1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
57 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
61 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
62 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
63 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
82 use crate::prelude::*;
84 use core::cell::RefCell;
86 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
87 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
88 use core::time::Duration;
91 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
92 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
93 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
95 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
97 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
98 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
99 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
101 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
102 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
103 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
104 // before we forward it.
106 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
107 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
108 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
109 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
110 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
112 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
115 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
116 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
118 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
119 /// do with the HTLC.
120 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
121 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
123 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
124 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
125 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
126 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
127 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
128 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
130 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
132 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
133 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
135 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
136 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
137 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
138 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
139 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
141 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
142 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
143 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
144 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
145 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
147 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
148 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
149 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
150 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
152 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
153 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
158 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
159 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
160 requires_blinded_error: bool,
162 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
163 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
164 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
166 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
167 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
169 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
170 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
171 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
172 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
173 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
174 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
175 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
177 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
178 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
179 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
180 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
182 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
183 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
184 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
186 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
187 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
188 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
192 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
193 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
194 pub struct BlindedForward {
195 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
196 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
197 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
198 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
199 // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
202 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
203 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
204 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
205 // TODO: needs update when we support forwarding blinded HTLCs as non-intro node
207 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
208 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
214 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
216 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
217 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
218 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
219 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
220 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
221 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
223 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
224 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
225 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
226 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
227 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
229 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
231 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
232 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
233 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
235 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
236 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
237 /// it along another path).
239 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
240 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
241 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
242 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
243 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
244 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
245 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
246 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
247 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
249 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
252 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
254 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
256 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
259 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
260 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
261 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
262 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
265 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
266 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
267 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
268 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
269 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
272 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
273 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
274 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
276 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
277 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
278 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
281 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
282 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
284 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
285 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
288 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
289 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
290 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
293 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
298 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
302 // Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
303 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
304 enum BlindedFailure {
305 FromIntroductionNode,
309 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
310 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
311 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
312 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
313 short_channel_id: u64,
314 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
316 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
317 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
318 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
320 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
321 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
326 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
328 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
329 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
330 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
332 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
333 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
336 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
337 struct ClaimableHTLC {
338 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
340 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
342 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
343 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
344 sender_intended_value: u64,
345 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
347 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
348 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
349 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
350 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
352 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
353 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
356 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
357 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
358 events::ClaimedHTLC {
359 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
360 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
361 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
362 value_msat: val.value,
363 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
368 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
369 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
371 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
372 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
373 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
376 /// Number of bytes in the id.
377 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
380 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
381 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
386 impl Readable for PaymentId {
387 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
388 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
393 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
394 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
395 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
399 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
401 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
402 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
403 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
405 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for InterceptId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
419 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
420 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
421 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
422 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
425 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
427 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
428 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
429 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
431 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
432 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
436 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
437 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
438 (0, short_channel_id, required),
439 (2, htlc_id, required),
441 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
442 (0, session_priv, required),
447 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
448 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
449 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
450 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
451 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
454 session_priv: SecretKey,
455 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
456 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
457 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
458 payment_id: PaymentId,
461 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
462 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
463 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
465 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
467 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
469 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
472 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
473 payment_id.hash(hasher);
474 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
480 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
482 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
483 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
484 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
485 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
486 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
487 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
491 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
492 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
493 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
494 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
495 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
496 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
498 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
504 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
505 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
507 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
508 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
509 pub enum FailureCode {
510 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
511 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
512 TemporaryNodeFailure,
513 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
514 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
515 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
516 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
517 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
518 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
519 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
520 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
521 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
522 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
524 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
525 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
526 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
529 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
530 fn into(self) -> u16 {
532 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
533 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
534 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
535 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
540 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
541 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
542 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
543 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
544 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
546 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
547 err: msgs::LightningError,
548 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
549 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
550 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
552 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
554 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
556 err: LightningError {
558 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
559 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
566 shutdown_finish: None,
567 channel_capacity: None,
571 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
572 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
575 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
576 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
577 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
578 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
579 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
580 // commitment upon reconnecting.
581 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
583 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
586 err: LightningError { err, action },
587 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
588 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
589 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
593 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
596 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
598 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
599 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
603 log_level: Level::Warn,
606 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
608 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
610 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
612 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
613 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
621 shutdown_finish: None,
622 channel_capacity: None,
626 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
627 self.chan_id.is_some()
631 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
632 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
633 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
634 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
635 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
637 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
638 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
639 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
640 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
641 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
642 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
643 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
645 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
649 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
650 struct ClaimingPayment {
652 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
653 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
654 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
655 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
657 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
658 (0, amount_msat, required),
659 (2, payment_purpose, required),
660 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
661 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
662 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
665 struct ClaimablePayment {
666 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
667 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
668 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
671 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
672 struct ClaimablePayments {
673 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
674 /// failed/claimed by the user.
676 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
677 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
679 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
680 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
681 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
683 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
684 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
685 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
686 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
689 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
690 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
691 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
692 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
694 enum BackgroundEvent {
695 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
696 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
697 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
698 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
700 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
701 /// are regenerated on startup.
702 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
703 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
704 /// channel to continue normal operation.
706 /// In general this should be used rather than
707 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
708 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
709 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
711 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
712 /// are regenerated on startup.
713 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
714 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
715 funding_txo: OutPoint,
716 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
718 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
719 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
721 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
722 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
723 channel_id: ChannelId,
728 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
729 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
730 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
731 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
732 /// event can be generated.
733 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
734 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
735 /// operation of another channel.
737 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
738 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
739 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
740 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
742 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
743 event: events::Event,
744 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
746 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
747 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
748 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
750 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
751 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
752 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
753 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
754 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
756 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
757 /// stored for later processing.
758 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
759 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
760 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
761 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
765 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
766 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
767 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
768 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
769 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
770 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
771 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
772 (4, blocking_action, required),
774 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
775 (0, event, upgradable_required),
776 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
777 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
778 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
779 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
780 // downgrades to prior versions.
781 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
785 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
786 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
787 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
788 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
789 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
792 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
793 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
794 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
799 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
800 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
801 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
802 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
803 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
804 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
806 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
807 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
808 channel_id: ChannelId,
809 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
814 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
815 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
816 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
817 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
818 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
823 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
824 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
828 /// State we hold per-peer.
829 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
830 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
832 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
833 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
834 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
836 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
837 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
838 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
839 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
840 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
841 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
842 latest_features: InitFeatures,
843 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
844 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
845 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
846 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
847 /// user but which have not yet completed.
849 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
850 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
851 /// for a missing channel.
852 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
853 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
854 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
856 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
857 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
858 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
859 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
861 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
862 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
863 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
864 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
865 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
866 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
867 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
868 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
869 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
870 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
871 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
872 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
873 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
874 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
875 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
879 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
880 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
881 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
882 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
883 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
884 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
887 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
888 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
889 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
892 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
893 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
894 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
897 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
898 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
899 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
900 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
904 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
905 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
906 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
907 /// The original OpenChannel message.
908 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
909 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
910 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
913 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
914 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
915 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
917 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
918 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
920 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
923 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
924 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
925 struct PendingInboundPayment {
926 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
927 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
928 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
929 /// this payment being removed.
931 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
932 user_payment_id: u64,
933 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
934 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
935 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
938 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
939 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
940 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
941 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
942 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
943 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
944 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
945 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
947 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
948 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
949 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
957 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
959 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
960 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
961 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
966 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
967 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
968 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
969 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
970 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
971 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
972 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
973 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
974 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
976 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
977 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
978 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
987 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
989 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
990 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
991 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
996 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
998 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1000 pub trait AChannelManager {
1001 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1002 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1003 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1004 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1005 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1006 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1007 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1008 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1009 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1010 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1011 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1012 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1013 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1014 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1015 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1016 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1017 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1018 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1019 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1020 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1021 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1022 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1023 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1024 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1025 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1026 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1027 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1028 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1029 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1030 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1031 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1032 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1033 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1034 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1035 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1036 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1039 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1040 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1042 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1043 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1044 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1045 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1046 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1047 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1051 type Watch = M::Target;
1053 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1055 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1057 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1059 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1060 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1062 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1064 type Router = R::Target;
1066 type Logger = L::Target;
1068 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1071 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1072 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1074 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1075 /// to individual Channels.
1077 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1078 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1079 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1080 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1082 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1083 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1084 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1085 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1086 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1087 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1088 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1089 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1090 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1092 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1093 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1094 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1096 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1097 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1098 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1099 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1100 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1102 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1103 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1104 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1105 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1107 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1108 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1109 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1111 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1112 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1113 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1114 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1115 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1117 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1118 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1119 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1120 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1121 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1122 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1123 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1124 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1127 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1128 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1129 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1130 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1131 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1135 // `pending_offers_messages`
1137 // `total_consistency_lock`
1139 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1141 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1143 // |__`per_peer_state`
1145 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1147 // |__`claimable_payments`
1149 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1155 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1157 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1161 // |__`pending_events`
1163 // |__`pending_background_events`
1165 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1167 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1168 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1169 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1170 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1171 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1172 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1176 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1177 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1178 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1184 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1186 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1188 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1189 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1191 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1192 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1193 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1194 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1196 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1197 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1199 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1200 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1201 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1202 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1203 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1204 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1205 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1206 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1208 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1210 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1211 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1213 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1215 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1216 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1217 /// and via the classic SCID.
1219 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1220 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1222 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1224 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1226 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1227 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1228 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1230 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1231 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1233 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1234 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1236 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1237 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1239 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1240 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1241 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1242 /// active channel list on load.
1244 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1245 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1247 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1249 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1250 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1251 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1253 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1254 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1255 /// the handling of the events.
1257 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1258 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1261 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1262 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1263 /// would break backwards compatability.
1264 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1265 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1266 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1268 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1269 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1271 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1273 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1274 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1275 /// confirmation depth.
1277 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1278 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1279 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1281 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1283 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1285 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1287 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1289 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1291 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1292 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1293 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1295 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1296 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1298 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1299 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1300 /// keeping additional state.
1301 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1303 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1304 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1305 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1306 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1308 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1309 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1311 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1312 /// are currently open with that peer.
1314 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1315 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1318 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1320 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1321 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1322 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1323 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1324 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1326 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1327 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1328 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1329 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1330 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1332 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1333 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1335 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1336 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1337 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1338 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1339 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1341 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1342 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1344 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1345 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1346 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1347 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1348 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1350 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1352 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1354 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1355 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1356 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1357 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1358 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1359 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1360 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1361 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1362 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1363 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1364 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1366 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1367 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1368 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1370 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1372 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1373 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1375 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1379 signer_provider: SP,
1384 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1386 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1387 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1388 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1389 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1390 pub struct ChainParameters {
1391 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1392 pub network: Network,
1394 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1396 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1397 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1400 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1404 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1405 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1408 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1409 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1410 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1411 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1412 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1413 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1415 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1416 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1417 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1418 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1419 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1420 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1422 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1423 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1426 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1427 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1428 /// events to handle.
1430 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1431 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1433 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1434 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1437 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1438 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1439 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1440 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1442 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1443 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1444 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1445 should_persist: move || {
1446 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1447 // processing and return that.
1448 let notify = persist_check();
1449 match (notify, force_notify) {
1450 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1451 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1452 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1453 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1454 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1457 _read_guard: read_guard,
1461 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1462 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1463 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1464 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1465 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1466 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1468 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1469 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1470 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1471 should_persist: persist_check,
1472 _read_guard: read_guard,
1477 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1478 fn drop(&mut self) {
1479 match (self.should_persist)() {
1480 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1481 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1482 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1484 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1485 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1486 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1491 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1492 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1494 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1496 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1497 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1498 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1499 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1500 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1502 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1503 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1505 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1507 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1508 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1509 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1510 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1511 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1512 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1513 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1514 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1515 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1516 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1517 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1518 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1519 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1521 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1522 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1524 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1525 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1526 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1527 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1529 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1530 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1531 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1532 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1533 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1534 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1536 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1538 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1539 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1541 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1543 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1544 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1546 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1547 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1548 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1550 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1551 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1552 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1554 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1555 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1556 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1557 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1559 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1560 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1561 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1563 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1564 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1565 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1567 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1568 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1569 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1570 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1571 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1572 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1573 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1574 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1575 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1576 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1577 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1580 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1581 /// to better separate parameters.
1582 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1583 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1584 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1585 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1586 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1587 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1588 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1589 pub features: InitFeatures,
1590 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1591 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1592 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1594 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1596 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1597 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1598 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1599 /// payments to us through this channel.
1600 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1601 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1602 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1603 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1604 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1605 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1606 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1609 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1610 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1611 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1612 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1613 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1614 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1615 /// lifetime of the channel.
1616 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1617 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1618 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1619 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1620 /// our counterparty already.
1622 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1623 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1624 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1625 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1627 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1628 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1629 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1630 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1632 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1633 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1635 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1636 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1638 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1639 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1640 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1641 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1642 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1643 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1644 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1645 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1646 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1649 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1651 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1652 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1653 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1654 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1655 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1656 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1657 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1659 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1660 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1662 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1663 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1664 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1665 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1666 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1667 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1668 /// this value on chain.
1670 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1672 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1674 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1675 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1676 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1677 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1678 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1679 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1680 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1682 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1683 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1684 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1685 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1686 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1687 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1689 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1690 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1691 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1692 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1693 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1695 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1696 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1697 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1698 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1700 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1701 pub balance_msat: u64,
1702 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1703 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1704 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1705 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1707 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1709 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1710 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1711 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1712 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1713 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1714 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1715 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1716 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1718 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1719 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1720 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1721 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1722 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1723 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1724 /// route which is valid.
1725 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1726 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1727 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1728 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1729 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1730 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1732 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1733 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1734 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1735 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1736 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1737 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1738 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1739 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1740 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1742 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1744 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1745 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1746 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1747 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1748 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1750 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1751 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1752 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1753 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1754 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1755 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1756 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1758 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1759 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1760 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1761 pub is_outbound: bool,
1762 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1763 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1764 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1765 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1766 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1768 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1769 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1770 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1771 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1772 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1773 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1774 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1776 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1777 pub is_usable: bool,
1778 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1779 pub is_public: bool,
1780 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1781 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1782 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1783 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1784 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1785 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1787 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1788 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1791 impl ChannelDetails {
1792 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1793 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1794 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1796 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1797 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1798 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1799 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1802 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1803 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1804 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1806 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1807 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1808 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1809 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1812 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1813 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1814 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1817 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1818 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1820 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1821 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1822 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1824 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1825 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1826 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1827 features: latest_features,
1828 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1829 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1830 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1831 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1832 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1833 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1834 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1835 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1836 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1837 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1839 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1840 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1841 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1842 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1843 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1844 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1845 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1846 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1847 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1848 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1849 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1850 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1851 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1852 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1853 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1854 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1855 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1856 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1857 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1858 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1859 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1860 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1861 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1862 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1863 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1864 config: Some(context.config()),
1865 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1870 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1871 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1872 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1873 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1874 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1875 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1876 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1877 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1878 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1880 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1882 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1883 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1885 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1886 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1887 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1888 /// to drop the channel.
1892 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1893 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1894 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1895 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1896 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1898 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1899 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1900 payment_id: PaymentId,
1902 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1904 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1905 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1906 payment_id: PaymentId,
1907 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1909 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1910 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1911 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1914 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1915 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1916 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1918 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1919 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1920 payment_id: PaymentId,
1921 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1922 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1923 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1925 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1926 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1927 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1929 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1930 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1931 payment_id: PaymentId,
1932 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1933 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1937 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1939 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1941 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1942 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1943 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1944 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1946 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1947 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1948 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1951 macro_rules! handle_error {
1952 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1953 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1954 // entering the macro.
1955 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1956 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1960 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1961 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1963 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1964 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1965 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1966 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1970 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1971 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1972 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1973 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1974 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1975 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1980 let logger = WithContext::from(
1981 &$self.logger, Some($counterparty_node_id), chan_id.map(|(chan_id, _)| chan_id)
1983 log_error!(logger, "{}", err.err);
1984 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1986 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1987 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1988 action: err.action.clone()
1992 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1993 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1994 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1995 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1996 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2000 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2007 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2008 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2009 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
2010 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2011 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2012 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2014 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2015 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2016 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2017 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2018 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2020 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2021 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2023 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2027 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2028 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2029 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2031 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2032 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2034 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2035 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2037 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2038 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2039 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2040 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2041 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
2042 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
2043 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
2045 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
2046 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
2050 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2051 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2053 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2054 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2056 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2057 match $channel_phase {
2058 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2059 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2061 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2062 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2064 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2065 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2071 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2072 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2076 let key = *$entry.key();
2077 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2079 $entry.remove_entry();
2087 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2088 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2092 let key = *$entry.key();
2093 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2095 $entry.remove_entry();
2103 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2104 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2106 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2107 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2113 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2114 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2115 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2116 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2117 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2119 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2120 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2121 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2122 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2123 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2124 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2125 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2126 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2127 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2128 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2133 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2134 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2135 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2136 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2137 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2138 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2139 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2140 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2141 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2143 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2148 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2149 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2150 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2151 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2152 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2153 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2154 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2155 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2156 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2158 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2163 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2164 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2165 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2166 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2167 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2168 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2169 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2170 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2171 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2172 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2173 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2174 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2176 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2177 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2178 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2184 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2185 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2187 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2188 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2189 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2190 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2191 updates.announcement_sigs);
2192 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2193 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2196 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2197 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2198 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2199 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2201 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2202 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2203 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2204 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2205 let mut batch_completed = false;
2206 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2207 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2208 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2209 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2211 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2212 channel_state.2 = true;
2214 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2216 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2218 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2221 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2222 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2223 if batch_completed {
2224 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2225 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2226 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2227 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2228 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2229 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2230 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2231 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2232 chan.set_batch_ready();
2233 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2234 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2238 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2239 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2240 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2245 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2247 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2248 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2250 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2251 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2252 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2253 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2258 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2259 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2260 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2261 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2263 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2264 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2265 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2266 panic!("{}", err_str);
2268 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2269 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2270 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2273 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2279 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2280 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2281 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2283 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2284 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2285 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2286 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2287 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2288 // filter for uniqueness here.
2289 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2290 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2291 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2292 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2294 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2295 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2297 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2298 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2299 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2305 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2306 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2307 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2308 while !processed_all_events {
2309 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2316 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2317 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2318 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2320 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2321 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2322 result = $self.process_background_events();
2324 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2325 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2326 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2327 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2331 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2332 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2333 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2334 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2337 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2339 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2340 $event_to_handle = event;
2342 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2343 post_event_actions.push(action);
2348 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2349 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2350 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2351 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2352 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2353 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2356 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2357 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2358 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2359 processed_all_events = false;
2363 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2364 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2365 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2367 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2368 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2369 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2375 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2377 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2378 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2379 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2380 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2381 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2382 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2386 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2388 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2390 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2391 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2393 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2395 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2396 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2397 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2400 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2401 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2402 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2404 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2405 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2406 current_timestamp: u32,
2408 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2409 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2410 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2411 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2413 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2414 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2415 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2420 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2422 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2423 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2424 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2425 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2426 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2427 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2428 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2429 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2431 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2434 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2435 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2437 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2439 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2441 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2443 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2444 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2445 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2446 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2447 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2448 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2449 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2450 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2452 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2462 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2463 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2464 &self.default_configuration
2467 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2468 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2469 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2472 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2473 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2475 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2477 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2481 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2486 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2488 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2489 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2490 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2491 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2492 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2494 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2495 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2497 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2498 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2499 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2501 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2502 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2503 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2505 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2506 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2508 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2509 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2510 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2511 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2512 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2513 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2515 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2516 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2517 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2518 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2519 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2520 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2523 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2524 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2525 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2527 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2529 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2530 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2532 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2534 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2535 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2536 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2541 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2542 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2543 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2544 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2545 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2546 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2550 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2555 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2557 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2558 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2559 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2561 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2563 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2566 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2569 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2570 node_id: their_network_key,
2573 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2576 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2577 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2578 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2579 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2580 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2581 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2582 // the same channel.
2583 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2585 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2586 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2587 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2588 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2589 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2590 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2591 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2592 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2593 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2597 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2598 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2599 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2607 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2608 /// more information.
2609 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2610 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2611 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2612 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2613 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2614 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2615 // the same channel.
2616 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2618 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2619 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2620 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2621 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2622 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2623 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2624 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2625 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2633 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2634 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2636 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2637 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2639 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2640 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2641 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2642 // really wanted anyway.
2643 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2646 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2647 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2648 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2649 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2651 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2652 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2653 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2654 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2655 let context_to_details = |context| {
2656 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2658 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2660 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2661 .map(context_to_details)
2667 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2668 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2670 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2671 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2672 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2674 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2675 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2676 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2677 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2678 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2679 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2681 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2682 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2683 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2685 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2686 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2687 payment_id: *payment_id,
2688 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2689 total_msat: *total_msat,
2692 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2693 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2695 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2696 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2698 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2703 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2704 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2705 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2706 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2707 Some(transaction) => {
2708 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2709 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2714 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2715 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2716 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2717 reason: closure_reason,
2718 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2719 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2723 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2724 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2726 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2727 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2730 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2732 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2733 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2735 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2736 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2738 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2739 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2740 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2741 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2742 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2743 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2744 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2745 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2747 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2748 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2749 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2750 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2751 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2755 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2756 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2758 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2759 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2760 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2761 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2764 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan_phase_entry.get().context(), ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2765 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2766 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2769 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2770 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2772 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2773 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2780 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2781 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2782 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2783 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2786 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2787 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2793 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2794 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2795 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2797 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2798 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2800 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2801 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2802 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2803 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2805 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2807 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2808 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2809 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2812 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2813 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2814 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2815 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2816 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2817 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2820 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2821 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2822 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2824 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2825 /// the channel being closed or not:
2826 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2827 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2828 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2829 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2830 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2831 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2832 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2834 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2835 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2836 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2837 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2839 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2841 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2842 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2843 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2846 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2847 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2848 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2849 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2850 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2853 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2854 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2855 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2856 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2857 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2860 let logger = WithContext::from(
2861 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2863 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2864 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2865 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2866 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2867 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2868 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2870 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2871 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2872 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2873 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2874 // ignore the result here.
2875 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2877 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2878 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2879 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2880 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2881 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2882 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2883 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2884 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2885 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2886 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2887 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2888 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2889 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2892 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2895 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2896 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2899 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2900 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2904 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2905 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2906 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2907 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2908 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2909 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2910 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2911 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2912 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2913 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2914 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2916 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2918 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2919 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2920 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2921 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2922 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2923 mem::drop(peer_state);
2924 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2926 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2927 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2928 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2930 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2931 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2932 // Unfunded channel has no update
2933 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2936 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2937 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2938 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2939 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2941 (None, *peer_node_id)
2943 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2946 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2947 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2948 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2949 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2950 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2951 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2952 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2953 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2954 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2960 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2963 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2964 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2965 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2966 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2967 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2968 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2969 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2970 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2971 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2972 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2973 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2974 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2985 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2986 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2987 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2989 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2990 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2991 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2994 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2995 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2996 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2998 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2999 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3000 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3001 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3002 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3005 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3006 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3007 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3008 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3009 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3013 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3014 /// local transaction(s).
3015 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3016 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3017 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3021 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3022 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3024 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3026 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3027 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3030 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3031 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3032 // TODO: update this when we support blinded forwarding as non-intro node
3033 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
3038 macro_rules! return_err {
3039 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3042 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3043 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3045 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3046 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3047 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3048 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3049 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3050 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3051 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3055 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3056 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3057 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3058 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3059 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3060 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3061 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3062 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3068 let NextPacketDetails {
3069 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3070 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3071 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3072 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3073 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3076 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3077 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3078 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3079 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3080 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3081 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3082 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3083 // phantom or an intercept.
3084 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3085 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3086 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3090 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3093 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3095 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3096 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3097 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3098 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3099 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3101 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3102 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3103 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3104 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3107 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3108 // have no consistency guarantees.
3109 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3113 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3114 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3115 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3116 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3117 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3119 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3120 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3121 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3122 // we don't have the channel here.
3123 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3125 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3127 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3128 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3129 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3130 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3131 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3132 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3133 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3134 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3135 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3136 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3137 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3139 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3142 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3143 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3145 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3146 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3153 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3155 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3156 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3158 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3159 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3160 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3161 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3162 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3164 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3165 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3171 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3172 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3173 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3174 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3176 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3177 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3179 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3180 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3181 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3183 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3184 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3185 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3186 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3187 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3188 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3189 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3193 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3195 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3198 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3199 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3200 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3201 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3202 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3203 macro_rules! return_err {
3204 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3206 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3207 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3208 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3209 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3210 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3211 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3212 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3213 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3214 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3218 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3219 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3220 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3221 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3222 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3228 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3230 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3231 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3232 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3233 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3236 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3237 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3238 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3239 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3240 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3242 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3245 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3246 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3247 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3248 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3249 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3255 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3256 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3257 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3259 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3260 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3261 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3263 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3264 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3265 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3266 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3267 return Err(LightningError {
3268 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3269 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3272 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3273 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3275 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3276 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3277 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3280 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3281 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3282 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3283 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3285 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3286 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3287 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3289 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3290 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3291 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3292 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3293 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3294 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3295 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3299 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3302 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3303 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3304 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3305 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3307 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3308 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3309 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3310 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3311 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3314 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3315 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3317 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3318 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3319 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3320 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3321 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3322 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3323 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3324 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3326 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3327 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3328 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3330 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3332 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3339 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3340 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3341 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3342 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3347 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3348 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3349 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3352 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3353 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3354 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3355 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3357 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3358 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3359 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3361 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3362 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3366 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3367 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3369 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3370 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3371 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3373 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3376 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3378 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3379 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3381 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3382 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3383 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3384 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3385 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3386 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3387 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3388 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3389 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3390 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3392 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3393 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3394 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3395 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3397 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3398 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3400 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3401 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3402 Some(monitor_update) => {
3403 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3405 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3406 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3407 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3408 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3409 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3410 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3411 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3419 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3422 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3423 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3424 // `channel_by_id` map.
3425 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3426 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3430 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3431 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3433 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3438 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3440 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3441 /// fields for more info.
3443 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3444 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3446 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3448 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3449 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3450 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3451 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3452 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3454 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3455 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3456 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3457 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3458 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3460 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3461 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3462 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3463 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3465 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3467 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3468 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3469 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3471 /// In general, a path may raise:
3472 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3473 /// node public key) is specified.
3474 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3475 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3476 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3477 /// relevant updates.
3479 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3480 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3481 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3483 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3484 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3485 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3486 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3487 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3488 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3489 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3490 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3491 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3492 self.pending_outbound_payments
3493 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3494 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3495 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3498 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3499 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3500 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3501 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3502 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3503 self.pending_outbound_payments
3504 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3505 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3506 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3507 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3511 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3512 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3513 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3514 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3515 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3516 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3520 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3521 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3522 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3526 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3527 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3530 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3531 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3532 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3533 self.pending_outbound_payments
3534 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3535 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3536 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3537 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3538 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3542 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3543 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3544 /// retries are exhausted.
3546 /// # Event Generation
3548 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3549 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3551 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3552 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3553 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3555 /// # Requested Invoices
3557 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3558 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3559 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3560 /// once the invoice has been received.
3562 /// # Restart Behavior
3564 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3565 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3566 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3568 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3569 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3570 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3571 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3574 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3575 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3576 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3577 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3578 /// never reach the recipient.
3580 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3581 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3583 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3584 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3586 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3587 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3588 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3589 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3590 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3591 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3592 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3595 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3596 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3598 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3601 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3602 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3603 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3604 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3605 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3606 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3607 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3608 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3611 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3612 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3613 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3614 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3615 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3616 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3617 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3618 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3619 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3622 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3625 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3626 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3629 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3630 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3632 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3633 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3634 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3635 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3636 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3637 let payment_params =
3638 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3640 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3642 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3645 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3646 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3648 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3649 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3650 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3651 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3653 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3654 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3655 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3656 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3657 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3658 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3659 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3660 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3661 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3662 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3664 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3665 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3666 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3667 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3671 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3673 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3674 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3677 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3679 let mut res = Vec::new();
3681 for mut path in route.paths {
3682 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3683 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3684 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3685 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3686 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3689 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3692 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3693 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3695 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3697 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3698 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3703 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3706 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3711 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3712 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3713 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3715 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3716 let used_liquidity =
3717 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3719 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3720 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3722 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3725 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3730 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3731 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3732 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3739 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3740 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3741 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3742 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3743 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3744 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3745 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3746 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3747 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3749 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3750 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3751 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3752 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3753 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3755 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3756 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3757 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3758 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3759 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3760 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3761 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3762 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3763 } else { unreachable!(); });
3765 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3766 Err((chan, err)) => {
3767 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3768 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3769 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3770 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3771 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3777 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3778 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3780 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3781 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3784 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3785 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3786 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3790 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3791 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3792 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3796 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3797 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3798 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3800 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3801 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3802 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3803 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3805 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3812 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3813 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3814 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3818 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3820 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3821 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3823 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3824 /// across the p2p network.
3826 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3827 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3829 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3830 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3831 /// keys per-channel).
3833 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3834 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3835 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3837 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3838 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3839 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3841 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3842 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3843 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3844 /// for more details.
3846 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3847 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3848 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3849 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3852 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3854 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3855 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3857 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3858 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3859 /// signature for each channel.
3861 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3862 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3863 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3864 let mut result = Ok(());
3866 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3867 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3868 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3869 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3870 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3875 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3876 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3877 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3881 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3882 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3883 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3884 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3885 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3886 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3887 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3888 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3890 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3891 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3896 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3897 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3898 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3899 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3903 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3904 match states.entry(txid) {
3905 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3906 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3907 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3911 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3914 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3915 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3916 temporary_channel_id,
3917 counterparty_node_id,
3918 funding_transaction.clone(),
3921 let mut output_index = None;
3922 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3923 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3924 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3925 if output_index.is_some() {
3926 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3927 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3930 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3933 if output_index.is_none() {
3934 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3935 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3938 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3939 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3940 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3946 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3947 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3948 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3949 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3950 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3951 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3952 .into_iter().flatten()
3953 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3955 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3956 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3958 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3960 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3961 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3962 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3963 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3964 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3966 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3967 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3968 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3972 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3973 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3979 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3981 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3982 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3983 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3984 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3986 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3987 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3989 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3990 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3992 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3994 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3995 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3996 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3997 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3998 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3999 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4000 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4001 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4002 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4003 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4004 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4005 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4006 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4010 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4011 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4012 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4013 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4014 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4015 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4016 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4017 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4018 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4019 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4023 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4024 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4025 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4026 config.apply(config_update);
4027 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4030 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4031 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4032 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4033 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4034 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4035 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4042 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4043 debug_assert!(false);
4044 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4046 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4047 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4054 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4056 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4057 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4058 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4059 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4061 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4062 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4064 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4065 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4067 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4069 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4070 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4071 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4072 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4073 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4074 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4075 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4076 pub fn update_channel_config(
4077 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4078 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4079 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4082 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4083 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4085 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4086 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4088 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4089 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4090 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4091 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4092 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4094 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4095 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4096 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4099 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4102 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4103 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4104 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4105 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4106 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4107 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4108 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4110 let next_hop_scid = {
4111 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4112 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4113 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4114 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4115 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4116 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4117 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4118 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4119 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4120 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4123 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4125 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4126 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4127 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4130 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4131 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4132 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4133 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4134 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4141 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4142 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4143 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4146 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4147 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4148 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4149 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4152 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4154 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4155 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4156 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4157 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4158 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4161 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4162 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4163 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4164 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4165 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4167 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4171 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4172 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4174 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4177 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4178 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4179 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4181 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4182 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4183 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4186 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4187 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4188 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4189 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4190 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4191 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4192 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4193 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4194 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4197 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4198 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4199 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4200 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4205 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4207 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4208 /// Will likely generate further events.
4209 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4210 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4212 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4213 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4214 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4216 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4217 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4219 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4220 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4221 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4222 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4224 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4225 match forward_info {
4226 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4227 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4228 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4229 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4230 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4233 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4234 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4235 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4236 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4238 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4239 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4240 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4241 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4242 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4243 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4244 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4245 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4248 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4249 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4251 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4254 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4255 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4261 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4262 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4264 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4268 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4269 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4271 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4275 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4276 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4277 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4278 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4279 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4280 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4281 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4284 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4285 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4286 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4287 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4288 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4290 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4292 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4293 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4297 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4298 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4299 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4300 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4301 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4302 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4304 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4305 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4311 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4314 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4317 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4318 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4319 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4320 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4321 // problem, not ours.
4327 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4328 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4329 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4331 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4335 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4336 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4337 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4338 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4339 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4342 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4343 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4344 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4345 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4346 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4347 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4348 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4349 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4350 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4351 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4352 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4353 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4354 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4357 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4358 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4359 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4360 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4361 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4362 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4363 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4364 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4365 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4366 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
4368 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4369 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4370 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4371 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4372 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4373 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4376 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4377 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4378 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4381 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4382 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4384 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4386 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4387 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4388 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4389 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4395 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4396 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4398 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4399 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4400 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4402 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4403 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4404 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4405 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4407 Some((res, htlc_id))
4410 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4411 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4412 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4413 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4415 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4417 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4418 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4419 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4425 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4429 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4430 match forward_info {
4431 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4432 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4433 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4434 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4435 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4438 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4439 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4440 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4441 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4442 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4444 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4445 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4446 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4447 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4448 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4450 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4451 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4452 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4456 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4457 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4460 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4463 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4464 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4465 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4466 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4467 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4468 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4469 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4470 phantom_shared_secret,
4473 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4474 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4475 // if routing nodes overpay
4476 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4477 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4479 total_value_received: None,
4480 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4483 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4486 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4488 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4489 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4490 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4491 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4492 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4493 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4495 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4496 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4497 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4498 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4499 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4500 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4501 phantom_shared_secret,
4504 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4505 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4507 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4510 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4511 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4512 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4513 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4514 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4517 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4518 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4519 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4520 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4521 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4522 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4524 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4525 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4526 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4528 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4529 .entry(payment_hash)
4530 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4531 .or_insert_with(|| {
4532 committed_to_claimable = true;
4534 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4537 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4538 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4539 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4540 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4542 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4543 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4544 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4546 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4547 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4548 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4551 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4553 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4554 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4555 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4556 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4557 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4558 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4559 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4560 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4561 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4562 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4564 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4566 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4567 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4568 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4569 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4570 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4571 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4573 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4574 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4575 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4576 committed_to_claimable = true;
4578 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4579 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4580 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4581 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4582 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4583 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4584 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4585 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4586 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4587 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4591 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4592 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4593 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4594 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4595 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4597 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4599 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4600 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4602 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4603 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4604 committed_to_claimable = true;
4607 payment_claimable_generated
4611 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4612 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4613 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4614 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4615 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4616 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4617 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4618 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4619 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4620 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4621 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4622 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4623 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4624 Ok(result) => result,
4626 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4627 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4630 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4631 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4632 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4633 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4634 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4635 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4638 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4639 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4640 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4642 check_total_value!(purpose);
4644 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4645 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4646 check_total_value!(purpose);
4650 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4651 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4652 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4653 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4655 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4656 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4657 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4658 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4659 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4660 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4661 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4662 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4664 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4665 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4666 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4668 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4669 if payment_claimable_generated {
4670 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4676 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4677 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4685 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4686 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4687 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4688 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4690 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4691 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4693 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4695 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4696 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4697 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4699 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4701 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4702 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4703 events.append(&mut new_events);
4706 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4708 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4709 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4710 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4712 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4714 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4715 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4716 if background_events.is_empty() {
4717 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4720 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4722 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4723 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4724 // monitor updating completing.
4725 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4727 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4728 let mut updated_chan = false;
4730 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4731 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4732 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4733 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4734 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4735 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4736 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4737 updated_chan = true;
4738 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4739 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4741 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4744 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4749 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4750 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4753 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4754 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4755 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4756 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4757 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4758 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4759 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4761 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4762 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4763 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4764 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4765 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4771 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4774 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4775 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4776 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4777 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4778 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4781 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4782 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4784 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4786 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4787 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4788 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4789 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4790 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4792 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4794 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4795 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4796 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4797 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4799 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4800 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4802 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4803 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4807 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4808 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4809 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4810 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4811 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4812 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4813 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4815 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4816 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4818 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4819 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4820 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4821 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4822 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4823 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4825 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4830 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4831 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4839 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4841 /// This currently includes:
4842 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4843 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4844 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4846 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4847 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4848 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4849 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4850 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4851 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4852 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4853 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4855 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4856 /// estimate fetches.
4858 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4859 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4860 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4861 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4862 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4864 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4865 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4867 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4868 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4869 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4870 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4872 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4873 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4874 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4875 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4876 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4877 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4879 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4880 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4881 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4883 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4884 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4885 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4886 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4887 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4888 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4889 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4890 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4891 channel_id: *chan_id,
4892 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4903 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4904 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4905 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4906 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4907 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4908 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4909 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4911 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4912 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4917 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4918 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4920 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4921 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4922 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4923 if needs_close { return false; }
4926 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4927 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4928 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4929 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4930 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4931 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4932 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4933 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4935 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4936 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4937 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4938 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4942 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4944 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4947 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4949 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4950 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4951 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4952 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4956 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4958 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4964 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4966 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4967 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4968 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4969 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4970 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4971 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4972 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4973 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4974 channel_id: *chan_id,
4975 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4983 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4984 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4985 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4987 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4988 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4989 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4994 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4995 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4996 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
4997 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4998 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4999 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5000 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5001 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5002 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5008 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5010 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5011 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5016 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5017 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5018 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5019 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5020 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5021 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5022 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5023 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5024 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5025 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5026 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5027 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5028 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5029 // have no channels to the peer.
5030 let remove_entry = {
5031 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5032 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5035 entry.remove_entry();
5038 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5043 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5044 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5045 // This should be unreachable
5046 debug_assert!(false);
5049 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5050 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5051 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5052 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5053 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5054 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5055 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5058 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5059 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5060 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5062 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5063 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5070 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5071 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5072 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5073 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5074 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5077 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5078 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5081 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5082 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5085 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5086 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5087 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5088 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5089 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5090 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5091 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5094 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5095 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5098 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5099 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5100 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5101 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5102 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5109 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5110 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5111 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5113 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5114 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5115 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5116 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5118 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5119 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5120 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5121 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5122 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5123 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5126 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5127 /// reason for the failure.
5129 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5130 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5131 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5133 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5134 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5135 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5136 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5137 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5138 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5139 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5144 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5145 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5146 match failure_code {
5147 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5148 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5149 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5150 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5151 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5152 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5154 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5155 let fail_data = match data {
5156 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5159 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5164 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5165 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5167 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5169 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5170 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5171 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5172 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5173 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5174 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5175 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5177 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5179 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5180 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5182 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5187 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5188 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5189 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5190 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5191 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5192 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5193 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5194 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5195 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5196 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5198 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5199 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5200 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5201 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5203 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5204 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5205 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5206 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5207 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5211 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5212 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5213 // be surfaced to the user.
5214 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5215 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5216 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5218 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5219 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5220 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5221 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5222 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5223 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5224 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5225 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5226 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5228 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5229 debug_assert!(false);
5230 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5233 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5235 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5238 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5239 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5240 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5241 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5245 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5246 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5247 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5248 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5249 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5250 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5251 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5252 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5253 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5254 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5257 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5258 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5259 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5262 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5263 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5264 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5266 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5267 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5268 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5269 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5270 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5272 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5273 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5274 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5277 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5278 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5279 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5281 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5282 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5283 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5284 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5285 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5287 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5289 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5290 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5292 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5293 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5297 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5298 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5300 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5304 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5305 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5306 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5307 push_forward_ev = true;
5309 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5310 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5311 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5313 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5314 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5317 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5318 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5319 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5320 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5321 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5322 failed_next_destination: destination,
5328 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5329 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5331 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5332 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5333 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5334 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5336 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5337 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5338 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5339 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5341 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5342 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5343 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5345 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5346 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5347 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5348 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5349 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5350 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5351 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5352 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5353 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5356 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5357 /// even type numbers.
5361 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5362 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5364 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5365 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5366 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5369 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5370 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5372 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5375 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5376 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5377 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5378 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5379 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5380 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5381 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5382 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5387 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5388 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5389 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5390 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5391 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5393 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5394 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5395 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5399 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5400 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5401 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5402 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5403 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5404 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5405 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5406 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5407 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5408 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5409 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5418 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5420 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5421 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5422 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5423 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5424 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5425 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5426 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5427 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5428 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5429 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5430 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5431 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5432 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5433 debug_assert!(false);
5437 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5439 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5440 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5441 debug_assert!(false);
5445 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5446 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5448 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5449 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5450 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5451 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5454 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5455 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5456 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5457 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5461 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5462 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5463 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5464 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5465 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5466 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5467 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5470 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5471 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5472 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5473 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5474 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5475 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5480 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5481 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5482 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5483 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5484 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5485 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5486 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5488 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5491 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5492 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5493 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5494 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5498 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5499 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5500 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5501 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5503 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5504 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5505 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5506 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5508 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5509 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5510 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5511 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5514 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5515 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5516 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5517 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5521 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5522 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5523 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5526 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5527 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5528 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5529 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5530 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5531 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5532 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5533 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5536 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5537 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5538 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5540 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5543 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5544 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5546 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5547 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5548 // monitor update as a background event.
5549 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5550 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5551 counterparty_node_id,
5552 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5553 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5557 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5558 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5563 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5565 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5567 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5568 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5569 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5570 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5571 blocking_action: blocker,
5573 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5575 debug_assert!(false,
5576 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5579 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5580 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5581 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5582 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5583 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5585 let mut found_blocker = false;
5586 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5587 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5588 // which case we need to only remove the one
5589 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5590 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5591 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5592 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5594 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5597 debug_assert!(false);
5606 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5607 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5608 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5614 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5615 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5616 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5617 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5618 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5619 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5620 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5621 // again on restart.
5622 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5623 payment_preimage, update_res);
5626 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5627 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5629 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5630 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5631 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5632 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5633 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5634 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5635 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5636 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5637 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5638 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5641 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5642 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5643 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5644 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5645 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5646 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5650 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5651 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5654 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5655 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5656 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5659 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5660 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5661 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5662 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5663 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5665 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5666 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5667 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5669 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5670 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5673 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5674 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5675 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5676 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5677 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5678 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5679 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5680 let chan_to_release =
5681 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5682 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5684 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5685 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5686 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5687 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5692 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5693 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5694 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5695 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5696 // in the background.
5697 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5698 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5699 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5700 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5702 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5703 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5704 funding_txo, update, ..
5706 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5707 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5708 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5709 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5711 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5717 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5718 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5719 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5721 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5722 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5724 monitor_update.updates[0],
5725 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5730 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5731 // immediately once we get going.
5732 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5735 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5737 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5740 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5741 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5742 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5743 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5744 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5745 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5749 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5750 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5751 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5754 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5755 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5757 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5758 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5759 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5760 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5762 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5766 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5767 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5768 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5774 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5775 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5776 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5779 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5780 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5781 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5782 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5784 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5786 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5787 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5788 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5790 payment_purpose: purpose,
5793 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5795 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5799 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5801 sender_intended_total_msat,
5805 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5806 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5808 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5809 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5810 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5813 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5814 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5816 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5817 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5818 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5819 Some(blocking_action),
5826 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5827 /// update completion.
5828 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5829 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5830 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5831 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5832 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5833 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5834 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5835 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5836 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5837 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5838 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5839 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5840 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5841 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5843 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5845 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5846 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5847 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5848 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5851 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5852 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5854 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5855 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5856 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5861 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5862 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5863 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5864 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5869 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5870 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5871 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5872 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5873 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5878 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5882 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5888 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5889 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5890 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5894 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5895 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5896 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5902 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5903 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5905 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5906 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5908 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5909 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5910 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5911 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5912 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5917 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5918 let mut peer_state_lock;
5919 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5920 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5921 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5922 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5924 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5927 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5928 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5929 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5930 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5931 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5934 let remaining_in_flight =
5935 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5936 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5939 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5940 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5941 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5942 remaining_in_flight);
5943 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5946 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5949 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5951 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5952 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5955 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5956 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5957 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5959 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5960 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5961 /// used to accept such channels.
5963 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5964 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5965 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5966 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5969 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5970 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5972 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5973 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5974 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5976 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5977 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5979 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5980 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5982 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5983 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5985 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5986 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5987 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5988 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5991 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5992 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5994 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5995 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5996 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5997 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5998 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5999 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6000 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6001 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6003 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6004 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6005 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6007 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6008 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6009 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6010 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6011 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6012 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6013 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
6015 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
6019 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6020 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6021 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6022 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6023 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6024 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6025 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6028 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6029 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
6031 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6032 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6033 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6034 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6035 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6036 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6037 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6038 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6041 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6042 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
6046 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6047 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6048 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6050 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6051 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6052 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6055 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6060 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6061 /// or 0-conf channels.
6063 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6064 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6065 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6066 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6067 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6068 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6070 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6071 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6072 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6073 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6074 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6075 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6076 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6080 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6083 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6084 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6086 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6087 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6089 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6090 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6091 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6092 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6093 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6095 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6098 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6099 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6100 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6103 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6104 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6109 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6112 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6113 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6114 // likely to be lost on restart!
6115 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6116 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6119 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6120 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6123 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6124 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6125 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6126 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6127 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6129 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6130 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6132 debug_assert!(false);
6133 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6135 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6136 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6138 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6139 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6140 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6141 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6142 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6143 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6145 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6146 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6147 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6150 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6151 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6152 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6153 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6154 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6157 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6158 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6160 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6163 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6164 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6165 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6166 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6167 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6168 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6169 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6170 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6171 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6173 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6174 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6175 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6180 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6181 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6182 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6183 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6184 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6185 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6186 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6189 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6194 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6195 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6196 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6198 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6199 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6202 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6203 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6205 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6206 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6207 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6209 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6213 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6214 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6215 // likely to be lost on restart!
6216 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6217 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6218 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6220 debug_assert!(false);
6221 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6223 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6224 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6225 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6226 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6227 match phase.get_mut() {
6228 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6229 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6230 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6233 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6237 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6240 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6241 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6242 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6243 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6244 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6246 user_channel_id: user_id,
6251 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6252 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6254 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6255 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6257 debug_assert!(false);
6258 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6261 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6262 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6263 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6264 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6265 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6266 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6267 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6269 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6270 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6271 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6272 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6273 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6274 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6275 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6276 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6277 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6281 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6282 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6284 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6287 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6288 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6289 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6290 "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6291 chan.context.channel_id()
6294 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6295 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6296 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6297 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6298 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6299 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6300 chan.context.channel_id()))
6302 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6303 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6304 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6305 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6306 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6308 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6309 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6310 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6311 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6312 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6313 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6314 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6319 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6320 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6321 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6323 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6327 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6328 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6329 let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6330 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6331 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6333 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6334 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6343 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6344 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6345 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6346 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6348 debug_assert!(false);
6349 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6352 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6353 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6354 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6355 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6356 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6357 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6358 let logger = WithContext::from(
6360 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6361 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6364 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6366 Ok((chan, monitor)) => {
6367 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6368 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6369 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6370 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6371 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6372 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6373 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6374 } else { unreachable!(); }
6377 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6378 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6382 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6383 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6384 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6385 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6386 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6387 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6391 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6394 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6398 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6399 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6400 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6401 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6402 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6404 debug_assert!(false);
6405 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6407 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6408 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6409 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6410 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6411 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6412 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6413 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6414 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6415 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6416 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6417 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6418 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6419 msg: announcement_sigs,
6421 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6422 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6423 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6424 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6425 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6426 // announcement_signatures.
6427 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6428 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6429 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6430 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6437 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6438 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6443 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6444 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6447 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6448 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6453 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6454 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6455 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6457 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6458 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6460 debug_assert!(false);
6461 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6463 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6464 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6465 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6466 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6468 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6469 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6470 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6471 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6473 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6476 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6477 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6478 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6479 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6481 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6482 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6483 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6484 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6485 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6486 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6490 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6491 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6492 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6493 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6496 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6497 let context = phase.context_mut();
6498 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6499 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6500 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6501 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6502 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6506 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6509 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6510 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6511 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6512 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6514 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6515 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6521 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6522 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6523 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6525 debug_assert!(false);
6526 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6528 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6529 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6530 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6531 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6532 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6533 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6534 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6535 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6536 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6537 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6538 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6543 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6544 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6545 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6546 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6547 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6548 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6549 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6551 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6552 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6555 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6558 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6559 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6560 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6561 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6563 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6564 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6565 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6566 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6567 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6571 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6573 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6574 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6575 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6580 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6581 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6582 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6583 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6585 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6586 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6587 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6588 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6590 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6591 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6593 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6594 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6595 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6597 debug_assert!(false);
6598 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6600 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6601 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6602 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6603 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6604 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6605 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6606 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6607 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6608 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6609 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6611 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6613 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6614 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6615 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6616 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6617 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6618 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6619 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6620 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6624 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6625 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6626 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6627 match pending_forward_info {
6628 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6629 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6631 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6632 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6633 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6634 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6635 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6637 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6638 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6639 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6640 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6641 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6644 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6646 _ => pending_forward_info
6649 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6650 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6652 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6653 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6656 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6661 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6663 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6664 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6665 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6667 debug_assert!(false);
6668 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6670 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6671 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6672 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6673 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6674 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6675 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6676 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6677 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6679 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6681 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6682 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6683 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6685 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6686 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6687 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6688 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6689 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6690 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6691 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6694 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6695 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6698 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6701 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6705 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6706 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6707 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6708 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6709 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6711 debug_assert!(false);
6712 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6714 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6715 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6716 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6718 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6719 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6721 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6722 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6725 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6730 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6731 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6732 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6733 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6734 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6736 debug_assert!(false);
6737 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6739 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6740 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6741 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6742 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6743 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6744 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6745 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6747 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6748 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6750 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6751 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6755 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6759 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6760 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6761 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6763 debug_assert!(false);
6764 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6766 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6767 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6768 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6769 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6770 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6771 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6772 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6773 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6774 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6775 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6776 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6780 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6781 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6784 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6789 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6790 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6791 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6792 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6793 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6794 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6795 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6796 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6797 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6798 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6799 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6801 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6802 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6804 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6805 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6806 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6807 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6808 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6809 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6811 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6812 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6813 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6815 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6816 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6817 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6818 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6819 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6820 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6821 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6822 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6823 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6826 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6827 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6829 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6830 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6831 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6832 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6833 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6834 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6835 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6836 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6837 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6838 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6839 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6842 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6843 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6844 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6849 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6850 // payments are being processed.
6851 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6852 push_forward_event = true;
6854 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6855 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6862 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6863 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6866 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6867 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6868 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6870 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6874 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6875 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6876 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6877 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6878 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6880 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6881 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6882 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6883 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6884 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6885 // real by taking more time.
6886 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6887 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6888 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6893 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6894 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6895 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6896 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6897 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6898 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6899 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6901 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6902 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6903 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6904 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6905 channel_funding_outpoint,
6906 counterparty_node_id,
6911 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6912 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6913 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6915 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6916 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6917 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6918 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6920 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6921 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6922 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6928 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6929 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6930 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6931 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6933 debug_assert!(false);
6934 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6935 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6936 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6937 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6938 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6939 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6940 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6941 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6942 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6943 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6944 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6945 *counterparty_node_id)
6947 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6948 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6949 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6950 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6951 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6952 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6953 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6957 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6958 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6961 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6964 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6968 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6969 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6970 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6972 debug_assert!(false);
6973 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6975 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6976 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6977 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6978 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6979 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6980 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6981 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6983 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6984 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6987 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6992 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6993 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6994 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6996 debug_assert!(false);
6997 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6999 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7000 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7001 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7002 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7003 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7004 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7005 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7008 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7009 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7010 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
7011 msg, &self.default_configuration
7012 ), chan_phase_entry),
7013 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7014 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7015 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7018 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7019 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7022 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7027 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7028 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7029 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7030 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7032 // It's not a local channel
7033 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7036 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7037 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7038 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7039 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7041 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7042 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7043 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7044 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7045 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7046 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7047 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7048 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7049 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7050 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7051 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7053 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7055 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7056 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7057 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7058 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7060 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7061 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7062 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7063 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7066 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7070 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7071 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7074 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7076 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7079 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7081 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7082 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7084 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7086 debug_assert!(false);
7087 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7088 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7092 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7093 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7094 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7095 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7096 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7097 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7098 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7099 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7100 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7101 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7102 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7103 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7104 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7105 let mut channel_update = None;
7106 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7107 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7108 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7111 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7112 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7113 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7114 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7115 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7116 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7117 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7122 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7123 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7124 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7125 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7126 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7127 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7131 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7132 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7135 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7136 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7138 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7139 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7140 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7141 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7142 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7143 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7145 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7146 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7147 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7148 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7149 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7150 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7151 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7152 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7153 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7154 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7155 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7156 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7157 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7158 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7159 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7160 next_funding_txid: None,
7163 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7164 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7165 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7171 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7172 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7173 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7174 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7177 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7178 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7183 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7184 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7185 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7187 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7188 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7189 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7190 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7191 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7192 match monitor_event {
7193 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7194 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7195 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7196 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7197 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7199 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7200 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7201 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7202 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7205 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7206 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7207 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7209 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7210 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7211 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7212 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7215 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7216 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7217 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7218 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7219 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7220 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7221 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7222 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7223 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7224 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7225 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7229 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7230 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7231 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7232 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7233 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7241 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7242 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7248 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7249 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7252 has_pending_monitor_events
7255 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7256 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7257 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7259 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7260 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7261 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7264 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7265 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7266 /// update was applied.
7267 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7268 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7269 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7271 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7272 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7273 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7274 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7276 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7277 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7279 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7280 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7281 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7282 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7284 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7285 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7286 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7287 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7288 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7289 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7291 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7292 has_monitor_update = true;
7294 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7295 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7296 continue 'peer_loop;
7305 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7306 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7307 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7313 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7314 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7316 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7317 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7319 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7320 #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7321 // actually finish implementing it fully.
7322 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7323 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7325 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7326 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7328 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7329 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7330 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7331 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7336 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7337 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7342 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7343 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7346 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7347 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7348 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7354 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7358 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7359 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7360 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7361 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7362 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7363 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7364 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7368 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7369 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7370 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7371 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7372 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7378 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7379 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7380 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7381 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7382 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7383 let mut has_update = false;
7384 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7386 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7388 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7389 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7390 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7391 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7392 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7394 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7395 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7396 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7397 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7398 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7400 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7401 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7404 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7405 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7406 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7408 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7409 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7410 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7411 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7412 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7417 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7419 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7420 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7421 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7427 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7428 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7433 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7439 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7440 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7443 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7444 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7450 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7451 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7453 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7454 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7455 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7456 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7457 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7458 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7459 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7460 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7461 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7462 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7463 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7464 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7465 assert!(should_broadcast);
7466 } else { unreachable!(); }
7467 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7468 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7469 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7472 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7476 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7477 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7478 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7482 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7483 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7484 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7485 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7489 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7492 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7494 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7495 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7496 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7497 &self, description: String
7498 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7499 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7500 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7501 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7502 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7503 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7505 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7506 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7510 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7511 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7515 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7516 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7518 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7519 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7520 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7523 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7524 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7525 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7527 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7528 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7532 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7533 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7534 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7535 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7539 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7540 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7544 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7545 /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7547 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7549 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7550 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7551 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7552 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7553 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7554 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7555 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7556 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7557 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7558 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7559 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7560 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7562 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7563 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7565 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7566 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7569 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7570 self.pending_outbound_payments
7571 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7572 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7574 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7579 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7580 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7581 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7583 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7584 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7585 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7586 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7587 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7588 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7589 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7591 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7592 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7596 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7597 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7600 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7601 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7602 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7606 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7607 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7608 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7609 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7613 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7614 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7615 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7619 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7620 /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7622 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7623 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7624 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7625 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7626 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7627 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7628 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7629 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7630 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7631 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7632 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7633 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7634 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7635 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7636 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7639 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7640 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7641 let builder = match quantity {
7643 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7645 let builder = match amount_msats {
7647 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7649 let builder = match payer_note {
7651 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7654 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7655 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7657 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7658 self.pending_outbound_payments
7659 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7660 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7662 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7664 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7665 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7666 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7667 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7668 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7671 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7673 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7674 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7675 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7676 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7677 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7678 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7679 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7680 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7681 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7683 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7690 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7693 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7694 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7695 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7699 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7700 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7701 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7702 /// received and no retries will be made.
7704 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7705 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7706 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7707 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7708 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7710 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7711 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7713 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7714 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7715 let payment_paths = vec![
7716 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7718 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7719 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7720 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7722 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7723 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7724 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7726 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7727 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7728 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7730 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7731 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7733 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7734 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7735 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7736 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7737 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7740 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7742 for path in refund.paths() {
7743 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7744 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7745 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7746 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7748 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7754 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7758 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7761 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7762 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7764 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7765 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7766 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7767 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7769 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7771 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7772 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7776 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7777 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7779 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7781 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7782 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7784 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7785 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7786 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7787 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7788 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7789 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7790 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7791 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7792 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7793 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7794 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7797 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7798 /// stored external to LDK.
7800 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7801 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7802 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7804 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7805 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7808 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7809 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7810 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7811 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7813 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7814 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7815 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7816 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7817 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7819 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7820 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7821 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7822 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7823 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7825 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7826 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7828 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7829 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7833 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7834 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7836 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7838 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7839 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7841 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7842 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7843 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7844 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7845 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7846 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7847 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7850 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7851 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7853 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7854 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7855 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7858 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7860 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7861 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7862 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7863 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7866 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7868 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7869 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7870 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7871 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7872 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7874 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7875 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7876 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7878 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7880 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7883 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7884 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7885 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7889 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7890 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7892 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7893 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7894 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7895 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7897 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7898 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7899 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7900 Some(_) => continue,
7901 None => return scid_candidate
7906 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7908 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7909 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7911 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7912 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7913 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7917 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7918 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7919 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7921 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7922 /// times to get a unique scid.
7923 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7924 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7925 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7927 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7928 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7929 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7930 return scid_candidate
7934 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7935 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7936 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7937 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7939 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7940 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7941 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7942 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7943 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7944 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7946 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7947 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7948 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7957 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7958 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7959 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7960 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7961 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7965 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7966 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7967 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7968 events.push_back((event, None));
7972 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7973 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7974 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7978 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7979 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7983 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7984 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7987 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7988 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7989 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7990 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7991 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7992 let logger = WithContext::from(
7993 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7996 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7997 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7998 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7999 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8000 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8001 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8002 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8003 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8005 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8009 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8010 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
8011 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8012 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8013 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8014 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8015 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8019 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
8020 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8021 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8022 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8023 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8024 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8025 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8026 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8027 if further_update_exists {
8028 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8033 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8034 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8040 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8041 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8047 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8048 for action in actions {
8050 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8051 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
8053 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
8059 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8060 /// using the given event handler.
8062 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8063 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8067 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8071 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8073 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8074 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8075 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8076 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8077 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8078 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8082 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8083 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8084 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8085 /// is always placed next to each other.
8087 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8088 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8089 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8090 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8092 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8093 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8094 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8095 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8096 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8097 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8098 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8100 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8101 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8102 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8103 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8106 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8107 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8109 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8110 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8113 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8114 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8115 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8116 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8117 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8118 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8119 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8123 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8124 events.replace(pending_events);
8133 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8135 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8136 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8137 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8138 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8139 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8140 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8144 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8146 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8147 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8148 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8150 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8154 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8156 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8157 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8158 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8159 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8160 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8161 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8165 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8167 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8168 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8169 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8170 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8171 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8174 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8175 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8178 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8179 let _persistence_guard =
8180 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8181 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8182 let new_height = height - 1;
8184 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8185 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8186 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8187 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8188 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8189 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8192 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8196 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8198 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8199 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8200 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8201 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8202 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8203 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8207 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8208 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8209 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8210 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8212 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8213 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8215 let _persistence_guard =
8216 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8217 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8218 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8219 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8221 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8222 if height < last_best_block_height {
8223 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8224 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8228 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8229 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8230 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8231 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8233 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8234 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8236 let _persistence_guard =
8237 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8238 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8239 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8241 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8243 macro_rules! max_time {
8244 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8246 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8247 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8248 // having an explicit local time source.
8249 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8250 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8251 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8252 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8253 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8259 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8260 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8261 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8262 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8266 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8267 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8268 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8269 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8270 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8271 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8272 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8273 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8274 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8275 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8276 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8283 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8284 let _persistence_guard =
8285 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8286 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8287 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8288 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8289 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8290 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8291 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8292 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8297 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8299 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8300 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8301 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8302 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8303 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8304 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8308 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8309 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8311 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8312 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8313 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8314 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8315 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8317 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8318 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8320 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8321 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8322 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8323 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8324 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8325 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8327 // Retain unfunded channels.
8328 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8329 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8330 let res = f(channel);
8331 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8332 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8333 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8334 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8335 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8337 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8338 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8339 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8340 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8341 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8342 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8343 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8344 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8349 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8354 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8355 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8358 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8359 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8360 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8361 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8362 msg: announcement_sigs,
8364 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8365 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8366 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8368 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8369 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8370 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8375 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8376 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8377 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8378 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8379 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8380 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8381 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8382 // is always consistent.
8383 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8384 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8385 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8386 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8387 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8390 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8391 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8392 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8393 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8394 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8395 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8396 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8400 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8401 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8402 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8403 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8404 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8405 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8406 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8407 data: reason_message,
8420 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8421 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8422 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8423 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8424 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8425 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8426 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8427 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8428 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8429 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8431 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8432 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8433 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8437 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8440 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8441 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8442 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8443 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8444 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8445 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8446 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8447 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8448 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8449 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8450 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8453 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8454 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8455 _ => unreachable!(),
8457 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8458 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8459 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8460 let logger = WithContext::from(
8461 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8463 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8469 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8471 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8472 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8476 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8477 /// may have events that need processing.
8479 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8480 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8482 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8483 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8484 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8485 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8488 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8489 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8490 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8493 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8494 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8495 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8498 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8499 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8500 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8501 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8504 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8505 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8506 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8507 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8510 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8511 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8513 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8514 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8515 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8516 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8517 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8520 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8521 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8522 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8523 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8526 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8527 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8528 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8529 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8532 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8533 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8534 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8535 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8538 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8539 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8540 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8541 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8545 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8546 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8548 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8549 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8550 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8551 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8552 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8553 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8557 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8558 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8559 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8560 // change to the contents.
8561 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8562 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8563 let persist = match &res {
8564 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8565 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8566 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8568 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8570 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8575 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8576 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8577 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8578 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8581 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8582 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8583 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8584 // change to the contents.
8585 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8586 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8587 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8591 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8592 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8593 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8594 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8597 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8599 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8602 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8603 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8604 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8607 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8608 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8609 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8610 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8611 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8612 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8613 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8614 let persist = match &res {
8615 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8616 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8618 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8623 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8624 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8625 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8626 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8629 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8630 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8631 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8632 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8635 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8636 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8637 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8638 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8641 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8642 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8643 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8644 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8647 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8648 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8649 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8652 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8653 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8654 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8657 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8658 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8659 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8660 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8661 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8662 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8663 let persist = match &res {
8664 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8665 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8666 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8668 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8673 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8674 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8675 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8678 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8679 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8680 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8681 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8682 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8683 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8684 let persist = match &res {
8685 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8686 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8687 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8689 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8694 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8695 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8696 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8697 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8698 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8699 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8700 let persist = match &res {
8701 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8702 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8703 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8705 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8710 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8711 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8712 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8715 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8716 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8717 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8720 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8721 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8722 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8723 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8724 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8725 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8726 let persist = match &res {
8727 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8728 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8729 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8731 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8736 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8737 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8738 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8741 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8742 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8743 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8746 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8751 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8752 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8753 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8754 let persist = match &res {
8755 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8756 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8757 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8759 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8764 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8765 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8766 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8767 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8768 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8771 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8772 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8773 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8775 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8776 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8777 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8778 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8779 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8780 let context = match phase {
8781 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8782 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8783 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8784 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8789 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8790 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8793 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8797 // Clean up for removal.
8798 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8799 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8800 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8803 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8804 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8805 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8806 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8808 // V1 Channel Establishment
8809 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8810 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8811 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8812 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8813 // V2 Channel Establishment
8814 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8815 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8816 // Common Channel Establishment
8817 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8818 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8820 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8822 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8823 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8824 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8825 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8826 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8827 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8828 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8829 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8830 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8831 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8832 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8833 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8834 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8835 // Channel Operations
8836 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8837 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8838 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8839 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8840 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8841 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8843 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8844 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8845 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8846 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8847 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8848 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8849 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8850 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8851 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8854 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8855 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8856 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8857 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8860 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8862 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8864 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8865 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8869 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8870 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8871 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8872 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8876 let mut res = Ok(());
8878 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8879 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8880 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8881 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8882 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8883 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8884 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8887 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8888 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8889 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8890 if inbound_peer_limited {
8892 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8894 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8895 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8896 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8897 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8898 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8899 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8900 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8901 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8905 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8906 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8907 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8909 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8910 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8911 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8912 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8915 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8918 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8919 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8924 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8926 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8927 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8928 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8929 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8930 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8932 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8933 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8934 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8935 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8936 // worry about closing and removing them.
8937 debug_assert!(false);
8941 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8942 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8943 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8944 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
8949 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8950 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8955 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8956 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8958 match &msg.data as &str {
8959 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8960 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8962 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8963 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8964 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8965 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8966 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8967 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8968 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8969 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8970 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8971 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8972 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8973 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8974 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8975 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8976 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8977 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8981 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8982 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8983 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8984 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8985 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8986 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8988 log_level: Level::Trace,
8998 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8999 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9000 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9001 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9002 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9003 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9004 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9005 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9006 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9007 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9008 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9010 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9011 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9012 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9016 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9017 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9018 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9019 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9020 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9021 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9022 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9023 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9024 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9025 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9033 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9034 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9038 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9039 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9042 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9043 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9046 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9047 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9050 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9051 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9052 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9053 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9056 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9057 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9058 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9059 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9062 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9063 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9064 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9065 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9068 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9069 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9070 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9071 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9074 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9075 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9076 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9077 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9080 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9081 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9082 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9083 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9086 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9087 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9088 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9089 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9092 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9093 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9094 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9095 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9098 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9099 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9100 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9101 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9105 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9106 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9108 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9109 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9110 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9111 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9112 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9113 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9117 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9118 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9119 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9122 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9123 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9126 Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
9127 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9129 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9130 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9132 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9133 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9136 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9138 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
9139 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
9140 let payment_paths = vec![
9141 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9143 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9144 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9145 payment_paths, payment_hash
9147 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9148 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9149 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9151 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9152 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9153 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9155 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9156 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9157 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9160 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
9161 let payment_paths = vec![
9162 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9164 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9165 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9166 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9167 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9168 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9170 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9171 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9172 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9174 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9175 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9177 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9178 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9179 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9180 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9182 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9183 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9187 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9188 Err(error) => Some(error),
9192 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
9196 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9197 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9199 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9201 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9202 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9205 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9206 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9207 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9214 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9215 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9221 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9222 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9226 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9227 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9228 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9229 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9230 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9234 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9235 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9237 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9238 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9239 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9240 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9241 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9244 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9245 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9246 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9247 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9250 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9251 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9252 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9253 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9256 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9257 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9258 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9259 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9262 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9263 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9264 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9265 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9266 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9267 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9268 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9269 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9270 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9271 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9272 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9273 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9274 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9275 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9276 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9277 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9278 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9279 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9280 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9281 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9286 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9287 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9289 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9290 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9291 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9292 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9295 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9296 (2, node_id, required),
9297 (4, features, required),
9298 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9299 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9300 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9301 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9304 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9305 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9306 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9307 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9308 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9309 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9310 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9311 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9312 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9313 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9314 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9315 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9316 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9317 (7, self.config, option),
9318 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9319 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9320 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9321 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9322 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9323 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9324 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9325 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9326 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9327 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9328 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9329 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9330 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9331 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9332 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9333 (32, self.is_public, required),
9334 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9335 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9336 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9337 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9338 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9344 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9345 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9346 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9347 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9348 (2, channel_id, required),
9349 (3, channel_type, option),
9350 (4, counterparty, required),
9351 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9352 (6, funding_txo, option),
9353 (7, config, option),
9354 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9355 (9, confirmations, option),
9356 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9357 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9358 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9359 (16, balance_msat, required),
9360 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9361 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9362 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9363 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9364 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9365 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9366 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9367 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9368 (26, is_outbound, required),
9369 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9370 (30, is_usable, required),
9371 (32, is_public, required),
9372 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9373 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9374 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9375 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9376 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9379 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9380 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9381 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9382 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9383 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9387 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9389 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9390 outbound_scid_alias,
9394 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9395 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9397 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9398 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9399 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9400 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9401 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9402 confirmations_required,
9404 force_close_spend_delay,
9405 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9406 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9407 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9408 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9409 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9410 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9411 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9412 channel_shutdown_state,
9417 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9418 (2, channels, required_vec),
9419 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9420 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9423 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9424 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9427 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9429 (0, onion_packet, required),
9430 (1, blinded, option),
9431 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9434 (0, payment_data, required),
9435 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9436 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9437 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9438 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9439 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9441 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9442 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9443 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9444 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9445 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9446 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9450 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9451 (0, routing, required),
9452 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9453 (4, payment_hash, required),
9454 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9455 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9456 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9457 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9461 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9462 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9464 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9466 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9467 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9468 reason.write(writer)?;
9470 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9471 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9474 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9475 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9476 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9477 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9484 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9485 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9486 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9489 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9490 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9491 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9492 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9496 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9497 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9498 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9499 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9500 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9503 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9504 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9505 // messages contained in the variants.
9506 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9507 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9508 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9510 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9511 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9512 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9513 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9514 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9517 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9518 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9519 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9520 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9521 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9523 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9528 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9533 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9534 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9535 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9538 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9539 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9540 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9541 (2, outpoint, required),
9542 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9543 (4, htlc_id, required),
9544 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9545 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9548 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9549 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9550 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9551 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9552 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9554 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9555 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9556 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9557 (2, self.value, required),
9558 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9559 (4, payment_data, option),
9560 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9561 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9562 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9563 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9569 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9570 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9571 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9572 (0, prev_hop, required),
9573 (1, total_msat, option),
9574 (2, value_ser, required),
9575 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9576 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9577 (5, total_value_received, option),
9578 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9579 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9580 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9582 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9583 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9584 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9586 if payment_data.is_some() {
9587 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9589 if total_msat.is_none() {
9590 total_msat = Some(value);
9592 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9595 if total_msat.is_none() {
9596 if payment_data.is_none() {
9597 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9599 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9601 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9605 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9608 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9609 total_value_received,
9610 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9612 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9613 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9618 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9619 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9620 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9623 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9624 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9625 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9626 let mut payment_id = None;
9627 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9628 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9629 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9630 (0, session_priv, required),
9631 (1, payment_id, option),
9632 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9633 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9634 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9635 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9637 if payment_id.is_none() {
9638 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9640 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9642 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9643 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9644 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9646 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9647 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9648 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9649 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9653 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9654 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9655 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9657 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9660 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9661 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9666 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9667 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9669 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9671 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9672 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9673 (0, session_priv, required),
9674 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9675 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9676 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9677 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9678 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9679 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9682 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9684 field.write(writer)?;
9691 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9692 (0, forward_info, required),
9693 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9694 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9695 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9696 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9699 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9700 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9701 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
9703 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
9707 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
9708 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9709 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9710 (0, htlc_id, required),
9711 (2, err_packet, required),
9714 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
9715 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
9716 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
9717 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
9718 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9719 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
9720 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9721 (0, htlc_id, required),
9722 (1, failure_code, required),
9723 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
9724 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
9732 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9733 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9734 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
9736 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
9738 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
9739 (0, htlc_id, required),
9740 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
9741 (2, err_packet, required),
9742 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
9744 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
9745 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
9746 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9748 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
9752 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9753 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
9757 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9762 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9763 (0, payment_secret, required),
9764 (2, expiry_time, required),
9765 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9766 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9767 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9770 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9772 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9773 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9774 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9775 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9776 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9777 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9781 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9782 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9784 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9786 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9788 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9789 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9790 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9793 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9795 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9796 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9797 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9798 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9799 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9800 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9801 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9804 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9805 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9809 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9811 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9812 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9813 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9814 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9815 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9816 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9819 channel.write(writer)?;
9825 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9826 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9827 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9828 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9829 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9830 for forward in pending_forwards {
9831 forward.write(writer)?;
9836 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9838 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9839 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9840 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9842 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9843 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9844 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9845 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9846 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9847 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9848 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9849 htlc.write(writer)?;
9851 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9852 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9855 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9856 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9857 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9858 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9859 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9860 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9861 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9864 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9865 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9866 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9867 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9868 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9870 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9871 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9872 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9873 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9874 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9875 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9876 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9881 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9882 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9883 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9884 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9885 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9886 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9887 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9888 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9889 0u64.write(writer)?;
9891 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9892 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9893 event.write(writer)?;
9897 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9898 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9899 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9900 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9901 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9902 0u64.write(writer)?;
9904 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9905 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9906 // likely to be identical.
9907 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9908 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9910 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9911 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9912 hash.write(writer)?;
9913 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9916 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9917 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9918 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9919 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9920 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9923 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9924 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9926 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9927 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9928 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9929 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9932 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9933 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9934 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9935 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9939 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9940 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9941 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9943 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9944 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9945 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9951 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9952 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9953 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9954 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9957 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9958 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9959 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9960 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9961 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9964 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9965 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9966 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9967 if !updates.is_empty() {
9968 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9969 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9974 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9975 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9976 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9977 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9978 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9979 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9980 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9981 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9982 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9983 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9984 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9985 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9986 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9993 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9994 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9995 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9996 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9999 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10000 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10001 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10002 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10003 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10004 // check that the event is sane here.
10005 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10006 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10007 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10008 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10014 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10015 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10016 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10017 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10018 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10019 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10022 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10023 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10024 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10025 events.push_back((ev, action));
10026 } else if action.is_some() {
10027 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10034 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10035 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10036 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10037 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10038 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10039 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10042 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10044 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10046 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10047 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10048 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10049 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10050 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10051 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10052 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10053 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10054 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10055 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10056 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10057 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10058 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10060 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10061 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10063 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10064 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10066 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10067 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10068 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10069 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10070 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10071 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10073 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10074 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10076 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10077 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10078 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10079 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10080 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10081 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10085 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10086 pub entropy_source: ES,
10088 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10089 pub node_signer: NS,
10091 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10092 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10094 pub signer_provider: SP,
10096 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10098 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10099 pub fee_estimator: F,
10100 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10102 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10103 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10104 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10105 pub chain_monitor: M,
10107 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10108 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10109 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10110 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10111 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10112 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10114 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10116 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10117 /// deserialization.
10119 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10120 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10121 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10123 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10124 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10126 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10127 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10128 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10129 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10131 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10134 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10135 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10138 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10139 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10141 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10142 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10143 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10144 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10145 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10146 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10150 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10151 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10152 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10153 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10154 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10156 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10157 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10162 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10163 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10164 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10165 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10167 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10168 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10169 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10170 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10171 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10172 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10176 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10177 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10178 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10182 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10183 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10185 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10186 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10187 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10188 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10189 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10190 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10194 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10195 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10197 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10198 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10199 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10201 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10203 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10204 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10205 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10206 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10207 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10208 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10209 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10210 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10211 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10212 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10214 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10215 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10216 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10217 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10218 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10219 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10220 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10221 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10222 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10223 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10224 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10225 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10226 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10227 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10229 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10230 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10231 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10233 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10234 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10235 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10237 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10238 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10239 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10241 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10242 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10243 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10245 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10246 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10247 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10250 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10251 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10252 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10253 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10254 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10255 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10256 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10258 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10259 let mut found_htlc = false;
10260 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10261 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10264 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10265 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10266 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10267 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10268 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10269 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10270 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10272 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10273 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10274 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10278 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10279 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10280 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10281 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10282 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10284 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10285 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10287 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10288 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10289 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10290 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10292 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10293 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10294 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10295 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10299 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10300 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10301 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10302 // safely discard the channel.
10303 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10304 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10305 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10306 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10307 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10308 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10309 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10312 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10313 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10314 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10315 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10316 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10317 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10321 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10322 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10323 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10324 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10325 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10326 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10327 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10328 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10330 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10334 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10335 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10336 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10337 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10338 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10339 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10340 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10341 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10342 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10344 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10347 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10348 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10349 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10350 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10351 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10352 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10353 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10354 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10356 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10359 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10362 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10363 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10364 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10365 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10366 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10367 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10368 is_connected: false,
10372 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10373 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10374 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10375 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10376 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10377 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10378 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10379 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10382 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10383 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10384 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10385 for _ in 0..event_count {
10386 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10387 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10392 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10393 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10394 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10396 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10397 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10398 // on-startup monitor updates.
10399 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10400 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10402 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10406 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10407 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10409 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10410 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10411 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10412 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10413 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10417 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10418 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10419 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10420 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10421 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10422 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10423 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10425 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10426 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10430 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10431 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10432 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10433 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10434 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10435 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10436 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10437 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10438 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10439 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10440 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10441 let mut events_override = None;
10442 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10443 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10444 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10445 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10446 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10447 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10448 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10449 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10450 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10451 (8, events_override, option),
10452 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10453 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10454 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10455 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10457 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10458 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10461 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10462 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10465 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10466 pending_events_read = events;
10469 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10470 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10473 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10474 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10475 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10476 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10477 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10478 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10480 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10482 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10483 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10484 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10487 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10488 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10489 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10490 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10491 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10493 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10494 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10495 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10497 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10498 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10499 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10500 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10501 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10503 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10504 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10505 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10506 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10507 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10508 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10509 pending_background_events.push(
10510 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10511 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10512 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10513 update: update.clone(),
10516 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10517 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10518 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10519 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10520 pending_background_events.push(
10521 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10522 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10523 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10526 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10527 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10528 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10530 max_in_flight_update_id
10534 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10535 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10536 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10537 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10538 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10539 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10541 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10543 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10544 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10545 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10546 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10547 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10548 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10549 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10550 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10551 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10554 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10555 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10556 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10557 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10558 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10559 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10560 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10561 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10562 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10563 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10564 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10567 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10568 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10569 debug_assert!(false);
10570 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10575 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10576 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10577 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10578 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10579 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10580 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10581 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10582 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10583 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10585 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10586 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10587 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10589 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10590 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10591 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10592 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10593 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10594 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10595 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10596 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10601 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10602 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10604 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10605 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10606 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10607 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10610 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10611 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10612 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10613 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10614 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10615 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10616 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10618 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10619 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10620 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10621 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10622 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10623 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10624 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10625 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10626 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10629 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10630 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10631 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10632 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10633 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10634 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10635 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10636 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10639 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10640 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10641 retry_strategy: None,
10642 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10643 payment_params: None,
10644 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10645 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10646 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10647 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10648 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10649 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10650 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10651 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10652 total_msat: path_amt,
10653 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10654 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10656 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10657 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10662 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10663 match htlc_source {
10664 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10665 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10666 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10667 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10669 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10670 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10671 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10672 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10673 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10674 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10675 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10676 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10677 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10678 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10679 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10684 !forwards.is_empty()
10686 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10687 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10688 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10689 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10690 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10691 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10692 intercepted_id != ev_id
10699 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10700 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10701 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10702 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10703 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10704 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10705 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10706 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10707 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10708 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10709 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10711 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10712 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10713 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10715 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10716 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10717 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10724 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10725 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10727 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10729 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10730 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10731 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10732 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10733 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10734 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10735 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10736 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10737 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10738 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10741 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10742 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10743 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10744 // channel still live case here.
10748 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10749 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10754 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10755 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10756 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10757 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10758 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10759 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10760 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10761 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10765 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10766 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10768 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10769 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10770 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10771 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10773 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10774 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10775 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10777 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10778 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10780 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10781 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10783 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10786 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10787 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10788 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10790 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10794 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10795 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10796 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10797 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10798 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10800 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10801 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10802 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10803 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10804 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10805 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10806 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10807 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10809 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10810 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10814 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10816 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10818 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10819 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10821 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10822 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10827 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10828 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10830 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10832 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10834 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10835 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10836 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10837 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10841 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10842 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10843 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10844 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10845 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10846 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10847 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10848 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10849 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10851 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10852 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10853 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10855 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10856 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10857 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10858 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10859 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10860 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10862 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10863 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10864 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10865 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10866 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10867 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10871 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10872 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10873 debug_assert!(false);
10874 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10879 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10881 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10882 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10883 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10884 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10885 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10886 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10887 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10888 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10889 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10890 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10891 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10893 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10894 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10896 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10897 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10898 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10899 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10901 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10902 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10903 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10904 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10906 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10907 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10908 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10909 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10911 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10912 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10913 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10914 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10915 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10916 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10917 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10918 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
10921 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10922 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10925 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10928 purpose: payment.purpose,
10929 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10930 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10931 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10937 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10938 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10939 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10940 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
10941 for action in actions.iter() {
10942 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10943 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10944 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10946 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10948 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10949 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10950 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10951 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10952 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10954 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10955 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10956 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10957 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10961 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10962 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10966 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10968 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10969 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10973 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10975 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10976 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10977 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10978 router: args.router,
10980 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10982 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10983 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10984 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10985 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10987 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10988 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10989 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10990 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10991 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10992 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10994 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10996 our_network_pubkey,
10999 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11001 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11003 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11004 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11005 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11006 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11007 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11009 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11010 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11012 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11014 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11016 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11017 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11018 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11020 logger: args.logger,
11021 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11024 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11025 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11026 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11027 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11028 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11031 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11032 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11033 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11034 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11035 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
11036 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
11039 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11040 //connection or two.
11042 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11048 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11049 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11050 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11051 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11052 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11053 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11054 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11055 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11056 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11057 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11058 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11059 use crate::prelude::*;
11060 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11061 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11062 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11063 use crate::util::test_utils;
11064 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11065 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11068 fn test_notify_limits() {
11069 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11070 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11071 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11072 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11073 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11074 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11076 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11077 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11078 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11079 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11080 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11082 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11084 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11085 // to connect messages with new values
11086 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11087 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11088 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11089 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11090 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11091 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11093 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11094 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11095 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11096 // ... but the last node should not.
11097 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11098 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11099 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11100 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11102 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11103 // about the channel.
11104 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11105 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11106 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11108 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11110 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11111 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11112 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11113 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11114 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11115 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11117 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11118 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11119 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11121 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11122 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11123 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11124 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11125 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11126 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11128 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11129 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11130 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11131 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11132 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11133 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11134 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11135 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11137 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11138 // the channel info has updated.
11139 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11140 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11141 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11142 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11143 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11144 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11148 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11149 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11151 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11152 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11153 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11154 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11155 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11157 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11158 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11159 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11160 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11162 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11163 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11164 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11165 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11166 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11167 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11168 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11169 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11171 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11172 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11173 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11175 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11176 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11177 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11179 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11180 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11181 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11182 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11183 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11185 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11186 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11187 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11189 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11190 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11191 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11192 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11193 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11194 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11195 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11196 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11197 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11199 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11200 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11201 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11203 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11205 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11207 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11208 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11209 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11210 // lightning messages manually.
11211 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11212 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11215 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11216 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11217 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11218 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11220 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11221 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11223 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11224 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11226 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11227 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11228 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11230 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11231 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11232 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11234 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11236 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11238 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11239 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11242 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11243 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11244 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11245 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11247 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11248 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11249 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11250 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11255 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11256 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11257 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11258 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11265 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11266 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11267 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11270 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11271 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11272 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11273 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11274 // fails as expected.
11275 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11276 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11277 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11278 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11279 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11280 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11281 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11282 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11283 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11284 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11285 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11286 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11287 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11288 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11289 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11291 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11292 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11293 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11295 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11296 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11297 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11298 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11299 let route = find_route(
11300 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11301 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11303 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11304 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11306 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11307 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11308 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11309 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11310 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11312 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11313 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11314 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11315 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11316 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11318 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11319 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11320 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11321 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11322 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11323 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11324 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11325 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11326 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11328 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11329 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11331 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11332 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11333 let route = find_route(
11334 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11335 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11337 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11338 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11340 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11341 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11342 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11343 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11344 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11346 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11347 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11348 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11349 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11351 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11352 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11353 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11354 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11355 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11357 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11358 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11359 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11361 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11362 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11363 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11364 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11365 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11366 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11367 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11368 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11369 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11371 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11372 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11374 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11375 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11376 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11377 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11379 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11380 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11381 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11382 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11383 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11385 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11386 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11387 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11390 let route = find_route(
11391 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11392 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11394 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11395 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11396 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11398 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11399 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11400 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11401 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11402 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11404 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11405 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11406 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11408 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11409 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11410 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11411 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11412 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11413 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11414 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11415 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11416 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11418 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11419 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11423 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11424 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11425 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11426 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11427 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11428 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11429 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11431 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11432 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11434 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11435 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11436 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11437 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11438 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11439 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11440 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11441 let route = find_route(
11442 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11443 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11446 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11447 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11448 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11449 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11450 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11451 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11454 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11455 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11456 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11457 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11458 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11459 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11460 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11462 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11466 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11467 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11468 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11469 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11470 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11471 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11472 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11473 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11474 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11476 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11477 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11479 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11480 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11481 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11482 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11483 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11484 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11485 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11486 let route = find_route(
11487 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11488 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11491 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11492 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11493 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11494 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11495 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11496 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11497 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11498 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11501 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11502 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11503 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11504 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11505 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11506 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11507 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11509 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11513 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11514 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11515 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11516 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11517 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11519 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11520 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11521 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11522 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11524 // Marshall an MPP route.
11525 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11526 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11527 route.paths.push(path);
11528 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11529 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11530 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11531 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11532 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11533 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11535 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11536 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11538 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11539 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11541 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11546 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11547 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11548 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11549 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11550 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11552 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11554 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11555 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11557 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11558 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11560 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11563 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11564 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11565 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11566 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11567 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11568 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11571 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11574 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11575 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11580 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11581 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11582 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11583 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11584 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11585 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11587 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11588 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11590 total_msat: 100_000,
11593 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11594 // payment verification fails as expected.
11595 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11596 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11597 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11598 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11600 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11604 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11605 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11609 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11610 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11611 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11612 // the channel is successfully closed.
11613 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11614 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11615 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11616 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11618 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11619 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11620 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11621 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11622 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11624 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11625 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11627 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11628 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11629 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11630 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11633 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11635 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11636 // as it has the funding transaction.
11637 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11638 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11639 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11642 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11644 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11646 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11648 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11649 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11650 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11652 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11655 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11656 // as it has the funding transaction.
11657 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11658 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11659 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11662 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11663 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11665 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11666 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11667 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11668 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11670 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11671 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11672 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11673 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11675 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11676 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11678 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11679 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11680 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11681 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11682 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11683 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11684 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11688 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11689 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11690 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11691 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11692 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11693 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11694 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11697 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11699 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11700 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11701 // closing transaction).
11702 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11703 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11704 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11706 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11707 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11708 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11709 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11710 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11713 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11715 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11717 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11718 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11719 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11721 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11723 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11724 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11727 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11728 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11729 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11732 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11733 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11734 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11737 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11738 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11739 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11742 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11743 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11744 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11747 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11749 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11750 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11752 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11753 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11755 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11756 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11761 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11762 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11763 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11764 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11765 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11766 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11767 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11768 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11771 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11772 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11773 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11775 // Test the API functions.
11776 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11778 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11780 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11782 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11784 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11786 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11788 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11792 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11793 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11794 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11795 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11796 // the given `channel_id`.
11797 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11798 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11799 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11800 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11802 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11805 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11807 // Test the API functions.
11808 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11810 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11812 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11814 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11816 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11818 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11822 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11823 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11824 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11825 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11826 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11827 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11829 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11831 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11832 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11834 let mut funding_tx = None;
11835 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11836 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11837 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11840 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11841 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11842 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11843 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11844 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11846 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11848 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11850 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11852 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11854 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11856 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11859 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11860 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11861 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11862 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11863 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11865 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11866 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11868 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11869 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11870 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11871 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11872 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11873 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11874 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11877 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11878 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11879 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11880 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11881 }, true).unwrap_err();
11883 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11884 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11885 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11886 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11887 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11888 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11889 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11891 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11892 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11894 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11895 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11896 }, true).unwrap_err();
11898 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11899 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11900 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11901 }, false).unwrap();
11902 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11904 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11905 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11907 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11908 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11909 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11910 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11911 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11913 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11914 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11915 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11917 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11918 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11919 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11921 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11922 // "protected" and can connect again.
11923 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11924 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11925 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11927 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11929 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11931 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11932 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11936 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11937 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11938 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11939 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11940 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11941 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11943 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11945 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11946 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11948 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11949 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11950 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11951 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11954 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11956 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11957 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11958 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11960 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11961 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11962 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11964 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11965 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11966 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11967 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11971 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11972 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11973 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11974 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11975 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11976 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11977 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11978 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11979 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11981 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11983 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11984 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11986 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11987 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11988 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11989 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11990 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11991 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11994 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11995 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11997 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11998 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12000 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12002 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12003 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12006 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12007 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12008 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12009 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12010 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12012 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12013 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12015 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12016 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12017 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12018 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12022 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12024 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12025 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12027 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12028 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12029 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12031 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12032 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12034 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12036 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12040 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12041 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12042 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12043 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12044 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12045 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12046 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12047 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12049 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
12050 payment_metadata: None,
12051 keysend_preimage: None,
12052 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12053 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12055 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12057 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12058 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12059 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12060 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
12061 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12062 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12063 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12065 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12066 } else { panic!(); }
12068 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12069 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12071 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
12072 payment_metadata: None,
12073 keysend_preimage: None,
12074 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12075 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12077 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12079 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12080 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12081 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12082 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12086 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12087 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12088 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12089 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12090 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12092 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12093 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12095 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
12096 payment_metadata: None,
12097 keysend_preimage: None,
12098 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12099 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12101 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12102 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12103 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12105 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12106 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12107 // is not satisfied.
12108 assert!(result.is_ok());
12112 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12113 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12114 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12115 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12116 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12118 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12119 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12121 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12122 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12123 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12124 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12125 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12127 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12128 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12130 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12131 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12132 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12133 match &msg_events[0] {
12134 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12135 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12137 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12138 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12139 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12142 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12145 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12146 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12148 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12149 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12150 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12152 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12156 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12157 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12158 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12159 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12160 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12161 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12162 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12163 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12164 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12165 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12166 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12168 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12169 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12170 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12172 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12173 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12175 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12176 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12181 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12182 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12184 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12185 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12187 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12188 // not have generated any events.
12189 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12193 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12194 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12195 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12196 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12197 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12198 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12199 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12200 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12202 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12203 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12206 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12207 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12208 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12209 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12210 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12212 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12213 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12216 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12217 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12218 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12220 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12221 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12222 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12223 ..Default::default()
12225 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12226 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12227 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12229 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12230 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12233 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12234 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12235 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12236 ..Default::default()
12238 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12239 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12240 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12241 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12243 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12244 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12247 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12248 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12249 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12250 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12251 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12254 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12255 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12256 ..Default::default()
12258 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12261 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12262 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12263 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12264 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12268 fn test_payment_display() {
12269 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12270 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12271 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12272 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12273 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12274 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12278 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12279 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12280 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12281 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12282 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12283 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12285 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12286 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12287 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12288 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12289 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12290 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12291 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12292 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12294 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12295 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12296 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12299 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12300 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12302 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12303 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12305 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12306 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12307 }, false).unwrap();
12308 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12309 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12310 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12312 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12314 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12315 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12316 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12317 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12318 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12319 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12320 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12321 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12322 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12323 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12324 } else { panic!() };
12325 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12326 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12327 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12328 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12330 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12332 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12333 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12334 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12339 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12340 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12341 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12342 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12345 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12346 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12347 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12349 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12350 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12352 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12353 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12356 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12357 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12358 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12360 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12364 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12365 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12366 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12368 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12373 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12374 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
12375 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12376 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12378 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12379 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12380 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12382 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12384 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12385 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12386 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12387 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12389 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12390 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12392 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12398 use crate::chain::Listen;
12399 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12400 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12401 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12402 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12403 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12404 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12405 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12406 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12407 use crate::util::test_utils;
12408 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12410 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12411 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12412 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12413 use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12415 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12417 use criterion::Criterion;
12419 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12420 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12421 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12422 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12423 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12424 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12425 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12427 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12428 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12430 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12431 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12433 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12435 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12438 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12439 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12442 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12443 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12444 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12446 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12447 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12449 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12450 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12451 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12452 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12453 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12455 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12456 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12457 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12459 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12460 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12461 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12462 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12464 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12465 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12466 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12468 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12469 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12470 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12471 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12472 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12474 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12475 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12476 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12478 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12479 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12481 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12482 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12483 }, false).unwrap();
12484 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12485 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12486 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12489 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12490 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12491 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12493 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12494 } else { panic!(); }
12496 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12497 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12498 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12499 match events_b[0] {
12500 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12501 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12503 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12506 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12507 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12508 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12509 match events_a[0] {
12510 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12511 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12513 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12516 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12518 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12519 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12520 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12522 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12523 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12524 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12525 match msg_events[0] {
12526 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12527 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12528 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12532 match msg_events[1] {
12533 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12537 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12538 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12539 match events_a[0] {
12540 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12541 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12543 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12546 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12547 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12548 match events_b[0] {
12549 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12550 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12552 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12555 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12556 macro_rules! send_payment {
12557 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12558 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12559 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12560 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12561 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12562 payment_count += 1;
12563 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12564 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12566 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12567 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12568 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12569 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12570 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12571 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12572 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12573 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12574 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12575 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12576 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12578 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12579 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12580 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12581 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12583 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12584 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12585 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12586 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12587 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12589 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12592 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12593 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12594 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12595 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12597 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12601 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12602 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12603 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);