1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
57 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
61 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
62 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
63 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, MessageRouter, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
82 use crate::prelude::*;
84 use core::cell::RefCell;
86 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
87 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
88 use core::time::Duration;
91 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
92 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
93 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
95 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
97 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
98 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
99 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
101 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
102 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
103 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
104 // before we forward it.
106 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
107 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
108 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
109 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
110 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
112 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
115 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
116 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
118 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
119 /// do with the HTLC.
120 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
121 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
123 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
124 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
125 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
126 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
127 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
128 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
130 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
132 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
133 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
135 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
136 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
137 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
138 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
139 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
141 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
142 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
143 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
144 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
145 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
147 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
148 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
149 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
150 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
152 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
153 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
158 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
159 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
160 requires_blinded_error: bool,
162 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
163 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
164 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
166 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
167 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
169 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
170 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
171 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
172 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
173 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
174 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
175 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
177 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
178 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
179 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
180 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
182 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
183 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
184 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
186 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
187 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
188 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
192 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
193 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
194 pub struct BlindedForward {
195 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
196 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
197 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
198 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
199 // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
202 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
203 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
204 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
205 // TODO: needs update when we support forwarding blinded HTLCs as non-intro node
207 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
208 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
214 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
216 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
217 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
218 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
219 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
220 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
221 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
223 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
224 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
225 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
226 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
227 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
229 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
231 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
232 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
233 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
235 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
236 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
237 /// it along another path).
239 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
240 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
241 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
242 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
243 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
244 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
245 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
246 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
247 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
249 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
252 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
254 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
256 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
259 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
260 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
261 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
262 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
265 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
266 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
267 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
268 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
269 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
272 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
273 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
274 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
276 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
277 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
278 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
281 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
282 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
284 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
285 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
288 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
289 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
290 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
293 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
298 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
302 // Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
303 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
304 enum BlindedFailure {
305 FromIntroductionNode,
309 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
310 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
311 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
312 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
313 short_channel_id: u64,
314 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
316 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
317 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
318 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
320 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
321 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
326 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
328 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
329 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
330 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
332 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
333 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
336 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
337 struct ClaimableHTLC {
338 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
340 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
342 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
343 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
344 sender_intended_value: u64,
345 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
347 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
348 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
349 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
350 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
352 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
353 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
356 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
357 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
358 events::ClaimedHTLC {
359 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
360 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
361 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
362 value_msat: val.value,
363 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
368 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
369 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
371 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
372 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
373 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
376 /// Number of bytes in the id.
377 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
380 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
381 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
386 impl Readable for PaymentId {
387 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
388 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
393 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
394 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
395 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
399 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
401 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
402 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
403 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
405 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for InterceptId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
419 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
420 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
421 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
422 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
425 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
427 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
428 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
429 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
431 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
432 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
436 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
437 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
438 (0, short_channel_id, required),
439 (2, htlc_id, required),
441 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
442 (0, session_priv, required),
447 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
448 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
449 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
450 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
451 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
454 session_priv: SecretKey,
455 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
456 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
457 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
458 payment_id: PaymentId,
461 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
462 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
463 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
465 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
467 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
469 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
472 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
473 payment_id.hash(hasher);
474 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
480 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
482 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
483 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
484 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
485 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
486 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
487 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
491 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
492 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
493 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
494 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
495 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
496 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
498 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
504 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
505 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
507 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
508 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
509 pub enum FailureCode {
510 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
511 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
512 TemporaryNodeFailure,
513 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
514 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
515 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
516 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
517 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
518 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
519 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
520 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
521 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
522 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
524 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
525 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
526 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
529 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
530 fn into(self) -> u16 {
532 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
533 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
534 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
535 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
540 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
541 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
542 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
543 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
544 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
546 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
547 err: msgs::LightningError,
548 closes_channel: bool,
549 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
551 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
553 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
555 err: LightningError {
557 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
558 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
564 closes_channel: false,
565 shutdown_finish: None,
569 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
570 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
573 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
574 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
575 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
576 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
577 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
578 // commitment upon reconnecting.
579 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
581 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
584 err: LightningError { err, action },
585 closes_channel: true,
586 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
590 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
593 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
595 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
596 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
600 log_level: Level::Warn,
603 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
605 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
607 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
609 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
610 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
617 closes_channel: false,
618 shutdown_finish: None,
622 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
627 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
628 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
629 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
630 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
631 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
633 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
634 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
635 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
636 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
637 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
638 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
639 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
641 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
645 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
646 struct ClaimingPayment {
648 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
649 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
650 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
651 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
653 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
654 (0, amount_msat, required),
655 (2, payment_purpose, required),
656 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
657 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
658 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
661 struct ClaimablePayment {
662 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
663 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
664 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
667 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
668 struct ClaimablePayments {
669 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
670 /// failed/claimed by the user.
672 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
673 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
675 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
676 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
677 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
679 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
680 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
681 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
682 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
685 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
686 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
687 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
688 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
690 enum BackgroundEvent {
691 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
692 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
693 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
694 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
696 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
697 /// are regenerated on startup.
698 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
699 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
700 /// channel to continue normal operation.
702 /// In general this should be used rather than
703 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
704 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
705 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
707 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
708 /// are regenerated on startup.
709 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
710 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
711 funding_txo: OutPoint,
712 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
714 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
715 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
717 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
718 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
719 channel_id: ChannelId,
724 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
725 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
726 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
727 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
728 /// event can be generated.
729 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
730 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
731 /// operation of another channel.
733 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
734 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
735 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
736 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
738 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
739 event: events::Event,
740 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
742 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
743 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
744 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
746 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
747 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
748 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
749 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
750 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
752 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
753 /// stored for later processing.
754 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
755 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
756 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
757 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
761 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
762 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
763 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
764 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
765 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
766 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
767 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
768 (4, blocking_action, required),
770 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
771 (0, event, upgradable_required),
772 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
773 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
774 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
775 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
776 // downgrades to prior versions.
777 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
781 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
782 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
783 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
784 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
785 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
789 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
790 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
791 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
795 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
796 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
797 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
798 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
799 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
800 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
802 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
803 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
804 channel_id: ChannelId,
805 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
810 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
811 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
812 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
813 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
814 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
820 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
824 /// State we hold per-peer.
825 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
826 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
828 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
829 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
830 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
832 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
833 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
834 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
835 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
836 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
837 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
838 latest_features: InitFeatures,
839 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
840 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
841 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
842 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
843 /// user but which have not yet completed.
845 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
846 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
847 /// for a missing channel.
848 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
849 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
850 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
852 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
853 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
854 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
855 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
857 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
858 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
859 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
860 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
861 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
862 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
863 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
864 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
865 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
866 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
867 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
868 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
869 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
870 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
871 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
875 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
876 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
877 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
878 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
879 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
880 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
883 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
884 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
885 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
888 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
889 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
890 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
893 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
894 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
895 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
896 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
900 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
901 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
902 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
903 /// The original OpenChannel message.
904 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
905 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
906 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
909 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
910 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
911 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
913 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
914 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
916 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
919 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
920 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
921 struct PendingInboundPayment {
922 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
923 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
924 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
925 /// this payment being removed.
927 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
928 user_payment_id: u64,
929 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
930 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
931 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
934 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
935 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
936 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
937 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
938 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
939 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
940 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
941 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
943 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
944 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
945 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
953 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
955 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
956 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
957 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
962 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
963 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
964 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
965 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
966 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
967 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
968 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
969 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
970 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
972 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
973 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
974 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
983 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
985 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
986 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
987 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
992 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
994 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
996 pub trait AChannelManager {
997 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
998 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
999 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1000 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1001 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1002 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1003 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1004 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1005 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1006 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1007 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1008 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1009 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1010 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1011 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1012 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1013 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1014 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1015 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1016 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1017 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1018 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1019 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1020 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1021 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1022 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1023 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1024 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1025 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1026 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1027 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1028 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1029 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1030 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1031 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1032 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1035 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1036 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1038 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1039 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1040 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1041 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1042 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1043 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1047 type Watch = M::Target;
1049 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1051 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1053 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1055 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1056 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1058 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1060 type Router = R::Target;
1062 type Logger = L::Target;
1064 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1067 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1068 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1070 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1071 /// to individual Channels.
1073 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1074 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1075 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1076 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1078 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1079 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1080 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1081 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1082 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1083 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1084 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1085 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1086 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1088 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1089 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1090 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1092 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1093 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1094 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1095 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1096 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1098 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1099 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1100 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1101 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1103 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1104 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1105 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1107 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1108 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1109 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1110 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1111 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1113 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1114 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1115 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1116 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1117 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1118 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1119 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1120 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1123 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1124 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1125 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1126 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1127 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1131 // `pending_offers_messages`
1133 // `total_consistency_lock`
1135 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1137 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1139 // |__`per_peer_state`
1141 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1143 // |__`claimable_payments`
1145 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1149 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1151 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1153 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1157 // |__`pending_events`
1159 // |__`pending_background_events`
1161 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1163 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1164 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1165 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1166 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1167 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1168 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1172 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1173 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1174 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1180 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1182 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1184 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1185 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1187 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1188 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1189 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1190 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1192 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1193 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1195 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1196 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1197 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1198 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1199 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1200 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1201 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1202 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1204 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1206 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1207 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1209 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1211 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1212 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1213 /// and via the classic SCID.
1215 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1216 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1218 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1220 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1222 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1223 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1224 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1226 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1227 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1229 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1230 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1232 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1233 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1235 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1236 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1237 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1238 /// active channel list on load.
1240 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1241 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1243 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1245 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1246 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1247 /// the handling of the events.
1249 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1250 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1253 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1254 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1255 /// would break backwards compatability.
1256 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1257 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1258 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1260 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1262 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1264 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1266 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1268 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1269 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1270 /// confirmation depth.
1272 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1273 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1274 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1276 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1278 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1280 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1282 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1284 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1286 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1287 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1288 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1290 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1291 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1293 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1294 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1295 /// keeping additional state.
1296 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1298 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1299 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1300 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1301 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1303 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1304 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1306 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1307 /// are currently open with that peer.
1309 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1310 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1313 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1315 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1316 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1317 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1318 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1319 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1321 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1322 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1323 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1324 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1325 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1327 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1328 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1330 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1331 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1332 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1333 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1334 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1336 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1337 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1339 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1340 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1341 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1342 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1343 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1345 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1347 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1349 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1350 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1351 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1352 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1353 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1354 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1355 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1356 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1357 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1358 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1359 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1361 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1362 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1363 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1365 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1367 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1368 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1370 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1374 signer_provider: SP,
1379 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1381 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1382 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1383 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1384 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1385 pub struct ChainParameters {
1386 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1387 pub network: Network,
1389 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1391 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1392 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1395 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1399 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1400 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1403 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1404 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1405 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1406 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1407 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1408 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1410 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1411 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1412 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1413 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1414 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1415 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1417 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1418 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1421 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1422 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1423 /// events to handle.
1425 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1426 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1428 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1429 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1432 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1433 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1434 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1435 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1437 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1438 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1439 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1440 should_persist: move || {
1441 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1442 // processing and return that.
1443 let notify = persist_check();
1444 match (notify, force_notify) {
1445 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1446 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1447 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1448 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1449 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1452 _read_guard: read_guard,
1456 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1457 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1458 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1459 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1460 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1461 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1463 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1464 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1465 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1466 should_persist: persist_check,
1467 _read_guard: read_guard,
1472 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1473 fn drop(&mut self) {
1474 match (self.should_persist)() {
1475 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1476 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1477 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1479 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1480 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1481 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1486 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1487 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1489 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1491 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1492 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1493 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1494 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1495 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1497 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1498 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1500 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1502 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1503 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1504 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1505 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1506 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1507 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1508 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1509 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1510 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1511 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1512 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1513 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1514 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1516 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1517 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1519 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1520 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1521 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1522 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1524 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1525 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1526 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1527 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1528 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1529 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1531 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1533 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1534 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1536 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1538 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1539 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1541 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1542 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1543 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1545 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1546 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1547 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1549 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1550 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1551 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1552 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1554 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1555 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1556 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1558 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1559 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1560 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1562 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1563 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1564 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1565 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1566 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1567 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1568 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1569 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1570 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1571 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1572 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1575 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1576 /// to better separate parameters.
1577 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1578 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1579 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1580 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1581 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1582 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1583 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1584 pub features: InitFeatures,
1585 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1586 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1587 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1589 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1591 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1592 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1593 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1594 /// payments to us through this channel.
1595 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1596 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1597 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1598 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1599 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1600 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1601 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1604 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1605 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1606 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1607 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1608 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1609 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1610 /// lifetime of the channel.
1611 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1612 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1613 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1614 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1615 /// our counterparty already.
1617 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1618 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1619 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1620 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1622 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1623 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1624 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1625 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1627 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1628 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1630 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1631 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1633 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1634 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1635 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1636 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1637 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1638 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1639 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1640 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1641 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1644 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1646 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1647 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1648 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1649 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1650 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1651 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1652 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1654 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1655 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1657 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1658 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1659 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1660 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1661 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1662 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1663 /// this value on chain.
1665 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1667 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1669 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1670 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1671 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1672 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1673 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1674 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1675 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1677 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1678 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1679 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1680 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1681 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1682 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1684 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1685 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1686 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1687 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1688 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1690 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1691 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1692 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1693 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1695 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1696 pub balance_msat: u64,
1697 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1698 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1699 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1700 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1702 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1704 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1705 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1706 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1707 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1708 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1709 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1710 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1711 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1713 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1714 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1715 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1716 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1717 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1718 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1719 /// route which is valid.
1720 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1721 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1722 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1723 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1724 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1725 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1727 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1728 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1729 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1730 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1731 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1732 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1733 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1734 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1735 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1737 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1739 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1740 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1741 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1742 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1743 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1745 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1746 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1747 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1748 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1749 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1750 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1751 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1753 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1754 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1755 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1756 pub is_outbound: bool,
1757 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1758 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1759 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1760 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1761 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1763 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1764 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1765 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1766 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1767 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1768 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1769 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1771 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1772 pub is_usable: bool,
1773 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1774 pub is_public: bool,
1775 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1776 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1777 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1778 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1779 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1780 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1782 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1783 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1786 impl ChannelDetails {
1787 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1788 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1789 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1791 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1792 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1793 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1794 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1797 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1798 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1799 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1801 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1802 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1803 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1804 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1807 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1808 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1809 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1812 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1813 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1815 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1816 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1817 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1819 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1820 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1821 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1822 features: latest_features,
1823 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1824 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1825 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1826 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1827 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1828 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1829 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1830 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1831 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1832 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1834 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1835 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1836 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1837 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1838 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1839 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1840 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1841 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1842 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1843 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1844 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1845 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1846 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1847 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1848 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1849 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1850 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1851 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1852 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1853 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1854 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1855 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1856 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1857 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1858 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1859 config: Some(context.config()),
1860 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1865 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1866 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1867 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1868 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1869 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1870 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1871 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1872 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1873 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1875 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1877 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1878 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1880 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1881 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1882 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1883 /// to drop the channel.
1887 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1888 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1889 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1890 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1891 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1893 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1894 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1895 payment_id: PaymentId,
1897 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1899 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1900 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1901 payment_id: PaymentId,
1902 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1904 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1905 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1906 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1909 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1910 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1911 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1913 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1914 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1915 payment_id: PaymentId,
1916 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1917 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1918 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1920 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1921 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1922 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1924 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1925 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1926 payment_id: PaymentId,
1927 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1928 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1932 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1934 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1936 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1937 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1938 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1939 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1941 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1942 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1943 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1946 macro_rules! handle_error {
1947 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1948 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1949 // entering the macro.
1950 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1951 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1955 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
1956 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1958 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1959 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
1960 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
1961 let logger = WithContext::from(
1962 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
1964 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
1966 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1967 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1968 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1973 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
1976 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1978 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1979 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1980 action: err.action.clone()
1984 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1985 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1986 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1987 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1988 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1992 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1999 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2000 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2001 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2002 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2004 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2005 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2006 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2008 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2009 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2010 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2011 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2012 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2014 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2015 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2017 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2021 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2022 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2023 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2025 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2026 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2028 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2029 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2031 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2032 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2033 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2034 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2035 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2036 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2038 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2043 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2044 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2046 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2047 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2049 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2050 match $channel_phase {
2051 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2052 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2054 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2055 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2057 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2058 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2064 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2065 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2069 let key = *$entry.key();
2070 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2072 $entry.remove_entry();
2080 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2081 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2085 let key = *$entry.key();
2086 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2088 $entry.remove_entry();
2096 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2097 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2099 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2100 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2106 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2107 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2108 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2109 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2110 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2112 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2113 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2114 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2115 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2116 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2117 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2118 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2119 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2120 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2121 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2126 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2127 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2128 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2129 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2130 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2131 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2132 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2133 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2134 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2136 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2141 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2142 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2143 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2144 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2145 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2146 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2147 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2148 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2149 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2151 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2156 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2157 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2158 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2159 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2160 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2161 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2162 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2163 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2164 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2165 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2166 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2167 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2169 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2170 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2171 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2177 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2178 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2180 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2181 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2182 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2183 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2184 updates.announcement_sigs);
2185 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2186 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2189 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2190 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2191 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2192 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2194 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2195 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2196 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2197 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2198 let mut batch_completed = false;
2199 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2200 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2201 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2202 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2204 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2205 channel_state.2 = true;
2207 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2209 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2211 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2214 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2215 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2216 if batch_completed {
2217 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2218 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2219 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2220 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2221 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2222 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2223 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2224 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2225 chan.set_batch_ready();
2226 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2227 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2231 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2232 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2233 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2238 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2240 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2241 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2243 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2244 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2245 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2246 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2251 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2252 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2253 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2254 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2256 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2257 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2258 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2259 panic!("{}", err_str);
2261 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2262 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2263 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2266 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2272 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2273 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2274 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2276 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2277 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2278 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2279 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2280 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2281 // filter for uniqueness here.
2282 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2283 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2284 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2285 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2287 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2288 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2290 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2291 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2292 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2298 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2299 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2300 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2301 while !processed_all_events {
2302 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2309 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2310 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2311 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2313 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2314 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2315 result = $self.process_background_events();
2317 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2318 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2319 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2320 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2324 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2325 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2326 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2327 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2330 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2332 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2333 $event_to_handle = event;
2335 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2336 post_event_actions.push(action);
2341 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2342 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2343 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2344 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2345 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2346 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2349 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2350 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2351 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2352 processed_all_events = false;
2356 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2357 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2358 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2360 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2361 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2362 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2368 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2370 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2371 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2372 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2373 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2374 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2375 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2379 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2381 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2383 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2384 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2386 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2388 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2389 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2390 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2393 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2394 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2395 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2397 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2398 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2399 current_timestamp: u32,
2401 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2402 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2403 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2404 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2406 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2407 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2408 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2413 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2415 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2416 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2417 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2418 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2419 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2420 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2421 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2422 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2424 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2427 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2428 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2430 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2432 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2434 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2436 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2437 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2438 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2439 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2440 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2441 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2442 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2443 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2445 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2455 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2456 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2457 &self.default_configuration
2460 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2461 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2462 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2465 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2466 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2468 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2470 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2474 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2479 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2481 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2482 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2483 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2484 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2485 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2487 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2488 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2490 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2491 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2492 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2494 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2495 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2496 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2498 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2499 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2501 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2502 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2503 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2504 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2505 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2506 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2508 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2509 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2510 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2511 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2512 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2513 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2516 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2517 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2518 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2520 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2522 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2523 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2525 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2527 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2528 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2529 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2534 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2535 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2536 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2537 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2538 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2539 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2543 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2548 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2550 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2551 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2552 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2554 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2556 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2559 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2562 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2563 node_id: their_network_key,
2566 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2569 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2570 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2571 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2572 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2573 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2574 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2575 // the same channel.
2576 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2578 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2579 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2580 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2581 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2582 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2583 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2584 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2585 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2586 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2590 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2591 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2592 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2600 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2601 /// more information.
2602 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2603 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2604 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2605 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2606 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2607 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2608 // the same channel.
2609 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2611 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2612 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2613 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2614 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2615 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2616 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2617 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2618 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2626 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2627 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2629 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2630 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2632 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2633 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2634 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2635 // really wanted anyway.
2636 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2639 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2640 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2641 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2642 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2644 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2645 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2646 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2647 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2648 let context_to_details = |context| {
2649 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2651 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2653 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2654 .map(context_to_details)
2660 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2661 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2663 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2664 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2665 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2667 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2668 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2669 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2670 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2671 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2672 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2674 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2675 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2676 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2678 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2679 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2680 payment_id: *payment_id,
2681 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2682 total_msat: *total_msat,
2685 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2686 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2688 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2689 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2691 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2696 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2697 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2699 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2700 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2703 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2705 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2706 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2708 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2709 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2711 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2712 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2713 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2714 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2715 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2716 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2717 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2718 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2720 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2721 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2722 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2723 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2724 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2728 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2729 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2731 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2732 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2733 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2734 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2737 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2738 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2741 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2742 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2744 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2745 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2752 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2753 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2754 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2755 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2758 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2759 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2765 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2766 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2767 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2769 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2770 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2772 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2773 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2774 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2775 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2777 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2779 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2780 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2781 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2784 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2785 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2786 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2787 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2788 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2789 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2792 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2793 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2794 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2796 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2797 /// the channel being closed or not:
2798 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2799 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2800 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2801 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2802 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2803 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2804 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2806 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2807 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2808 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2809 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2811 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2813 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2814 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2815 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2818 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2819 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2820 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2821 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2822 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2825 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2826 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2827 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2828 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2829 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2832 let logger = WithContext::from(
2833 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2836 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2837 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2838 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2839 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2840 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2841 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2842 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2844 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2845 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2846 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2847 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2848 // ignore the result here.
2849 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2851 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2852 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2853 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2854 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2856 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2857 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2858 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2859 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2860 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2861 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2862 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2865 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2868 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2869 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2874 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2875 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2876 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2877 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2878 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2879 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2880 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2883 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2884 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2885 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2889 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2890 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2894 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2895 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2896 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2897 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2898 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2899 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2900 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2901 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2902 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2903 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2904 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2906 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2908 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2909 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2910 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2911 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2912 mem::drop(peer_state);
2913 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2915 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2916 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2917 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2919 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2920 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2921 // Unfunded channel has no update
2922 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2925 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2926 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2927 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2928 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2930 (None, *peer_node_id)
2932 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2935 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2936 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2937 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2938 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2939 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2940 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2941 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2942 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2943 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2949 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2952 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2953 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2954 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2955 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2956 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2957 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2958 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2959 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2960 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2961 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2962 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2963 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2974 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2975 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2976 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2978 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2979 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2980 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2983 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2984 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2985 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2987 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2988 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2989 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2990 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2991 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2994 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2995 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2996 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2997 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2998 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3002 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3003 /// local transaction(s).
3004 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3005 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3006 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3010 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3011 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3013 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3015 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3016 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3019 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3020 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3021 // TODO: update this when we support blinded forwarding as non-intro node
3022 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
3027 macro_rules! return_err {
3028 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3031 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3032 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3034 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3035 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3036 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3037 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3038 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3039 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3040 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3044 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3045 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3046 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3047 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3048 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3049 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3050 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3051 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3057 let NextPacketDetails {
3058 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3059 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3060 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3061 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3062 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3065 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3066 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3067 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3068 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3069 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3070 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3071 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3072 // phantom or an intercept.
3073 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3074 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3075 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3079 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3082 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3084 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3085 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3086 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3087 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3088 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3090 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3091 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3092 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3093 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3096 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3097 // have no consistency guarantees.
3098 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3102 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3103 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3104 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3105 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3106 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3108 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3109 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3110 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3111 // we don't have the channel here.
3112 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3114 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3116 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3117 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3118 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3119 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3120 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3121 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3122 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3123 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3124 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3125 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3126 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3128 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3131 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3132 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3134 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3135 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3142 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3144 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3145 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3147 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3148 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3149 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3150 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3151 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3153 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3154 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3160 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3161 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3162 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3163 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3165 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3166 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3168 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3169 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3170 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3172 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3173 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3174 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3175 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3176 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3177 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3178 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3182 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3184 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3187 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3188 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3189 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3190 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3191 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3192 macro_rules! return_err {
3193 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3195 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3196 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3197 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3198 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3199 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3200 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3201 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3202 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3203 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3207 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3208 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3209 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3210 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3211 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3217 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3219 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3220 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3221 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3222 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3225 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3226 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3227 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3228 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3229 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3231 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3234 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3235 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3236 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3237 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3238 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3244 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3245 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3246 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3248 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3249 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3250 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3252 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3253 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3254 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3255 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3256 return Err(LightningError {
3257 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3258 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3261 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3262 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3264 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3265 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3266 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3269 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3270 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3271 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3272 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3274 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3275 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3276 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3278 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3279 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3280 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3281 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3282 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3283 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3284 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3288 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3291 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3292 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3293 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3294 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3296 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3297 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3298 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3299 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3300 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3303 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3304 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3306 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3307 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3308 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3309 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3310 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3311 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3312 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3313 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3315 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3316 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3317 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3319 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3321 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3328 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3329 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3330 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3331 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3336 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3337 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3338 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3341 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3342 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3343 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3344 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3346 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3347 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3348 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3350 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3351 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3355 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3356 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3358 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3359 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3360 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3362 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3365 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3367 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3368 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3370 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3371 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3372 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3373 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3374 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3375 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3376 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3377 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3378 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3379 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3381 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3382 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3383 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3384 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3386 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3387 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3389 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3390 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3391 Some(monitor_update) => {
3392 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3394 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3395 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3396 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3397 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3398 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3399 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3400 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3408 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3411 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3412 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3413 // `channel_by_id` map.
3414 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3415 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3419 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3420 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3422 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3427 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3429 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3430 /// fields for more info.
3432 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3433 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3435 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3437 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3438 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3439 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3440 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3441 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3443 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3444 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3445 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3446 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3447 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3449 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3450 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3451 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3452 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3454 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3456 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3457 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3458 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3460 /// In general, a path may raise:
3461 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3462 /// node public key) is specified.
3463 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3464 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3465 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3466 /// relevant updates.
3468 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3469 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3470 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3472 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3473 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3474 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3475 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3476 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3477 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3478 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3479 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3480 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3481 self.pending_outbound_payments
3482 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3483 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3484 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3487 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3488 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3489 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3490 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3491 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3492 self.pending_outbound_payments
3493 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3494 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3495 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3496 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3500 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3501 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3502 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3503 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3504 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3505 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3509 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3510 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3511 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3515 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3516 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3519 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3520 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3521 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3522 self.pending_outbound_payments
3523 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3524 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3525 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3526 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3527 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3531 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3532 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3533 /// retries are exhausted.
3535 /// # Event Generation
3537 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3538 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3540 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3541 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3542 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3544 /// # Requested Invoices
3546 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3547 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3548 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3549 /// once the invoice has been received.
3551 /// # Restart Behavior
3553 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3554 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3555 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3557 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3558 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3559 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3560 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3563 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3564 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3565 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3566 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3567 /// never reach the recipient.
3569 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3570 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3572 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3573 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3575 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3576 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3577 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3578 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3579 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3580 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3581 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3584 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3585 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3587 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3590 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3591 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3592 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3593 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3594 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3595 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3596 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3597 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3600 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3601 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3602 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3603 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3604 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3605 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3606 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3607 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3608 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3611 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3614 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3615 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3618 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3619 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3621 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3622 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3623 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3624 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3625 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3626 let payment_params =
3627 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3629 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3631 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3634 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3635 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3637 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3638 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3639 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3640 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3642 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3643 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3644 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3645 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3646 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3647 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3648 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3649 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3650 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3651 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3653 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3654 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3655 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3656 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3660 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3662 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3663 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3666 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3668 let mut res = Vec::new();
3670 for mut path in route.paths {
3671 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3672 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3673 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3674 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3675 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3678 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3681 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3682 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3684 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3686 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3687 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3692 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3695 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3700 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3701 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3702 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3704 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3705 let used_liquidity =
3706 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3708 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3709 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3711 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3714 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3719 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3720 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3721 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3728 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3729 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3730 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3731 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3732 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3733 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3734 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3735 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3736 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3738 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3739 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3741 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3742 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3743 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3745 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3746 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3747 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3748 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3749 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3750 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3751 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3752 } else { unreachable!(); });
3754 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3755 Err((chan, err)) => {
3756 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3757 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3758 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3759 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3760 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3766 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3767 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3769 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3770 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3773 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3774 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3775 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3779 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3780 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3781 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3785 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3786 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3787 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3789 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3790 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3791 if outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3792 panic!("outpoint_to_peer map already contained funding outpoint, which shouldn't be possible");
3794 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3801 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3802 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3803 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3807 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3809 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3810 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3812 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3813 /// across the p2p network.
3815 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3816 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3818 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3819 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3820 /// keys per-channel).
3822 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3823 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3824 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3826 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3827 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3828 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3830 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3831 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3832 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3833 /// for more details.
3835 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3836 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3837 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3838 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3841 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3843 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3844 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3846 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3847 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3848 /// signature for each channel.
3850 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3851 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3852 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3853 let mut result = Ok(());
3855 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3856 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3857 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3858 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3859 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3864 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3865 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3866 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3870 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3871 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3872 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3873 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3874 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3875 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3876 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3877 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3879 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3880 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3885 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3886 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3887 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3888 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3892 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3893 match states.entry(txid) {
3894 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3895 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3896 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3900 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3903 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3904 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3905 temporary_channel_id,
3906 counterparty_node_id,
3907 funding_transaction.clone(),
3910 let mut output_index = None;
3911 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3912 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3913 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3914 if output_index.is_some() {
3915 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3916 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3919 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3922 if output_index.is_none() {
3923 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3924 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3927 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3928 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3929 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3935 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3936 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3937 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3938 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3939 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3940 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3941 .into_iter().flatten()
3942 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3944 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3945 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3947 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3949 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3950 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3951 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3952 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3953 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3955 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3956 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
3957 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3961 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3962 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3968 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3970 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3971 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3972 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3973 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3975 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3976 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3978 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3979 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3981 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3983 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3984 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3985 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3986 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3987 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3988 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3989 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3990 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3991 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3992 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3993 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3994 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3995 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3999 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4000 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4001 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4002 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4003 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4004 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4005 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4006 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4007 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4008 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4012 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4013 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4014 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4015 config.apply(config_update);
4016 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4019 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4020 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4021 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4022 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4023 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4024 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4031 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4032 debug_assert!(false);
4033 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4035 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4036 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4043 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4045 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4046 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4047 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4048 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4050 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4051 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4053 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4054 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4056 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4058 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4059 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4060 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4061 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4062 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4063 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4064 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4065 pub fn update_channel_config(
4066 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4067 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4068 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4071 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4072 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4074 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4075 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4077 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4078 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4079 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4080 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4081 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4083 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4084 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4085 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4088 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4091 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4092 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4093 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4094 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4095 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4096 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4097 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4099 let next_hop_scid = {
4100 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4101 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4102 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4103 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4104 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4105 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4106 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4107 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4108 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4109 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4112 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4114 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4115 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4116 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4119 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4120 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4121 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4122 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4123 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4130 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4131 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4132 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4135 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4136 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4137 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4138 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4141 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4143 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4144 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4145 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4146 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4147 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4150 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4151 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4152 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4153 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4154 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4156 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4160 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4161 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4163 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4166 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4167 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4168 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4170 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4171 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4172 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4175 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4176 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4177 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4178 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4179 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4180 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4181 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4182 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4183 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4186 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4187 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4188 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4189 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4194 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4196 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4197 /// Will likely generate further events.
4198 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4199 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4201 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4202 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4203 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4205 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4206 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4208 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4209 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4210 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4211 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4213 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4214 match forward_info {
4215 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4216 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4217 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4218 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4219 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4222 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4223 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4224 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4225 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4227 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4228 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4229 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4230 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4231 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4232 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4233 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4234 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4237 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4238 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4240 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4243 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4244 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4250 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4251 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4253 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4257 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4258 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4260 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4264 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4265 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4266 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4267 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4268 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4269 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4270 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4273 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4274 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4275 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4276 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4277 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4279 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4281 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4282 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4286 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4287 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4288 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4289 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4290 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4291 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4293 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4294 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4300 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4303 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4306 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4307 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4308 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4309 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4310 // problem, not ours.
4316 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4317 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4318 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4320 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4324 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4325 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4326 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4327 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4328 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4331 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4332 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4333 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4334 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4335 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4336 match forward_info {
4337 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4338 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4339 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4340 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4341 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4342 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4343 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4346 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4347 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4348 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4349 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4350 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4351 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4352 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4353 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4354 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4355 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
4357 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4358 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4359 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4360 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4361 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4362 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4365 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4366 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4367 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4370 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4371 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4373 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4375 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4376 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4377 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4378 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4383 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4384 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4386 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4387 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4388 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4389 htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger
4391 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4392 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4394 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4396 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4397 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4398 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4402 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4403 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4404 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &self.logger) {
4405 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4406 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4408 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_malformed_htlc() were not met");
4410 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4411 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4412 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4419 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4423 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4424 match forward_info {
4425 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4426 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4427 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4428 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4429 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4432 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4433 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4434 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4435 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4436 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4438 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4439 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4440 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4441 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4442 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4444 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4445 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4446 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4450 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4451 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4454 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4457 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4458 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4459 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4460 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4461 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4462 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4463 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4464 phantom_shared_secret,
4467 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4468 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4469 // if routing nodes overpay
4470 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4471 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4473 total_value_received: None,
4474 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4477 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4480 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4482 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4483 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4484 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4485 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4486 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4487 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4489 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4490 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4491 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4492 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4493 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4494 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4495 phantom_shared_secret,
4498 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4499 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4501 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4504 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4505 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4506 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4507 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4508 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4511 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4512 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4513 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4514 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4515 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4516 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4518 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4519 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4520 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4522 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4523 .entry(payment_hash)
4524 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4525 .or_insert_with(|| {
4526 committed_to_claimable = true;
4528 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4531 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4532 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4533 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4534 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4536 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4537 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4538 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4540 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4541 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4542 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4545 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4547 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4548 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4549 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4550 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4551 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4552 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4553 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4554 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4555 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4556 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4558 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4560 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4561 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4562 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4563 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4564 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4565 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4567 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4568 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4569 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4570 committed_to_claimable = true;
4572 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4573 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4574 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4575 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4576 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4577 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4578 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4579 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4580 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4581 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4585 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4586 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4587 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4588 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4589 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4591 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4593 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4594 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4596 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4597 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4598 committed_to_claimable = true;
4601 payment_claimable_generated
4605 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4606 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4607 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4608 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4609 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4610 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4611 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4612 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4613 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4614 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4615 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4616 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4617 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4618 Ok(result) => result,
4620 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4621 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4624 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4625 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4626 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4627 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4628 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4629 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4632 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4633 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4634 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4636 check_total_value!(purpose);
4638 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4639 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4640 check_total_value!(purpose);
4644 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4645 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4646 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4647 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4649 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4650 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4651 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4652 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4653 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4654 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4655 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4656 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4658 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4659 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4660 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4662 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4663 if payment_claimable_generated {
4664 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4670 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4671 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4679 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4680 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4681 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4682 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4684 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4685 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4687 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4689 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4690 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4691 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4693 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4695 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4696 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4697 events.append(&mut new_events);
4700 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4702 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4703 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4704 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4706 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4708 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4709 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4710 if background_events.is_empty() {
4711 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4714 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4716 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4717 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4718 // monitor updating completing.
4719 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4721 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4722 let mut updated_chan = false;
4724 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4725 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4726 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4727 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4728 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4729 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4730 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4731 updated_chan = true;
4732 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4733 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4735 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4738 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4743 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4744 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4747 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4748 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4749 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4750 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4751 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4752 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4753 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4755 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4756 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4757 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4758 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4759 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4765 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4768 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4769 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4770 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4771 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4772 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4775 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4776 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4778 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4780 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4781 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4782 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4783 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4784 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4786 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4788 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4789 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4790 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4791 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4793 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4794 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4796 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4797 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4801 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4802 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4803 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4804 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4805 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4806 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4807 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4809 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4810 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4812 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4813 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4814 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4815 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4816 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4817 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4819 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4824 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4825 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4833 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4835 /// This currently includes:
4836 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4837 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4838 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4840 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4841 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4842 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4843 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4844 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4845 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4846 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4847 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4849 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4850 /// estimate fetches.
4852 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4853 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4854 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4855 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4856 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4858 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4859 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4861 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4862 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4863 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4864 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4866 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4867 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4868 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4869 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4870 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4871 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4873 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4874 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4875 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4877 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4878 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4879 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4880 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4881 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4882 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4883 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4884 channel_id: *chan_id,
4885 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4896 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4897 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4898 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4899 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4900 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4901 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4902 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4904 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4905 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4910 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4911 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4913 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4914 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4915 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4916 if needs_close { return false; }
4919 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4920 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4921 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4922 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4923 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4924 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4925 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4926 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4928 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4929 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4930 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4931 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4935 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4937 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4940 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4942 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4943 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4944 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4945 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4949 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4951 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4957 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4959 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4960 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4961 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4962 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4963 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4964 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4965 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4966 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4967 channel_id: *chan_id,
4968 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4976 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4977 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4978 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4980 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4981 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4982 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4987 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4988 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4989 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
4990 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4991 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4992 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4993 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4994 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4995 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5001 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5003 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5004 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5009 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5010 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5011 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5012 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5013 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5014 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5015 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5016 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5017 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5018 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5019 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5020 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5021 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5022 // have no channels to the peer.
5023 let remove_entry = {
5024 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5025 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5028 entry.remove_entry();
5031 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5036 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5037 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5038 // This should be unreachable
5039 debug_assert!(false);
5042 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5043 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5044 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5045 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5046 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5047 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5048 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5051 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5052 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5053 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5055 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5056 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5063 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5064 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5065 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5066 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5067 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5070 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5071 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5074 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5075 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5078 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5079 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5080 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5081 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5082 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5083 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5084 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5087 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5088 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5091 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5092 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5093 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5094 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5095 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5102 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5103 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5104 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5106 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5107 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5108 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5109 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5111 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5112 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5113 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5114 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5115 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5116 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5119 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5120 /// reason for the failure.
5122 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5123 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5124 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5126 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5127 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5128 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5129 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5130 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5131 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5132 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5137 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5138 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5139 match failure_code {
5140 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5141 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5142 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5143 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5144 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5145 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5147 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5148 let fail_data = match data {
5149 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5152 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5157 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5158 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5160 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5162 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5163 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5164 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5165 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5166 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5167 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5168 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5170 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5172 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5173 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5175 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5180 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5181 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5182 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5183 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5184 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5185 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5186 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5187 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5188 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5189 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5191 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5192 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5193 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5194 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5196 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5197 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5198 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5199 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5200 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5204 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5205 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5206 // be surfaced to the user.
5207 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5208 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5209 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5211 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5212 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5213 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5214 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5215 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5216 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5217 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5218 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5219 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5221 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5222 debug_assert!(false);
5223 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5226 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5228 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5231 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5232 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5233 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5234 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5238 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5239 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5240 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5241 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5242 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5243 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5244 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5245 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5246 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5247 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5250 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5251 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5252 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5255 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5256 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5257 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5259 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5260 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5261 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5262 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5263 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5265 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5266 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5267 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5270 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5271 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5272 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5274 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5275 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5276 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5277 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5278 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5280 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5282 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5283 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5285 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5286 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5290 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5291 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5293 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5297 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5298 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5299 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5300 push_forward_ev = true;
5302 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5303 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5304 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5306 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5307 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5310 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5311 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5312 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5313 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5314 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5315 failed_next_destination: destination,
5321 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5322 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5324 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5325 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5326 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5327 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5329 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5330 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5331 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5332 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5334 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5335 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5336 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5338 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5339 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5340 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5341 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5342 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5343 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5344 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5345 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5346 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5349 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5350 /// even type numbers.
5354 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5355 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5357 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5358 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5359 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5362 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5363 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5365 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5368 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5369 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5370 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5371 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5372 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5373 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5374 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5375 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5380 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5381 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5382 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5383 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5384 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5386 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5387 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5388 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5392 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5393 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5394 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5395 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5396 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5397 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5398 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5399 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5400 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5401 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5402 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5411 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5413 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5414 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5415 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5416 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5417 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5418 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5419 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5420 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5421 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5422 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5423 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5424 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5425 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5426 debug_assert!(false);
5430 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5432 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5433 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5434 debug_assert!(false);
5438 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5439 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5441 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5442 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5443 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5444 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5447 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5448 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5449 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5450 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5454 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5455 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5456 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5457 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5458 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5459 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5460 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5463 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5464 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5465 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5466 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5467 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5468 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5473 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5474 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5475 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5476 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5477 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5478 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5479 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5481 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5484 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5485 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5486 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5487 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5491 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5492 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5493 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5494 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5496 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5497 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5498 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5499 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5501 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5502 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5503 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5504 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5507 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5508 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5509 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5510 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5514 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5515 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5516 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5519 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5520 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5521 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5522 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5523 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5524 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5525 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5526 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5529 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5530 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5531 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5533 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5536 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5537 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5539 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5540 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5541 // monitor update as a background event.
5542 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5543 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5544 counterparty_node_id,
5545 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5546 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5550 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5551 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5556 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5558 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5560 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5561 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5562 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5563 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5564 blocking_action: blocker,
5566 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5568 debug_assert!(false,
5569 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5572 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5573 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5574 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5575 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5576 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5578 let mut found_blocker = false;
5579 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5580 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5581 // which case we need to only remove the one
5582 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5583 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5584 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5585 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5587 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5590 debug_assert!(false);
5599 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5600 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5601 counterparty_node_id: None,
5602 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5608 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5609 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5610 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5611 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5612 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5613 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5614 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5615 // again on restart.
5616 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5617 payment_preimage, update_res);
5620 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5621 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5623 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5624 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5625 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5626 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5627 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5628 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5629 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5630 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5631 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5632 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5635 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5636 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5637 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5638 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5639 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5640 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5644 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5645 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5648 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5649 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5650 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5653 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5654 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5655 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5656 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5657 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5659 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5660 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5661 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5663 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5664 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5667 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5668 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5669 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5670 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5671 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5672 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5673 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5674 let chan_to_release =
5675 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5676 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5678 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5679 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5680 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5681 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5686 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5687 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5688 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5689 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5690 // in the background.
5691 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5692 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5693 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5694 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5696 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5697 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5698 funding_txo, update, ..
5700 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5701 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5702 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5703 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5705 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5711 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5712 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5713 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5715 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5716 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5718 monitor_update.updates[0],
5719 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5724 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5725 // immediately once we get going.
5726 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5729 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5731 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5734 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5735 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5736 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5737 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5738 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5739 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5743 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5744 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5745 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5748 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5749 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5751 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5752 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5753 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5754 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5756 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5760 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5761 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5762 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5768 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5769 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5770 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5773 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5774 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5775 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5776 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5778 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5780 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5781 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5782 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5784 payment_purpose: purpose,
5787 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5789 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5793 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5795 sender_intended_total_msat,
5799 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5800 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5802 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5803 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5804 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5807 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5808 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5810 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5811 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5812 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5813 Some(blocking_action),
5820 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5821 /// update completion.
5822 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5823 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5824 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5825 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5826 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5827 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5828 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5829 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5830 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5831 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5832 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5833 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5834 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5835 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5837 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5839 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5840 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5841 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5842 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5845 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5846 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5848 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5849 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5850 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5855 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5856 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5857 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5858 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5863 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5864 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5865 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5866 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5867 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5872 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5876 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5882 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5883 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5884 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5888 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5889 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5890 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5896 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5897 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5899 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5900 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5902 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5903 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
5904 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5905 match outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_txo) {
5906 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5911 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5912 let mut peer_state_lock;
5913 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5914 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5915 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5916 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5918 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5921 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5922 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5923 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5924 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5925 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5928 let remaining_in_flight =
5929 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5930 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5933 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5934 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5935 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5936 remaining_in_flight);
5937 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5940 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5943 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5945 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5946 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5949 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5950 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5951 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5953 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5954 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5955 /// used to accept such channels.
5957 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5958 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5959 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5960 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5963 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5964 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5966 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5967 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5968 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5970 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5971 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5973 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5974 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5976 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5977 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5979 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5980 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5981 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5982 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5985 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5986 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5988 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5989 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5990 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5991 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5992 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5993 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5994 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5995 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5997 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5998 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5999 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6001 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6002 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6003 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6004 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6005 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6006 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6007 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
6009 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
6013 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6014 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6015 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6016 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6017 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6018 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6019 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6022 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6023 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
6025 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6026 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6027 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6028 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6029 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6030 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6031 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6032 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6035 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6036 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
6040 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6041 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6042 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6044 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6045 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6046 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6049 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6054 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6055 /// or 0-conf channels.
6057 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6058 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6059 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6060 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6061 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6062 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6064 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6065 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6066 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6067 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6068 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6069 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6070 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6074 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6077 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6078 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6080 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6081 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6083 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6084 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6085 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6086 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6087 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6089 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6092 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6093 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6094 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6097 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6098 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6103 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6106 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6107 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6108 // likely to be lost on restart!
6109 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6110 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6113 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6114 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6117 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6118 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6119 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6120 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6121 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6123 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6124 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6126 debug_assert!(false);
6127 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6129 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6130 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6132 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6133 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6134 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6135 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6136 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6137 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6139 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6140 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6141 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6144 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6145 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6146 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6147 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6148 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6151 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6152 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6154 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6157 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6158 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6159 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6160 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6161 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6162 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6163 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6164 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6165 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6167 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6168 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6169 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6174 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6175 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6176 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6177 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6178 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6179 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6180 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6183 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6188 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6189 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6190 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6192 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6193 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6196 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6197 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6199 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6200 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6201 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6203 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6207 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6208 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6209 // likely to be lost on restart!
6210 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6211 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6212 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6214 debug_assert!(false);
6215 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6217 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6218 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6219 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6220 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6221 match phase.get_mut() {
6222 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6223 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6224 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6227 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6231 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6234 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6235 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6236 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6237 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6238 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6240 user_channel_id: user_id,
6245 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6246 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6248 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6249 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6251 debug_assert!(false);
6252 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6255 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6256 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6257 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6258 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6259 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6260 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6261 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6263 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6264 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6265 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6266 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6267 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6268 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6269 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6270 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6271 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6275 Some(mut phase) => {
6276 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6277 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6278 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6280 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6283 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6285 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6286 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6287 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6288 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6289 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6290 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6292 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6293 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6294 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6297 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6298 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6299 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6301 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6302 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6303 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6304 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6305 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6308 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6309 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6310 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6311 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6313 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6314 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6315 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6316 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6317 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6318 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6319 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6324 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6325 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6326 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6328 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6332 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6333 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6334 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6342 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6343 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6344 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6345 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6347 debug_assert!(false);
6348 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6351 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6352 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6353 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6354 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6355 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6356 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6357 let logger = WithContext::from(
6359 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6360 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6363 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6365 Ok((chan, monitor)) => {
6366 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6367 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6368 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6369 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6370 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6371 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6372 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6373 } else { unreachable!(); }
6376 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6377 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6381 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6382 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6383 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6384 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6385 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6386 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6390 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6393 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6397 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6398 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6399 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6400 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6401 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6403 debug_assert!(false);
6404 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6406 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6407 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6408 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6409 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6410 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6411 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6412 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6413 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6414 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6415 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6416 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6417 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6418 msg: announcement_sigs,
6420 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6421 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6422 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6423 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6424 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6425 // announcement_signatures.
6426 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6427 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6428 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6429 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6436 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6437 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6442 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6443 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6446 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6447 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6452 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6453 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6454 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6456 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6457 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6459 debug_assert!(false);
6460 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6462 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6463 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6464 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6465 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6467 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6468 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6469 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6470 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6472 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6475 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6476 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6477 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6478 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6480 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6481 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6482 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6483 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6484 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6485 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6489 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6490 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6491 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6492 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6495 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6496 let context = phase.context_mut();
6497 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6498 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6499 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6500 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6504 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6507 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6508 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6509 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6510 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6512 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6513 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6519 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6520 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6521 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6523 debug_assert!(false);
6524 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6526 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6527 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6528 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6529 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6530 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6531 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6532 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6533 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6534 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6535 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6536 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6541 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6542 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6543 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6544 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6545 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6546 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6547 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6549 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6550 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6553 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6556 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6557 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6558 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6559 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6561 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6562 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6563 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6564 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6565 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6570 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6571 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6572 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6577 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6578 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6579 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6580 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6582 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6583 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6584 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6585 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6587 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6588 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6590 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6591 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6592 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6594 debug_assert!(false);
6595 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6597 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6598 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6599 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6600 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6601 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6602 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6603 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6604 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6605 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6606 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6608 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6610 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6611 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6612 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6613 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6614 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6615 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6616 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6617 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6621 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6622 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6623 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6624 match pending_forward_info {
6625 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6626 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6628 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6629 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6630 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6631 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6632 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6634 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6635 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6636 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6637 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6638 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6641 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6643 _ => pending_forward_info
6646 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6647 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6649 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6650 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6653 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6658 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6660 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6661 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6662 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6664 debug_assert!(false);
6665 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6667 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6668 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6669 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6670 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6671 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6672 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6673 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6674 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6676 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6678 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6679 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6680 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6682 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6683 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6684 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6685 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6686 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6687 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6688 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6691 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6692 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6695 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6698 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6702 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6703 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6704 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6705 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6706 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6708 debug_assert!(false);
6709 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6711 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6712 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6713 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6714 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6715 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6716 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6718 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6719 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6727 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6728 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6729 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6730 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6731 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6733 debug_assert!(false);
6734 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6736 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6737 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6738 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6739 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6740 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6741 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6742 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6744 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6745 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6747 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6748 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6752 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6756 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6757 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6758 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6760 debug_assert!(false);
6761 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6763 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6764 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6765 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6766 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6767 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6768 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6769 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6770 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6771 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6772 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6773 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6777 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6778 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6786 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6787 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6788 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6789 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6790 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6791 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6792 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6793 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6794 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6795 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6796 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6798 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6799 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6801 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6802 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6803 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6805 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6806 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6808 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6809 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6810 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6812 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6813 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6814 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6815 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6816 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6817 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6818 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6819 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6820 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6823 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6824 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6826 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6827 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6828 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6829 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6830 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6831 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6832 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6833 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6834 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6835 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6836 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6839 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6840 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6841 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6846 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6847 // payments are being processed.
6848 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6849 push_forward_event = true;
6851 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6852 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6859 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6860 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6863 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6864 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6865 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6867 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6871 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6872 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6873 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6874 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6875 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6877 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6878 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6879 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6880 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6881 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6882 // real by taking more time.
6883 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6884 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6885 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6890 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6891 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6892 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6893 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6894 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6895 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6896 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6898 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6899 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6900 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6901 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6902 channel_funding_outpoint,
6903 counterparty_node_id,
6908 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6909 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6910 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6912 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6913 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6914 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6915 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6917 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6918 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6919 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6925 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6926 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6927 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6928 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6930 debug_assert!(false);
6931 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6932 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6933 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6934 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6935 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6936 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6937 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6938 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6939 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6940 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6941 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6942 *counterparty_node_id)
6944 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6945 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6946 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6947 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6948 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6949 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6950 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6954 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6955 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6958 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6961 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6965 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6966 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6967 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6969 debug_assert!(false);
6970 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6972 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6973 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6974 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6975 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6976 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6977 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6978 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6980 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6981 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6984 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6989 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6990 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6991 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6993 debug_assert!(false);
6994 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6996 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6997 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6998 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6999 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7000 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7001 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7002 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7005 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7006 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7007 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
7008 msg, &self.default_configuration
7009 ), chan_phase_entry),
7010 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7011 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7012 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7015 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7016 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7019 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7024 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7025 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7026 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7027 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7029 // It's not a local channel
7030 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7033 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7034 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7035 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7036 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7038 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7039 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7040 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7041 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7042 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7043 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7044 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7045 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7046 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7047 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7048 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7050 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7052 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7053 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7054 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7055 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7057 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7058 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7059 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7060 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7063 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7067 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7068 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7071 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7073 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7076 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7078 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7079 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7081 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7083 debug_assert!(false);
7084 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7085 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7089 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7090 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7091 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7092 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7093 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7094 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7095 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7096 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7097 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7098 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7099 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7100 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7101 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7102 let mut channel_update = None;
7103 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7104 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7105 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7108 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7109 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7110 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7111 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7112 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7113 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7114 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7119 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7120 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7121 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7122 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7123 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7124 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7128 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7129 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7132 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7133 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7135 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7136 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7137 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7138 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7139 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7140 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7142 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7143 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7144 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7145 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7146 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7147 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7148 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7149 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7150 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7151 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7152 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7153 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7154 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7155 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7156 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7157 next_funding_txid: None,
7160 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7161 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7162 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7168 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7169 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7170 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7171 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7174 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7175 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7180 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7181 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7182 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7184 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7185 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7186 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7187 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7188 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7189 match monitor_event {
7190 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7191 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7192 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7193 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7194 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7196 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7197 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7198 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7199 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7202 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7203 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7204 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7206 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7207 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7208 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7209 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7212 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7213 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7214 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7215 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7216 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7217 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7218 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7219 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7220 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
7221 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7222 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7226 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7227 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7228 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7229 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7237 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7238 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7244 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7245 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7248 has_pending_monitor_events
7251 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7252 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7253 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7255 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7256 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7257 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7260 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7261 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7262 /// update was applied.
7263 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7264 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7265 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7267 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7268 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7269 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7270 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7272 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7273 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7275 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7276 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7277 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7278 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7280 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7281 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7282 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7283 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7284 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7285 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7287 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7288 has_monitor_update = true;
7290 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7291 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7292 continue 'peer_loop;
7301 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7302 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7303 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7309 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7310 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7312 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7313 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7315 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7316 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7317 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7318 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7320 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7321 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7323 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7324 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7325 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7326 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7331 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7332 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7337 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7338 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7341 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7342 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7343 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7349 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7353 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7354 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7355 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7356 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7357 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7358 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7359 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7363 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7364 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7365 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7366 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7367 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7373 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7374 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7375 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7376 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7377 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7378 let mut has_update = false;
7379 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7381 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7383 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7384 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7385 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7386 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7387 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7389 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7390 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7391 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7392 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7393 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7395 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7396 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7399 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7400 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7401 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7403 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7404 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7405 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7406 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7407 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7412 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7413 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7414 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7420 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7421 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7426 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7432 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7433 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7436 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7437 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7443 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7444 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7446 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7447 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7448 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7449 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7450 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7451 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7452 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7453 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7454 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7455 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7456 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7457 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7458 assert!(should_broadcast);
7459 } else { unreachable!(); }
7460 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7461 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7462 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7465 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7469 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7470 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7471 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7475 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7476 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7477 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7478 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7479 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7481 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7485 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7490 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7492 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7494 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7495 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7496 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7497 &self, description: String
7498 ) -> Result<OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7499 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7500 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7501 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7502 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7504 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7505 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7506 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7508 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7514 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7515 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7519 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7520 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7522 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7523 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7524 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7527 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7528 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7529 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7531 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7532 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7536 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7537 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7538 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7539 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7540 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7542 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7546 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7547 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7552 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7553 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7554 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7556 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7558 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7559 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7560 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7561 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7562 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7563 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7564 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7565 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7566 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7567 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7568 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7569 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7571 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7572 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7573 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7575 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7576 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7579 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7580 self.pending_outbound_payments
7581 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7582 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7584 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7589 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7590 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7591 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7593 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7594 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7595 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7596 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7597 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7598 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7599 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7601 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7602 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7606 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7607 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7610 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7611 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7612 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7616 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7617 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7618 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7619 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7623 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7624 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7625 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7630 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7631 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7632 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7635 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7636 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7637 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7638 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7639 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7640 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7641 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7642 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7643 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7644 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7645 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7646 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7647 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7648 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7649 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7652 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7653 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7654 let builder = match quantity {
7656 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7658 let builder = match amount_msats {
7660 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7662 let builder = match payer_note {
7664 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7666 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7667 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7669 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7670 self.pending_outbound_payments
7671 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7672 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7674 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7676 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7677 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7678 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7679 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7680 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7683 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7685 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7686 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7687 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7688 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7689 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7690 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7691 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7692 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7693 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7695 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7702 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7705 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7706 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7707 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7711 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7712 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7713 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7714 /// received and no retries will be made.
7718 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply
7719 /// path for the invoice.
7721 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7722 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7723 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7724 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7725 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7727 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7728 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7730 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7731 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7732 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7733 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7735 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7736 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7737 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7739 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7740 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7741 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7743 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7744 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7745 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7747 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7748 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7749 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7751 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7752 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7753 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7754 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7755 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7758 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7760 for path in refund.paths() {
7761 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7762 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7763 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7764 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7766 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7772 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7776 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7779 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7780 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7782 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7783 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7784 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7785 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7787 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7789 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7790 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7794 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7795 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7797 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7799 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7800 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7802 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7803 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7804 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7805 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7806 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7807 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7808 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7809 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7810 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7811 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7812 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7815 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7816 /// stored external to LDK.
7818 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7819 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7820 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7822 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7823 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7826 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7827 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7828 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7829 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7831 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7832 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7833 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7834 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7835 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7837 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7838 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7839 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7840 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7841 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7843 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7844 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7846 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7847 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7851 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7852 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7854 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7856 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7857 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7859 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7860 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7861 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7862 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7863 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7864 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7865 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7868 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7869 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7871 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7872 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7873 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7876 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
7878 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
7879 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
7880 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
7881 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7882 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7884 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
7886 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
7887 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
7888 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
7891 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, entropy_source, secp_ctx)
7892 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
7895 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
7896 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
7897 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
7898 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7899 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
7900 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7901 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7903 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
7904 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7905 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
7906 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7907 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7909 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7911 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7914 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
7915 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7919 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7920 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7922 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7923 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7924 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7925 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7927 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7928 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7929 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7930 Some(_) => continue,
7931 None => return scid_candidate
7936 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7938 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7939 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7941 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7942 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7943 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7947 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7948 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7949 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7951 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7952 /// times to get a unique scid.
7953 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7954 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7955 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7957 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7958 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7959 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7960 return scid_candidate
7964 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7965 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7966 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7967 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7969 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7970 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7971 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7972 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7973 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7974 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7976 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7977 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7978 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7987 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7988 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7989 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7990 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7991 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7995 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7996 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7997 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7998 events.push_back((event, None));
8002 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8003 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8004 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8008 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8009 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8013 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8014 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8017 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8018 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8019 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8020 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8021 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8022 let logger = WithContext::from(
8023 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8026 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8027 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8028 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8029 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8030 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8031 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8032 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8033 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8035 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8039 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8040 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
8041 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8042 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8043 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8044 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8045 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8049 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
8050 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8051 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8052 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8053 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8054 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8055 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8056 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8057 if further_update_exists {
8058 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8063 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8064 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8070 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8071 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8077 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8078 for action in actions {
8080 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8081 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
8083 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
8089 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8090 /// using the given event handler.
8092 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8093 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8097 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8101 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8103 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8104 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8105 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8106 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8107 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8108 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8112 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8113 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8114 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8115 /// is always placed next to each other.
8117 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8118 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8119 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8120 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8122 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8123 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8124 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8125 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8126 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8127 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8128 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8130 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8131 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8132 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8133 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8136 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8137 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8139 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8140 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8143 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8144 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8145 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8146 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8147 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8148 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8149 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8153 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8154 events.replace(pending_events);
8163 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8165 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8166 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8167 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8168 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8169 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8170 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8174 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8176 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8177 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8178 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8180 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8184 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8186 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8187 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8188 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8189 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8190 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8191 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8195 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8197 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8198 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8199 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8200 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8201 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8204 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8205 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8208 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8209 let _persistence_guard =
8210 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8211 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8212 let new_height = height - 1;
8214 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8215 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8216 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8217 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8218 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8219 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8222 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8226 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8228 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8229 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8230 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8231 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8232 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8233 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8237 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8238 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8239 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8240 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8242 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8243 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8245 let _persistence_guard =
8246 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8247 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8248 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8249 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8251 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8252 if height < last_best_block_height {
8253 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8254 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8258 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8259 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8260 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8261 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8263 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8264 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8266 let _persistence_guard =
8267 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8268 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8269 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8271 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8273 macro_rules! max_time {
8274 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8276 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8277 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8278 // having an explicit local time source.
8279 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8280 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8281 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8282 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8283 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8289 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8290 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8291 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8292 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8296 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8297 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8298 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8299 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8300 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8301 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8302 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8303 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8304 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8305 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8306 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8313 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8314 let _persistence_guard =
8315 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8316 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8317 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8318 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8319 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8320 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8321 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8322 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8327 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8329 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8330 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8331 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8332 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8333 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8334 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8338 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8339 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8341 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8342 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8343 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8344 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8345 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8347 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8348 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8350 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8351 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8352 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8353 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8354 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8355 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8357 // Retain unfunded channels.
8358 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8359 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8360 let res = f(channel);
8361 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8362 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8363 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8364 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8365 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8367 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8368 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8369 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8370 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8371 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8372 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8373 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8374 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8379 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8384 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8385 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8388 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8389 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8390 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8391 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8392 msg: announcement_sigs,
8394 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8395 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8396 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8398 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8399 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8400 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8405 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8406 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8407 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8408 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8409 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8410 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8411 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8412 // is always consistent.
8413 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8414 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8415 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8416 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8417 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8420 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8421 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8422 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8423 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8424 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8425 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8426 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8427 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8431 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8432 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8433 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8434 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8435 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8436 data: reason_message,
8449 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8450 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8451 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8452 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8453 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8454 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8455 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8456 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8457 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8458 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8460 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8461 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8462 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8466 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8469 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8470 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8471 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8472 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8473 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8474 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8475 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8476 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8477 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8478 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8479 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8482 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8483 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8484 _ => unreachable!(),
8486 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8487 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8488 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8489 let logger = WithContext::from(
8490 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8492 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8498 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8500 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8501 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8505 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8506 /// may have events that need processing.
8508 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8509 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8511 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8512 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8513 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8514 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8517 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8518 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8519 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8522 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8523 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8524 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8527 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8528 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8529 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8530 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8533 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8534 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8535 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8536 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8539 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8540 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8542 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8543 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8544 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8545 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8546 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8549 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8550 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8551 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8552 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8555 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8556 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8557 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8558 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8561 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8562 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8563 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8564 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8567 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8568 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8569 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8570 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8574 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8575 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8577 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8578 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8579 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8580 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8581 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8582 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8586 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8587 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8588 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8589 // change to the contents.
8590 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8591 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8592 let persist = match &res {
8593 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8594 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8595 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8597 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8599 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8604 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8605 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8606 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8607 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8610 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8611 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8612 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8613 // change to the contents.
8614 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8615 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8616 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8620 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8621 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8622 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8623 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8626 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8627 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8628 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8631 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8632 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8633 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8636 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8637 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8638 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8639 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8640 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8641 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8642 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8643 let persist = match &res {
8644 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8645 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8647 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8652 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8653 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8654 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8655 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8658 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8659 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8660 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8661 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8664 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8665 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8666 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8667 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8670 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8671 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8672 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8673 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8676 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8677 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8678 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8681 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8682 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8683 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8686 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8687 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8688 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8689 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8690 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8691 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8692 let persist = match &res {
8693 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8694 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8695 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8697 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8702 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8703 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8704 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8707 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8708 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8709 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8710 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8711 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8712 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8713 let persist = match &res {
8714 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8715 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8716 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8718 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8723 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8724 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8725 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8726 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8727 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8728 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8729 let persist = match &res {
8730 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8731 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8732 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8734 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8739 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8740 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8741 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8744 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8745 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8746 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8749 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8750 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8751 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8752 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8753 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8754 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8755 let persist = match &res {
8756 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8757 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8758 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8760 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8765 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8766 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8767 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8770 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8771 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8772 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8775 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8780 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8781 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8782 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8783 let persist = match &res {
8784 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8785 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8786 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8788 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8793 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8794 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8795 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8796 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8797 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8800 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8801 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8802 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8804 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8805 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8806 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8807 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8808 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8809 let context = match phase {
8810 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8811 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8812 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8813 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8818 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8819 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8822 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8826 // Clean up for removal.
8827 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8828 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
8831 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8832 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8833 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8834 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8836 // V1 Channel Establishment
8837 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8838 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8839 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8840 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8841 // V2 Channel Establishment
8842 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8843 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8844 // Common Channel Establishment
8845 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8846 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8848 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8850 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8851 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8852 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8853 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8854 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8855 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8856 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8857 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8858 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8859 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8860 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8861 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8862 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8863 // Channel Operations
8864 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8865 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8866 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8867 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8868 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8869 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8871 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8872 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8873 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8874 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8875 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8876 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8877 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8878 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8879 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8882 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8883 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8884 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8885 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8888 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8890 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8892 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8893 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8897 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8898 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8899 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8900 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8904 let mut res = Ok(());
8906 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8907 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8908 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8909 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8910 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8911 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8912 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8915 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8916 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8917 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8918 if inbound_peer_limited {
8920 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8922 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8923 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8924 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8925 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8926 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8927 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8928 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8929 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8933 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8934 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8935 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8937 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8938 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8939 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8940 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8943 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8946 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8947 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8952 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8954 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8955 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8956 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8957 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8958 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8960 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8961 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8962 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8963 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8964 // worry about closing and removing them.
8965 debug_assert!(false);
8969 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8970 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8971 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8972 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
8977 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8978 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8983 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8984 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8986 match &msg.data as &str {
8987 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8988 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8990 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8991 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8992 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8993 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8994 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8995 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8996 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8997 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8998 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8999 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9000 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9001 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9002 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9003 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9004 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9005 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9009 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9010 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9011 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9012 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9013 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9014 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9016 log_level: Level::Trace,
9026 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9027 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9028 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9029 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9030 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9031 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9032 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9033 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9034 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9035 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9036 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9038 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9039 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9040 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9044 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9045 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9046 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9047 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9048 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9049 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9050 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9051 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9052 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9053 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9061 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9062 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9066 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9067 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9070 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9071 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9074 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9075 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9078 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9079 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9080 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9081 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9084 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9085 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9086 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9087 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9090 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9091 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9092 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9093 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9096 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9097 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9098 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9099 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9102 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9103 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9104 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9105 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9108 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9109 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9110 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9111 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9114 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9115 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9116 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9117 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9120 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9121 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9122 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9123 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9126 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9127 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9128 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9129 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9133 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9134 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9136 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9137 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9138 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9139 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9140 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9141 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9145 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9146 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9147 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9150 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9151 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9154 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9155 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9157 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9158 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9160 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9161 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9165 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9166 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9167 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9169 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9171 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9172 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9176 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9177 amount_msats, payment_secret
9179 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9181 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9182 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9186 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9187 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9188 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9191 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9192 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9193 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9194 payment_paths, payment_hash
9196 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9197 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9198 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9200 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9201 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9202 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9205 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9206 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9207 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9208 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9209 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9211 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9212 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9214 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9215 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9216 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9217 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9219 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9220 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9224 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9225 Err(error) => Some(error),
9229 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9230 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9232 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9234 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9235 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9238 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9240 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9247 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9248 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9254 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9255 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9259 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9260 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9261 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9262 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9263 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9267 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9268 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9270 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9271 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9272 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9273 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9274 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9277 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9278 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9279 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9280 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9283 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9284 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9285 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9286 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9289 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9290 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9291 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9292 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9295 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9296 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9297 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9298 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9299 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9300 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9301 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9302 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9303 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9304 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9305 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9306 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9307 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9308 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9309 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9310 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9311 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9312 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9313 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9314 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9319 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9320 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9322 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9323 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9324 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9325 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9328 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9329 (2, node_id, required),
9330 (4, features, required),
9331 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9332 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9333 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9334 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9337 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9338 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9339 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9340 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9341 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9342 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9343 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9344 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9345 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9346 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9347 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9348 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9349 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9350 (7, self.config, option),
9351 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9352 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9353 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9354 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9355 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9356 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9357 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9358 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9359 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9360 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9361 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9362 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9363 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9364 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9365 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9366 (32, self.is_public, required),
9367 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9368 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9369 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9370 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9371 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9377 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9378 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9379 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9380 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9381 (2, channel_id, required),
9382 (3, channel_type, option),
9383 (4, counterparty, required),
9384 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9385 (6, funding_txo, option),
9386 (7, config, option),
9387 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9388 (9, confirmations, option),
9389 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9390 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9391 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9392 (16, balance_msat, required),
9393 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9394 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9395 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9396 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9397 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9398 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9399 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9400 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9401 (26, is_outbound, required),
9402 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9403 (30, is_usable, required),
9404 (32, is_public, required),
9405 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9406 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9407 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9408 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9409 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9412 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9413 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9414 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9415 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9416 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9420 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9422 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9423 outbound_scid_alias,
9427 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9428 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9430 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9431 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9432 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9433 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9434 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9435 confirmations_required,
9437 force_close_spend_delay,
9438 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9439 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9440 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9441 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9442 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9443 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9444 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9445 channel_shutdown_state,
9450 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9451 (2, channels, required_vec),
9452 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9453 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9456 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9457 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9460 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9462 (0, onion_packet, required),
9463 (1, blinded, option),
9464 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9467 (0, payment_data, required),
9468 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9469 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9470 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9471 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9472 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9474 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9475 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9476 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9477 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9478 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9479 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9483 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9484 (0, routing, required),
9485 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9486 (4, payment_hash, required),
9487 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9488 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9489 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9490 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9494 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9495 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9497 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9499 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9500 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9501 reason.write(writer)?;
9503 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9504 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9507 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9508 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9509 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9510 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9517 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9518 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9519 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9522 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9523 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9524 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9525 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9529 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9530 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9531 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9532 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9533 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9536 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9537 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9538 // messages contained in the variants.
9539 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9540 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9541 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9543 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9544 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9545 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9546 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9547 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9550 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9551 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9552 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9553 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9554 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9556 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9561 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9566 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9567 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9568 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9571 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9572 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9573 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9574 (2, outpoint, required),
9575 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9576 (4, htlc_id, required),
9577 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9578 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9581 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9582 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9583 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9584 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9585 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9587 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9588 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9589 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9590 (2, self.value, required),
9591 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9592 (4, payment_data, option),
9593 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9594 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9595 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9596 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9602 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9603 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9604 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9605 (0, prev_hop, required),
9606 (1, total_msat, option),
9607 (2, value_ser, required),
9608 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9609 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9610 (5, total_value_received, option),
9611 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9612 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9613 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9615 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9616 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9617 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9619 if payment_data.is_some() {
9620 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9622 if total_msat.is_none() {
9623 total_msat = Some(value);
9625 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9628 if total_msat.is_none() {
9629 if payment_data.is_none() {
9630 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9632 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9634 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9638 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9641 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9642 total_value_received,
9643 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9645 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9646 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9651 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9652 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9653 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9656 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9657 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9658 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9659 let mut payment_id = None;
9660 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9661 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9662 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9663 (0, session_priv, required),
9664 (1, payment_id, option),
9665 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9666 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9667 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9668 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9670 if payment_id.is_none() {
9671 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9673 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9675 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9676 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9677 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9679 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9680 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9681 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9682 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9686 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9687 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9688 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9690 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9693 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9694 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9699 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9700 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9702 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9704 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9705 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9706 (0, session_priv, required),
9707 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9708 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9709 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9710 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9711 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9712 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9715 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9717 field.write(writer)?;
9724 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9725 (0, forward_info, required),
9726 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9727 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9728 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9729 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9732 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9733 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9734 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
9736 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
9740 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
9741 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9742 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9743 (0, htlc_id, required),
9744 (2, err_packet, required),
9747 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
9748 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
9749 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
9750 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
9751 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9752 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
9753 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9754 (0, htlc_id, required),
9755 (1, failure_code, required),
9756 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
9757 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
9765 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9766 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9767 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
9769 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
9771 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
9772 (0, htlc_id, required),
9773 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
9774 (2, err_packet, required),
9775 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
9777 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
9778 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
9779 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9781 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
9785 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9786 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
9790 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9795 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9796 (0, payment_secret, required),
9797 (2, expiry_time, required),
9798 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9799 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9800 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9803 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9805 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9806 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9807 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9808 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9809 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9810 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9814 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9815 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9817 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9819 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9821 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9822 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9823 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9826 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9828 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9829 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9830 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9831 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9832 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9833 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9834 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9837 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9838 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9842 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9844 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9845 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9846 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9847 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9848 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9849 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9852 channel.write(writer)?;
9858 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9859 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9860 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9861 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9862 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9863 for forward in pending_forwards {
9864 forward.write(writer)?;
9869 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9871 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9872 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9873 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9875 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9876 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9877 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9878 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9879 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9880 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9881 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9882 htlc.write(writer)?;
9884 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9885 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9888 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9889 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9890 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9891 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9892 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9893 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9894 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9897 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9898 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9899 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9900 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9901 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9903 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9904 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9905 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9906 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9907 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9908 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9909 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9914 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9915 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9916 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9917 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9918 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9919 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9920 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9921 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9922 0u64.write(writer)?;
9924 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9925 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9926 event.write(writer)?;
9930 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9931 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9932 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9933 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9934 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9935 0u64.write(writer)?;
9937 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9938 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9939 // likely to be identical.
9940 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9941 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9943 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9944 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9945 hash.write(writer)?;
9946 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9949 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9950 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9951 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9952 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9953 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9956 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9957 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9959 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9960 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9961 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9962 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9965 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9966 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9967 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9968 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9972 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9973 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9974 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9976 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9977 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9978 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9984 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9985 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9986 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9987 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9990 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9991 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9992 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9993 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9994 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9997 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9998 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9999 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10000 if !updates.is_empty() {
10001 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
10002 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10007 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10008 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10009 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10010 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10011 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10012 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10013 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10014 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10015 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10016 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10017 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10018 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10019 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10026 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10027 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10028 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10029 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10032 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10033 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10034 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10035 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10036 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10037 // check that the event is sane here.
10038 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10039 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10040 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10041 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10047 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10048 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10049 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10050 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10051 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10052 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10055 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10056 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10057 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10058 events.push_back((ev, action));
10059 } else if action.is_some() {
10060 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10067 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10068 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10069 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10070 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10071 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10072 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10075 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10077 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10079 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10080 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10081 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10082 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10083 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10084 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10085 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10086 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10087 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10088 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10089 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10090 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10091 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10093 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10094 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10096 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10097 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10099 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10100 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10101 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10102 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10103 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10104 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10106 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10107 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10109 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10110 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10111 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10112 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10113 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10114 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10118 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10119 pub entropy_source: ES,
10121 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10122 pub node_signer: NS,
10124 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10125 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10127 pub signer_provider: SP,
10129 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10131 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10132 pub fee_estimator: F,
10133 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10135 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10136 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10137 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10138 pub chain_monitor: M,
10140 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10141 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10142 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10143 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10144 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10145 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10147 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10149 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10150 /// deserialization.
10152 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10153 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10154 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10156 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10157 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10159 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10160 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10161 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10162 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10164 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10167 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10168 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10171 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10172 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10174 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10175 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10176 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10177 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10178 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10179 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10183 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10184 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10185 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10186 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10187 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10189 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10190 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10195 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10196 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10197 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10198 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10200 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10201 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10202 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10203 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10204 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10205 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10209 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10210 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10211 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10215 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10216 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10218 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10219 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10220 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10221 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10222 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10223 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10227 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10228 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10230 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10231 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10232 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10234 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10236 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10237 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10238 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10239 let mut outpoint_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10240 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10241 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10242 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10243 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10244 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10245 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10247 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10248 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10249 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10250 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10251 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10252 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10253 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10254 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10255 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10256 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10257 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10258 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10259 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10260 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10262 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10263 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10264 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10266 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10267 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10268 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10270 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10271 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10272 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10274 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10275 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10276 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10278 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10279 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10280 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10283 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10284 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10285 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10286 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10287 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10288 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10289 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10291 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10292 let mut found_htlc = false;
10293 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10294 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10297 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10298 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10299 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10300 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10301 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10302 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10303 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10305 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10306 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10307 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10311 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10312 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10313 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10314 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10315 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10317 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10318 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10320 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10321 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10322 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10323 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10326 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10327 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10328 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10332 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10333 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10334 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10335 // safely discard the channel.
10336 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10337 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10338 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10339 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10340 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10341 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10342 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10345 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10346 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10347 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10348 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10349 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10350 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10354 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10355 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10356 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10357 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10358 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10359 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10360 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10361 counterparty_node_id: None,
10362 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10364 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10368 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10369 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10370 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10371 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10372 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10373 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10374 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10375 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10376 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10378 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10381 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10382 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10383 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10384 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10385 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10386 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10387 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10388 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10390 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10393 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10396 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10397 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10398 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10399 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10400 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10401 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10402 is_connected: false,
10406 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10407 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10408 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10409 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10410 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10411 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10412 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10413 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10416 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10417 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10418 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10419 for _ in 0..event_count {
10420 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10421 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10426 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10427 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10428 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10430 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10431 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10432 // on-startup monitor updates.
10433 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10434 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10436 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10440 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10441 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10443 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10444 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10445 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10446 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10447 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10451 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10452 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10453 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10454 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10455 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10456 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10457 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10459 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10460 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10464 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10465 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10466 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10467 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10468 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10469 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10470 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10471 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10472 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10473 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10474 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10475 let mut events_override = None;
10476 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10477 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10478 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10479 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10480 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10481 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10482 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10483 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10484 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10485 (8, events_override, option),
10486 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10487 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10488 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10489 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10491 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10492 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10495 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10496 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10499 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10500 pending_events_read = events;
10503 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10504 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10507 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10508 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10509 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10510 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10511 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10512 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10514 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10516 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10517 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10518 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10521 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10522 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10523 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10524 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10525 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10527 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10528 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10529 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10531 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10532 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10533 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10534 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10535 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10537 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10538 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10539 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10540 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10541 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10542 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10543 pending_background_events.push(
10544 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10545 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10546 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10547 update: update.clone(),
10550 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10551 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10552 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10553 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10554 pending_background_events.push(
10555 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10556 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10557 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10560 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10561 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10562 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10564 max_in_flight_update_id
10568 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10569 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10570 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10571 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10572 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10573 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10575 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10577 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10578 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10579 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10580 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10581 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10582 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10583 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10584 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10585 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10588 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10589 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10590 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10591 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10592 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10593 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10594 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10595 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10596 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10597 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10598 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10601 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10602 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10603 debug_assert!(false);
10604 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10609 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10610 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10611 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10612 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10613 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10614 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10615 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10616 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10617 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10619 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10620 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10621 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10623 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10624 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10625 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10626 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10627 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10628 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10629 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10630 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10635 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10636 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10638 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10639 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10640 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10641 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10644 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10645 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10646 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10647 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10648 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10649 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10650 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10652 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10653 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10654 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10655 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10656 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10657 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10658 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10659 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10660 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10663 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10664 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10665 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10666 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10667 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10668 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10669 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10670 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10672 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10673 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10674 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10675 retry_strategy: None,
10676 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10677 payment_params: None,
10678 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10679 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10680 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10681 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10682 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10683 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10684 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10685 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10686 total_msat: path_amt,
10687 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10688 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10690 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10691 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10696 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10697 match htlc_source {
10698 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10699 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10700 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10701 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10703 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10704 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10705 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10706 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10707 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10708 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10709 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10710 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10711 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10712 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10713 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10718 !forwards.is_empty()
10720 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10721 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10722 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10723 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10724 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10725 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10726 intercepted_id != ev_id
10733 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10734 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10735 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10736 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10737 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10738 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10739 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10740 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10741 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10742 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10743 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10745 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10746 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10747 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10749 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10750 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10751 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10758 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10759 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10761 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10763 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10764 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10765 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10766 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10767 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10768 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10769 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10770 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10771 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10772 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10775 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10776 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10777 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10778 // channel still live case here.
10782 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10783 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10788 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10789 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10790 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10791 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10792 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10793 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10794 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10795 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10799 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10800 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10802 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10803 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10804 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10805 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10807 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10808 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10809 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10811 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10812 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10814 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10815 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10817 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10820 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10821 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10822 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10824 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10828 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10829 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10830 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10831 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10832 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10834 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10835 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10836 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10837 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10838 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10839 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10840 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10841 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10843 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10844 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10848 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10850 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10852 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10853 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10855 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10856 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10861 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10862 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10864 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10866 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10868 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10869 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10870 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10871 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10875 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10876 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10877 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10878 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10879 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10880 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10881 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10882 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10883 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10885 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10886 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10887 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10889 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10890 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10891 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10892 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10893 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10894 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10896 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10897 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10898 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10899 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10900 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10901 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10905 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10906 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10907 debug_assert!(false);
10908 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10913 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10915 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10916 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10917 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10918 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10919 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10920 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10921 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10922 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10923 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10924 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10925 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10927 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10928 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10930 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10931 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10932 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10933 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10935 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10936 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10937 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10938 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10940 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10941 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10942 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10943 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10945 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10946 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10947 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10948 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10949 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10950 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10951 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10952 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
10955 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10956 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10959 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10962 purpose: payment.purpose,
10963 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10964 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10965 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10971 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10972 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10973 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10974 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
10975 for action in actions.iter() {
10976 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10977 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10978 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10980 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10982 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10983 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10984 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10985 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10986 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10988 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10989 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10990 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10991 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10995 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10996 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11000 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11002 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11003 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11007 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11009 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11010 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11011 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11012 router: args.router,
11014 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11016 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11017 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11018 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11019 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11021 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11022 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11023 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11024 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11025 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11026 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11028 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11030 our_network_pubkey,
11033 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11035 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11037 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11038 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11039 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11040 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11041 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11043 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11044 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11046 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11048 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11050 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11051 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11052 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11054 logger: args.logger,
11055 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11058 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11059 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11060 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11061 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11062 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11065 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11066 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11067 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11068 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11069 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
11070 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
11073 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11074 //connection or two.
11076 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11082 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11083 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11084 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11085 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11086 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11087 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11088 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11089 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11090 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11091 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11092 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11093 use crate::prelude::*;
11094 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11095 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11096 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11097 use crate::util::test_utils;
11098 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11099 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11102 fn test_notify_limits() {
11103 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11104 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11105 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11106 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11107 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11108 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11110 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11111 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11112 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11113 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11114 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11116 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11118 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11119 // to connect messages with new values
11120 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11121 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11122 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11123 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11124 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11125 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11127 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11128 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11129 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11130 // ... but the last node should not.
11131 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11132 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11133 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11134 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11136 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11137 // about the channel.
11138 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11139 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11140 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11142 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11144 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11145 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11146 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11147 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11148 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11149 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11151 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11152 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11153 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11155 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11156 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11157 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11158 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11159 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11160 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11162 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11163 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11164 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11165 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11166 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11167 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11168 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11169 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11171 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11172 // the channel info has updated.
11173 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11174 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11175 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11176 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11177 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11178 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11182 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11183 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11185 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11186 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11187 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11188 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11189 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11191 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11192 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11193 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11194 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11196 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11197 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11198 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11199 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11200 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11201 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11202 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11203 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11205 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11206 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11207 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11209 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11210 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11211 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11213 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11214 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11215 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11216 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11217 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11219 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11220 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11221 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11223 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11224 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11225 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11226 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11227 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11228 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11229 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11230 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11231 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11233 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11234 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11235 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11237 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11238 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11239 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11241 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11242 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11243 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11244 // lightning messages manually.
11245 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11246 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11249 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11250 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11251 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11252 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11254 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11255 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11257 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11258 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11260 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11261 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11262 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11264 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11265 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11266 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11268 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11270 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11272 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11273 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11276 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11277 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11278 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11279 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11281 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11282 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11283 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11284 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11289 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11290 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11291 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11292 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11294 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11299 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11300 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11301 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11304 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11305 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11306 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11307 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11308 // fails as expected.
11309 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11310 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11311 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11312 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11313 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11314 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11315 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11316 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11317 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11318 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11319 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11320 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11321 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11322 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11323 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11325 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11326 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11327 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11329 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11330 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11331 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11332 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11333 let route = find_route(
11334 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11335 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11337 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11338 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11340 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11341 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11342 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11343 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11344 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11346 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11347 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11348 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11349 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11350 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11352 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11353 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11354 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11355 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11356 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11357 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11358 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11359 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11360 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11362 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11363 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11365 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11366 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11367 let route = find_route(
11368 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11369 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11371 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11372 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11374 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11375 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11376 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11377 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11378 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11380 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11381 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11382 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11383 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11385 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11386 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11387 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11388 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11389 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11391 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11392 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11393 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11395 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11396 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11397 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11398 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11399 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11400 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11401 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11402 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11403 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11405 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11406 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11408 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11409 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11410 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11411 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11413 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11414 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11415 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11416 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11417 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11419 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11420 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11421 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11424 let route = find_route(
11425 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11426 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11428 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11429 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11430 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11432 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11433 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11434 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11435 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11436 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11438 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11439 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11440 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11442 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11443 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11444 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11445 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11446 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11447 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11448 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11449 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11450 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11452 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11453 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11457 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11458 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11459 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11460 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11461 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11462 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11463 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11465 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11466 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11468 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11469 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11470 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11471 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11472 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11473 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11474 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11475 let route = find_route(
11476 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11477 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11480 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11481 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11482 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11483 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11484 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11485 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11488 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11489 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11490 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11491 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11492 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11493 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11494 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11496 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11500 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11501 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11502 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11503 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11504 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11505 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11506 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11507 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11508 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11510 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11511 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11513 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11514 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11515 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11516 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11517 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11518 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11519 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11520 let route = find_route(
11521 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11522 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11525 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11526 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11527 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11528 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11529 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11530 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11531 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11532 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11535 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11536 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11537 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11538 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11539 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11540 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11541 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11543 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11547 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11548 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11549 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11550 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11551 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11553 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11554 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11555 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11556 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11558 // Marshall an MPP route.
11559 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11560 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11561 route.paths.push(path);
11562 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11563 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11564 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11565 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11566 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11567 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11569 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11570 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11572 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11573 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11575 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11580 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11581 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11584 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11586 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11588 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11589 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11591 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11592 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11594 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11597 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11598 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11599 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11600 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11601 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11602 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11605 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11608 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11609 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11614 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11615 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11616 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11617 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11618 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11619 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11621 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11622 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11624 total_msat: 100_000,
11627 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11628 // payment verification fails as expected.
11629 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11630 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11631 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11632 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11634 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11638 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11639 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11643 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11644 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11645 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11646 // the channel is successfully closed.
11647 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11648 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11649 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11650 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11652 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11653 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11654 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11655 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11656 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11658 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11659 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11661 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11662 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11663 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11664 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11667 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11669 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11670 // as it has the funding transaction.
11671 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11672 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11673 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11676 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11678 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11680 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11682 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11683 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11684 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11686 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11689 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
11690 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
11691 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11692 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11693 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11696 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11697 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11699 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11700 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11701 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11702 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11704 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11705 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11706 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11707 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11709 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11710 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11712 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11713 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11714 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11715 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11716 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11717 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11718 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11722 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11723 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11724 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11725 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
11726 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11727 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11728 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11731 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11733 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11734 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11735 // closing transaction).
11736 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
11737 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11738 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11740 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11741 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11742 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11743 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11744 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11747 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11749 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11751 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
11752 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11753 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11755 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11757 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11758 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11761 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11762 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11763 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11766 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11767 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11768 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11771 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11772 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11773 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11776 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11777 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11778 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11781 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11783 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11784 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11786 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11787 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11789 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11790 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11795 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11796 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11797 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11798 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11799 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11800 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11801 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11802 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11805 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11806 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11807 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11809 // Test the API functions.
11810 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11812 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11814 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11816 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11818 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11820 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11822 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11826 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11827 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11828 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11829 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11830 // the given `channel_id`.
11831 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11832 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11833 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11834 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11836 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11839 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11841 // Test the API functions.
11842 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11844 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11846 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11848 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11850 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11852 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11856 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11857 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11861 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11863 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11865 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11866 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11868 let mut funding_tx = None;
11869 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11870 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11871 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11874 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11875 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11876 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11877 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11878 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11880 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11882 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11884 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11886 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11888 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11890 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11893 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11894 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11895 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11896 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11897 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11899 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11900 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11902 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11903 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11904 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11905 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11906 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11907 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11908 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11911 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11912 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11913 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11914 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11915 }, true).unwrap_err();
11917 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11918 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11919 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11920 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11921 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11922 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11923 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11925 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11926 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11928 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11929 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11930 }, true).unwrap_err();
11932 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11933 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11934 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11935 }, false).unwrap();
11936 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11938 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11939 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11941 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11942 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11943 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11944 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11945 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11947 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11948 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11949 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11951 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11952 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11953 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11955 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11956 // "protected" and can connect again.
11957 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11958 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11959 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11961 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11963 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11965 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11966 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11970 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11971 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11972 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11973 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11974 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11975 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11977 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11979 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11980 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11982 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11983 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11984 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11985 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11988 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11990 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11991 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11992 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11994 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11995 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11996 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11998 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11999 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12000 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12001 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12005 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12006 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12007 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12008 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12009 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12010 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12011 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12012 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12013 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12015 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12017 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12018 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12020 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12021 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12022 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12023 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12024 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12025 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12028 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12029 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12031 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12032 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12034 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12036 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12037 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12040 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12041 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12042 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12043 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12044 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12046 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12047 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12049 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12050 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12051 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12052 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12056 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12058 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12059 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12061 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12062 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12063 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12065 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12066 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12070 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12074 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12075 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12076 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12077 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12078 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12079 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12080 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12081 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12083 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
12084 payment_metadata: None,
12085 keysend_preimage: None,
12086 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12087 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12089 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12091 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12092 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12093 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12094 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
12095 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12096 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12097 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12099 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12100 } else { panic!(); }
12102 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12103 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12105 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
12106 payment_metadata: None,
12107 keysend_preimage: None,
12108 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12109 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12111 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12113 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12114 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12115 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12116 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12120 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12121 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12122 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12123 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12124 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12126 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12127 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12129 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
12130 payment_metadata: None,
12131 keysend_preimage: None,
12132 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12133 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12135 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12136 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12137 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12139 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12140 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12141 // is not satisfied.
12142 assert!(result.is_ok());
12146 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12147 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12148 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12149 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12150 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12152 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12153 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12155 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12156 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12157 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12158 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12159 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12161 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12162 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12164 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12165 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12166 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12167 match &msg_events[0] {
12168 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12169 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12171 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12172 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12173 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12176 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12179 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12180 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12182 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12183 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12184 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12186 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12190 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12191 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12192 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12193 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12194 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12195 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12196 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12197 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12198 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12199 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12200 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12202 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12203 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12204 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12206 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12207 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12209 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12210 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12212 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12215 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12216 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12218 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12219 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12221 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12222 // not have generated any events.
12223 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12227 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12228 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12229 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12230 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12231 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12232 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12233 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12234 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12236 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12237 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12238 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12240 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12241 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12242 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12243 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12244 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12246 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12247 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12250 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12251 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12252 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12254 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12255 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12256 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12257 ..Default::default()
12259 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12260 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12261 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12263 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12264 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12267 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12268 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12269 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12270 ..Default::default()
12272 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12273 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12274 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12275 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12277 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12278 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12281 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12282 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12283 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12284 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12285 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12288 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12289 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12290 ..Default::default()
12292 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12295 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12296 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12297 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12298 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12302 fn test_payment_display() {
12303 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12304 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12305 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12306 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12307 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12308 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12312 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12313 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12314 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12315 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12316 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12317 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12319 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12320 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12321 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12322 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12323 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12324 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12325 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12326 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12328 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12329 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12330 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12333 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12334 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12336 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12337 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12339 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12340 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12341 }, false).unwrap();
12342 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12343 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12344 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12346 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12348 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12349 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12350 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12351 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12352 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12353 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12354 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12355 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12356 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12357 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12358 } else { panic!() };
12359 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12360 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12361 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12362 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12364 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12366 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12367 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12368 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12373 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12374 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12375 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12376 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12379 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12380 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12381 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12383 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12384 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12386 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12387 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12390 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12391 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12392 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12394 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12398 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12399 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12400 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12402 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12407 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12408 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
12409 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12410 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12412 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12413 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12414 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12416 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12418 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12419 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12420 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12421 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12423 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12424 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12426 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12432 use crate::chain::Listen;
12433 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12434 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12435 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12436 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12437 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12438 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12439 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12440 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12441 use crate::util::test_utils;
12442 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12444 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12445 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12446 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12447 use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12449 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12451 use criterion::Criterion;
12453 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12454 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12455 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12456 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12457 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12458 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12459 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12461 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12462 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12464 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12465 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12467 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12469 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12472 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12473 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12476 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12477 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12478 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12480 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12481 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12483 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12484 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12485 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12486 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12487 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12489 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12490 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12491 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12493 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12494 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12495 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12496 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12498 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12499 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12500 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12502 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12503 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12504 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12505 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12506 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12508 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12509 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12510 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12512 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12513 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12515 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12516 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12517 }, false).unwrap();
12518 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12519 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12520 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12523 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12524 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12525 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12527 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12528 } else { panic!(); }
12530 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12531 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12532 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12533 match events_b[0] {
12534 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12535 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12537 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12540 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12541 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12542 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12543 match events_a[0] {
12544 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12545 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12547 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12550 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12552 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12553 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12554 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12556 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12557 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12558 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12559 match msg_events[0] {
12560 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12561 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12562 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12566 match msg_events[1] {
12567 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12571 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12572 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12573 match events_a[0] {
12574 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12575 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12577 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12580 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12581 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12582 match events_b[0] {
12583 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12584 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12586 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12589 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12590 macro_rules! send_payment {
12591 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12592 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12593 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12594 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12595 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12596 payment_count += 1;
12597 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12598 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12600 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12601 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12602 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12603 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12604 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12605 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12606 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12607 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12608 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12609 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12610 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12612 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12613 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12614 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12615 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12617 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12618 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12619 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12620 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12621 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12623 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12626 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12627 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12628 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12629 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12631 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12635 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12636 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12637 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);