1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
54 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
55 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use crate::util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
65 use crate::prelude::*;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
96 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
116 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
134 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
147 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
148 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
151 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
155 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
156 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
157 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
158 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
159 short_channel_id: u64,
161 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
162 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
164 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
165 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
170 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
172 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
173 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
174 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
176 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
177 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
180 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
181 struct ClaimableHTLC {
182 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
184 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
186 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
188 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
192 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
193 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
194 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
195 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
197 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
198 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
203 impl Readable for PaymentId {
204 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
205 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
209 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
210 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
211 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
212 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
213 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
216 session_priv: SecretKey,
217 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
218 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
219 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
220 payment_id: PaymentId,
221 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
222 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
225 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
226 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
227 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
229 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
231 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
233 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
236 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
237 payment_id.hash(hasher);
238 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
239 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
240 payment_params.hash(hasher);
245 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
248 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
249 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
251 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
252 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
253 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
254 payment_secret: None,
255 payment_params: None,
260 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
261 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
263 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
271 struct ReceiveError {
277 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
278 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
280 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
285 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
287 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
288 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
289 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
290 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
291 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
293 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
294 err: msgs::LightningError,
295 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
296 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
298 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
300 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
302 err: LightningError {
304 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
305 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
312 shutdown_finish: None,
316 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
318 err: LightningError {
320 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
323 shutdown_finish: None,
327 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
328 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
331 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
333 err: LightningError {
335 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
336 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
342 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
343 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
347 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
350 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
352 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
353 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
357 log_level: Level::Warn,
360 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
362 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
364 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
366 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
367 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
375 shutdown_finish: None,
380 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
381 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
382 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
383 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
384 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
386 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
387 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
388 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
389 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
390 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
391 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
392 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
394 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
398 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
399 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
400 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
401 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
402 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
403 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
406 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
407 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
408 /// quite some time lag.
409 enum BackgroundEvent {
410 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
411 /// commitment transaction.
412 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
415 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
416 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
418 latest_features: InitFeatures,
421 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
422 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
424 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
427 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
428 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
429 struct PendingInboundPayment {
430 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
431 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
432 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
433 /// this payment being removed.
435 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
436 user_payment_id: u64,
437 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
438 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
439 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
442 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
443 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
444 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
446 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
449 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
450 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
451 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
452 pending_amt_msat: u64,
453 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
454 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
455 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
457 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
458 starting_block_height: u32,
460 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
461 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
462 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
464 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
465 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
466 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
468 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
469 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
470 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
471 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
472 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
474 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
476 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
477 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
481 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
482 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
484 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
488 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
490 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
494 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
496 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
501 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
503 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
504 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
505 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
506 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
510 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
511 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
512 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
513 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
514 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
516 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
519 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
520 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
523 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
524 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
525 let our_payment_hash;
526 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
527 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
528 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
532 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
536 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
540 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
541 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
542 let remove_res = match self {
543 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
544 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
545 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
546 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
547 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
551 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
552 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
553 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
554 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
555 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
556 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
563 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
564 let insert_res = match self {
565 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
566 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
567 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
569 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
570 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
573 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
574 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
575 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
576 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
577 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
584 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
586 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
587 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
588 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
589 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
596 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
597 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
598 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
599 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
600 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
601 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
602 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
604 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
605 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
607 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
608 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
609 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
610 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
611 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
612 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
613 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
614 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
616 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
617 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
619 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
620 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
622 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
623 /// to individual Channels.
625 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
626 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
627 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
628 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
630 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
631 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
632 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
633 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
634 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
635 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
636 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
638 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
639 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
640 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
641 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
644 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
645 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
646 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
647 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
648 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
650 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
651 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
652 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
653 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
654 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
657 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
658 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
659 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
660 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
661 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
665 // `total_consistency_lock`
667 // |__`forward_htlcs`
669 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
671 // | |__`claimable_htlcs`
673 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
675 // | |__`channel_state`
679 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
681 // | |__`per_peer_state`
683 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
687 // | |__`pending_events`
689 // | |__`pending_background_events`
691 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
692 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
693 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
694 K::Target: KeysInterface,
695 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
698 default_configuration: UserConfig,
699 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
700 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
704 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
706 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
708 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
709 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
711 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
712 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
713 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
714 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
715 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
717 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
718 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
719 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
720 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
722 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
723 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
725 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
726 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
727 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
728 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
729 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
730 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
731 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
732 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
734 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
736 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
737 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
739 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
741 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
742 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
743 /// and via the classic SCID.
745 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
746 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
748 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
750 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
752 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
754 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
755 /// failed/claimed by the user.
757 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
758 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
760 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
761 claimable_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>>,
763 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
764 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
765 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
766 /// active channel list on load.
768 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
769 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
771 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
773 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
774 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
775 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
777 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
778 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
779 /// the handling of the events.
782 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
783 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
784 /// would break backwards compatability.
785 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
786 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
787 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
789 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
790 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
792 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
794 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
795 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
796 /// confirmation depth.
798 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
799 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
800 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
802 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
804 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
806 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
808 our_network_key: SecretKey,
809 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
811 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
813 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
814 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
815 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
817 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
818 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
820 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
821 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
822 /// keeping additional state.
823 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
825 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
826 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
827 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
828 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
830 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
831 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
832 /// are currently open with that peer.
833 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
834 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
837 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
838 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
840 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
841 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
842 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
843 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
844 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
845 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
846 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
847 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
848 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
849 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
850 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
852 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
859 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
861 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
862 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
863 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
864 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
865 pub struct ChainParameters {
866 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
867 pub network: Network,
869 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
871 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
872 pub best_block: BestBlock,
875 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
881 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
882 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
883 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
884 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
885 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
886 /// updates are ready for persistence).
888 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
889 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
890 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
891 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
892 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
894 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
895 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
898 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
899 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
900 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
903 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
904 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
906 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
907 persistence_notifier: notifier,
908 should_persist: persist_check,
909 _read_guard: read_guard,
914 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
916 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
917 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
922 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
923 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
925 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
927 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
928 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
929 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
930 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
931 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
933 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
934 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
936 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
938 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
939 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
940 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
941 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
942 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
943 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
944 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
945 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
946 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
947 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
948 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
949 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
950 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
952 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
953 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
955 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
956 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
957 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
958 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
960 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
961 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
962 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
963 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
964 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
965 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
968 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
970 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
971 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
974 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
976 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
977 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
979 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
980 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
981 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
982 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
984 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
985 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
986 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
987 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
988 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
989 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
990 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
991 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
992 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
993 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
994 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
997 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
998 /// to better separate parameters.
999 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1000 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1001 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1002 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1003 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1004 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1005 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1006 pub features: InitFeatures,
1007 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1008 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1009 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1011 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1013 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1014 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1015 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1016 /// payments to us through this channel.
1017 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1018 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1019 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1020 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1021 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1022 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1023 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1026 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1027 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1028 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1029 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1030 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1031 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1032 /// lifetime of the channel.
1033 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1034 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1035 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1036 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1037 /// our counterparty already.
1039 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1040 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1041 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1042 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1044 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1045 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1046 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1047 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1049 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1050 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1052 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1053 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1055 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1056 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1057 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1058 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1059 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1060 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1061 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1062 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1063 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1066 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1068 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1069 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1070 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1071 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1072 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1073 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1074 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1076 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1077 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1079 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1080 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1081 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1082 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1083 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1084 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1085 /// this value on chain.
1087 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1089 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1091 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1092 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1093 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1094 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1096 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1097 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1098 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1099 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1101 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1102 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1103 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1104 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1106 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1107 pub balance_msat: u64,
1108 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1109 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1110 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1111 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1113 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1115 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1116 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1117 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1118 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1119 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1120 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1121 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1122 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1124 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1125 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1126 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1127 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1128 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1129 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1130 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1132 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1133 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1134 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1135 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1136 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1137 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1138 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1139 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1140 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1142 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1144 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1145 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1146 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1147 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1148 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1149 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1150 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1151 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1152 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1154 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1155 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1156 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1157 pub is_outbound: bool,
1158 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1159 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1160 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1161 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1162 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1164 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1165 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1166 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1167 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1169 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1170 pub is_usable: bool,
1171 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1172 pub is_public: bool,
1173 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1174 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1175 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1176 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1177 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1178 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1180 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1181 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1184 impl ChannelDetails {
1185 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1186 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1187 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1189 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1190 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1191 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1192 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1195 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1196 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1197 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1199 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1200 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1201 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1202 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1206 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1207 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1208 /// states for more.
1209 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1210 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1211 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1212 /// send the payment at all.
1214 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1216 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1217 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1218 /// for this payment.
1219 ParameterError(APIError),
1220 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1221 /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
1223 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1225 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1228 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1229 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1230 /// for this payment.
1231 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1232 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1233 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1234 /// paths than the ones selected).
1236 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1237 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1238 /// for this payment.
1239 AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
1240 /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
1241 /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
1242 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
1244 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1246 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1247 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1248 /// in over-/re-payment.
1250 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1251 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1252 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1254 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1255 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1256 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1257 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1259 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1260 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1261 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1262 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1263 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1264 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1265 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1266 payment_id: PaymentId,
1270 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1272 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1274 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1275 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1276 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1277 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1279 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1280 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1281 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1284 macro_rules! handle_error {
1285 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1288 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1289 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1291 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1292 // entering the macro.
1293 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1294 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1297 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1299 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1300 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1301 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1302 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1306 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1307 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1308 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1309 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1314 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1315 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1317 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1318 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1319 action: err.action.clone()
1323 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1324 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1327 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1334 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1335 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1336 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1337 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1338 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1339 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1341 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1342 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1343 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1344 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1345 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1347 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1348 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1350 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1354 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1355 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1356 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1358 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1359 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1361 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1362 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1364 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1365 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1366 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1367 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1368 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1369 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1375 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1376 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1380 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1382 $entry.remove_entry();
1390 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1391 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1395 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1397 $entry.remove_entry();
1405 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1406 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1408 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1409 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1415 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1416 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1418 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1419 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1420 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1421 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1422 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1423 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1424 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1425 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1426 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1427 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1428 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1429 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1430 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1431 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1434 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1435 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1436 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1437 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1438 match $action_type {
1439 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1440 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1442 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1443 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1445 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1446 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1447 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1448 if !$resend_commitment {
1449 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1452 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1454 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1455 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1457 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1462 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1463 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1465 $entry.remove_entry();
1469 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1470 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1471 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1473 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1474 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1476 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1477 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1479 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1480 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1482 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1483 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1487 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1488 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1489 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1490 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1491 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1493 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1494 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1495 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1496 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1497 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1498 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1499 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1500 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1501 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1502 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1507 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1508 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1509 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1511 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1512 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1513 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1514 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1515 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1516 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1519 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1524 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1525 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1526 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1527 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1528 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1530 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1531 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1532 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1534 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1535 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1536 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1537 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1540 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1541 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1542 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1543 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1544 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1545 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1546 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1547 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1548 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1549 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1550 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1551 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1554 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1555 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1556 // before it should be allowed to.
1557 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1558 send_channel_ready!($self, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1560 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1561 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1562 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1567 emit_channel_ready_event!($self, $channel_entry.get_mut());
1569 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1570 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1571 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1572 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1573 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1574 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1575 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1576 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1577 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1578 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1579 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1580 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1581 match $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1582 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
1584 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1585 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1586 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1587 let mut order = $order;
1589 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1591 break handle_monitor_update_res!($self, e, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1596 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1597 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1598 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1599 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1604 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1605 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1606 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1607 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1608 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1613 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1617 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1622 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1623 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1624 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1629 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1630 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1631 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1632 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1633 assert!(res.is_ok());
1636 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1640 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1641 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1642 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1644 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1646 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1647 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1652 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1653 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1654 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1655 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1656 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1659 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1661 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1662 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1664 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1666 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1667 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1668 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1669 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1670 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1671 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1672 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1673 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1675 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1676 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1677 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1681 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1683 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1684 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1685 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1687 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1688 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1689 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1690 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1691 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1692 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1693 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1695 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1696 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1699 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1700 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1702 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1704 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1706 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1708 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1709 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1710 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1711 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1719 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1720 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1721 &self.default_configuration
1724 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1725 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1726 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1729 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1730 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1732 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1734 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1738 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1743 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1745 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1746 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1747 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1748 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1749 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1751 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1752 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1754 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1755 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1756 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1758 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1759 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1760 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1761 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1762 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1763 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1765 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1766 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1767 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1768 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1769 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1770 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1774 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1775 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1776 Some(peer_state) => {
1777 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1778 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1779 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1780 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1781 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1782 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1783 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1787 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1792 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1795 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1797 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1798 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1799 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1801 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1802 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1803 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1806 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1808 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1811 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1813 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1814 node_id: their_network_key,
1817 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1820 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1821 let mut res = Vec::new();
1823 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1824 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1825 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1826 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1827 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1828 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1829 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1830 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1831 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1832 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1833 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1834 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1835 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1836 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1837 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1838 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1839 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1840 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1841 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1842 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1843 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1845 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1846 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1847 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1848 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1849 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1850 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1851 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1852 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1853 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1854 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1855 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1856 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1857 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1858 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1859 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1860 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1861 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1862 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1863 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1864 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1865 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1866 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1867 config: Some(channel.config()),
1871 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1872 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1873 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1874 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1880 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1881 /// more information.
1882 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1883 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1886 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1887 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1889 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1890 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1893 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1894 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1895 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1896 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1897 // really wanted anyway.
1898 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1901 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1902 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1903 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1904 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1905 Some(transaction) => {
1906 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1910 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1911 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1912 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1913 reason: closure_reason
1917 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1918 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1920 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1921 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1922 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1923 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1924 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1925 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1926 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1927 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1929 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1930 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1931 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1932 Some(peer_state) => {
1933 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1934 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1935 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1937 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1940 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1942 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1943 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1944 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1945 let (result, is_permanent) =
1946 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1948 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1953 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1954 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1958 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1959 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1960 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1961 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1965 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1973 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1974 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1975 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1978 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1982 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1983 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1984 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1986 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1987 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1989 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1990 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1991 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1992 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1994 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1996 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1997 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1998 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1999 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2000 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
2003 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2004 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2005 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2007 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2008 /// the channel being closed or not:
2009 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2010 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2011 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2012 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2013 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2014 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2015 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2017 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
2019 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2020 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2021 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2022 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2023 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2027 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2028 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2029 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2030 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2031 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2032 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2033 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
2035 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2036 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2037 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2038 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2039 // ignore the result here.
2040 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2044 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2045 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2046 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2047 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2049 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2050 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2051 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2052 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
2053 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2055 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2056 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2058 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2060 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2062 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2065 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2066 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2067 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2068 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2069 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2074 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2077 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2078 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2079 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2080 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2081 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2082 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2083 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2084 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2085 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2095 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2096 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2097 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2099 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2100 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2101 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2104 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2105 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2106 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2108 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2109 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2110 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2111 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2112 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2115 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2116 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2117 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2118 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2119 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2123 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2124 /// local transaction(s).
2125 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2126 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2127 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2131 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2132 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2134 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2135 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2136 return Err(ReceiveError {
2137 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2139 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2142 // final_expiry_too_soon
2143 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2144 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2145 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2146 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2147 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2148 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2149 return Err(ReceiveError {
2151 err_data: Vec::new(),
2152 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2155 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2156 return Err(ReceiveError {
2158 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2159 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2163 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2164 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2165 return Err(ReceiveError {
2166 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2167 err_data: Vec::new(),
2168 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2171 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2172 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2173 return Err(ReceiveError {
2174 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2175 err_data: Vec::new(),
2176 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2178 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2179 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2181 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2182 phantom_shared_secret,
2184 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2185 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2186 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2187 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2188 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2189 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2190 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2191 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2192 return Err(ReceiveError {
2193 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2194 err_data: Vec::new(),
2195 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2199 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2201 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2204 return Err(ReceiveError {
2205 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2206 err_data: Vec::new(),
2207 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2212 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2215 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2216 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2217 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2218 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2222 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2223 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2224 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2226 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2227 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2228 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2229 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2230 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2231 failure_code: $err_code,
2237 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2238 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2241 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2243 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2244 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2245 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2246 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2247 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2248 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2249 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2250 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2252 macro_rules! return_err {
2253 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2255 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2256 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2257 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2258 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2259 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2265 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2267 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2268 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2270 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2271 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2275 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2276 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2278 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2280 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2281 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2282 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2283 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2284 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2286 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2289 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2290 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2291 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2293 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2294 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2295 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2298 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2299 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2300 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2301 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2305 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2306 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2307 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2310 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2311 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2312 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2313 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2314 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2319 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2320 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2321 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2322 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2323 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2324 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2325 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2326 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2327 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2328 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2329 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2331 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
2334 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2337 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2339 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2340 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2342 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2343 // no consistency guarantees.
2344 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2348 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2349 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2350 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2351 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2352 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2354 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2355 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2356 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2357 // we don't have the channel here.
2358 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2360 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2362 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2363 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2364 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2365 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2366 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2367 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2368 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2370 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2371 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2373 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2374 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2378 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2380 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2387 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2388 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2389 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2390 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2391 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2392 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2394 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2395 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2397 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2398 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2399 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2400 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2401 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2402 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2403 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2404 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2405 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2406 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2412 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2413 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2414 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2415 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2417 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2418 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2420 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2421 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2422 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2424 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2425 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2426 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2428 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2433 pending_forward_info
2436 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2437 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2438 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2440 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2441 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2442 if !chan.should_announce() {
2443 return Err(LightningError {
2444 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2445 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2448 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2449 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2451 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2452 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2455 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2456 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2457 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2458 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2459 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2460 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2461 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2462 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2463 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2467 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2469 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2470 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2471 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2473 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2474 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2476 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2477 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2478 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2479 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2480 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2481 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2482 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2483 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2486 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2487 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2489 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2495 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2496 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2497 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2498 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2499 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2501 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2502 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2503 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2504 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2505 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2507 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2509 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2511 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2512 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2513 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2514 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2517 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2518 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2519 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2521 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2522 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2524 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2525 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2527 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2528 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2530 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2531 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2533 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2534 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2535 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2538 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2539 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2540 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2542 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2543 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2545 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2546 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2547 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2548 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2549 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2550 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2551 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2552 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2553 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2554 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2556 _ => unreachable!(),
2559 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2560 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2561 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2562 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2563 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2564 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2565 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2566 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2575 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2576 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2577 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2578 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2583 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2584 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2586 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2591 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2593 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2594 /// fields for more info.
2596 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2597 /// method will error with an [`APIError::RouteError`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2598 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2599 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2602 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2603 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2604 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2605 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2606 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2608 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2609 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2611 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2612 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2613 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2615 /// In general, a path may raise:
2616 /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2617 /// node public key) is specified.
2618 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2619 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2621 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2622 /// relevant updates.
2624 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2625 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2626 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2628 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2629 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2630 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2631 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2634 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2635 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2636 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2638 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2639 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2640 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2641 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2642 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2646 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2647 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2650 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2651 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2652 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2653 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2656 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2657 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2658 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2659 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2660 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2661 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2662 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2663 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2666 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2667 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2670 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2671 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2674 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2679 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2680 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2681 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2683 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2684 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2686 let mut total_value = 0;
2687 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2688 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2689 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2690 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2691 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2692 continue 'path_check;
2694 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2695 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2696 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2697 continue 'path_check;
2700 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2701 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2703 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2704 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2706 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2707 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2708 total_value = amt_msat;
2711 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2712 let mut results = Vec::new();
2713 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2714 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2715 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2718 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2719 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2720 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2721 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2724 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2725 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2726 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2727 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2729 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2730 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2734 results.push(path_res);
2736 let mut has_ok = false;
2737 let mut has_err = false;
2738 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2739 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2740 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2741 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2742 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2743 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2744 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2748 } else if res.is_err() {
2749 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2750 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2753 if has_err && has_ok {
2754 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2757 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2758 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2759 Some(RouteParameters {
2760 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2761 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2762 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2768 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2769 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2770 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2771 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2772 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2778 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2780 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2781 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2782 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2783 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2784 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2786 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2787 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2788 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2789 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2790 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2791 if path.len() == 0 {
2792 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2793 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2798 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2799 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2800 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2803 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2804 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2805 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2807 let res = match payment {
2808 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2809 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2811 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2812 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2813 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2814 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2817 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2819 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2820 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2821 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2824 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2825 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2826 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2829 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2830 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2831 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2835 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2836 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2841 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2842 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2846 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2849 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2851 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2852 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2853 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2854 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2856 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2857 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2858 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2860 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2861 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2862 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2863 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2864 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2866 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2867 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2868 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2869 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2870 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2872 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2880 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2881 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2882 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2883 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2884 /// never reach the recipient.
2886 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2887 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2889 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2890 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2892 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2894 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2895 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2896 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2898 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2900 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2901 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2903 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2904 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2909 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2910 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2911 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2912 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2913 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2915 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2918 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2919 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2923 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2924 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2926 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2927 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2932 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2934 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2935 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2936 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2939 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2940 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2941 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2942 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2943 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2944 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2947 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2948 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2949 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2950 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2951 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2953 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2955 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2957 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2958 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2959 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2960 } else { unreachable!(); })
2963 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2965 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2966 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2969 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2970 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2975 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2976 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2977 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2980 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2981 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2982 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2984 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2985 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2986 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2987 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2996 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2997 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2998 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3002 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3004 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3005 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3007 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3008 /// across the p2p network.
3010 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3011 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3013 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3014 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3015 /// keys per-channel).
3017 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3018 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3019 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3021 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3022 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3023 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3025 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3026 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3027 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3028 /// for more details.
3030 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3031 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3032 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3033 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3035 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3036 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3037 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3038 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3043 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3044 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
3045 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
3046 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
3047 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
3048 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3049 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3053 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3054 let mut output_index = None;
3055 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3056 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3057 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3058 if output_index.is_some() {
3059 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3060 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3063 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3064 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3065 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3068 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3071 if output_index.is_none() {
3072 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3073 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3076 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3080 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3082 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3083 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3084 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3085 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3087 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3088 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3090 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3091 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3093 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3095 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3096 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3097 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3098 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3099 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3100 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3101 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3102 pub fn update_channel_config(
3103 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3104 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3105 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3106 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3107 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3111 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3112 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3115 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3116 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3117 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3118 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3119 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3120 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3122 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3123 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3124 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3125 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3129 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3130 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3131 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3134 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3135 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3136 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3137 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3138 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3147 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3149 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3150 /// Will likely generate further events.
3151 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3152 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3154 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3155 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3156 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3157 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3159 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3160 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3162 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3163 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3164 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3166 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3167 match forward_info {
3168 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3169 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3170 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3171 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3172 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3175 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3176 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3177 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3179 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3180 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3181 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3182 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3183 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3184 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3187 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3188 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3190 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3193 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3194 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3200 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3201 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3203 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3207 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3208 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3210 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3214 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3215 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3216 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3217 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3218 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3220 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3221 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3222 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3223 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3224 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3226 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3228 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3229 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3233 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3234 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3235 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3236 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3242 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3245 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3248 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3249 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3250 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3251 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3252 // problem, not ours.
3258 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3259 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3261 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3265 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3266 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3267 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3268 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3269 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3272 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3273 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3274 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3275 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3276 match forward_info {
3277 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3278 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint ,
3279 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3280 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3281 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3284 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3285 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3286 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3287 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3288 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3289 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3290 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3291 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3293 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3295 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3296 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3298 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3300 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3301 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3302 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3303 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3309 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3311 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3312 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3313 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3314 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3315 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3316 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3317 // this channel currently :/.
3323 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3324 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3326 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3327 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3328 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3330 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3331 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3333 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3335 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3336 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3337 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3340 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3342 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3343 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3344 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3345 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3346 // messages when we can.
3347 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3348 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3349 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3356 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3357 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3360 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3361 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3362 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3363 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3364 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3365 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3367 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3368 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3369 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3370 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3371 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3374 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3378 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3379 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3381 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3385 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3386 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3387 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3388 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3389 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3390 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3391 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3392 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3393 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3395 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3402 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3403 match forward_info {
3404 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3405 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3406 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3407 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3410 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3411 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3412 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3413 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3415 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3416 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3418 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3421 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3422 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3423 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3424 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3425 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3426 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3427 phantom_shared_secret,
3429 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3431 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3436 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3437 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3438 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3439 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3440 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3442 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3443 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3444 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3445 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3446 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3447 phantom_shared_secret,
3449 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3450 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3455 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3456 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3457 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3459 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3460 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3461 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3464 let mut claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3465 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3466 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3467 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3468 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3469 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3470 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3474 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3475 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3476 total_value += htlc.value;
3477 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3478 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3479 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3480 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3481 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3482 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3484 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3486 _ => unreachable!(),
3489 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3490 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3491 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3492 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3493 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3494 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3495 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3498 amount_msat: total_value,
3500 payment_received_generated = true;
3502 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3503 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3505 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3507 payment_received_generated
3511 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3512 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3513 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3514 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3515 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3516 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3517 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3518 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3519 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3520 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3521 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3522 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3523 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3524 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3526 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3530 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3532 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3533 match self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_hash) {
3534 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3535 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3536 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3537 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3539 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3543 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3544 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3545 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3551 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3552 if payment_data.is_none() {
3553 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3554 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3557 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3558 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3559 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3560 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3561 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3562 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3563 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3564 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3566 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3567 if payment_received_generated {
3568 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3574 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3575 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3583 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3584 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3586 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3588 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3589 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3592 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3593 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3594 events.append(&mut new_events);
3597 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3599 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3600 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3602 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3603 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3604 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3605 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3606 if background_events.is_empty() {
3610 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3612 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3613 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3614 // monitor updating completing.
3615 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3622 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3623 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3624 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3625 self.process_background_events();
3628 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3629 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3630 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3631 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3632 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3633 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3634 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3636 if !chan.is_live() {
3637 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3638 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3639 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3641 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3642 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3644 let mut retain_channel = true;
3645 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3648 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3649 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3653 let ret_err = match res {
3654 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3655 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3656 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3657 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3658 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3659 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3660 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3661 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3662 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3663 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3664 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3671 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3672 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3680 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3684 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3685 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3686 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3687 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3688 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3689 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3690 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3692 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3694 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3696 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3697 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3698 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3699 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3700 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3701 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3703 handle_errors.push(err);
3713 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3714 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3715 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3716 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3717 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3718 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3719 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3721 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3722 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3723 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3724 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3725 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3726 if no_remaining_entries {
3727 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3729 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3730 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3731 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3732 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3733 no_remaining_entries = false;
3741 if no_remaining_entries {
3742 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3743 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3745 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3752 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3754 /// This currently includes:
3755 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3756 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3757 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3759 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3760 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3762 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3763 /// estimate fetches.
3764 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3765 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3766 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3767 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3769 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3771 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3772 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3774 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3775 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3776 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3777 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3778 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3779 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3780 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3782 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3784 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3786 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3787 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3788 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3789 if needs_close { return false; }
3792 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3793 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3794 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3795 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3796 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3797 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3798 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3799 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3803 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3804 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3806 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3807 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3808 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3812 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3813 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3818 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3824 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3825 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3826 // This should be unreachable
3827 debug_assert!(false);
3830 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3831 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3832 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3833 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3835 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3836 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3837 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3839 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3846 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3847 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3848 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3851 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3852 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3855 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3861 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3862 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3863 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3865 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3866 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3867 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3868 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3870 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3871 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3872 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3873 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3874 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3875 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3877 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(payment_hash);
3878 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3879 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3880 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3881 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3882 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3883 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
3884 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3885 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3886 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3891 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3892 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3894 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3896 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3897 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3898 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3899 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3900 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3901 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3902 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3904 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3906 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3907 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3909 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3914 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3915 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3916 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3917 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3918 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3919 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3920 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3921 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3922 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3923 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3925 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3926 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3927 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3928 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3930 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3931 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3932 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3933 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3934 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3938 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3939 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3940 // be surfaced to the user.
3941 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3942 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3943 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3945 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3946 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3947 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3948 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3949 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3951 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3954 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3955 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
3959 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3960 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3961 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason,destination: HTLCDestination) {
3962 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3964 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3965 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3966 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3967 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3968 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3971 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3972 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3973 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3976 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3977 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3978 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3980 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3981 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3982 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3983 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3984 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3985 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3986 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3987 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3988 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3991 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3992 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3995 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3996 all_paths_failed = true;
3997 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3998 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
4000 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
4006 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4009 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
4010 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
4011 Some(RouteParameters {
4012 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
4013 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
4014 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
4017 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4019 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
4020 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4022 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4024 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4026 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4027 if !payment_retryable {
4028 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
4030 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4034 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4036 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4042 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
4043 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
4044 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
4045 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
4046 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4048 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4049 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4050 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4051 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
4058 error_code: onion_error_code,
4060 error_data: onion_error_data
4064 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4070 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
4071 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
4072 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
4073 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
4075 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
4076 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
4077 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
4078 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4080 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4081 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4083 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4085 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4088 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4089 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4090 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4091 payment_failed_permanently: false,
4092 network_update: None,
4095 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4098 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
4100 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
4105 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4106 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4107 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4109 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
4110 let err_packet = match onion_error {
4111 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
4112 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
4113 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
4114 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4115 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
4116 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
4118 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4119 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
4122 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
4123 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4124 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4128 let mut forward_event = None;
4129 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4130 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4131 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4133 match forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
4134 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4135 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
4137 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4138 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
4141 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4142 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4143 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4144 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4145 time_forwardable: time
4148 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4149 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4150 failed_next_destination: destination
4156 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4157 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4159 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4160 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4161 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4163 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4164 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4165 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4166 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4168 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4169 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4170 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4171 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4172 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4173 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4174 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4175 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4177 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4179 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_hash);
4180 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4181 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4183 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4184 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4185 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4186 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4188 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4189 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4190 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4191 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4192 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4194 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4195 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4196 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4197 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4198 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4199 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4200 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4201 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4202 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4203 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4210 if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4215 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4216 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4217 debug_assert!(false);
4221 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4222 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4223 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4224 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4225 if sources.len() != 1 {
4226 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4227 debug_assert!(false);
4233 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4235 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4236 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4239 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4240 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4241 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4245 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4246 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4247 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4248 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4249 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4250 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4251 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4252 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4253 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4255 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4256 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4257 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4258 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4259 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4260 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4262 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4266 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4268 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4269 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4270 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4271 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4272 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
4273 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4274 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4275 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4279 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4280 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4282 purpose: payment_purpose,
4283 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4287 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4288 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4289 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4290 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4295 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4296 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4297 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4298 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4299 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4301 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4305 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4306 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4307 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4308 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4309 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4310 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4312 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4313 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4314 payment_preimage, e);
4315 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4316 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4317 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4318 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4322 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4323 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4324 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4325 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4326 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4327 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4328 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4329 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4330 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4331 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4337 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4339 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4342 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4343 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4344 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4346 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4347 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4348 payment_preimage, e);
4351 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4352 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4354 chan.remove_entry();
4356 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4359 } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
4362 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4363 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4364 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4365 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4366 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4367 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4368 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4369 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4370 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4371 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4372 pending_events.push(
4373 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4375 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4385 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4387 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4388 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4389 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4390 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4391 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4392 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4393 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4394 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4395 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4396 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4397 pending_events.push(
4398 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4399 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4405 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4409 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4410 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4411 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4413 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4414 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4415 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4416 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4417 pending_events.push(
4418 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4427 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4430 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4431 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4432 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4433 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4434 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4435 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4436 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4439 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4440 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4441 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4442 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4443 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4446 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4447 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4448 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4449 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4450 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4451 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4452 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4453 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4454 // again on restart.
4455 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4456 payment_preimage, update_res);
4458 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4459 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4460 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4461 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4464 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4465 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4466 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4467 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4471 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4472 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4473 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4476 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4477 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4478 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4480 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4482 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4492 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4493 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4494 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4497 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4498 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4500 let chan_restoration_res;
4501 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4502 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4503 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4504 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4505 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4506 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4508 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4512 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4513 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4514 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4515 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4516 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4517 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4518 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4520 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4521 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4522 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4527 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4528 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4529 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4532 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4534 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4535 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4536 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4537 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4538 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4542 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4544 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4545 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4548 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4549 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4550 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4552 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4553 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4554 /// used to accept such channels.
4556 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4557 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4558 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4559 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4562 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4563 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4565 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4566 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4567 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4569 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4570 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4572 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4573 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4575 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4576 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4578 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4579 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4580 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4581 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4584 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4585 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4587 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4588 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4589 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4590 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4591 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4592 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4594 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4595 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4598 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4599 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4600 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4601 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4602 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4603 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4606 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4607 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4608 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4611 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4612 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4613 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4616 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4617 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4623 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4624 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4625 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4628 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4629 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4632 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4633 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4634 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4636 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4637 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4638 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4639 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4642 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4643 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4647 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4648 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4649 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4650 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4651 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4652 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4654 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4655 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4656 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4657 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4659 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4660 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4661 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4664 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4665 pending_events.push(
4666 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4667 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4668 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4669 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4670 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4671 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4676 entry.insert(channel);
4682 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4683 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4684 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4685 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4686 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4687 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4688 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4689 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4691 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4692 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4694 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4697 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4698 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4699 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4700 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4701 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4703 user_channel_id: user_id,
4708 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4709 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4710 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4711 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4712 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4713 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4714 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4715 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4716 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4718 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4720 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4723 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4724 // lock before watch_channel
4725 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4726 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4727 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4728 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4729 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4730 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4731 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4732 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4733 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4734 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4735 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4736 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4737 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4739 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4740 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4741 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4742 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4743 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4744 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4745 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4748 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4749 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4750 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4751 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4752 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4754 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4755 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4756 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4757 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4758 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4759 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4760 funding_msg.channel_id))
4762 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4763 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4766 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4767 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4770 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4771 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4779 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4781 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4782 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4783 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4784 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4785 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4786 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4787 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4789 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4790 Ok(update) => update,
4791 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4793 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4794 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4796 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4797 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4798 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4799 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4800 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4801 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4802 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4808 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4809 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4813 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4816 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4817 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4821 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4822 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4823 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4824 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4825 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4826 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4827 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4829 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4830 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4831 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4832 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4833 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4834 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4835 msg: announcement_sigs,
4837 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4838 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4839 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4840 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4841 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4842 // announcement_signatures.
4843 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4844 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4845 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4846 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4852 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4856 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4860 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4861 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4862 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4863 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4864 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4866 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4867 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4868 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4869 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4872 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4873 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4874 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4875 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4878 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4879 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4881 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4882 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4883 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4884 let (result, is_permanent) =
4885 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4887 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4892 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4893 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4894 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4901 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4904 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4905 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4906 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4909 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4913 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4914 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4915 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4916 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4917 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4918 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4919 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4920 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4922 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4923 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4924 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4925 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4930 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4931 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4932 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4933 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4934 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4935 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4936 } else { (tx, None) }
4938 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4941 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4942 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4943 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4945 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4946 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4947 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4948 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4952 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4957 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4958 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4959 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4960 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4962 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4963 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4964 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4965 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4967 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4968 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4969 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4971 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4972 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4973 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4974 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4977 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4978 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4979 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4980 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4981 match pending_forward_info {
4982 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4983 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4984 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4985 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4987 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4989 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4990 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4991 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4994 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4996 _ => pending_forward_info
4999 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5001 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5006 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5007 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5008 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5009 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5010 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5011 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5012 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5013 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5015 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5020 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5024 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5025 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5026 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5027 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5028 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5029 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5030 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5032 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
5034 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5039 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5040 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5041 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5042 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5043 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5044 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5045 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5047 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5048 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5049 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5051 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), chan);
5054 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5058 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5059 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5060 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5061 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5062 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5063 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5064 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5066 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5067 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5068 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5069 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5070 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5071 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5072 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5077 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5078 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5082 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5083 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5084 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5086 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5087 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5088 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5089 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5090 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5091 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5092 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5093 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5095 commitment_signed: msg,
5101 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5106 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5107 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5108 let mut forward_event = None;
5109 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5110 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5111 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5112 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
5114 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5115 match forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
5116 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5117 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5118 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5120 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5121 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5122 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
5124 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5125 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5126 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, forward_info })));
5131 match forward_event {
5133 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5134 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5135 time_forwardable: time
5143 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5144 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5146 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5147 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5148 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5149 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5150 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5151 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5153 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5154 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5155 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5156 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5157 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5158 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5159 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5160 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5161 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5162 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5163 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5164 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5166 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5167 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5168 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5169 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5170 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5171 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5173 } else { unreachable!(); }
5175 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5176 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5177 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5181 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5182 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5183 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5184 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5185 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
5187 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5190 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5192 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5193 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
5195 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5196 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5197 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
5199 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
5200 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5207 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5208 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5209 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5210 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5211 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5212 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5213 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5215 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5217 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5222 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5223 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5224 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5226 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5227 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5228 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5229 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5231 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5232 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5235 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5236 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5237 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5238 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5239 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5240 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5243 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5248 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5249 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5250 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5251 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5253 // It's not a local channel
5254 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5257 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5258 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5259 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5260 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5261 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5262 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5263 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5264 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5265 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5266 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5268 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5270 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5271 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5272 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5273 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5275 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5276 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5279 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5281 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5284 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5285 let chan_restoration_res;
5286 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5287 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5288 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5290 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5291 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5292 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5293 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5295 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5296 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5297 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5298 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5299 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5300 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5301 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5302 let mut channel_update = None;
5303 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5304 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5305 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5308 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5309 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5310 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5311 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5312 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5313 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5314 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5319 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5320 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5321 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5322 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5323 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5324 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5326 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5331 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5332 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5334 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5335 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5340 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5341 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5342 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5343 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5344 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5345 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5346 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5347 match monitor_event {
5348 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5349 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5350 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5351 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5353 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5354 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5355 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5358 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5359 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5360 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5361 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5362 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5363 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5364 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5365 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5366 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5367 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5368 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5372 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5373 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5375 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5377 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5378 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5379 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5380 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5381 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5386 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5387 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5393 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5394 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5397 has_pending_monitor_events
5400 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5401 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5402 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5404 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5405 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5408 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5409 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5410 /// update was applied.
5412 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5413 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5414 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5415 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5416 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5417 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5418 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5419 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5421 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5422 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5423 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5424 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5426 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5427 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5428 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5429 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5431 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5433 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5436 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5437 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5438 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5439 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5440 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5441 updates: commitment_update,
5445 has_monitor_update = true;
5446 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5447 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5448 if close_channel { return false; }
5455 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5456 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5457 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5464 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5465 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5466 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5469 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5470 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5476 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5477 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5478 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5479 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5480 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5481 let mut has_update = false;
5483 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5484 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5485 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5486 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5488 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5489 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5490 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5491 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5493 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5494 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5497 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5498 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5499 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5500 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5501 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5506 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5508 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5509 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5510 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5516 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5517 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5524 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5525 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5531 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5532 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5534 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5535 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5536 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5537 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5538 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5539 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5540 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5541 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5542 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5543 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5544 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5545 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5546 assert!(should_broadcast);
5547 } else { unreachable!(); }
5548 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5550 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5554 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5555 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5557 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5558 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5561 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5563 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5564 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5565 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5566 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5567 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5568 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5569 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5570 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5571 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5572 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5573 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5574 // never fail a payment too early.
5575 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5577 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5580 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5585 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5588 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5589 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5591 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5592 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5593 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5595 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5597 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5598 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5602 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5603 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5605 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5607 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5608 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5609 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5610 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5611 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5612 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5615 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5616 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5618 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5621 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5623 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5625 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5626 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5627 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5628 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5629 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5632 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5633 /// stored external to LDK.
5635 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5636 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5637 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5639 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5640 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5643 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5644 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5645 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5646 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5648 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5649 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5650 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5651 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5652 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5654 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5655 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5656 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5657 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5658 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5660 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5661 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5663 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5664 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5668 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5669 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5671 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5673 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5674 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5675 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5676 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5679 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5680 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5682 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5685 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5687 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5689 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5690 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5693 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5694 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5696 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5697 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5698 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5701 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5702 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5704 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5705 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5706 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5707 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5709 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5710 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5711 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5712 Some(_) => continue,
5713 None => return scid_candidate
5718 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5720 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5721 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5723 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5724 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5725 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5729 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5730 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5731 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5732 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5734 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5735 for htlc_source in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5736 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5737 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5745 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5746 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5747 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5748 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5749 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5754 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5755 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5759 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5760 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5763 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5764 /// using the given event handler.
5766 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5767 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5770 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5771 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5772 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5774 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5776 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5777 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5778 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5779 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5782 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5783 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5784 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5787 for event in pending_events {
5788 handler(event).await;
5791 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5792 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5797 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5798 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5799 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5800 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5801 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5804 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5805 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5806 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5807 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5809 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5810 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5811 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5812 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5815 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5816 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5818 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5819 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5822 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5823 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5824 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5826 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5827 events.replace(pending_events);
5836 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5838 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5839 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5840 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5841 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5844 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5846 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5847 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5848 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5849 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5850 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5852 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5853 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5854 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5855 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5858 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5859 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5860 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5863 for event in pending_events {
5864 handler.handle_event(event);
5872 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5874 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5875 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5876 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5877 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5880 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5882 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5883 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5884 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5885 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5886 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5889 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5890 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5893 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5894 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5895 let new_height = height - 1;
5897 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5898 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5899 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5900 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5901 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5902 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5905 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5909 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5911 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5912 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5913 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5914 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5917 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5918 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5919 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5920 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5922 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5923 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5925 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5926 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5927 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5929 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5930 if height < last_best_block_height {
5931 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5932 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5936 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5937 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5938 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5939 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5941 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5942 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5944 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5946 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5948 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5950 macro_rules! max_time {
5951 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5953 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5954 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5955 // having an explicit local time source.
5956 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5957 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5958 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5959 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5960 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5966 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5967 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5968 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5969 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5973 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5974 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5975 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
5976 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5977 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5978 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
5984 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5985 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5986 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5987 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5988 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5989 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5990 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5991 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5996 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5998 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5999 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6000 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6001 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6004 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6005 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6007 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6008 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6009 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6010 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6011 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6013 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6014 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6016 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6017 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
6018 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6019 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6020 let res = f(channel);
6021 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6022 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6023 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6024 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
6026 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6028 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6029 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6030 if channel.is_usable() {
6031 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6032 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6033 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6034 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6039 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6043 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6045 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6046 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6047 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6048 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6049 msg: announcement_sigs,
6051 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6052 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
6053 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6055 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6056 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6057 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
6062 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6063 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6064 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6065 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6066 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6067 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6068 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6069 // is always consistent.
6070 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6071 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6072 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6073 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6074 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6077 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6078 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6079 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6080 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6081 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6082 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6083 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6087 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6088 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6089 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6090 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6091 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6092 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6093 data: reason_message,
6102 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6103 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6104 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6105 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6106 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6107 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6108 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6109 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6110 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
6111 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
6113 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
6114 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
6115 data: htlc_msat_height_data
6116 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6120 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6124 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6126 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6127 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
6131 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6132 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6133 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6134 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6136 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6138 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6139 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6140 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6141 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6142 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6143 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6146 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6147 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6148 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6150 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6151 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6152 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6153 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6156 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6157 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6158 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6159 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6160 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6163 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6164 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6165 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6168 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6169 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6170 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6171 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6175 impl<M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
6176 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6177 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6178 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6179 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6180 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6183 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6184 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6185 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6188 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6189 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6190 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6193 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6194 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6195 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6198 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6199 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6200 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6203 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6204 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6205 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6208 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6209 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6210 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6213 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6214 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6215 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6218 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6219 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6220 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6223 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6224 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6225 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6228 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6229 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6230 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6233 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6234 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6235 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6238 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6239 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6240 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6243 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6244 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6245 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6248 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6249 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6250 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6253 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6254 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6255 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6258 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6259 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6260 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6263 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6268 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6269 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6270 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6273 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6274 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6275 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6276 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6278 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6279 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6280 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6281 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6282 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6283 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6284 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6285 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6286 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6287 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6288 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6291 no_channels_remain = false;
6296 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6298 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6299 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6300 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6301 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6302 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6303 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6304 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6305 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6306 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6307 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6308 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6309 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6310 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6311 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6312 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6313 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6314 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6315 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6316 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6317 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6321 if no_channels_remain {
6322 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6325 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6326 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6330 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6331 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6332 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6336 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6338 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6341 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6342 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6343 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6344 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6345 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6349 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6354 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6355 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6356 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6357 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6358 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6359 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6360 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6361 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6362 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6366 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6367 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6368 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6373 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6374 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6375 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6376 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6377 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6385 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6389 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6390 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6392 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6393 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6394 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6395 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6396 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6401 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6402 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6403 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6404 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6407 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6408 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6409 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6417 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6418 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6422 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6423 provided_node_features()
6426 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6427 provided_init_features()
6431 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6432 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6433 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6434 provided_init_features().to_context()
6437 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6438 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6440 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6441 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6442 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6443 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6444 provided_init_features().to_context()
6447 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6448 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6449 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6450 provided_init_features().to_context()
6453 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6454 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6455 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6456 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6457 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6458 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6459 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6460 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6461 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6462 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6463 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6464 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6465 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6466 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6467 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6468 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6469 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6470 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6474 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6475 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6477 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6478 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6479 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6480 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6483 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6484 (2, node_id, required),
6485 (4, features, required),
6486 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6487 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6488 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6489 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6492 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6493 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6494 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6495 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6496 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6497 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6498 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6499 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6500 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6501 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6502 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6503 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6504 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6505 (7, self.config, option),
6506 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6507 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6508 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6509 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6510 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6511 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6512 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6513 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6514 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6515 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6516 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6517 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6518 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6519 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6520 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6521 (32, self.is_public, required),
6522 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6523 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6524 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6530 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6531 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6532 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6533 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6534 (2, channel_id, required),
6535 (3, channel_type, option),
6536 (4, counterparty, required),
6537 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6538 (6, funding_txo, option),
6539 (7, config, option),
6540 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6541 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6542 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6543 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6544 (16, balance_msat, required),
6545 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6546 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6547 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6548 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6549 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6550 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6551 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6552 (26, is_outbound, required),
6553 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6554 (30, is_usable, required),
6555 (32, is_public, required),
6556 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6557 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6558 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6561 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6562 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6563 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6564 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6565 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6569 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6571 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6572 outbound_scid_alias,
6576 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6577 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6579 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6580 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6581 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6582 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6583 confirmations_required,
6584 force_close_spend_delay,
6585 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6586 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6587 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6588 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6589 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6590 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6595 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6596 (2, channels, vec_type),
6597 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6598 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6601 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6603 (0, onion_packet, required),
6604 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6607 (0, payment_data, required),
6608 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6609 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6611 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6612 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6613 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6617 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6618 (0, routing, required),
6619 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6620 (4, payment_hash, required),
6621 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6622 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6623 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6627 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6628 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6630 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6632 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6633 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6634 reason.write(writer)?;
6636 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6637 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6640 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6641 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6642 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6643 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6650 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6651 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6652 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6655 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6656 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6657 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6658 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6662 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6663 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6664 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6665 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6666 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6669 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6670 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6671 // messages contained in the variants.
6672 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6673 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6674 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6676 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6677 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6678 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6679 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6680 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6683 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6684 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6685 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6686 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6687 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6689 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6694 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6699 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6700 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6701 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6702 (2, outpoint, required),
6703 (4, htlc_id, required),
6704 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6707 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6708 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6709 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6710 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6711 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6713 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6714 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6715 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6716 (2, self.value, required),
6717 (4, payment_data, option),
6718 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6719 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6725 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6726 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6727 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6729 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6730 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6731 let mut total_msat = None;
6732 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6733 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6734 (0, prev_hop, required),
6735 (1, total_msat, option),
6736 (2, value, required),
6737 (4, payment_data, option),
6738 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6739 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6741 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6743 if payment_data.is_some() {
6744 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6746 if total_msat.is_none() {
6747 total_msat = Some(value);
6749 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6752 if total_msat.is_none() {
6753 if payment_data.is_none() {
6754 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6756 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6758 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6762 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6765 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6772 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6773 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6774 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6777 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6778 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6779 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6780 let mut payment_id = None;
6781 let mut payment_secret = None;
6782 let mut payment_params = None;
6783 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6784 (0, session_priv, required),
6785 (1, payment_id, option),
6786 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6787 (3, payment_secret, option),
6788 (4, path, vec_type),
6789 (5, payment_params, option),
6791 if payment_id.is_none() {
6792 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6794 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6796 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6797 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6798 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6799 path: path.unwrap(),
6800 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6805 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6806 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6811 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6812 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6814 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6816 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6817 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6818 (0, session_priv, required),
6819 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6820 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6821 (3, payment_secret, option),
6822 (4, *path, vec_type),
6823 (5, payment_params, option),
6826 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6828 field.write(writer)?;
6835 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6836 (0, LightningError) => {
6840 (0, failure_code, required),
6841 (2, data, vec_type),
6845 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6846 (0, forward_info, required),
6847 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6848 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6849 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6852 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6854 (0, htlc_id, required),
6855 (2, err_packet, required),
6860 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6861 (0, payment_secret, required),
6862 (2, expiry_time, required),
6863 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6864 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6865 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6868 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6870 (0, session_privs, required),
6873 (0, session_privs, required),
6874 (1, payment_hash, option),
6875 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
6878 (0, session_privs, required),
6879 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6880 (2, payment_hash, required),
6881 (4, payment_secret, option),
6882 (6, total_msat, required),
6883 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6884 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6887 (0, session_privs, required),
6888 (2, payment_hash, required),
6892 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6893 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6894 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6895 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6896 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6899 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6900 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6902 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6904 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6906 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6907 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6908 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6912 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
6913 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
6914 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6915 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6916 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6917 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6918 unfunded_channels += 1;
6921 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6922 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6923 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6924 channel.write(writer)?;
6930 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6931 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6932 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6933 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6934 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6935 for forward in pending_forwards {
6936 forward.write(writer)?;
6941 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6942 let claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6943 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6945 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6946 (claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6947 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6948 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6949 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6950 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6951 htlc.write(writer)?;
6953 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6956 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6957 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6958 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6959 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6960 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6961 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6964 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6965 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6966 for event in events.iter() {
6967 event.write(writer)?;
6970 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6971 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6972 for event in background_events.iter() {
6974 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6976 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6977 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6982 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6983 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6984 // likely to be identical.
6985 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6986 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6988 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6989 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6990 hash.write(writer)?;
6991 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6994 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6995 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6996 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6997 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6998 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7001 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7002 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7004 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7005 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7006 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7007 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7010 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7011 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7015 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7016 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7017 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7019 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7020 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7021 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7026 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7027 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7028 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7029 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7030 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7031 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7032 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7039 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7041 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7043 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7044 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7045 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7046 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7047 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7048 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7049 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7050 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7051 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7052 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7053 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7054 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7055 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7057 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7058 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7060 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7061 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7063 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7064 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7065 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7066 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7067 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7068 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7070 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7071 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7072 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7073 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7074 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7075 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7078 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7079 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7081 pub keys_manager: K,
7083 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7085 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7086 pub fee_estimator: F,
7087 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7089 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7090 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7091 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7092 pub chain_monitor: M,
7094 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7095 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7096 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7097 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7098 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7099 /// deserialization.
7101 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7102 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7103 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7105 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7106 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7108 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7109 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7110 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7111 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7113 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7116 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7117 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
7120 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7121 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
7122 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7123 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7124 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7125 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7128 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7129 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7130 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7131 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7132 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7134 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7135 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7140 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7141 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7142 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7143 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7144 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7145 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7146 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7147 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7150 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7151 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7152 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7156 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7157 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7158 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7159 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7160 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7161 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7164 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7165 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7167 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7168 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7169 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7171 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7173 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7174 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7175 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7176 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7177 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7178 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7179 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7180 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7181 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7182 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7183 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7184 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7185 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7186 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7187 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7188 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7189 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7190 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7191 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7192 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7193 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7194 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7195 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7196 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7197 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7198 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7199 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7200 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7201 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7202 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7203 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7204 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7205 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7206 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7207 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7208 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7209 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7210 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7211 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7212 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7215 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7216 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7217 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7219 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7220 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7222 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7224 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7225 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7226 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7227 // safely discard the channel.
7228 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7229 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7230 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7231 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7232 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7235 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7236 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7237 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7238 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7239 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7240 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7244 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7245 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7246 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7247 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7251 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7252 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7253 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7254 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7255 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7256 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7257 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7258 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7259 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7261 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7264 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7265 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7266 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7267 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7268 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7269 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7270 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7271 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7273 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7276 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7277 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7278 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7279 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7280 let peer_state = PeerState {
7281 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7283 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7286 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7287 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7288 for _ in 0..event_count {
7289 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7290 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7294 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
7295 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7296 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7297 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7298 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7299 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7300 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7301 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7305 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7306 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7307 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7308 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7309 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7310 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7314 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7315 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7317 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7318 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7319 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7320 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7321 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7325 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7326 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7327 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7328 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7329 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7330 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7331 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7333 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7334 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7338 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7339 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7340 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7341 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7342 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7343 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7344 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7345 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7346 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7347 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7348 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7349 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7350 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7351 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7353 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7354 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7357 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7358 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7361 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7362 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7363 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7364 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7365 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7366 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7368 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7370 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7371 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7372 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7373 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7374 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7375 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7376 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7378 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7379 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7380 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7381 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7382 if path.is_empty() {
7383 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7384 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7386 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7387 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7388 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7389 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7390 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7391 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7392 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7393 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7395 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7396 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7397 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7398 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7399 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7401 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7402 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7403 total_msat: path_amt,
7404 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7406 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7407 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7416 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7417 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7419 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7420 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7421 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7422 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7424 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7425 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7428 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7429 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7430 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7431 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7432 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7434 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7435 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7436 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7437 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7438 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7439 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7440 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7441 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7443 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7444 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7448 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7450 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7452 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7453 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7455 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7459 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7460 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7462 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7463 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7466 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7468 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7470 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7471 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7472 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7473 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7474 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7478 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7479 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7480 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7481 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7483 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7484 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7485 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7487 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7488 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7489 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7490 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7491 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7492 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7494 if chan.is_usable() {
7495 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7496 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7497 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7498 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7499 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7504 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7506 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7507 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7508 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7509 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7510 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7511 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7512 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7514 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7515 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7516 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7517 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7519 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7520 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7521 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7522 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7524 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7525 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7526 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7527 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7529 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7530 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7531 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7533 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7534 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7537 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7539 purpose: payment_purpose,
7540 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7546 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7548 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7549 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7550 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7552 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7554 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7556 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7558 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7559 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7560 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7562 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7563 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(claimable_htlcs),
7564 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7565 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7566 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7567 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7569 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7575 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7577 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7579 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7580 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7581 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7582 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7584 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7585 logger: args.logger,
7586 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7589 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7590 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7591 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7592 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7595 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7596 //connection or two.
7598 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7604 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7605 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7606 use core::time::Duration;
7607 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7608 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7609 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7610 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7611 use crate::ln::msgs;
7612 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7613 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7614 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7615 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7616 use crate::util::test_utils;
7617 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7620 fn test_notify_limits() {
7621 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7622 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7623 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7624 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7625 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7626 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7628 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7629 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7630 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7631 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7632 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7634 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7636 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7637 // to connect messages with new values
7638 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7639 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7640 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7641 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7643 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7644 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7645 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7646 // ... but the last node should not.
7647 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7648 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7649 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7650 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7652 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7653 // about the channel.
7654 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7655 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7656 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7658 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7660 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7661 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7662 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7663 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7664 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7665 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7667 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7668 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7669 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7671 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7672 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7673 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7674 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7675 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7676 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7678 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7679 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7680 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7681 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7682 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7683 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7684 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7685 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7687 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7688 // the channel info has updated.
7689 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7690 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7691 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7692 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7693 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7694 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7698 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7699 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7701 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7702 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7703 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7704 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7705 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7707 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7708 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7709 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7710 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7712 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7713 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7714 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7715 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7716 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7717 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7719 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7720 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7721 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7723 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7724 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7726 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7727 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7728 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7729 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7730 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7732 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7733 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7734 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7736 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7737 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7738 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7739 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7740 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7741 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7742 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7743 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7744 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7746 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7747 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7749 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7750 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7751 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7753 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7754 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7755 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7756 // lightning messages manually.
7757 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7758 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7761 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7762 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7763 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7765 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7766 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7768 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7769 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7770 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7771 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7772 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7773 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7775 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7776 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7777 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7779 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7781 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7783 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7784 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7787 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7788 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7789 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7790 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7792 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7793 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7794 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7795 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7797 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7800 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7801 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7802 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7803 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7805 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7808 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7809 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7810 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7811 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7813 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7818 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7819 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7820 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7821 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7822 // fails as expected.
7823 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7824 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7825 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7826 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7827 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7828 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7829 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7831 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7832 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7833 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7835 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7836 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7837 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7838 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7839 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7841 let route = find_route(
7842 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7843 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7845 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7847 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7848 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7849 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7850 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7851 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7853 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7854 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7855 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7856 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7857 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7859 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7860 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7861 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7862 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7863 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7864 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7865 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7866 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7867 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7869 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7870 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7872 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7873 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7874 let route = find_route(
7875 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7876 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7878 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7880 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7881 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7882 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7883 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7884 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7886 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7887 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7888 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7890 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7891 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7892 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7893 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7894 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7896 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7897 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7898 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7900 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7901 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7902 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7903 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7904 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7905 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7906 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7907 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7908 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7910 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7911 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7915 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7916 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7917 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7918 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7919 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7920 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7921 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7923 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7924 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7925 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7926 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7928 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7929 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7930 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7931 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7932 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7934 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7935 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7936 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7937 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7938 let route = find_route(
7939 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7940 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7943 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7944 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7945 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7946 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7949 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7950 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7951 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7952 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7953 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7954 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7955 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7957 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7961 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7962 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7963 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7964 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7965 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7966 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7968 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7969 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7970 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7971 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7973 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7974 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7975 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7976 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7977 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7979 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7980 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7981 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7982 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7983 let route = find_route(
7984 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7985 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7988 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7989 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7990 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7991 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7992 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7995 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7996 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7997 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7998 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7999 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8000 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8001 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8003 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8007 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8008 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8009 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8010 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8011 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8013 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8014 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8015 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8016 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8018 // Marshall an MPP route.
8019 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8020 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8021 route.paths.push(path);
8022 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8023 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8024 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8025 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8026 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8027 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8029 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8030 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8031 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8032 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8037 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8038 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8039 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8040 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8041 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8042 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8044 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8045 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8047 total_msat: 100_000,
8050 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8051 // payment verification fails as expected.
8052 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8053 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8054 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8055 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8057 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8061 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8062 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8066 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8067 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8068 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8069 // the channel is successfully closed.
8070 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8071 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8072 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8073 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8075 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8076 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8077 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8078 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8079 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8081 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8082 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8084 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8085 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8086 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8087 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8090 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8092 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8093 // as it has the funding transaction.
8094 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8095 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8096 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8098 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8101 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8103 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8105 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8106 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8107 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8109 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8110 // as it has the funding transaction.
8111 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8112 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8113 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8116 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8117 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8119 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8120 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8121 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8123 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8124 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8125 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8126 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8128 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8129 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8131 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8132 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8133 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8134 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8135 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8136 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8137 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8139 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8140 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8141 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8142 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8143 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8144 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8145 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8148 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8150 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8151 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8152 // closing transaction).
8153 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8154 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8155 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8157 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8158 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8159 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8160 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8161 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8164 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8166 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8168 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8169 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8170 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8172 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8174 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8175 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8179 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8181 use crate::chain::Listen;
8182 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8183 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8184 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8185 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8186 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8187 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8188 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8189 use crate::util::test_utils;
8190 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8191 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8193 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8194 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8195 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8197 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8201 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8202 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8203 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8204 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8205 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8206 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8207 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8212 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8213 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8216 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8217 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8218 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8220 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8221 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8223 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8224 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8226 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8227 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8229 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8230 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8231 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8232 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8233 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8235 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8237 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8239 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8240 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8241 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8242 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8243 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8245 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8247 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8249 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8250 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8251 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8252 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8253 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8256 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8257 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8258 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8260 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8261 } else { panic!(); }
8263 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8264 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8266 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8269 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8272 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8273 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8275 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8276 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8277 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8278 match msg_events[0] {
8279 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8280 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8281 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8285 match msg_events[1] {
8286 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8290 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8291 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8293 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8294 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8296 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8299 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8300 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8302 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8303 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8305 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8308 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8310 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8311 macro_rules! send_payment {
8312 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8313 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8314 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8315 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8316 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8317 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8318 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8319 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8320 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8321 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8323 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8324 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8326 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8327 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8329 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8330 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8331 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8332 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8333 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8334 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8335 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8336 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8338 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8339 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8340 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8341 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8343 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8344 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8345 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8346 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8347 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8349 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8352 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8353 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8354 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8355 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8357 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8362 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8363 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);