),
4000 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
4003 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4004 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4005 /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
4006 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
4007 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4008 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4009 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4010 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4011 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4012 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4013 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4014 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
4015 match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) {
4016 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
4017 assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4018 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4024 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4029 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4030 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4032 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
4033 if !self.is_outbound() {
4034 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
4036 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
4037 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
4040 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4041 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4044 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4045 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4049 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4050 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4051 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
4052 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4053 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4054 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4055 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4056 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
4057 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4058 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4059 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4060 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4061 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4062 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4063 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4064 first_per_commitment_point,
4065 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
4066 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4067 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4068 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4073 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
4074 if self.is_outbound() {
4075 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
4077 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4078 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
4080 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4081 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4084 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4085 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4087 msgs::AcceptChannel {
4088 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4089 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4090 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4091 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4092 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4093 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
4094 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4095 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4096 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4097 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4098 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4099 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4100 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4101 first_per_commitment_point,
4102 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4103 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4104 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4109 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
4110 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4111 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4112 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
4113 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4114 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
4117 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
4118 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
4119 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
4120 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
4121 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
4122 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
4123 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
4124 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4125 if !self.is_outbound() {
4126 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
4128 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4129 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
4131 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
4132 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4133 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4134 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
4137 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
4138 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
4140 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
4143 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
4144 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4149 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
4151 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
4153 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
4154 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
4155 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
4157 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
4158 temporary_channel_id,
4159 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
4160 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
4165 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
4166 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
4167 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
4168 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4169 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4171 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
4172 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
4174 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4175 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
4176 if !self.config.announced_channel {
4177 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4179 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
4180 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
4182 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
4183 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
4186 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
4188 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4189 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
4191 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4192 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
4193 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
4194 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
4195 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
4196 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4199 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
4200 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4205 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4207 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4208 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
4209 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
4211 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
4212 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4213 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4214 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4215 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4216 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4217 contents: announcement,
4220 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4224 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4225 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4226 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4227 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4228 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
4230 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4232 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4234 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4235 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4237 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4238 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4239 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4240 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4243 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4245 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
4248 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4249 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4250 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
4251 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
4253 Err(_) => return None,
4255 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4256 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
4257 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4262 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4263 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4264 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4265 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4266 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4267 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4268 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4269 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4270 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4271 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4272 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4273 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4274 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4275 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4276 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4277 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4278 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4279 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4280 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
4283 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4284 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4285 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
4286 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4289 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4290 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4291 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4292 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4293 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4294 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4295 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4296 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4298 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4299 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4300 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4301 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4302 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4303 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4304 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4305 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4306 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4308 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4314 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4316 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
4317 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
4319 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
4321 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
4322 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
4324 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
4325 /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
4328 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
4330 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
4331 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
4332 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4333 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
4335 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
4336 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
4337 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
4340 if amount_msat == 0 {
4341 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4344 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
4345 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
4348 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
4349 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
4350 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
4351 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
4352 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
4353 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
4354 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
4355 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
4358 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4359 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4360 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4361 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4363 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4364 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4365 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4368 if !self.is_outbound() {
4369 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4370 let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
4371 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
4372 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4373 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4374 if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4375 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4379 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
4380 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
4381 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4382 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4383 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
4384 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4388 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4389 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
4390 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4391 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4392 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
4393 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4397 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
4398 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
4399 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
4402 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
4403 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
4404 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4405 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4407 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4408 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4411 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4412 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4413 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
4414 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4415 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4418 // Now update local state:
4419 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
4420 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4425 onion_routing_packet,
4430 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4431 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4433 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4435 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4439 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4440 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4441 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4445 onion_routing_packet,
4447 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4452 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4453 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4454 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4455 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4456 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4457 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4458 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4460 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4461 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4463 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4464 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4466 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4467 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4469 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4470 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4471 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4472 have_updates = true;
4474 if have_updates { break; }
4476 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4477 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4478 have_updates = true;
4480 if have_updates { break; }
4483 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4485 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4487 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4488 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4489 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
4490 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4491 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4493 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4494 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4495 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4497 if let Some(state) = new_state {
4498 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4502 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4503 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4504 Some(fail_reason.take())
4506 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4507 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4510 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4511 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
4512 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
4513 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4514 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4515 self.pending_update_fee = None;
4518 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4520 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4521 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4522 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4523 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4524 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4525 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4527 Err(e) => return Err(e),
4530 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4531 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4532 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4533 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4534 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4535 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4536 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4537 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4540 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4541 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4544 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4545 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4546 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4547 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4548 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
4549 let feerate_per_kw = counterparty_commitment_tx.1;
4550 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4551 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4553 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4555 if !self.is_outbound() {
4556 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4557 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4558 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4559 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4560 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4561 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4562 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4563 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4564 let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.2);
4565 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4572 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.3.len());
4573 for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.3.iter() {
4577 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4578 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4580 htlc_signatures = res.1;
4582 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
4583 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4584 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4585 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4587 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4588 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
4589 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4590 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4591 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4592 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4596 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4597 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4600 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.3)))
4603 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4604 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4605 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4607 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4608 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4609 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4610 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4611 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4617 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4618 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4619 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4622 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4623 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4624 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4626 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4627 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4628 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4629 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4635 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4636 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4637 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
4638 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4639 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4640 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4641 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4644 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4645 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4646 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4648 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4649 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4652 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4653 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4654 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4657 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4660 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4661 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4662 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
4664 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4669 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4670 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4671 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4673 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4675 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4677 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4678 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4679 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4680 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4681 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4682 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4686 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
4687 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4688 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4691 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4692 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4693 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4694 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4695 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4697 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4698 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4705 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4708 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4709 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4710 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4711 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4712 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4713 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4714 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4715 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4716 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4717 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4718 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4720 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4721 // return them to fail the payment.
4722 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4723 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4725 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4726 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4731 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4732 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4733 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4734 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4735 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4736 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4737 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4738 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4739 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4740 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4741 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4742 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4743 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4748 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4749 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4750 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4754 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
4755 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4757 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
4763 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4764 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4765 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
4766 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
4767 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
4769 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4770 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4771 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4772 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4778 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4779 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4780 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4781 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
4782 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
4783 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4788 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4789 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4790 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4793 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4795 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4797 // Write out the old serialization for the config object. This is read by version-1
4798 // deserializers, but we will read the version in the TLV at the end instead.
4799 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4800 self.config.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4801 self.config.announced_channel.write(writer)?;
4802 self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4804 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4805 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4806 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4808 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4810 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4811 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4812 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
4813 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
4814 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4815 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4817 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
4818 // deserialized from that format.
4819 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
4820 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
4821 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
4823 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4825 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4826 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4827 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4829 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4830 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4831 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4832 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4835 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4836 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4837 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4840 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4841 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4842 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4843 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4845 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4846 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4848 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4850 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4852 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4854 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4857 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4859 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4864 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4865 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4866 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4867 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4868 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4869 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4870 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4872 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4874 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4876 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4879 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
4880 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
4881 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
4884 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4886 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4888 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4890 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4895 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4896 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4898 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4900 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4901 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4902 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4903 source.write(writer)?;
4904 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4906 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4908 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4909 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4911 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4913 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4914 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4919 match self.resend_order {
4920 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4921 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4924 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4925 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4926 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4928 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4929 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4930 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4931 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4934 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4935 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4936 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4937 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4938 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4941 if self.is_outbound() {
4942 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
4943 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4944 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed, drop it.
4945 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
4947 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
4949 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4951 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4952 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4953 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4954 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4956 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4957 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4959 feerate.write(writer)?;
4963 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4966 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4967 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
4968 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4970 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4971 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4972 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4974 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4975 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4977 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4978 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4979 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4981 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4982 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4984 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
4987 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
4988 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4989 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4991 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
4994 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4995 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
4997 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4998 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4999 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
5001 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
5003 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
5005 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
5007 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5008 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5009 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5010 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
5011 htlc.write(writer)?;
5014 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5015 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
5016 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
5017 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
5018 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
5019 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
5020 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
5022 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
5023 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5024 (5, self.config, required),
5025 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5032 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
5033 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
5034 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
5035 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5036 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5038 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5040 let mut config = Some(ChannelConfig::default());
5042 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
5043 config.as_mut().unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
5044 config.as_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
5045 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
5046 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5048 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
5049 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5052 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5053 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
5054 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5056 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5058 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5059 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
5060 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
5061 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
5062 let mut data = [0; 1024];
5063 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
5064 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
5065 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
5067 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
5069 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
5070 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
5071 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
5074 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
5076 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5077 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5078 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5080 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5081 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5082 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
5083 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5084 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5085 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5086 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5087 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5088 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5089 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
5090 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5091 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5092 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5093 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5098 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5099 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5100 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
5101 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5102 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5103 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5104 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5105 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5106 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5107 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5108 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5109 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5110 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5111 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
5112 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5113 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5118 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5119 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
5120 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
5121 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5122 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5123 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5124 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5125 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5126 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5127 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5129 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
5130 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
5131 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5133 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
5134 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5135 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5137 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5141 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5142 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5143 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5144 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5147 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
5148 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
5149 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
5151 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5152 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5153 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
5154 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5157 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5158 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5159 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
5160 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5163 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
5165 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
5167 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5168 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5169 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
5170 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
5172 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5174 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
5175 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5178 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
5179 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
5180 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5182 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5183 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5184 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5185 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
5187 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5188 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5190 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5191 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5193 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5194 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5195 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
5197 let mut minimum_depth = None;
5199 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5200 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5202 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5203 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5206 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5208 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5209 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5210 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
5211 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
5213 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5216 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
5217 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
5219 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5221 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5222 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5224 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5225 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
5227 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
5229 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5230 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
5231 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5233 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5234 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
5235 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
5239 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
5240 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
5241 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
5243 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
5249 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
5250 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5251 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
5252 (1, minimum_depth, option),
5253 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5254 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
5255 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5258 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5259 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5264 config: config.unwrap(),
5268 channel_value_satoshis,
5270 latest_monitor_update_id,
5273 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5276 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5277 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5280 pending_inbound_htlcs,
5281 pending_outbound_htlcs,
5282 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
5286 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
5287 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
5288 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
5289 monitor_pending_forwards,
5290 monitor_pending_failures,
5293 holding_cell_update_fee,
5294 next_holder_htlc_id,
5295 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
5296 update_time_counter,
5299 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5300 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5301 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5302 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5304 last_sent_closing_fee,
5306 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
5307 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
5310 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
5311 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5312 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5313 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5314 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
5315 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5316 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
5319 counterparty_forwarding_info,
5321 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
5322 funding_transaction,
5324 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
5325 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
5326 counterparty_node_id,
5328 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5332 channel_update_status,
5336 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5337 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5338 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5339 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5341 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5343 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5344 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
5351 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
5352 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
5353 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
5354 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
5355 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
5356 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5357 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5358 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
5360 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
5361 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
5362 use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
5363 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
5364 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
5365 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
5366 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
5368 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
5369 use chain::BestBlock;
5370 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
5371 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
5372 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
5373 use util::config::UserConfig;
5374 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
5375 use util::errors::APIError;
5376 use util::test_utils;
5377 use util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
5378 use util::logger::Logger;
5379 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
5380 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
5381 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
5382 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
5383 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5384 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5385 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
5386 use core::num::NonZeroU8;
5390 struct TestFeeEstimator {
5393 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
5394 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
5400 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
5401 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
5402 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
5406 signer: InMemorySigner,
5408 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
5409 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
5411 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
5412 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
5413 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5414 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5415 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
5416 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
5419 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
5420 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5421 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5422 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
5425 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
5428 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
5429 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
5430 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
5433 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
5434 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
5438 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
5439 let features = InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
5440 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
5441 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(NonZeroU8::new(16).unwrap(), &[0, 40]).unwrap();
5443 let seed = [42; 32];
5444 let network = Network::Testnet;
5445 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5446 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
5447 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
5450 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 };
5451 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5452 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5453 let config = UserConfig::default();
5454 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config) {
5455 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
5456 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
5458 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
5459 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
5463 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
5464 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
5466 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
5467 let original_fee = 253;
5468 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
5469 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5470 let seed = [42; 32];
5471 let network = Network::Testnet;
5472 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5474 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5475 let config = UserConfig::default();
5476 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5478 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
5479 // same as the old fee.
5480 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
5481 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5482 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
5486 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
5487 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
5488 // dust limits are used.
5489 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5490 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5491 let seed = [42; 32];
5492 let network = Network::Testnet;
5493 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5495 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
5496 // they have different dust limits.
5498 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5499 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5500 let config = UserConfig::default();
5501 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5503 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5504 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
5505 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5506 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5507 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5509 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
5510 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5511 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5512 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5513 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
5515 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
5516 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
5517 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5519 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
5520 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
5521 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
5522 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5525 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5527 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
5528 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
5529 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
5530 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5531 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5533 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5534 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
5538 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
5539 // the dust limit check.
5540 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5541 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5542 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5543 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
5545 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
5546 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
5547 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5548 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
5549 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5550 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5551 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5555 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5556 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5557 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5558 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5559 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5560 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5561 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5562 let seed = [42; 32];
5563 let network = Network::Testnet;
5564 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5566 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5567 let config = UserConfig::default();
5568 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5570 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5571 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5573 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5574 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5575 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5576 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5577 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5578 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5580 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5581 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5582 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5583 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5584 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5586 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5588 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5589 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5590 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5591 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5592 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5594 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5595 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5596 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5597 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5598 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5602 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5603 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5604 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5605 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5606 let seed = [42; 32];
5607 let network = Network::Testnet;
5608 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5609 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5610 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5612 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5614 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5615 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5616 let config = UserConfig::default();
5617 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5619 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5620 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5621 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5622 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5624 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5625 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5626 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5628 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5629 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5630 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5631 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5633 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5634 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5635 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5637 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5638 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5640 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5641 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5642 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5643 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5644 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5645 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5646 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5647 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5648 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5653 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5655 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5656 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5657 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5658 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5659 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5660 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5661 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5668 fn channel_update() {
5669 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5670 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5671 let seed = [42; 32];
5672 let network = Network::Testnet;
5673 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5674 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5676 // Create a channel.
5677 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5678 let config = UserConfig::default();
5679 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5680 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5681 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5682 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5684 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5685 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5686 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5688 short_channel_id: 0,
5691 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5692 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5693 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5695 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5696 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5698 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5700 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5702 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5703 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5704 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5705 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5707 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5708 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5709 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5711 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5716 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5717 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5718 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5719 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5720 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5722 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5724 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5725 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5726 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5727 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5728 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5730 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5731 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5736 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5737 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5738 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5740 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5741 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5742 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5743 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5744 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5745 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
5747 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5749 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5750 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5751 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5752 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5753 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5754 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5756 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5757 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5758 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5759 selected_contest_delay: 144
5761 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5762 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5764 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5765 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5767 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5768 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5770 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5771 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5773 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5774 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5775 // build_commitment_transaction.
5776 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5777 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5778 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5779 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5780 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5782 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5783 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5784 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5786 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5787 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
5789 let htlcs = res.3.drain(..)
5790 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5794 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5795 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5796 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5797 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5798 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5799 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5801 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5802 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5803 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5804 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5806 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5807 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5808 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5810 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5812 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5813 commitment_tx.clone(),
5814 counterparty_signature,
5815 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5816 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5817 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5819 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5820 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5822 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5823 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5824 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5826 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5827 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5830 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5832 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5833 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
5834 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
5835 &htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
5836 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5837 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5838 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5840 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5843 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5844 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5845 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5849 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5852 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5853 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5855 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5856 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5857 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5858 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5859 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5860 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5861 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5863 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5867 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5868 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5870 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5871 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5872 "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", {});
5874 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5875 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5877 amount_msat: 1000000,
5879 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5880 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5882 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5885 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5886 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5888 amount_msat: 2000000,
5890 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5891 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5893 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5896 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5897 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5899 amount_msat: 2000000,
5901 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5902 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5903 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5905 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5908 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5909 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5911 amount_msat: 3000000,
5913 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5914 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5915 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5917 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5920 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5921 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5923 amount_msat: 4000000,
5925 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5926 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5928 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5932 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5933 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5934 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5936 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5937 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5938 "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", {
5941 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5942 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5943 "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" },
5946 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5947 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5948 "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" },
5951 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5952 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5953 "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" },
5956 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5957 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5958 "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" },
5961 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5962 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5963 "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" }
5966 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5967 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5968 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5970 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5971 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5972 "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", {
5975 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5976 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5977 "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" },
5980 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5981 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5982 "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" },
5985 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5986 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5987 "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" },
5990 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5991 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5992 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe030000000000000000010c0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c6401483045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5995 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5996 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5997 "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" }
6000 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6001 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6002 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
6004 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
6005 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
6006 "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", {
6009 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
6010 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
6011 "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" },
6014 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
6015 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
6016 "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" },
6019 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
6020 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
6021 "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" },
6024 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
6025 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
6026 "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" }
6029 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6030 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6031 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
6033 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
6034 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
6035 "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", {
6038 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
6039 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
6040 "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" },
6043 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
6044 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
6045 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
6048 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
6049 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
6050 "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" },
6053 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
6054 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
6055 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
6058 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6059 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6060 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
6062 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
6063 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
6064 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
6067 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
6068 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
6069 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
6072 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
6073 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
6074 "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" },
6077 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
6078 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
6079 "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" }
6082 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6083 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6084 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
6086 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
6087 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
6088 "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", {
6091 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
6092 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
6093 "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" },
6096 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
6097 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
6098 "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" },
6101 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
6102 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
6103 "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" }
6106 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6107 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6108 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
6110 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
6111 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
6112 "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", {
6115 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
6116 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
6117 "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" },
6120 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
6121 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
6122 "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" }
6125 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6126 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6127 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
6129 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
6130 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
6131 "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", {
6134 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
6135 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
6136 "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" },
6139 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
6140 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
6141 "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" }
6144 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6145 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6146 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
6148 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
6149 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
6150 "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", {
6153 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
6154 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
6155 "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" }
6158 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6159 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6160 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
6162 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
6163 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
6164 "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", {
6167 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
6168 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
6169 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
6172 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6173 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6174 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
6176 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
6177 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
6178 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
6180 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6181 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6182 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
6184 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
6185 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
6186 "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", {});
6188 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6189 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6190 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
6192 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6193 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6194 "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", {});
6196 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
6197 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6198 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
6200 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6201 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6202 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
6204 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
6205 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
6206 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
6207 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
6208 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6209 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6211 amount_msat: 2000000,
6213 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6214 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6216 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
6219 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
6220 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6221 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6223 amount_msat: 5000000,
6225 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6226 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6227 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6229 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6232 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6233 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6235 amount_msat: 5000000,
6237 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6238 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6239 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6241 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6245 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
6246 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
6247 "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", {
6250 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
6251 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
6252 "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" },
6254 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
6255 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
6256 "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" },
6258 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
6259 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
6260 "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" }
6265 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
6266 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
6268 let mut seed = [0; 32];
6269 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
6270 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6271 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
6273 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
6274 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6275 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
6277 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
6278 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
6280 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
6281 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
6283 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
6284 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
6285 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
6289 fn test_key_derivation() {
6290 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
6291 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6293 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6294 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6296 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
6297 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
6299 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
6300 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
6302 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6303 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
6305 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6306 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
6308 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6309 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
6311 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6312 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());