1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
34 use ln::msgs::LocalFeatures;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
52 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
65 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
66 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
67 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
68 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
69 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
70 short_channel_id: u64,
71 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
72 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
75 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
76 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
77 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
78 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
81 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
82 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
83 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
84 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
88 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
89 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
90 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
91 short_channel_id: u64,
93 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
96 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
97 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
98 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
99 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
102 session_priv: SecretKey,
103 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
104 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
105 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
110 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
111 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
112 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
113 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
114 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
122 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
130 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
131 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
132 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
133 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
134 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
135 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
137 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
139 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
140 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
141 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
142 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
143 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
145 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
146 err: msgs::LightningError,
147 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
149 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
151 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
153 err: LightningError {
155 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
156 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
158 data: err.to_string()
162 shutdown_finish: None,
166 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
168 err: LightningError {
170 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
172 shutdown_finish: None,
176 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
177 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
180 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
182 err: LightningError {
184 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
185 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
187 data: err.to_string()
191 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
195 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
198 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
200 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
202 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
204 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
205 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
207 data: msg.to_string()
211 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
213 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
214 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
216 data: msg.to_string()
221 shutdown_finish: None,
226 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
227 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
228 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
229 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
230 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
232 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
234 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
236 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
245 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
246 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
247 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
248 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
249 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
250 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
252 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
256 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
257 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
258 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
259 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
260 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
261 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
262 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
263 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
264 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
265 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
266 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
267 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
268 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
270 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
271 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
272 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
273 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
275 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
276 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
277 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
278 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
279 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
280 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
283 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
285 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
286 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
287 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
288 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
289 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
294 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
295 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
297 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
298 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
300 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
301 /// to individual Channels.
303 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
304 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
305 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
306 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
308 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
309 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
310 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
311 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
312 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
313 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
314 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
316 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
317 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
318 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
319 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
321 pub struct ChannelManager<'a> {
322 default_configuration: UserConfig,
323 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
324 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
325 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor + 'a>,
326 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
329 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
331 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
332 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
333 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
336 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
338 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
339 our_network_key: SecretKey,
341 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
342 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
343 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
344 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
345 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
347 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
352 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
353 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
354 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
355 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
356 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
358 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
359 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
360 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
361 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
362 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
363 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
364 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
366 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
367 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
368 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
369 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
370 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
371 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
374 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
376 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
377 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
380 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
382 macro_rules! secp_call {
383 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
386 Err(_) => return Err($err),
391 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
392 pub struct ChannelDetails {
393 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
394 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
395 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
396 /// lifetime of the channel.
397 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
398 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
399 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
400 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
401 /// The node_id of our counterparty
402 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
403 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
404 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
405 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
407 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
408 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
409 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
410 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
411 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
412 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
413 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
414 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
415 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
416 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
417 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
418 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
419 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
423 macro_rules! handle_error {
424 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
427 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
428 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
429 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
430 if let Some(update) = update_option {
431 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
432 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
443 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
444 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
447 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
448 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
450 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
451 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
452 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
453 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
454 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
456 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
458 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
463 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
464 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
467 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
468 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
470 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
471 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
472 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
473 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
474 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
476 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
478 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
479 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
480 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
481 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
482 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
484 if let Some(update) = update {
485 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
487 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
488 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
489 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
490 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
491 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
492 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
496 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
497 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
498 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
500 shutdown_res.0.clear();
501 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
507 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
508 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
509 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
511 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
513 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
514 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
515 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
516 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
517 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
519 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
520 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
521 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
522 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
523 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
524 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
525 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
526 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
527 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
528 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
531 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
532 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
533 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
534 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
536 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
537 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
539 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
540 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
542 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
543 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
544 if !$resend_commitment {
545 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
548 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
550 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
551 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
557 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
558 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
559 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
561 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
562 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
566 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
567 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
568 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
569 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
570 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
573 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
578 impl<'a> ChannelManager<'a> {
579 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
581 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
582 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
584 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
586 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
588 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
589 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
591 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
592 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
593 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
594 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
595 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
597 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor + 'a>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager<'a>>, secp256k1::Error> {
598 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
600 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
601 default_configuration: config.clone(),
602 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
603 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
604 monitor: monitor.clone(),
607 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
608 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
611 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
612 by_id: HashMap::new(),
613 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
614 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
615 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
616 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
618 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
620 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
621 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
631 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
633 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
634 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
635 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
636 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
638 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
639 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
641 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
642 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
643 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
644 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
645 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
648 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
649 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
651 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
652 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
653 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
654 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
655 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
656 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
658 panic!("RNG is bad???");
661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
663 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
664 node_id: their_network_key,
670 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
671 /// more information.
672 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
673 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
674 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
675 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
676 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
677 res.push(ChannelDetails {
678 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
679 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
680 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
681 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
682 inbound_capacity_msat,
683 outbound_capacity_msat,
684 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
685 is_live: channel.is_live(),
691 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
692 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
694 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
695 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
696 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
697 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
698 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
699 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
700 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
701 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
702 // really wanted anyway.
703 if channel.is_live() {
704 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
705 res.push(ChannelDetails {
706 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
707 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
708 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
709 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
710 inbound_capacity_msat,
711 outbound_capacity_msat,
712 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
720 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
721 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
722 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
724 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
725 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
726 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
728 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
729 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
730 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
731 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
732 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
733 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
734 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
735 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
738 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
739 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
740 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
742 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
743 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
745 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
748 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
749 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
751 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
752 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
757 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
758 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
759 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
768 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
769 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
770 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
771 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
772 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
774 for tx in local_txn {
775 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
779 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
780 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
781 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
782 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
785 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
786 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
787 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
788 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
789 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
796 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
797 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
798 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
799 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
800 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
806 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
807 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
808 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
809 for chan in self.list_channels() {
810 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
814 const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
815 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
816 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
817 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
819 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
820 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
821 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
822 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
823 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
824 failure_code: $err_code,
825 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
830 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
831 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
834 let shared_secret = {
835 let mut arr = [0; 32];
836 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
839 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
841 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
842 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
843 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
844 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
845 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
846 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
847 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
848 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
851 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
852 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
853 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
854 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
855 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
858 let mut channel_state = None;
859 macro_rules! return_err {
860 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
862 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
863 if channel_state.is_none() {
864 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
866 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
867 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
868 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
869 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
870 })), channel_state.unwrap());
875 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
876 let next_hop_data = {
877 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
878 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
879 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
881 let error_code = match err {
882 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
883 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
885 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
891 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
893 // final_expiry_too_soon
894 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
895 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
897 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
898 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
899 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
901 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
902 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
903 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
906 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
907 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
908 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
909 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
911 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
913 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
915 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
916 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
917 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
920 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
921 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
922 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
924 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
926 let blinding_factor = {
927 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
928 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
929 sha.input(&shared_secret);
930 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
933 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
935 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
937 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
940 hop_data: new_packet_data,
941 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
944 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
945 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
946 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
947 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
948 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
949 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
950 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
954 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
955 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
956 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
957 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
958 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
959 None => { // unknown_next_peer
960 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
962 Some(id) => id.clone(),
964 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
965 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
967 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
968 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
969 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
970 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
971 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
972 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
973 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
975 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
976 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
978 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
979 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
980 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
982 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
983 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
985 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
986 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
987 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
988 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
990 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
991 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
996 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
997 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
998 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
999 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1001 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1002 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1004 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1005 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1007 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1009 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1014 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1017 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1018 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1019 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1020 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1021 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1025 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1027 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1028 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1029 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1030 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1031 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1032 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1033 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1034 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1035 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1036 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1039 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1040 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1042 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1048 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1050 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1051 /// fields for more info.
1053 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1054 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1055 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1056 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1057 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1058 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1060 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1062 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1063 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1064 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1065 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1066 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1067 /// relevant updates.
1069 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1070 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1071 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1072 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1073 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1074 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1075 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1076 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1078 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1079 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1080 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1081 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1085 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1087 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1089 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1090 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1091 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1092 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1094 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1096 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1097 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1099 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1100 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1101 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1104 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1105 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1107 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1108 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1110 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1111 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1113 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1114 route: route.clone(),
1115 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1116 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1117 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1119 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1120 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1121 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1122 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1123 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1124 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1125 // something else in case we will resend later!
1126 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1129 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1130 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1131 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1132 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1133 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1134 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1135 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1143 } else { unreachable!(); }
1147 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1148 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1150 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.action {
1152 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1153 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1154 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1155 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1159 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1164 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1166 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1167 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1169 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1171 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1172 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1173 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1174 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1176 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1178 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1179 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1181 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1182 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1183 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1184 } else { unreachable!(); })
1190 match handle_error!(self, res) {
1191 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1192 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1195 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1196 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1197 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1198 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1205 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1206 // lock before add_update_monitor
1207 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1209 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1210 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None))) {
1212 log_error!(self, "Failed to store ChannelMonitor update for funding tx generation");
1213 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1214 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1215 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1220 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1223 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1224 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1225 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1226 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1228 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1233 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1234 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1235 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1238 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1239 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1240 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1242 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1248 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1249 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1251 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1253 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1255 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1256 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1258 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1259 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1260 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1261 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1262 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1266 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1268 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1269 /// Will likely generate further events.
1270 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1271 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1273 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1274 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1275 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1277 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1278 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1280 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1281 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1282 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1283 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1285 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1286 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1287 match forward_info {
1288 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1289 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1290 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1291 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1292 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1294 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1296 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1297 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1298 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1299 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1300 // problem, not ours.
1307 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1308 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1309 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1310 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1311 match forward_info {
1312 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1313 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1314 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1315 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1316 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1317 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1319 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1321 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1322 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1324 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1326 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1327 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1332 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1334 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1335 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1336 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1337 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1338 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1339 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1340 // this channel currently :/.
1346 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1347 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1348 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1350 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1351 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1353 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1355 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1356 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1357 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1360 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1362 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1363 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1364 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1365 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1366 // messages when we can.
1367 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1368 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1369 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1376 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1377 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1380 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1381 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1382 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1383 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1384 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1385 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1387 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1388 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1389 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1390 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1391 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1393 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1395 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1397 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1398 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1401 msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError => {},
1403 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1404 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1405 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1406 node_id: their_node_id,
1416 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1417 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1420 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1421 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1422 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1423 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1424 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1425 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1426 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1428 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1436 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1437 match forward_info {
1438 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1439 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1440 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1441 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1442 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1444 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1445 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1446 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1448 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1449 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1450 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1453 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1454 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1462 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1464 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1465 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1469 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1470 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1473 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.action {
1475 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1476 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1477 node_id: their_node_id,
1485 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1486 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1487 events.append(&mut new_events);
1490 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1491 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1492 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1493 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1494 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1495 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1496 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1498 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1499 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1500 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1501 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1502 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1503 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1504 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1505 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1511 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1512 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1513 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1514 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1515 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1516 /// still-available channels.
1517 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1518 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1519 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1520 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1523 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1524 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1525 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1526 match &onion_error {
1527 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1529 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1531 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1532 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1533 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1534 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1535 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1536 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1537 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1542 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1543 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1544 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1545 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1547 error_code: onion_error_code
1551 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1555 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1556 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1557 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1558 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1560 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1561 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1562 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1563 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1564 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1565 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1567 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1573 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1574 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1575 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1576 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1577 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1578 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1580 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1581 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1582 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1586 let mut forward_event = None;
1587 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1588 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1590 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1591 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1592 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1594 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1595 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1598 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1599 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1600 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1601 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1602 time_forwardable: time
1609 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1610 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1611 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1613 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1614 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1615 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1616 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1617 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1618 /// motivated attackers.
1620 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1621 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1622 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1624 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1626 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1627 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1628 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1629 for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1630 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1631 if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
1632 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
1633 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1634 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1635 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1636 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
1637 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1639 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1645 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1646 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1648 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1649 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1650 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1651 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1655 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1656 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1657 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1659 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1660 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1662 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1663 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1664 // why it's missing.
1669 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1670 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1671 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1672 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1673 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1674 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1675 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1676 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1678 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1682 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1683 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1684 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1685 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1686 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1687 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1688 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1689 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1697 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1698 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1699 //TODO: Do something with e?
1703 } else { unreachable!(); }
1709 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1712 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.action {
1714 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1715 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1716 node_id: their_node_id,
1724 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1725 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1726 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1729 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1730 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1732 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1733 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1734 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1735 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1736 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1737 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1740 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1741 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1742 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1743 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1744 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1745 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1746 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1747 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1749 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1750 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1751 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1752 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1753 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1754 // on-chain confirmations.
1755 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1756 // should be written.
1757 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1758 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1760 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1761 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1762 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1768 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1771 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1772 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1773 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1775 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1777 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1778 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1779 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1780 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1785 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1786 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1787 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1788 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1789 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1794 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1798 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1803 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1804 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1805 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1806 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1809 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1810 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1811 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1814 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1815 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1816 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1817 msg: announcement_sigs,
1820 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1828 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1830 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1831 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1833 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1835 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1836 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1840 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1841 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1842 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1845 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_local_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1846 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1847 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1848 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1849 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1850 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1851 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1852 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1853 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1854 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1856 entry.insert(channel);
1862 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1863 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1864 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1865 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1866 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1867 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1868 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1869 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1870 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1872 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_local_features), channel_state, chan);
1873 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1875 //TODO: same as above
1876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1879 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1880 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1881 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1882 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1883 output_script: output_script,
1884 user_channel_id: user_id,
1889 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1890 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
1891 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1892 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1893 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1895 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1896 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1897 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1899 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1901 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1904 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1905 // lock before add_update_monitor
1906 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1908 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1909 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
1910 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
1911 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
1912 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
1913 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
1915 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1916 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
1917 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
1918 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
1919 // until we have persisted our monitor.
1920 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1924 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1925 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1926 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1927 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1928 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1930 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1931 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1932 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1941 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1942 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1943 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1944 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1945 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1946 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1947 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1948 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1949 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1951 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1952 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1953 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
1955 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1957 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1960 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1961 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1962 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1963 user_channel_id: user_id,
1968 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1969 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1970 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1971 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1972 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1973 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1974 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1975 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1977 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1978 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1979 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
1980 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
1981 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
1982 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
1983 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
1984 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
1985 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
1986 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
1987 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
1988 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1989 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1990 msg: announcement_sigs,
1995 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1999 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2000 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2001 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2002 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2004 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2005 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2006 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2007 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2008 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2010 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2011 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2012 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2013 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2017 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2018 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2019 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2023 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2024 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2025 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2027 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2028 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2030 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2033 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2034 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2036 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2037 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2038 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2039 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2047 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2048 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2049 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2050 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2051 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2052 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2053 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2054 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2055 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2057 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2058 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2059 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2060 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2065 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2066 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2067 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2068 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2069 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2070 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2071 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2073 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2074 } else { (tx, None) }
2076 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2079 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2080 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2082 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2083 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2084 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2085 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2093 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2094 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2095 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2096 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2098 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2099 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2100 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2101 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2103 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2104 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2106 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2107 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2108 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2109 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2110 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2112 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2113 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2114 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2115 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2116 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2117 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2118 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2119 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2120 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2121 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2122 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2123 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2124 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2125 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2127 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2128 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2129 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2130 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2134 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2135 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2136 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2137 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2138 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2139 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2144 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2146 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2151 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2152 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2154 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2155 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2156 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2157 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2158 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2159 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2161 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2163 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2166 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2170 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2171 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2172 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2173 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2174 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2175 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2176 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2177 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2179 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2181 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2186 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2187 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2188 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2189 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2190 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2191 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2192 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2193 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2195 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2196 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2198 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2201 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2205 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2206 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2207 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2208 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2209 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2210 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2211 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2212 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2214 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2215 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2216 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2217 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2218 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2220 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2221 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2222 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2224 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2225 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2226 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2227 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2228 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2229 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2230 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2231 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2233 commitment_signed: msg,
2237 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2238 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2239 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2245 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2250 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2251 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2252 let mut forward_event = None;
2253 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2254 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2255 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2256 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2258 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2259 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2260 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2261 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2263 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2264 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2269 match forward_event {
2271 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2272 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2273 time_forwardable: time
2281 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2282 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2283 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2284 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2285 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2286 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2287 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2288 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2289 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2291 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2292 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2293 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2294 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2295 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2296 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2297 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2299 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2302 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2303 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2304 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2308 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2309 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2310 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2314 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2316 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2319 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2320 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2322 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2327 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2328 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2329 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2330 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2331 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2332 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2333 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2334 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2336 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2338 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2343 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2344 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2345 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2347 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2349 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2350 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2352 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2353 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2356 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2357 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2358 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2360 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2361 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2362 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2363 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2364 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2367 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2369 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2370 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2371 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2372 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2373 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2374 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2375 contents: announcement,
2377 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2380 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2385 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2386 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2387 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2389 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2390 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2391 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2392 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2394 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2395 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2396 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2397 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2398 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2399 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2400 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2401 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2402 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2404 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2405 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2407 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2408 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2411 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2412 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2413 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2417 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2418 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2419 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2420 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2425 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2426 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2427 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2428 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2434 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2438 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2443 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2444 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2445 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2451 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2455 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2456 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2457 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2458 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2460 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2461 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2463 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2464 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2465 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2467 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2468 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2469 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2470 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2471 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2473 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2474 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2476 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2477 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2479 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2480 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2481 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2483 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2486 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2487 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2488 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2489 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2490 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2491 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2492 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2493 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2503 match handle_error!(self, err) {
2504 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2506 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.action {
2508 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2509 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2510 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2511 node_id: their_node_id,
2515 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2521 impl<'a> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<'a> {
2522 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2523 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2524 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2525 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2527 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2528 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2529 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2530 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2531 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2533 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2534 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2539 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2540 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2541 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2546 impl<'a> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<'a> {
2547 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2548 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2549 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2550 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2552 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2553 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2554 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2555 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2556 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2558 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2559 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2564 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2565 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2566 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2571 impl<'a> ChainListener for ChannelManager<'a> {
2572 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2573 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2574 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2575 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2576 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2578 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2579 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2580 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2581 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2582 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2583 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2584 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2585 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2586 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2587 msg: funding_locked,
2589 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2590 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2591 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2592 msg: announcement_sigs,
2595 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2596 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2597 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2598 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2599 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2603 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2604 for tx in txn_matched {
2605 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2606 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2607 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2608 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2609 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2611 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2612 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2613 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2614 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2615 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2616 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2625 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2626 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2627 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2629 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2630 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2631 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2632 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2633 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2634 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2635 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2644 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2645 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2647 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2648 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2651 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2652 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2653 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2654 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2656 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2657 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2658 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2659 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2660 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2661 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2662 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2663 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2665 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2666 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2667 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2677 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2678 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2680 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2681 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2685 impl<'a> ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<'a> {
2686 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2687 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2688 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2689 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
2692 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2693 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2694 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
2697 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2698 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2699 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg))
2702 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2703 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2704 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2707 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2708 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2709 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg))
2712 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2713 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2714 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg))
2717 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2718 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2719 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2722 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2723 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2724 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2727 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2728 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2729 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2732 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2733 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2734 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2737 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2738 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2739 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2742 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2743 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2744 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2747 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2748 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2749 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg))
2752 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2753 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2754 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg))
2757 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2758 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2759 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg))
2762 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2763 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2764 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg))
2767 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2768 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2769 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2770 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2772 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2773 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2774 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2775 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2776 if no_connection_possible {
2777 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2778 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2779 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2780 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2781 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2783 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2784 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2785 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2795 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2796 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2797 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2798 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2799 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2800 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2801 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2802 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2804 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2805 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2806 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2814 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2816 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2817 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2818 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2819 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2820 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2821 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2822 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2823 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2824 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2825 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2826 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2827 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2828 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2829 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2830 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2834 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2835 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2837 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2838 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2839 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2844 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2845 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2847 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2848 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2849 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2850 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2851 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2852 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2853 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2854 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2855 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2856 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2860 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2861 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2862 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2868 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2871 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2872 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2874 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2875 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2876 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2877 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2881 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2886 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2887 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2889 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2890 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2891 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2892 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2893 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2894 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2895 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2896 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2901 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2902 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2903 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2904 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2905 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2906 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2907 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2908 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2909 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2914 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2915 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2917 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2919 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2921 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2923 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2930 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2931 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2932 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2933 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2934 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2935 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2940 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2941 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2943 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2945 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2947 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2949 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2956 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2957 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2958 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2959 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2960 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2961 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2966 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2969 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2972 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2973 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2975 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2977 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2979 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2981 route.write(writer)?;
2982 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2983 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2990 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2991 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2992 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2993 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2994 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2995 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2996 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2997 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2999 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3004 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3005 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3007 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3011 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3013 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3014 data.write(writer)?;
3021 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3022 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3023 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3024 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3025 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3026 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3027 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3029 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3034 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3035 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3037 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3039 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3040 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3041 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3043 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3045 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3046 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3053 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
3054 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3055 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3056 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3057 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3058 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3059 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3061 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3062 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3063 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3065 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3070 impl<'a> Writeable for ChannelManager<'a> {
3071 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3072 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3074 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3075 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3077 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3078 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3079 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3081 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3082 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3083 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3084 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3085 unfunded_channels += 1;
3088 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3089 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3090 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3091 channel.write(writer)?;
3095 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3096 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3097 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3098 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3099 for forward in pending_forwards {
3100 forward.write(writer)?;
3104 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3105 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3106 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3107 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3108 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
3109 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
3110 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3118 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3120 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3122 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3123 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3124 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3125 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3126 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3127 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3128 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3129 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3130 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3131 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3132 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3133 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, 'b> {
3134 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3135 /// deserialization.
3136 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3138 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3140 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3141 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3142 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3144 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3145 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3146 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3147 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor + 'b>,
3149 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3150 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3151 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3152 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3153 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3154 /// deserialization.
3155 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3156 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3157 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3158 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3160 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3161 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3163 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3164 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3165 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3166 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3168 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3170 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3173 impl<'a, 'b, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, 'b>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<'b>) {
3174 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, 'b>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3175 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3176 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3177 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3178 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3181 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3182 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3183 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3185 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3187 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3188 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3189 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3190 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3191 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3192 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3193 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3194 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3197 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3198 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3199 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3200 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3201 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3202 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3203 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3204 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3205 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3207 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3208 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3210 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3213 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3217 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3218 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3219 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3223 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3224 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3225 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3226 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3227 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3228 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3229 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3230 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3232 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3235 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3236 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3237 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3238 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3239 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3240 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3241 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3242 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3244 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3247 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3249 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3250 monitor: args.monitor,
3251 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3253 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3254 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3255 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3257 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3262 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3264 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3266 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3267 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3268 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3269 logger: args.logger,
3270 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3273 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3274 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3275 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3276 //connection or two.
3279 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))