1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysInterface, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, Sign, SignerProvider};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
61 use crate::util::events;
62 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
63 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
64 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
65 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
66 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
69 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
74 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
75 use core::time::Duration;
78 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
79 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::PaymentSendFailure;
81 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
83 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
84 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
85 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
87 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
88 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
89 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
90 // before we forward it.
92 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
93 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
94 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
95 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
96 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
101 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
102 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
103 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
104 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
112 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
113 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
119 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
120 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
121 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
122 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
123 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
124 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
129 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
130 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
133 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
136 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
137 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
140 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
141 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
143 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
144 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
145 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
148 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
149 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
151 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
152 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
155 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
156 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
159 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
163 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
164 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
165 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
166 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
167 short_channel_id: u64,
169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
170 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
172 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
173 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
178 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
180 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
181 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
182 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
184 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
185 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
188 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
189 struct ClaimableHTLC {
190 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
192 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
194 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
196 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
200 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
205 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
206 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
211 impl Readable for PaymentId {
212 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
213 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
218 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
219 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
220 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
221 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
223 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
224 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
229 impl Readable for InterceptId {
230 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
231 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
235 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
236 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
237 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
238 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
239 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
242 session_priv: SecretKey,
243 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
244 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
245 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
246 payment_id: PaymentId,
247 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
248 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
251 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
252 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
253 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
255 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
257 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
259 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
262 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
263 payment_id.hash(hasher);
264 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
265 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
266 payment_params.hash(hasher);
271 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
274 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
275 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
277 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
278 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
279 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
280 payment_secret: None,
281 payment_params: None,
286 struct ReceiveError {
292 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
294 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
295 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
296 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
297 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
298 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
300 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
301 err: msgs::LightningError,
302 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
303 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
305 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
307 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
309 err: LightningError {
311 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
312 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
319 shutdown_finish: None,
323 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
325 err: LightningError {
327 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
330 shutdown_finish: None,
334 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
335 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
338 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
340 err: LightningError {
342 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
343 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
349 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
350 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
354 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
357 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
359 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
360 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
364 log_level: Level::Warn,
367 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
369 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
371 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
373 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
374 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
382 shutdown_finish: None,
387 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
388 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
389 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
390 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
391 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
393 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
394 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
395 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
396 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
397 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
398 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
399 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
401 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
405 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
406 struct ClaimingPayment {
408 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
409 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
411 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
412 (0, amount_msat, required),
413 (2, payment_purpose, required),
414 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
417 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
418 struct ClaimablePayments {
419 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
420 /// failed/claimed by the user.
422 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
423 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
425 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
426 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
427 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
429 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
430 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
431 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
432 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
435 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
436 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
437 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
438 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
439 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
440 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
443 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
444 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
445 /// quite some time lag.
446 enum BackgroundEvent {
447 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
448 /// commitment transaction.
449 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
452 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
453 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
454 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
455 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
456 /// event can be generated.
457 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
458 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
459 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
462 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
463 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
465 latest_features: InitFeatures,
468 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
469 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
471 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
474 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
475 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
476 struct PendingInboundPayment {
477 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
478 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
479 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
480 /// this payment being removed.
482 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
483 user_payment_id: u64,
484 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
485 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
486 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
489 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
490 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
491 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
492 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
493 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
494 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
495 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
497 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
498 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
500 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
501 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
502 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
503 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
504 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
505 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
506 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
507 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
509 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
510 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
512 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
513 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
515 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
516 /// to individual Channels.
518 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
519 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
520 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
521 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
523 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
524 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
525 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
526 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
527 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
528 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
529 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
531 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
532 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
533 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
534 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
537 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
538 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
539 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
540 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
541 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
543 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
544 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
545 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
546 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
547 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
550 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
551 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
552 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
553 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
554 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
558 // `total_consistency_lock`
560 // |__`forward_htlcs`
562 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
564 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
566 // | |__`claimable_payments`
568 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
570 // | |__`channel_state`
574 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
576 // | |__`per_peer_state`
578 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
582 // | |__`pending_events`
584 // | |__`pending_background_events`
586 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
587 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
588 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
589 K::Target: KeysInterface,
590 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
593 default_configuration: UserConfig,
594 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
595 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
599 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
601 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
603 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
604 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
606 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
607 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
608 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
609 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
610 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
612 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
613 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
614 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
615 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
617 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
618 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
620 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
621 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
622 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
623 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
624 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
625 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
626 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
627 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
629 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
631 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
632 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
634 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
636 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
637 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
638 /// and via the classic SCID.
640 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
641 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
643 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
645 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
647 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
648 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
649 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
651 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
652 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
654 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
655 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
657 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
658 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
660 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
661 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
662 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
663 /// active channel list on load.
665 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
666 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
668 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
670 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
671 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
672 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
674 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
675 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
676 /// the handling of the events.
679 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
680 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
681 /// would break backwards compatability.
682 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
683 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
684 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
686 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
687 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
689 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
691 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
692 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
693 /// confirmation depth.
695 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
696 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
697 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
699 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
701 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
703 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
705 our_network_key: SecretKey,
706 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
708 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
710 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
711 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
712 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
714 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
715 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
717 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
718 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
719 /// keeping additional state.
720 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
722 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
723 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
724 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
725 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
727 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
728 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
729 /// are currently open with that peer.
730 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
731 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
734 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
735 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
737 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
738 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
739 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
740 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
741 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
742 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
743 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
744 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
745 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
746 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
747 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
749 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
756 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
758 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
759 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
760 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
761 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
762 pub struct ChainParameters {
763 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
764 pub network: Network,
766 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
768 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
769 pub best_block: BestBlock,
772 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
778 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
779 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
780 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
781 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
782 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
783 /// updates are ready for persistence).
785 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
786 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
787 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
788 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
789 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
791 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
792 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
795 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
796 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
797 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
800 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
801 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
803 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
804 persistence_notifier: notifier,
805 should_persist: persist_check,
806 _read_guard: read_guard,
811 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
813 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
814 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
819 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
820 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
822 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
824 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
825 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
826 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
827 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
828 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
830 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
831 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
833 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
835 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
836 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
837 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
838 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
839 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
840 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
841 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
842 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
843 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
844 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
845 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
846 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
847 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
849 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
850 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
852 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
853 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
854 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
855 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
857 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
858 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
859 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
860 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
861 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
862 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
865 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
867 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
868 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
871 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
873 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
874 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
876 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
877 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
878 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
879 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
881 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
882 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
883 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
884 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
885 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
886 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
887 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
888 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
889 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
890 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
891 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
894 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
895 /// to better separate parameters.
896 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
897 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
898 /// The node_id of our counterparty
899 pub node_id: PublicKey,
900 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
901 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
902 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
903 pub features: InitFeatures,
904 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
905 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
906 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
908 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
910 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
911 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
912 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
913 /// payments to us through this channel.
914 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
915 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
916 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
917 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
918 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
919 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
920 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
923 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
924 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
925 pub struct ChannelDetails {
926 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
927 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
928 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
929 /// lifetime of the channel.
930 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
931 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
932 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
933 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
934 /// our counterparty already.
936 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
937 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
938 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
939 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
941 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
942 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
943 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
944 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
946 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
947 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
949 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
950 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
952 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
953 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
954 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
955 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
956 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
957 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
958 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
959 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
960 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
963 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
965 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
966 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
967 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
968 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
969 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
970 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
971 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
973 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
974 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
976 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
977 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
978 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
979 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
980 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
981 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
982 /// this value on chain.
984 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
986 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
988 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
989 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
990 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
991 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
993 pub user_channel_id: u128,
994 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
995 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
996 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
998 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
999 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1000 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1001 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1003 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1004 pub balance_msat: u64,
1005 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1006 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1007 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1008 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1010 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1012 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1013 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1014 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1015 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1016 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1017 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1018 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1019 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1021 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1022 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1023 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1024 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1025 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1026 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1027 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1029 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1030 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1031 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1032 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1033 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1034 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1035 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1036 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1037 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1039 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1041 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1042 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1043 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1044 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1045 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1047 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1048 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1049 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1050 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1051 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1052 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1053 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1055 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1056 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1057 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1058 pub is_outbound: bool,
1059 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1060 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1061 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1062 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1063 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1065 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1066 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1067 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1068 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1070 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1071 pub is_usable: bool,
1072 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1073 pub is_public: bool,
1074 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1075 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1076 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1077 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1078 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1079 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1081 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1082 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1085 impl ChannelDetails {
1086 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1087 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1088 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1090 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1091 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1092 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1093 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1096 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1097 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1098 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1100 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1101 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1102 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1103 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1107 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1109 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1111 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1112 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1113 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1114 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1116 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1117 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1118 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1121 macro_rules! handle_error {
1122 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1125 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1126 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1128 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1129 // entering the macro.
1130 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1131 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1134 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1136 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1137 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1138 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1139 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1143 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1144 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1145 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1146 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1151 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1152 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1154 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1155 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1156 action: err.action.clone()
1160 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1161 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1164 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1171 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1172 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1173 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1174 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1175 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1176 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1178 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1179 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1180 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1181 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1182 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1184 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1185 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1187 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1191 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1192 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1193 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1195 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1196 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1198 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1199 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1201 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1202 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1203 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1204 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1205 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1206 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1212 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1213 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1217 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1219 $entry.remove_entry();
1227 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1228 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1232 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1234 $entry.remove_entry();
1242 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1243 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1245 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1246 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1252 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1253 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1255 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1256 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1257 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1258 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1259 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1260 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1261 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1262 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1263 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1264 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1265 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1266 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1267 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1268 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1271 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1272 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1273 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1274 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1275 match $action_type {
1276 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1277 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1279 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1280 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1282 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1283 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1284 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1285 if !$resend_commitment {
1286 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1289 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1291 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1292 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1294 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1299 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1300 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1302 $entry.remove_entry();
1306 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1307 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1308 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1310 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1311 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1313 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1314 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1316 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1317 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1319 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1320 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1324 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1325 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1326 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1327 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1328 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1330 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1331 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1332 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1333 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1334 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1335 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1336 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1337 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1338 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1339 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1344 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1345 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1346 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1348 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1349 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1350 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1351 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1352 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1353 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1356 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1361 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1362 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1363 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1364 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1365 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1368 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1370 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1371 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1373 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1375 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1376 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1377 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1378 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1379 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1380 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1381 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1382 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1384 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1385 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1386 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1390 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1392 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1393 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1394 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1396 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1397 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1398 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1399 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1400 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1401 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1402 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1403 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1405 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1406 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1409 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1410 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1412 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1414 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1416 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1418 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1419 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1420 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1421 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1429 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1430 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1431 &self.default_configuration
1434 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1435 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1436 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1439 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1440 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1442 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1444 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1448 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1453 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1455 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1456 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1457 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1458 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1459 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1461 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1462 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1464 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1465 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1466 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1468 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1469 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1470 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1471 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1472 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1473 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1475 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1476 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1477 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1478 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1479 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1480 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1484 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1485 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1486 Some(peer_state) => {
1487 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1488 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1489 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1490 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1491 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1492 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1493 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1497 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1502 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1505 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1507 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1508 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1509 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1511 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1512 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1513 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1514 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1516 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1518 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1521 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1523 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1524 node_id: their_network_key,
1527 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1530 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1531 let mut res = Vec::new();
1533 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1534 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1535 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1536 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1537 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1538 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1539 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1540 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1541 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1542 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1543 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1544 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1545 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1546 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1547 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1548 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1549 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1550 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1551 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1552 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1553 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1554 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1556 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1557 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1558 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1559 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1560 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1561 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1562 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1563 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1564 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1565 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1566 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1567 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1568 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1569 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1570 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1571 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1572 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1573 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1574 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1575 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1576 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1577 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1578 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1579 config: Some(channel.config()),
1583 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1584 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1585 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1586 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1592 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1593 /// more information.
1594 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1595 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1598 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1599 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1601 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1602 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1605 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1606 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1607 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1608 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1609 // really wanted anyway.
1610 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1613 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1614 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1615 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1616 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1617 Some(transaction) => {
1618 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1622 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1623 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1624 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1625 reason: closure_reason
1629 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1630 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1632 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1633 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1634 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1635 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1636 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1637 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1638 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1639 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1641 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1642 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1643 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1644 Some(peer_state) => {
1645 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1646 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1647 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1649 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1652 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1654 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1655 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1656 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1657 let (result, is_permanent) =
1658 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1660 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1665 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1666 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1670 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1671 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1672 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1673 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1677 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1681 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1685 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1686 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1687 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1688 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1691 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1695 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1696 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1697 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1699 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1700 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1702 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1703 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1704 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1705 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1707 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1709 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1710 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1711 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1712 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1713 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1716 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1717 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1718 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1720 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1721 /// the channel being closed or not:
1722 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1723 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1724 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1725 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1726 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1727 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1728 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1730 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1732 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1733 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1734 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1735 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1736 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1740 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1741 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1742 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1743 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1744 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1745 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1746 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1747 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1749 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1750 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1751 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1752 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1753 // ignore the result here.
1754 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1758 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1759 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1760 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1761 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1763 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1764 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1765 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1766 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1767 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1769 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1770 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1772 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1774 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1776 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1779 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1780 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1781 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1782 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1783 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1788 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1791 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1792 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1793 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1794 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1795 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1796 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1797 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1798 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1799 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1809 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1810 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1811 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1813 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1814 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1815 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1818 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1819 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1820 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1822 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1823 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1824 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1825 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1826 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1829 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1830 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1831 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1832 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1833 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1837 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1838 /// local transaction(s).
1839 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1840 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1841 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1845 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1846 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1848 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1849 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1850 return Err(ReceiveError {
1851 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1853 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
1856 // final_expiry_too_soon
1857 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1858 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1859 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1860 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1861 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1862 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1863 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1864 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
1865 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
1866 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
1867 return Err(ReceiveError {
1868 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
1869 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1872 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1873 return Err(ReceiveError {
1875 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
1876 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1880 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1881 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
1882 return Err(ReceiveError {
1883 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1884 err_data: Vec::new(),
1885 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
1888 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1889 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1890 return Err(ReceiveError {
1891 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1892 err_data: Vec::new(),
1893 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
1895 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1896 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1898 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1899 phantom_shared_secret,
1901 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1902 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1903 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1904 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1905 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1906 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1907 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1908 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
1909 return Err(ReceiveError {
1910 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1911 err_data: Vec::new(),
1912 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
1916 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1918 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1921 return Err(ReceiveError {
1922 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
1923 err_data: Vec::new(),
1924 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
1929 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
1932 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1933 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
1934 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
1935 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1939 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
1940 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1941 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1943 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1944 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1945 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1946 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1947 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1948 failure_code: $err_code,
1954 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1955 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1958 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
1960 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1961 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1962 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1963 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1964 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1965 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1966 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1967 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1969 macro_rules! return_err {
1970 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1972 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1973 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1974 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1975 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1976 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
1977 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
1983 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
1985 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
1986 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
1988 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
1989 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
1993 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
1994 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
1996 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
1998 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1999 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2000 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2001 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2002 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2004 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2007 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2008 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2009 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2011 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2012 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2013 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2016 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2017 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2018 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2019 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2023 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2024 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2025 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2028 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2029 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2030 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2031 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2032 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2037 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2038 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2039 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2040 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2041 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2042 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2043 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2044 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2045 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2046 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2047 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2048 // phantom or an intercept.
2049 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2050 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2051 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2055 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2058 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2060 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2061 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2063 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2064 // no consistency guarantees.
2065 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2069 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2070 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2071 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2072 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2073 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2075 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2076 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2077 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2078 // we don't have the channel here.
2079 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2081 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2083 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2084 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2085 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2086 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2087 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2088 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2089 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2091 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2092 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2094 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2095 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2099 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2100 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2101 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2102 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2104 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2111 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2112 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2113 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2114 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2115 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2116 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2118 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2119 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2121 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2122 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2123 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2124 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2125 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2126 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2127 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2128 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2129 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2130 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2136 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2137 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2138 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2139 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2141 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2142 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2144 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2145 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2146 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2148 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2149 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2150 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2151 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2152 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2153 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2154 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2158 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2163 pending_forward_info
2166 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2167 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2168 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2170 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2171 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2172 if !chan.should_announce() {
2173 return Err(LightningError {
2174 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2175 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2178 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2179 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2181 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2182 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2185 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2186 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2187 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2188 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2189 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2190 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2191 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2192 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2193 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2197 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2199 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2200 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2201 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2203 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2204 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2206 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2207 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2208 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2209 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2210 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2211 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2212 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2213 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2216 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2217 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2219 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2225 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2226 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2227 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2228 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2229 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2231 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2232 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2233 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2234 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2235 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2237 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2239 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2241 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2242 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2243 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2244 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2247 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2248 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2249 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2251 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2252 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2254 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2255 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2257 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2258 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2260 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2261 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2263 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2264 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2265 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2268 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2269 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2270 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2272 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2273 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2275 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2276 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2277 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2278 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2279 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2280 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2281 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2282 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2283 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2284 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2286 _ => unreachable!(),
2289 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2290 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2291 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2292 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2293 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2294 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2295 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2296 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2305 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2306 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2307 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2308 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2313 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2314 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2316 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2321 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2323 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2324 /// fields for more info.
2326 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2327 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2328 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2329 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2332 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2333 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2334 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2335 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2336 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2338 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2339 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2341 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2342 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2343 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2345 /// In general, a path may raise:
2346 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2347 /// node public key) is specified.
2348 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2349 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2351 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2352 /// relevant updates.
2354 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2355 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2356 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2358 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2359 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2360 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2361 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2364 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2365 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2366 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2368 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2369 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2370 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2371 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2372 self.pending_outbound_payments
2373 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2374 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2375 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2379 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2380 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2381 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2382 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2383 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2387 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2388 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2389 self.pending_outbound_payments.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height)
2393 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2395 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2396 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2397 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2398 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2399 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2401 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2402 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2403 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2404 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2405 self.pending_outbound_payments.retry_payment_with_route(route, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2406 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2407 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2410 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2412 /// After this method returns, no future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2413 /// are allowed. If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be
2414 /// generated as soon as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2416 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2417 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2418 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2420 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2421 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, the payment may still be in the pending state
2422 /// upon restart. This allows further calls to [`retry_payment`] (and requiring a second call
2423 /// to [`abandon_payment`] to mark the payment as failed again). Otherwise, future calls to
2424 /// [`retry_payment`] will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`].
2426 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
2427 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2428 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2429 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2430 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2431 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2432 if let Some(payment_failed_ev) = self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id) {
2433 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(payment_failed_ev);
2437 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2438 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2439 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2440 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2441 /// never reach the recipient.
2443 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2444 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2446 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2447 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2449 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2451 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2452 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2453 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2454 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2455 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2456 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2459 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2460 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2461 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2462 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2463 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2464 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2465 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2466 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2469 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2472 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2473 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2476 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2477 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2478 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2479 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2480 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2482 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2484 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2486 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2487 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2488 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2489 } else { unreachable!(); })
2492 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2494 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2495 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2498 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2499 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2504 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2505 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2506 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2509 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2511 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2514 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2515 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2516 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2525 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2526 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2527 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2531 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2533 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2534 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2536 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2537 /// across the p2p network.
2539 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2540 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2542 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2543 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2544 /// keys per-channel).
2546 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2547 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2548 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2550 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2551 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2552 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2554 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2555 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2556 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2557 /// for more details.
2559 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2560 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2561 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2562 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2564 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2565 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2566 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2567 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2572 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2573 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2574 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2575 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2576 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2577 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2578 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2582 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2583 let mut output_index = None;
2584 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2585 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2586 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2587 if output_index.is_some() {
2588 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2589 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2592 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2593 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2594 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2597 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2600 if output_index.is_none() {
2601 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2602 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2605 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2609 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2611 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2612 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2613 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2614 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2616 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2617 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2619 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2620 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2622 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2624 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2625 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2626 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2627 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2628 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2629 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2630 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2631 pub fn update_channel_config(
2632 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2633 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2634 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2635 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2636 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2640 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2641 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2644 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2645 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2646 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2647 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
2648 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2649 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
2651 .get_counterparty_node_id();
2652 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
2653 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2654 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
2658 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2659 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2660 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2663 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2664 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2665 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2666 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2667 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2676 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2677 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2679 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2680 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2682 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2683 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2684 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2685 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2686 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2688 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2689 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2691 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2694 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2695 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2696 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2697 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2698 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2699 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2701 let next_hop_scid = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2703 if !chan.is_usable() {
2704 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2705 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2708 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2710 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2711 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2715 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2716 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2717 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2720 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2721 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2722 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2724 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2726 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2727 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2730 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2731 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2732 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2733 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2734 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2736 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2740 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2741 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2743 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2746 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2747 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2748 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2750 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2751 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2752 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2755 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2756 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2757 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2758 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2759 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2760 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2761 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2764 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2765 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2766 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2767 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2772 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2774 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2775 /// Will likely generate further events.
2776 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2777 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2779 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2780 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2781 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2783 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2784 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
2786 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
2787 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2788 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
2790 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2791 match forward_info {
2792 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2793 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2794 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2795 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
2796 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
2799 macro_rules! failure_handler {
2800 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
2801 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2803 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2804 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2805 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2806 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2807 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2808 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2811 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
2812 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
2814 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
2817 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2818 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
2824 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2825 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2827 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
2831 macro_rules! failed_payment {
2832 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2834 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
2838 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2839 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2840 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
2841 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
2842 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2844 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2845 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2846 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2847 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2848 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2850 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2852 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2853 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2857 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2858 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2859 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2860 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
2866 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2869 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2872 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2873 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2874 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2875 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2876 // problem, not ours.
2882 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
2883 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2885 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2889 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2890 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2891 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2892 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2893 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2896 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2897 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2898 match forward_info {
2899 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2900 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
2901 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2902 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
2903 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
2906 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2907 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2908 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2909 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2910 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2911 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2912 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
2913 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2915 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
2916 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
2917 onion_packet, &self.logger)
2919 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2920 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2922 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2924 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
2925 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2926 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
2927 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
2932 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2933 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2935 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2936 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2937 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
2938 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
2940 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2941 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2943 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
2945 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2946 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2947 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2956 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2957 match forward_info {
2958 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2959 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2960 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2961 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
2964 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
2965 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
2966 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
2967 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
2969 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2970 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
2972 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2975 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2976 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2977 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2978 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2979 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2980 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2981 phantom_shared_secret,
2983 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
2985 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
2990 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2991 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2992 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
2993 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2994 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
2996 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2997 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2998 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2999 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3000 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3001 phantom_shared_secret,
3003 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3004 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3008 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3009 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3010 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3011 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3012 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3015 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3016 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3017 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3019 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3020 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3021 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3024 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3025 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3026 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3029 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3030 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3031 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3032 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3033 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3034 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3038 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3039 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3040 total_value += htlc.value;
3041 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3042 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3043 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3044 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3045 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3046 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3048 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3050 _ => unreachable!(),
3053 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3054 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3055 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3056 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3057 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3058 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3059 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3060 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3061 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3064 amount_msat: total_value,
3065 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3066 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3068 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3070 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3071 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3073 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3075 payment_claimable_generated
3079 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3080 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3081 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3082 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3083 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3084 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3085 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3086 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3087 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3088 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3089 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3090 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3091 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3092 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3094 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3098 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3100 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3101 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3102 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3103 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3106 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3107 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3108 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3109 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3110 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3111 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3112 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3114 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3116 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3117 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3120 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3121 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3122 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3128 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3129 if payment_data.is_none() {
3130 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3131 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3134 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3135 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3136 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3137 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3138 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3139 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3140 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3141 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3143 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3144 if payment_claimable_generated {
3145 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3151 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3152 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3160 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3161 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3163 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3165 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3166 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3167 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3169 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3171 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3172 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3173 events.append(&mut new_events);
3176 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3178 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3179 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3181 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3182 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3183 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3184 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3185 if background_events.is_empty() {
3189 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3191 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3192 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3193 // monitor updating completing.
3194 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3201 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3202 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3203 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3204 self.process_background_events();
3207 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3208 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3209 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3210 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3211 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3212 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3213 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3215 if !chan.is_live() {
3216 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3217 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3218 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3220 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3221 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3223 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3224 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3228 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3229 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3230 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3231 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3232 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3233 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3234 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3236 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3238 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3239 for (chan_id, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
3240 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3241 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3248 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3250 /// This currently includes:
3251 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3252 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3253 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3255 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3256 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3258 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3259 /// estimate fetches.
3260 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3261 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3262 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3263 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3265 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3267 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3268 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3270 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3271 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3272 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3273 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3274 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3275 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3277 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3278 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3279 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3280 if needs_close { return false; }
3283 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3284 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3285 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3286 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3287 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3288 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3289 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3290 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3294 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3295 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3297 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3298 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3299 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3303 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3304 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3309 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3315 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3316 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3317 // This should be unreachable
3318 debug_assert!(false);
3321 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3322 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3323 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3324 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3326 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3327 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3328 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3330 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3337 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3338 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3339 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3340 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3341 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3344 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3345 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3348 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3350 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3351 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3352 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3353 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3354 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3361 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3362 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3363 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3365 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3366 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3367 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3368 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3370 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3371 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3372 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3373 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3374 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3375 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3377 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3378 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3379 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3380 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3381 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3382 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3383 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3384 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3385 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3390 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3391 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3393 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3395 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3396 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3397 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3398 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3399 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3400 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3401 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3403 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3405 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3406 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3408 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3413 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3414 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3415 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3416 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3417 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3418 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3419 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3420 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3421 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3422 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3424 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3425 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3426 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3427 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3429 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3430 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3431 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3432 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3433 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3437 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3438 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3439 // be surfaced to the user.
3440 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3441 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3442 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3444 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3445 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3446 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3447 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3452 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3453 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3454 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3455 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3459 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3460 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3461 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3462 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3464 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3465 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3466 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3467 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3468 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3471 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3472 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3473 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3476 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3477 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3478 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3480 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3481 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3483 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3484 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3485 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3487 let mut forward_event = None;
3488 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3489 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3490 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3492 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3493 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3494 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3496 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3497 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3500 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3501 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3502 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3503 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3504 time_forwardable: time
3507 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3508 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3509 failed_next_destination: destination,
3515 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3516 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3518 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3519 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3520 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3522 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3523 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3524 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3525 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3527 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3528 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3529 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3530 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3531 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3532 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3533 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3535 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3538 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3539 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3540 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3541 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3542 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3543 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3544 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3545 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3550 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3551 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3552 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3554 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3555 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3556 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3557 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3562 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3564 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3565 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3566 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3567 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3568 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3570 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3571 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3573 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3574 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3575 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3576 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3577 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3579 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3580 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3581 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3582 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3583 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3584 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3585 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3586 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3593 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_id) {
3598 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3599 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3600 debug_assert!(false);
3604 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3605 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3606 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3607 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3608 if sources.len() != 1 {
3609 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3610 debug_assert!(false);
3616 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3618 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3619 mem::drop(channel_state);
3620 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3621 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3624 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3625 mem::drop(channel_state);
3626 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3627 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3628 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3632 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3633 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3634 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.take().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop,
3636 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3638 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3639 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3640 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3641 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3642 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3646 mem::drop(channel_state);
3648 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3649 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3650 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3651 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3652 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3653 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3654 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3656 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3659 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3660 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3661 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3662 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3666 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3667 mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
3668 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3669 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3670 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3672 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
3673 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3674 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3675 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3676 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3677 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3678 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3679 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3680 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3682 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3683 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3684 payment_preimage, e);
3685 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
3686 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3687 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3688 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
3691 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3692 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3693 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3694 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3695 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3696 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3697 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3698 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3699 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3700 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3706 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3707 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3713 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3714 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3715 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3717 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3718 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3719 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
3720 // again on restart.
3721 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3722 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3723 payment_preimage, e);
3726 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3728 chan.remove_entry();
3730 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3731 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3732 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
3736 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3737 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3738 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3742 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3743 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
3744 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update);
3745 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
3746 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3747 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3748 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
3749 // again on restart.
3750 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3751 payment_preimage, update_res);
3753 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3754 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
3755 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
3756 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
3757 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
3758 // `PaymentForwarded`).
3759 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3764 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3765 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
3768 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3770 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3771 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3772 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3774 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3775 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3776 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage,
3777 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
3778 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3779 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3780 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3783 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
3784 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
3786 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3788 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3794 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
3795 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3796 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3802 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3803 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3804 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3807 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
3808 for action in actions.into_iter() {
3810 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
3811 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3812 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
3813 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
3814 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3818 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
3819 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
3825 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
3826 /// update completion.
3827 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
3828 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
3829 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
3830 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
3831 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
3832 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
3833 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
3835 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
3836 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3837 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
3838 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
3841 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
3842 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
3844 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
3845 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3846 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3851 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
3853 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
3854 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
3855 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3856 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3861 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
3862 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
3863 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3864 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3865 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3870 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
3874 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
3880 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
3881 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
3882 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
3888 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3889 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3892 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
3893 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3894 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3895 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3896 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3897 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3899 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3903 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3904 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
3905 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
3906 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3907 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
3908 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
3909 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
3911 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
3912 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3913 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3918 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
3919 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3920 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3923 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
3925 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
3926 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
3928 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3929 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3930 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
3931 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
3935 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
3937 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
3938 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
3941 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
3942 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
3943 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
3945 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
3946 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
3947 /// used to accept such channels.
3949 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
3950 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
3951 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3952 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
3955 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
3956 /// it as confirmed immediately.
3958 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
3959 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
3960 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
3962 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
3963 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
3965 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
3966 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
3968 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
3969 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
3971 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
3972 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
3973 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3974 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
3977 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3978 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3980 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3981 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3982 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3983 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
3984 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
3985 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
3987 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
3988 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
3991 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
3992 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
3993 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3994 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3995 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
3996 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
3999 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4000 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4001 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4004 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4005 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4006 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4009 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4010 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4016 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4017 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4018 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4021 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4022 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4025 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4026 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4027 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4029 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4030 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4031 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4032 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4035 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4036 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4040 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4041 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4042 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4043 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4044 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4045 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4047 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4048 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4049 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4050 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4052 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4053 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4054 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4057 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4058 pending_events.push(
4059 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4060 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4061 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4062 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4063 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4064 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4069 entry.insert(channel);
4075 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4076 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4077 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4078 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4079 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4080 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4081 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4082 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4084 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4085 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4087 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4090 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4091 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4092 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4093 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4094 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4096 user_channel_id: user_id,
4101 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4102 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4103 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4104 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4105 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4106 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4107 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4108 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4109 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4111 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4113 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4116 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4117 // lock before watch_channel
4118 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4119 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4120 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4121 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4122 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4123 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4124 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4125 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4126 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4127 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4128 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4129 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4130 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4132 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4133 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4134 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4135 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4136 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4137 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4138 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4141 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4142 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4143 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4144 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4145 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4147 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4148 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4149 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4150 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4151 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4152 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4153 funding_msg.channel_id))
4155 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4156 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4159 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4160 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4163 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4164 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4172 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4174 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4175 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4176 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4177 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4178 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4179 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4180 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4182 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger) {
4183 Ok(update) => update,
4184 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4186 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4187 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4189 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4190 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4191 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4192 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4193 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4194 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4195 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4201 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4202 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4206 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4209 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4210 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4214 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4215 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4216 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4217 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4218 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4219 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4220 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4222 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4223 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4224 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4225 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4226 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4227 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4228 msg: announcement_sigs,
4230 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4231 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4232 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4233 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4234 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4235 // announcement_signatures.
4236 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4237 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4238 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4239 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4245 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4249 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4253 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4254 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4255 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4256 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4257 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4259 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4260 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4261 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4262 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4265 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4266 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4267 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4268 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4271 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4272 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4274 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4275 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4276 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4277 let (result, is_permanent) =
4278 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4280 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4285 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4286 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4287 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4294 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4297 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4298 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4299 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4300 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4303 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4307 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4308 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4309 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4310 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4311 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4312 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4313 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4314 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4316 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4317 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4318 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4319 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4324 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4325 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4326 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4327 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4328 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4329 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4330 } else { (tx, None) }
4332 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4335 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4336 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4337 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4339 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4340 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4341 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4342 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4346 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4351 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4352 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4353 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4354 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4356 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4357 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4358 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4359 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4361 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4362 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4363 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4365 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4366 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4367 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4368 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4371 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4372 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4373 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4374 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4375 match pending_forward_info {
4376 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4377 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4378 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4379 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4381 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4382 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4383 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4384 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4385 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4388 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4390 _ => pending_forward_info
4393 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4395 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4400 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4401 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4402 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4403 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4404 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4405 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4406 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4407 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4409 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4411 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4414 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4418 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4419 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4420 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4421 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4422 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4423 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4424 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4426 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4428 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4433 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4434 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4435 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4436 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4437 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4438 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4439 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4441 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4442 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4443 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4445 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4448 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4452 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4453 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4454 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4455 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4457 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4458 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4460 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4461 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4462 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4463 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4464 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4465 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4466 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4471 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4472 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4476 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4477 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4478 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4480 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4481 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4482 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4483 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4484 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4485 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4486 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4487 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4489 commitment_signed: msg,
4495 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4500 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4501 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4502 let mut forward_event = None;
4503 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4504 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4505 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4506 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4507 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4508 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4509 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4510 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4512 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4513 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4515 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4516 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4517 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4518 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4519 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4520 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4522 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4523 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4524 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4526 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4527 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4528 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4529 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4530 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4531 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4532 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4533 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4534 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4537 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4538 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4540 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4541 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4542 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4543 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4544 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4545 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4546 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4547 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4550 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4551 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4552 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4557 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4558 // payments are being processed.
4559 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4560 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4562 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4563 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4570 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4571 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4574 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4575 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4576 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4579 match forward_event {
4581 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4582 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4583 time_forwardable: time
4591 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4592 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4594 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4595 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4596 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4597 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4598 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4599 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4601 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4602 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4603 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4604 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4605 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
4606 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
4607 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4608 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4609 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4610 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4611 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4612 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4614 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4615 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
4616 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4617 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4618 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4619 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4621 } else { unreachable!(); }
4623 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4624 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4625 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4629 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4630 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4631 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4632 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4633 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
4634 chan.get().get_user_id()))
4636 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4639 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4641 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4642 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
4644 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4645 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4646 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4648 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
4649 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4656 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4657 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4658 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4659 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4660 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4661 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4662 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4664 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
4666 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4671 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4672 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4673 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4675 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4676 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4677 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4678 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4680 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4681 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4684 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4685 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4686 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
4687 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4688 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4689 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4692 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4697 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4698 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4699 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4700 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4702 // It's not a local channel
4703 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4706 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4707 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4708 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4709 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4710 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4711 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4712 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4713 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4714 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4715 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4717 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4719 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4720 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4721 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4722 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4724 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
4725 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
4728 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4730 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4733 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4735 let need_lnd_workaround = {
4736 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4737 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4739 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4740 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4741 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4742 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4744 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4745 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4746 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4747 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4748 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4749 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4750 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
4751 let mut channel_update = None;
4752 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4753 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4754 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4757 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4758 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4759 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4760 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4761 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4762 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4763 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4768 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4769 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
4770 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4771 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
4772 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4773 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4777 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4781 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4782 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4785 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4786 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
4791 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4792 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4793 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4794 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4795 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4796 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4797 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
4798 match monitor_event {
4799 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4800 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4801 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4802 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4804 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4805 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4806 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4807 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4810 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4811 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4812 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4813 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4814 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4815 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4816 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4817 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4818 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4819 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4820 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4824 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4825 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4827 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4829 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4830 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4831 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4832 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4833 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4838 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4839 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4845 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4846 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4849 has_pending_monitor_events
4852 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4853 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4854 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4856 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4857 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4860 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4861 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4862 /// update was applied.
4863 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4864 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4865 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4866 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4868 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4869 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4870 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4871 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4873 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4874 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4875 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4876 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4878 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
4880 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
4883 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4884 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4885 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
4886 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4887 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4888 updates: commitment_update,
4892 has_monitor_update = true;
4893 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
4894 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4895 if close_channel { return false; }
4902 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
4903 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4904 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4911 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4912 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4913 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
4916 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4917 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4923 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4924 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4925 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4926 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4927 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4928 let mut has_update = false;
4930 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4931 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4932 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4933 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4935 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4936 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4937 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4938 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4940 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4941 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4944 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4945 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4946 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4947 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4948 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4953 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4955 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4956 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4957 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
4963 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
4964 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4971 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4972 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4978 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4979 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4981 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4982 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4983 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4984 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4985 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4986 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4987 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4988 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4989 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4990 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4991 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4992 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4993 assert!(should_broadcast);
4994 } else { unreachable!(); }
4995 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4997 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5001 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5002 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5004 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5005 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5008 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5010 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5011 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5012 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5013 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5014 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5015 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5016 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5017 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5018 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5019 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5020 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5021 // never fail a payment too early.
5022 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5024 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5027 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5032 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5035 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5036 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5038 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5039 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5040 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5042 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5044 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5045 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5049 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5050 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5052 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5054 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5055 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5056 /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5057 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5058 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5059 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5062 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5063 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5065 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5068 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5070 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5072 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5073 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5074 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5075 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5076 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5079 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5080 /// stored external to LDK.
5082 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5083 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5084 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5086 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5087 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5090 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5091 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5092 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5093 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5095 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5096 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5097 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5098 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5099 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5101 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5102 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5103 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5104 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5105 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5107 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5108 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5110 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5111 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5115 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5116 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5118 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5120 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5121 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5122 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5123 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5126 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5127 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5129 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5132 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5134 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5136 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5137 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5140 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5141 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5143 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5144 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5145 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5148 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5149 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5151 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5152 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5153 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5154 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5156 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5157 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5158 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5159 Some(_) => continue,
5160 None => return scid_candidate
5165 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5167 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5168 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5170 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5171 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5172 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5176 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5177 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5178 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5180 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5181 /// times to get a unique scid.
5182 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5183 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5184 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5186 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5187 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5188 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5189 return scid_candidate
5193 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5194 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5195 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5196 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5198 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5199 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5200 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5201 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5209 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5210 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5211 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5212 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5213 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5218 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5219 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5220 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5224 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5225 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5229 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5230 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5233 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5234 /// using the given event handler.
5236 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5237 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5240 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5241 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5242 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5244 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5246 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5247 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5248 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5249 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5252 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5253 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5254 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5257 for event in pending_events {
5258 handler(event).await;
5261 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5262 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5267 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5268 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5269 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5270 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5271 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5274 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5275 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5276 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5277 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5279 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5280 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5281 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5282 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5285 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5286 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5288 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5289 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5292 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5293 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5294 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5296 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5297 events.replace(pending_events);
5306 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5308 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5309 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5310 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5311 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5314 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5316 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5317 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5318 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5319 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5320 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5322 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5323 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5324 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5325 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5328 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5329 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5330 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5333 for event in pending_events {
5334 handler.handle_event(event);
5342 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5344 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5345 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5346 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5347 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5350 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5352 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5353 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5354 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5355 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5356 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5359 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5360 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5363 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5364 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5365 let new_height = height - 1;
5367 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5368 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5369 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5370 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5371 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5372 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5375 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5379 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5381 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5382 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5383 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5384 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5387 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5388 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5389 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5390 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5392 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5393 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5395 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5396 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5397 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5399 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5400 if height < last_best_block_height {
5401 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5402 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5406 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5407 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5408 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5409 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5411 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5412 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5414 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5416 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5418 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5420 macro_rules! max_time {
5421 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5423 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5424 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5425 // having an explicit local time source.
5426 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5427 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5428 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5429 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5430 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5436 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5437 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5438 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5439 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5443 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5444 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5445 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
5446 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5447 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5448 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
5454 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5455 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5456 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5457 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5458 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5459 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5460 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5461 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5466 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5468 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5469 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5470 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5471 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5474 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5475 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5477 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5478 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5479 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5480 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5481 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5483 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5484 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5486 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5487 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5488 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5489 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5490 let res = f(channel);
5491 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5492 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5493 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5494 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5495 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5497 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5498 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5499 if channel.is_usable() {
5500 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5501 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5502 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5503 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5508 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5512 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5514 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5515 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5516 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5517 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5518 msg: announcement_sigs,
5520 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5521 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5522 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5524 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5525 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5526 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5531 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5532 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5533 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5534 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5535 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5536 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5537 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5538 // is always consistent.
5539 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5540 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5541 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5542 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5543 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5546 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5547 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5548 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5549 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5550 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5551 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5552 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5556 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5557 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5558 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5559 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5560 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5561 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5562 data: reason_message,
5571 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5572 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5573 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5574 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5575 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5576 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5577 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5578 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5579 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5580 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
5582 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
5583 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5584 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5588 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5591 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5592 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
5593 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5594 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5595 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
5596 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
5597 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5598 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5599 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
5602 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
5603 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5604 _ => unreachable!(),
5606 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
5607 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
5608 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
5609 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
5615 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5617 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5618 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
5622 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5623 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5624 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
5625 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5627 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5629 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5630 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
5631 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5632 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5633 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5634 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5637 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5638 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
5639 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5641 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5642 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5643 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5644 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5647 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
5648 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
5649 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
5650 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
5651 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
5654 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5655 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5656 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
5659 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5660 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5661 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5662 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5666 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref >
5667 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5668 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5669 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5670 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5671 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5674 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5675 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5676 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5679 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5680 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5681 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5684 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5685 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5686 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5689 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5690 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5691 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5694 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
5695 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5696 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5699 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5700 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5701 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5704 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5705 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5706 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5709 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5710 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5711 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5714 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5715 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5716 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5719 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5720 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5721 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5724 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5725 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5726 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5729 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5730 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5731 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5734 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5735 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5736 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5739 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5740 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5741 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5744 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5745 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5746 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5749 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5750 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5751 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5754 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5759 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5760 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5761 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5764 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5765 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5766 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5767 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5769 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5770 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5771 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5772 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
5773 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
5774 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5775 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5776 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5777 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5778 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5779 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5782 no_channels_remain = false;
5787 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5789 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5790 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5791 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5792 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5793 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5794 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5795 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5796 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5797 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5798 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5799 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5800 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5801 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5802 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5803 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5804 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5805 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5806 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5807 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5808 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
5812 if no_channels_remain {
5813 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5816 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5817 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5821 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
5822 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
5823 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5827 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5829 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5832 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5833 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5834 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5835 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5836 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5839 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5840 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5845 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5846 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5847 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5848 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5849 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5850 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5851 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5852 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5853 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5857 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5858 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5859 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5864 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5865 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
5866 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
5867 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
5868 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5876 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5880 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5881 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5883 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5884 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5885 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5886 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5887 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
5892 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
5893 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5894 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
5895 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5898 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
5899 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
5900 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5908 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5909 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
5913 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
5914 provided_node_features()
5917 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
5918 provided_init_features()
5922 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5923 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5924 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
5925 provided_init_features().to_context()
5928 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5929 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5931 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
5932 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
5933 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
5934 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
5935 provided_init_features().to_context()
5938 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5939 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5940 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
5941 provided_init_features().to_context()
5944 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5945 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5946 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
5947 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
5948 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
5949 // ErroringMessageHandler.
5950 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
5951 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
5952 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
5953 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
5954 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
5955 features.set_payment_secret_required();
5956 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
5957 features.set_wumbo_optional();
5958 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
5959 features.set_channel_type_optional();
5960 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
5961 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
5965 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5966 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5968 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
5969 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
5970 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
5971 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
5974 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
5975 (2, node_id, required),
5976 (4, features, required),
5977 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
5978 (8, forwarding_info, option),
5979 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
5980 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
5983 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
5984 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5985 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
5986 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
5987 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
5988 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
5989 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5990 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
5991 (2, self.channel_id, required),
5992 (3, self.channel_type, option),
5993 (4, self.counterparty, required),
5994 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
5995 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
5996 (7, self.config, option),
5997 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
5998 (9, self.confirmations, option),
5999 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6000 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6001 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6002 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6003 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6004 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6005 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6006 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6007 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6008 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6009 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6010 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6011 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6012 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6013 (32, self.is_public, required),
6014 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6015 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6016 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6022 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6023 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6024 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6025 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6026 (2, channel_id, required),
6027 (3, channel_type, option),
6028 (4, counterparty, required),
6029 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6030 (6, funding_txo, option),
6031 (7, config, option),
6032 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6033 (9, confirmations, option),
6034 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6035 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6036 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6037 (16, balance_msat, required),
6038 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6039 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6040 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6041 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6042 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6043 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6044 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6045 (26, is_outbound, required),
6046 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6047 (30, is_usable, required),
6048 (32, is_public, required),
6049 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6050 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6051 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6054 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6055 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6056 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6057 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6058 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6062 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6064 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6065 outbound_scid_alias,
6069 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6070 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6072 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6073 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6074 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6075 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6076 confirmations_required,
6078 force_close_spend_delay,
6079 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6080 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6081 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6082 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6083 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6084 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6089 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6090 (2, channels, vec_type),
6091 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6092 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6095 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6097 (0, onion_packet, required),
6098 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6101 (0, payment_data, required),
6102 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6103 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6105 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6106 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6107 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6111 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6112 (0, routing, required),
6113 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6114 (4, payment_hash, required),
6115 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6116 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6117 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6121 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6122 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6124 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6126 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6127 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6128 reason.write(writer)?;
6130 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6131 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6134 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6135 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6136 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6137 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6144 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6145 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6146 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6149 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6150 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6151 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6152 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6156 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6157 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6158 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6159 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6160 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6163 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6164 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6165 // messages contained in the variants.
6166 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6167 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6168 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6170 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6171 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6172 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6173 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6174 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6177 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6178 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6179 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6180 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6181 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6183 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6188 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6193 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6194 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6195 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6196 (2, outpoint, required),
6197 (4, htlc_id, required),
6198 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6201 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6202 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6203 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6204 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6205 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6207 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6208 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6209 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6210 (2, self.value, required),
6211 (4, payment_data, option),
6212 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6213 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6219 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6220 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6221 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6223 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6224 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6225 let mut total_msat = None;
6226 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6227 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6228 (0, prev_hop, required),
6229 (1, total_msat, option),
6230 (2, value, required),
6231 (4, payment_data, option),
6232 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6233 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6235 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6237 if payment_data.is_some() {
6238 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6240 if total_msat.is_none() {
6241 total_msat = Some(value);
6243 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6246 if total_msat.is_none() {
6247 if payment_data.is_none() {
6248 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6250 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6252 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6256 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6259 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6266 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6267 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6268 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6271 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6272 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6273 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6274 let mut payment_id = None;
6275 let mut payment_secret = None;
6276 let mut payment_params = None;
6277 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6278 (0, session_priv, required),
6279 (1, payment_id, option),
6280 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6281 (3, payment_secret, option),
6282 (4, path, vec_type),
6283 (5, payment_params, option),
6285 if payment_id.is_none() {
6286 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6288 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6290 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6291 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6292 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6293 path: path.unwrap(),
6294 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6299 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6300 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6305 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6306 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6308 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6310 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6311 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6312 (0, session_priv, required),
6313 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6314 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6315 (3, payment_secret, option),
6316 (4, *path, vec_type),
6317 (5, payment_params, option),
6320 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6322 field.write(writer)?;
6329 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6330 (0, forward_info, required),
6331 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6332 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6333 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6334 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6337 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6339 (0, htlc_id, required),
6340 (2, err_packet, required),
6345 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6346 (0, payment_secret, required),
6347 (2, expiry_time, required),
6348 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6349 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6350 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6353 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6354 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6355 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6356 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6357 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6360 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6361 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6363 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6365 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6367 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6368 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6369 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6373 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
6374 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
6375 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6376 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6377 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6378 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6379 unfunded_channels += 1;
6382 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6383 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6384 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6385 channel.write(writer)?;
6391 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6392 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6393 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6394 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6395 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6396 for forward in pending_forwards {
6397 forward.write(writer)?;
6402 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6403 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6404 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6406 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6407 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6408 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6409 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6410 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6411 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6412 htlc.write(writer)?;
6414 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6417 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6418 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6419 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6420 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6421 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6422 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6425 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6426 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6427 for event in events.iter() {
6428 event.write(writer)?;
6431 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6432 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6433 for event in background_events.iter() {
6435 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6437 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6438 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6443 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6444 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6445 // likely to be identical.
6446 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6447 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6449 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6450 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6451 hash.write(writer)?;
6452 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6455 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6456 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6457 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6458 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6459 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6462 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6463 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6465 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6466 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6467 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6468 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6471 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6472 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6476 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6477 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6478 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6480 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6481 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6482 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6488 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
6489 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6490 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
6491 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
6494 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
6495 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6496 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
6497 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
6498 pending_claiming_payments = None;
6500 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
6503 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6504 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6505 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
6506 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6507 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
6508 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6509 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6510 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6511 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6518 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6520 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6522 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6523 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6524 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6525 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6526 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6527 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6528 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6529 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6530 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6531 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6532 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6533 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6534 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6536 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6537 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6539 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6540 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6542 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6543 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6544 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6545 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6546 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6547 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6549 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6550 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6551 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6552 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6553 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6554 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6557 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6558 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6560 pub keys_manager: K,
6562 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6564 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6565 pub fee_estimator: F,
6566 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6568 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6569 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6570 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6571 pub chain_monitor: M,
6573 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6574 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6575 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6576 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6577 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6578 /// deserialization.
6580 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6581 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6582 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6584 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6585 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6587 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6588 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6589 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6590 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6592 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6595 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6596 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
6599 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6600 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
6601 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6602 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6603 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6604 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6607 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6608 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6609 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6610 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6611 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
6613 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6614 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6619 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6620 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6621 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6622 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
6623 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6624 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6625 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6626 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6629 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6630 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6631 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6635 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6636 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
6637 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6638 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6639 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6640 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6643 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6644 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6646 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6647 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6648 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6650 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6652 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6653 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6654 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6655 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6656 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6657 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6658 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6659 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6660 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6661 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6662 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6663 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6664 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6665 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6666 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6667 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6668 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6669 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6670 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6671 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6672 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6673 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6674 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6675 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6676 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6677 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6678 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6679 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6680 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6681 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6682 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6683 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6684 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6685 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6686 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6687 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6688 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6689 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6690 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6691 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6693 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6694 let mut found_htlc = false;
6695 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
6696 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
6699 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
6700 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
6701 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
6702 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
6703 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
6704 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
6705 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
6706 log_info!(args.logger,
6707 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
6708 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
6709 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6713 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6714 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6715 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6717 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6718 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
6720 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6722 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
6723 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
6724 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
6725 // safely discard the channel.
6726 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
6727 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6728 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6729 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6730 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
6733 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6734 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6735 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6736 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6737 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6738 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6742 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6743 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6744 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6745 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6749 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6750 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6751 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6752 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6753 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6754 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6755 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6756 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6757 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6759 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6762 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6763 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6764 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6765 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6766 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6767 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6768 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6769 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
6771 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
6774 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6775 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6776 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6777 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6778 let peer_state = PeerState {
6779 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6781 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6784 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6785 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6786 for _ in 0..event_count {
6787 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6788 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6793 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6794 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6795 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6796 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6797 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6798 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6802 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
6803 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6805 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6806 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6807 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6808 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6809 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6813 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6814 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6815 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6816 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6817 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6818 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6819 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6821 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6822 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6826 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6827 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6828 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6829 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
6830 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6831 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6832 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6833 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
6834 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
6835 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6836 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6837 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
6838 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6839 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
6840 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6841 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6842 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6843 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
6845 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6846 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6849 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
6850 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6853 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6854 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6855 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6856 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6857 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6858 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6860 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6862 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6863 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6864 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6865 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6866 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6867 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6868 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6870 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
6871 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6872 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6873 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6874 if path.is_empty() {
6875 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6876 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6878 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6879 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6880 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6881 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6882 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6883 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6884 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6885 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6887 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6888 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6889 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6890 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6891 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6893 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6894 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6895 total_msat: path_amt,
6896 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6898 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6899 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6904 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
6905 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
6906 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
6907 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
6908 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
6910 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
6911 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
6912 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
6913 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
6914 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
6915 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
6916 forwards.retain(|forward| {
6917 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
6918 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
6919 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
6920 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
6925 !forwards.is_empty()
6927 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
6928 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
6929 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
6930 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
6931 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
6932 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
6933 intercepted_id != ev_id
6945 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
6946 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6947 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6948 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6949 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6950 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6951 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6952 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6956 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6957 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6959 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
6960 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
6961 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
6962 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6964 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
6965 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
6968 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
6969 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
6970 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
6971 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
6972 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6974 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
6975 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
6976 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
6977 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
6978 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
6979 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
6980 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
6981 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
6983 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
6984 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6988 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
6990 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
6992 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
6993 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
6995 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
6999 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7000 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7002 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7003 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7006 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7008 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7010 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7011 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7012 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7013 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7014 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7018 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7019 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7020 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7021 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7023 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7024 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7025 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7027 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7028 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7029 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7030 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7031 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7032 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7034 if chan.is_usable() {
7035 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7036 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7037 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7038 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7039 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7044 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7046 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7047 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7048 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7049 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7050 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7051 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7052 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7053 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7054 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7055 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7056 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7058 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7059 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7061 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7062 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7063 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7064 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7066 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7067 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7068 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7069 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7071 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7072 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7073 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7074 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7076 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7077 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7078 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7080 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7081 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7084 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7087 purpose: payment_purpose,
7088 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7094 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7096 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7097 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7098 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7100 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7102 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7104 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7106 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7107 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7108 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()) },
7109 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7111 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7112 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7113 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7114 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7115 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7116 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7118 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7124 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7126 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7128 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7129 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7130 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7131 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7133 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7134 logger: args.logger,
7135 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7138 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7139 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7140 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7141 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7142 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7145 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7146 //connection or two.
7148 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7154 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7155 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7156 use core::time::Duration;
7157 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7158 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7159 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7160 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7161 use crate::ln::msgs;
7162 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7163 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7164 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7165 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7166 use crate::util::test_utils;
7167 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysInterface};
7170 fn test_notify_limits() {
7171 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7172 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7173 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7174 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7175 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7176 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7178 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7179 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7180 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7181 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7182 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7184 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7186 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7187 // to connect messages with new values
7188 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7189 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7190 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7191 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7193 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7194 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7195 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7196 // ... but the last node should not.
7197 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7198 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7199 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7200 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7202 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7203 // about the channel.
7204 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7205 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7206 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7208 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7210 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7211 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7212 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7213 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7214 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7215 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7217 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7218 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7219 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7221 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7222 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7223 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7224 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7225 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7226 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7228 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7229 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7230 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7231 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7232 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7233 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7234 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7235 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7237 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7238 // the channel info has updated.
7239 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7240 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7241 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7242 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7243 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7244 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7248 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7249 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7251 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7252 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7253 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7254 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7255 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7257 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7258 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7259 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7260 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7262 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7263 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7264 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7265 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7266 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7267 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7269 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7270 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7271 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7273 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7274 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7276 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7277 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7278 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7279 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7280 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7282 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7283 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7284 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7286 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7287 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7288 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7289 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7290 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7291 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7292 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7293 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7294 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7296 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7297 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7299 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7300 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7301 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7303 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7304 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7305 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7306 // lightning messages manually.
7307 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7308 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7311 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7312 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7313 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7315 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7316 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7318 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7319 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7321 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7322 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7323 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7325 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7326 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7327 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7329 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7331 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7333 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7334 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7337 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7338 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7339 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7340 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7342 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7343 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7344 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7345 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7347 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7350 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7351 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7352 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7353 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7355 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7358 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7359 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7360 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7361 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7363 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7368 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7369 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7370 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7371 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7372 // fails as expected.
7373 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7374 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7375 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7376 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7377 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7378 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7379 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7381 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7382 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7383 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7385 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7386 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7387 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7388 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7389 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7391 let route = find_route(
7392 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7393 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7395 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7397 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7398 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7399 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7400 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7401 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7403 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7404 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7405 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7406 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7407 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7409 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7410 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7411 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7412 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7413 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7414 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7415 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7416 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7417 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7419 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7420 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7422 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7423 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7424 let route = find_route(
7425 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7426 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7428 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7430 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7431 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7432 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7433 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7434 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7436 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7437 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7438 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7440 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7441 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7442 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7443 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7444 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7446 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7447 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7448 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7450 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7451 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7452 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7453 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7454 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7455 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7456 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7457 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7458 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7460 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7461 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7465 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7466 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7467 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7468 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7470 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7471 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7473 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7474 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7475 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7476 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7478 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7479 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7480 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7481 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7482 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7484 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7485 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7486 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7487 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7488 let route = find_route(
7489 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7490 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7493 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7494 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7495 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7496 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7499 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7500 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7501 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7502 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7503 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7504 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7505 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7507 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7511 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7512 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7513 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7516 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7518 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7519 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7520 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7521 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7523 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7524 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7525 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7526 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7527 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7529 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7530 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7531 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7532 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7533 let route = find_route(
7534 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7535 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7538 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7539 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7540 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7541 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7542 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7545 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7546 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7547 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7548 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7549 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7550 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7551 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7553 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7557 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7558 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7559 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7560 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7561 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7563 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7564 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7565 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7566 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7568 // Marshall an MPP route.
7569 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7570 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7571 route.paths.push(path);
7572 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7573 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7574 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7575 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7576 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7577 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7579 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
7580 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7581 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7582 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7587 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7588 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7589 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7590 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7591 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7592 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7594 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7595 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7597 total_msat: 100_000,
7600 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7601 // payment verification fails as expected.
7602 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7603 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7604 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7605 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7607 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7611 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7612 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7616 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
7617 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
7618 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
7619 // the channel is successfully closed.
7620 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7621 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7622 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7623 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7625 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7626 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7627 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
7628 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7629 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
7631 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
7632 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
7634 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
7635 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
7636 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7637 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7640 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7642 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7643 // as it has the funding transaction.
7644 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7645 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7646 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7648 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7651 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7653 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7655 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7656 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7657 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7659 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7660 // as it has the funding transaction.
7661 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7662 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7663 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7666 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7667 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
7668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7669 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7670 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
7671 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
7673 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7674 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7675 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7676 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
7678 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7679 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
7681 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
7682 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
7683 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
7684 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
7685 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7686 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7687 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7689 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
7690 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
7691 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
7692 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
7693 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7694 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7695 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7698 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
7700 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
7701 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
7702 // closing transaction).
7703 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
7704 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
7705 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7707 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
7708 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
7709 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7710 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7711 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7714 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7716 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
7718 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
7719 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
7720 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7722 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7724 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7725 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7729 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7731 use crate::chain::Listen;
7732 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7733 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7734 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
7735 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7736 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7737 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
7738 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7739 use crate::util::test_utils;
7740 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7741 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7743 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7744 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7745 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
7747 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7751 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7752 node: &'a ChannelManager<
7753 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7754 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7755 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7756 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7757 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
7762 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7763 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7766 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7767 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7768 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7770 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7771 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7773 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7774 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7776 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7777 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7779 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7780 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7781 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7782 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7783 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7785 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7787 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7789 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7790 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7791 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7792 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7793 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7795 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7797 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7799 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7800 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7801 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7802 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7803 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7806 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7807 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7808 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7810 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7811 } else { panic!(); }
7813 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7814 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7816 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7819 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7822 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7823 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7825 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7826 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7827 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7828 match msg_events[0] {
7829 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
7830 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7831 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7835 match msg_events[1] {
7836 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7840 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7841 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
7843 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
7844 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
7846 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7849 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7850 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
7852 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
7853 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7855 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7858 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
7860 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7861 macro_rules! send_payment {
7862 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7863 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7864 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7865 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7866 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7867 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7868 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7869 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7870 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7871 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7873 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7874 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7876 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7877 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7879 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7880 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7881 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7882 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7883 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7884 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7885 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7886 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7888 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7889 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7890 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7891 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
7893 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7894 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7895 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7896 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7897 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7899 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7902 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7903 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7904 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7905 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7907 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7912 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7913 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);