1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
33 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
34 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
46 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage};
67 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
68 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
69 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
70 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
71 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
72 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
73 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
74 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
76 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
79 use crate::prelude::*;
81 use core::cell::RefCell;
83 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
84 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
85 use core::time::Duration;
88 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
89 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
90 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
92 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
94 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
95 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
96 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
98 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
99 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
100 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
101 // before we forward it.
103 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
104 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
105 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
106 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
107 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
109 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
110 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
112 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
113 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
114 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
115 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
118 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
119 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
120 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
126 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
127 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
128 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
129 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
130 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
131 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
132 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
138 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
139 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
140 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
142 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
143 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
144 /// may overshoot this in either case)
145 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
146 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
147 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
148 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
149 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
152 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
153 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
154 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
155 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
158 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
159 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
160 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
161 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
162 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
165 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
166 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
168 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
169 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
170 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
176 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
177 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
180 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
181 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
184 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
188 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
189 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
190 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
191 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
192 short_channel_id: u64,
193 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
195 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
196 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
198 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
199 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
204 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
206 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
207 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
208 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
210 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
211 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
214 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
215 struct ClaimableHTLC {
216 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
218 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
220 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
221 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
222 sender_intended_value: u64,
223 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
225 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
226 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
227 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
228 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
230 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
231 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
234 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
235 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
236 events::ClaimedHTLC {
237 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
238 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
239 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
240 value_msat: val.value,
245 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
246 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
248 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
249 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
250 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
253 /// Number of bytes in the id.
254 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
257 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
258 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
263 impl Readable for PaymentId {
264 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
265 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
270 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
271 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
272 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
276 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
278 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
279 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
280 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
282 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
283 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
288 impl Readable for InterceptId {
289 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
290 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
295 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
296 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
297 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
298 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
299 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
302 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
304 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
305 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
306 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
308 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
309 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
313 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
314 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
315 (0, short_channel_id, required),
316 (2, htlc_id, required),
318 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
319 (0, session_priv, required),
324 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
325 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
326 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
327 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
328 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
331 session_priv: SecretKey,
332 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
333 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
334 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
335 payment_id: PaymentId,
338 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
339 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
340 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
342 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
344 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
346 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
349 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
350 payment_id.hash(hasher);
351 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
357 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
359 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
360 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
361 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
362 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
363 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
364 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
368 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
369 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
370 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
371 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
372 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
373 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
375 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
381 struct InboundOnionErr {
387 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
388 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
390 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
391 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
392 pub enum FailureCode {
393 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
394 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
395 TemporaryNodeFailure,
396 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
397 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
398 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
399 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
400 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
401 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
402 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
403 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
404 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
405 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
407 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
408 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
409 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
412 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
413 fn into(self) -> u16 {
415 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
416 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
417 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
418 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
423 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
424 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
425 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
426 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
427 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
429 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
430 err: msgs::LightningError,
431 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
432 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
433 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
435 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
437 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
439 err: LightningError {
441 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
442 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
449 shutdown_finish: None,
450 channel_capacity: None,
454 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
455 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
458 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
459 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
460 let action = if let (Some(_), ..) = &shutdown_res {
461 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
462 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
463 // commitment upon reconnecting.
464 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
466 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
469 err: LightningError { err, action },
470 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
471 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
472 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
476 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
479 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
481 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
482 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
486 log_level: Level::Warn,
489 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
491 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
493 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
495 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
496 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
504 shutdown_finish: None,
505 channel_capacity: None,
509 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
510 self.chan_id.is_some()
514 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
515 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
516 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
517 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
518 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
520 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
521 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
522 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
523 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
524 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
525 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
526 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
528 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
532 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
533 struct ClaimingPayment {
535 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
536 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
537 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
538 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
540 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
541 (0, amount_msat, required),
542 (2, payment_purpose, required),
543 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
544 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
545 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
548 struct ClaimablePayment {
549 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
550 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
551 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
554 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
555 struct ClaimablePayments {
556 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
557 /// failed/claimed by the user.
559 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
560 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
562 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
563 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
564 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
566 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
567 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
568 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
569 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
572 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
573 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
574 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
575 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
577 enum BackgroundEvent {
578 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
579 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
580 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
581 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
583 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
584 /// are regenerated on startup.
585 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
586 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
587 /// channel to continue normal operation.
589 /// In general this should be used rather than
590 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
591 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
592 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
594 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
595 /// are regenerated on startup.
596 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
597 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
598 funding_txo: OutPoint,
599 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
601 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
602 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
604 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
605 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
606 channel_id: ChannelId,
611 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
612 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
613 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
614 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
615 /// event can be generated.
616 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
617 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
618 /// operation of another channel.
620 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
621 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
622 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
623 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
625 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
626 event: events::Event,
627 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
629 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
630 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
631 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
633 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
634 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
635 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
636 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
637 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
639 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
640 /// stored for later processing.
641 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
642 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
643 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
644 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
648 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
649 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
650 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
651 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
652 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
653 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
654 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
655 (4, blocking_action, required),
657 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
658 (0, event, upgradable_required),
659 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
660 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
661 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
662 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
663 // downgrades to prior versions.
664 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
668 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
669 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
670 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
671 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
672 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
675 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
676 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
677 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
678 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
682 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
683 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
684 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
685 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
686 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
687 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
689 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
690 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
691 channel_id: ChannelId,
692 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
697 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
698 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
699 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
700 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
701 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
706 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
707 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
711 /// State we hold per-peer.
712 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
713 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
715 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
716 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
717 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
719 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
720 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
721 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
722 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
723 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
724 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
725 latest_features: InitFeatures,
726 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
727 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
728 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
729 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
730 /// user but which have not yet completed.
732 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
733 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
734 /// for a missing channel.
735 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
736 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
737 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
739 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
740 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
741 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
742 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
744 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
745 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
746 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
747 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
748 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
749 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
750 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
751 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
752 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
753 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
754 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
755 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
756 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
757 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
758 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
762 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
763 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
764 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
765 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
766 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
767 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
770 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
771 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
772 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
775 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
776 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
777 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
780 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
781 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
782 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
783 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
787 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
788 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
789 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
790 /// The original OpenChannel message.
791 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
792 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
793 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
796 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
797 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
798 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
800 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
801 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
803 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
806 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
807 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
808 struct PendingInboundPayment {
809 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
810 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
811 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
812 /// this payment being removed.
814 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
815 user_payment_id: u64,
816 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
817 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
818 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
821 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
822 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
823 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
824 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
825 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
826 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
827 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
828 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
830 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
831 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
839 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
841 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
842 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
843 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
848 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
849 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
850 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
851 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
852 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
853 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
854 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
855 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
856 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
858 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
859 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
868 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
870 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
871 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
872 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
877 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
879 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
881 pub trait AChannelManager {
882 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
883 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
884 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
885 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
886 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
887 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
888 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
889 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
890 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
891 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
892 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
893 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
894 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
895 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
896 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
897 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
898 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
899 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
900 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
901 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
902 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
903 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
904 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
905 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
906 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
907 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
908 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
909 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
910 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
911 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
912 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
913 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
914 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
915 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
916 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
917 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
920 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
921 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
923 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
924 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
925 ES::Target: EntropySource,
926 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
927 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
928 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
932 type Watch = M::Target;
934 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
936 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
938 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
940 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
941 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
943 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
945 type Router = R::Target;
947 type Logger = L::Target;
949 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
952 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
953 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
955 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
956 /// to individual Channels.
958 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
959 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
960 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
961 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
963 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
964 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
965 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
966 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
967 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
968 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
969 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
970 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
971 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
973 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
974 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
975 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
977 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
978 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
979 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
980 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
981 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
983 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
984 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
985 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
986 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
988 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
989 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
990 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
992 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
993 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
994 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
995 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
996 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
998 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
999 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1000 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1001 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1002 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1003 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1004 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1005 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1008 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1009 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1010 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1011 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1012 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1016 // `pending_offers_messages`
1018 // `total_consistency_lock`
1020 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1022 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1024 // |__`per_peer_state`
1026 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1028 // |__`claimable_payments`
1030 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1036 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1038 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1042 // |__`pending_events`
1044 // |__`pending_background_events`
1046 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1048 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1049 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1050 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1051 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1052 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1053 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1057 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1058 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1059 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1065 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1067 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1069 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1070 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1072 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1073 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1074 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1075 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1077 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1078 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1080 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1081 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1082 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1083 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1084 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1085 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1086 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1087 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1089 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1091 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1092 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1094 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1096 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1097 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1098 /// and via the classic SCID.
1100 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1101 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1103 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1105 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1107 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1108 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1109 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1111 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1112 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1114 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1115 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1117 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1118 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1120 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1121 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1122 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1123 /// active channel list on load.
1125 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1126 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1128 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1130 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1131 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1132 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1134 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1135 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1136 /// the handling of the events.
1138 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1139 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1142 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1143 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1144 /// would break backwards compatability.
1145 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1146 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1147 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1149 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1150 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1152 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1154 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1155 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1156 /// confirmation depth.
1158 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1159 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1160 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1162 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1164 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1166 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1168 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1170 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1172 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1173 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1174 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1176 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1177 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1179 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1180 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1181 /// keeping additional state.
1182 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1184 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1185 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1186 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1187 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1189 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1190 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1192 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1193 /// are currently open with that peer.
1195 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1196 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1199 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1201 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1202 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1203 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1204 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1205 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1207 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1208 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1209 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1210 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1211 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1213 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1214 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1216 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1217 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1218 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1219 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1220 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1222 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1223 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1225 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1226 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1227 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1228 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1229 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1231 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1233 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1235 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1236 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1237 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1238 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1239 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1240 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1241 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1242 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1243 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1244 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1245 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1247 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1248 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1249 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1251 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1253 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1254 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1256 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1260 signer_provider: SP,
1265 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1267 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1268 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1269 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1270 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1271 pub struct ChainParameters {
1272 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1273 pub network: Network,
1275 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1277 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1278 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1281 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1285 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1286 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1289 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1290 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1291 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1292 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1293 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1294 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1296 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1297 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1298 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1299 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1300 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1301 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1303 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1304 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1307 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1308 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1309 /// events to handle.
1311 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1312 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1314 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1315 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1318 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1319 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1320 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1321 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1323 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1324 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1325 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1326 should_persist: move || {
1327 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1328 // processing and return that.
1329 let notify = persist_check();
1330 match (notify, force_notify) {
1331 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1332 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1333 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1334 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1335 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1338 _read_guard: read_guard,
1342 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1343 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1344 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1345 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1346 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1347 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1349 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1350 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1351 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1352 should_persist: persist_check,
1353 _read_guard: read_guard,
1358 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1359 fn drop(&mut self) {
1360 match (self.should_persist)() {
1361 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1362 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1363 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1365 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1366 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1367 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1372 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1373 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1375 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1377 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1378 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1379 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1380 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1381 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1383 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1384 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1386 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1388 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1389 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1390 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1391 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1392 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1393 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1394 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1395 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1396 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1397 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1398 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1399 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1400 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1402 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1403 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1405 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1406 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1407 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1408 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1410 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1411 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1412 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1413 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1414 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1415 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1418 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1420 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1421 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1424 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1426 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1427 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1429 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1430 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1431 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1433 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1434 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1435 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1437 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1438 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1439 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1440 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1442 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1443 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1444 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1446 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1447 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1448 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1450 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1451 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1452 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1453 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1454 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1455 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1456 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1457 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1458 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1459 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1460 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1463 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1464 /// to better separate parameters.
1465 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1466 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1467 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1468 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1469 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1470 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1471 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1472 pub features: InitFeatures,
1473 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1474 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1475 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1477 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1479 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1480 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1481 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1482 /// payments to us through this channel.
1483 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1484 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1485 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1486 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1487 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1488 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1489 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1492 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1493 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1494 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1495 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1496 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1497 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1498 /// lifetime of the channel.
1499 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1500 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1501 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1502 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1503 /// our counterparty already.
1505 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1506 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1507 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1508 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1510 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1511 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1512 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1513 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1515 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1516 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1518 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1519 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1521 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1522 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1523 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1524 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1525 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1526 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1527 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1528 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1529 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1532 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1534 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1535 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1536 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1537 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1538 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1539 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1540 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1542 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1543 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1545 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1546 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1547 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1548 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1549 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1550 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1551 /// this value on chain.
1553 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1555 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1557 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1558 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1559 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1560 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1561 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1562 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1563 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1565 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1566 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1567 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1568 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1569 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1570 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1572 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1573 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1574 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1575 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1576 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1578 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1579 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1580 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1581 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1583 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1584 pub balance_msat: u64,
1585 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1586 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1587 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1588 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1590 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1592 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1593 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1594 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1595 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1596 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1597 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1598 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1599 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1601 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1602 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1603 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1604 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1605 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1606 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1607 /// route which is valid.
1608 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1609 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1610 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1611 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1612 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1613 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1615 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1616 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1617 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1618 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1619 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1620 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1621 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1622 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1623 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1625 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1627 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1628 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1629 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1630 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1631 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1633 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1634 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1635 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1636 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1637 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1638 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1639 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1641 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1642 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1643 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1644 pub is_outbound: bool,
1645 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1646 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1647 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1648 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1649 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1651 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1652 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1653 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1654 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1655 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1656 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1657 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1659 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1660 pub is_usable: bool,
1661 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1662 pub is_public: bool,
1663 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1664 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1665 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1666 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1667 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1668 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1670 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1671 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1674 impl ChannelDetails {
1675 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1676 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1677 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1679 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1680 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1681 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1682 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1685 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1686 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1687 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1689 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1690 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1691 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1692 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1695 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1696 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1697 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1700 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1701 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1703 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1704 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1705 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1707 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1708 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1709 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1710 features: latest_features,
1711 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1712 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1713 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1714 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1715 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1716 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1717 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1718 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1719 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1720 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1722 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1723 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1724 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1725 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1726 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1727 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1728 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1729 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1730 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1731 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1732 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1733 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1734 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1735 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1736 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1737 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1738 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1739 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1740 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1741 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1742 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1743 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1744 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1745 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1746 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1747 config: Some(context.config()),
1748 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1753 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1754 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1755 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1756 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1757 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1758 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1759 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1760 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1761 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1763 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1765 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1766 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1768 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1769 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1770 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1771 /// to drop the channel.
1775 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1776 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1777 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1778 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1779 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1781 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1782 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1783 payment_id: PaymentId,
1785 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1787 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1788 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1789 payment_id: PaymentId,
1790 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1792 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1793 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1794 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1797 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1798 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1799 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1801 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1802 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1803 payment_id: PaymentId,
1804 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1805 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1806 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1808 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1809 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1810 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1812 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1813 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1814 payment_id: PaymentId,
1815 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1816 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1820 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1822 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1824 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1825 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1826 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1827 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1829 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1830 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1831 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1834 macro_rules! handle_error {
1835 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1836 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1837 // entering the macro.
1838 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1839 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1843 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1844 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1846 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1847 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1848 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1849 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1853 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1854 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1855 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1856 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1857 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1858 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1863 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1864 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1866 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1867 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1868 action: err.action.clone()
1872 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1873 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1874 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1875 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1876 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1880 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1885 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1888 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1889 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1890 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1896 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1897 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1898 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1899 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1900 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1901 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1903 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1904 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1905 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1906 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1907 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1909 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1910 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1912 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1916 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1917 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1918 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1920 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1921 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1923 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1924 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1926 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1927 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1928 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1929 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1930 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1931 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1933 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1934 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1938 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1939 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1941 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1942 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1944 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1945 match $channel_phase {
1946 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1947 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1949 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1950 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1952 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1953 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1959 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1960 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1964 let key = *$entry.key();
1965 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1967 $entry.remove_entry();
1975 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1976 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1980 let key = *$entry.key();
1981 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1983 $entry.remove_entry();
1991 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1992 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1994 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1995 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2001 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2002 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2003 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2004 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2005 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2007 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2008 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2009 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2010 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2011 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2012 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2013 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2014 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2015 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2016 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2021 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2022 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2023 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2024 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2025 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2026 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2027 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2028 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2029 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2031 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2036 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2037 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2038 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2039 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2040 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2041 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2042 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2043 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2044 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2046 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2051 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2052 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2053 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2054 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2055 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2056 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2057 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2058 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2059 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2060 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2061 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2063 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2064 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2065 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2071 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2072 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2074 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2075 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2076 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2077 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2078 updates.announcement_sigs);
2079 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2080 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2083 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2084 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2085 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2086 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2088 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2089 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2090 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2091 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2092 let mut batch_completed = false;
2093 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2094 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2095 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2096 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2098 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2099 channel_state.2 = true;
2101 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2103 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2105 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2108 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2109 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2110 if batch_completed {
2111 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2112 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2113 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2114 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2115 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2116 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2117 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2118 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2119 chan.set_batch_ready();
2120 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2121 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2125 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2126 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2127 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2132 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2134 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2135 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2137 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2138 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2139 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2140 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2145 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2146 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2147 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2149 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2150 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2151 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2152 panic!("{}", err_str);
2154 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2155 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2156 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2159 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2165 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2166 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2167 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2169 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2170 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2171 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2172 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2173 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2174 // filter for uniqueness here.
2175 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2176 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2177 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2178 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2180 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2181 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2183 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2184 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2185 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2191 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2192 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2193 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2194 while !processed_all_events {
2195 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2202 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2203 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2204 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2206 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2207 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2208 result = $self.process_background_events();
2210 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2211 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2212 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2213 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2217 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2218 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2219 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2220 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2223 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2225 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2226 $event_to_handle = event;
2228 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2229 post_event_actions.push(action);
2234 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2235 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2236 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2237 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2238 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2239 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2242 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2243 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2244 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2245 processed_all_events = false;
2249 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2250 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2251 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2253 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2254 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2255 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2261 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2263 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2264 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2265 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2266 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2267 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2268 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2272 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2274 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2276 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2277 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2279 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2281 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2282 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2283 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2286 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2287 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2288 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2290 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2291 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2292 current_timestamp: u32,
2294 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2295 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2296 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2297 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2299 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2300 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2301 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2306 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2308 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2309 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2310 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2311 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2312 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2313 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2314 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2315 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2317 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2320 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2321 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2323 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2325 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2327 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2329 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2330 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2331 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2332 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2333 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2334 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2335 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2336 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2338 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2348 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2349 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2350 &self.default_configuration
2353 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2354 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2355 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2358 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2359 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2361 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2363 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2367 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2372 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2374 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2375 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2376 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2377 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2378 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2380 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2381 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2383 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2384 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2385 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2387 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2388 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2389 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2391 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2392 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2393 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2394 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2395 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2396 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2398 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2399 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2400 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2401 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2402 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2403 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2406 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2407 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2408 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2410 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2412 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2413 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2415 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2417 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2418 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2419 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2420 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2421 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2422 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2426 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2431 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2433 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2434 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2437 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2439 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2442 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2445 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2446 node_id: their_network_key,
2449 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2452 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2453 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2454 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2455 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2456 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2457 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2458 // the same channel.
2459 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2461 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2462 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2463 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2464 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2465 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2466 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2467 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2468 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2469 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2473 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2474 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2475 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2483 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2484 /// more information.
2485 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2486 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2487 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2488 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2489 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2490 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2491 // the same channel.
2492 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2494 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2495 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2496 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2497 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2498 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2499 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2500 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2501 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2509 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2510 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2512 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2513 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2515 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2516 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2517 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2518 // really wanted anyway.
2519 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2522 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2523 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2524 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2525 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2527 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2528 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2529 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2530 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2531 let context_to_details = |context| {
2532 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2534 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2536 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2537 .map(context_to_details)
2543 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2544 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2546 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2547 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2548 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2550 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2551 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2552 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2553 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2554 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2555 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2557 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2558 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2559 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2561 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2562 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2563 payment_id: *payment_id,
2564 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2565 total_msat: *total_msat,
2568 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2569 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2571 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2572 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2574 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2579 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2580 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2581 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2582 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2583 Some(transaction) => {
2584 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2585 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2590 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2591 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2592 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2593 reason: closure_reason,
2594 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2595 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2599 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2600 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2602 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2603 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2605 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2607 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2608 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2610 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2611 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2613 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2614 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2615 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2616 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2617 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2618 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2619 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2620 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2621 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2623 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2624 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2625 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2626 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2627 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2631 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2632 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2634 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2635 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2636 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2637 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2641 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2642 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2643 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2644 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2648 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2649 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
2655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2656 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2657 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2659 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2660 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2661 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2662 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2667 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2668 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2669 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2670 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2673 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2674 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2680 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2681 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2682 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2684 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2685 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2687 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2688 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2689 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2690 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2692 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2694 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2695 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2696 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2699 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2700 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2701 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2702 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2703 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2704 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2707 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2708 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2709 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2711 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2712 /// the channel being closed or not:
2713 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2714 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2715 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2716 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2717 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2718 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2719 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2721 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2722 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2723 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2724 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2726 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2728 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2729 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2730 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2733 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2734 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2735 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2736 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2737 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2738 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2741 fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2742 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2743 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2744 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2745 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2748 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res;
2749 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2750 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2751 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2752 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2753 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2754 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2756 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2757 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2758 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2759 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2760 // ignore the result here.
2761 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2763 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2764 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2765 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2766 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2768 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2769 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2770 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2771 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2772 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2773 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2774 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2775 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2778 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2781 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2782 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2785 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2786 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2790 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2791 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2792 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2793 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2794 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2795 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2796 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2797 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2798 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2799 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2800 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2802 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2804 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2805 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2806 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2807 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2808 mem::drop(peer_state);
2809 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2811 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2812 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2813 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2815 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2816 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2817 // Unfunded channel has no update
2818 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2821 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2822 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2823 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2824 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2826 (None, *peer_node_id)
2828 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2831 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2832 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2833 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2834 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2835 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2836 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2837 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2838 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2839 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2845 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2848 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2849 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2850 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2851 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2853 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2854 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2855 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2856 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2857 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2858 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2859 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2870 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2871 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2872 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2874 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2875 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2876 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2879 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2880 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2881 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2883 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2884 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2885 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2886 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2887 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2890 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2891 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2892 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2893 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2894 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2898 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2899 /// local transaction(s).
2900 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2901 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2902 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2906 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2907 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2908 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2909 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2910 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2911 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2912 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2914 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2915 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2919 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2920 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2921 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2922 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2923 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2924 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2925 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2926 err_data: Vec::new(),
2930 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2931 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2932 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2935 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2936 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2937 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2938 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2939 outgoing_cltv_value,
2940 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2944 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2945 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2946 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2947 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2948 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2949 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2950 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2951 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2953 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2954 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2955 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2957 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2958 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2960 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2961 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2962 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2963 err_data: Vec::new(),
2964 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2968 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2969 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2970 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2971 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2973 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2976 // final_expiry_too_soon
2977 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2978 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2980 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2981 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2982 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2983 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2984 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
2985 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2986 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2987 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2988 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2989 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2990 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2993 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2994 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2995 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2997 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2999 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
3000 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
3004 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
3005 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
3006 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
3007 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
3008 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
3009 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
3010 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3011 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
3012 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3013 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3014 err_data: Vec::new(),
3015 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
3018 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
3019 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3020 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3021 err_data: Vec::new(),
3022 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
3025 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
3029 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3032 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
3033 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3036 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3037 phantom_shared_secret,
3041 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3042 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3043 err_data: Vec::new(),
3044 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3047 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3050 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3051 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3052 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3053 outgoing_cltv_value,
3054 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3058 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3059 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3060 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3061 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3062 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3064 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3065 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3066 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3067 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3068 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3069 failure_code: $err_code,
3075 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3076 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3079 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3080 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3081 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3083 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3084 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3085 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3086 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3087 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3088 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3089 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3090 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3092 macro_rules! return_err {
3093 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3095 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3096 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3097 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3098 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3099 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3100 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3106 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3107 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3108 msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3111 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3112 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3114 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3115 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3118 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3119 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3120 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3121 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3124 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3125 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3126 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3128 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3129 // inbound channel's state.
3130 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3131 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3132 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3134 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3138 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3139 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3140 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3141 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3142 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3143 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3144 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3145 // phantom or an intercept.
3146 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3147 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3148 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3152 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3155 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3157 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3158 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3159 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3160 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3161 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3163 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3164 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3165 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3166 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3169 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3170 // have no consistency guarantees.
3171 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3175 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3176 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3177 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3178 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3179 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3181 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3182 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3183 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3184 // we don't have the channel here.
3185 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3187 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3189 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3190 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3191 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3192 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3193 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3194 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3195 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3196 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3197 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3198 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3199 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3201 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3204 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3205 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3207 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3208 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3212 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3213 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3214 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3215 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3217 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3224 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3225 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3226 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3227 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3228 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3229 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3231 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3232 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3234 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3235 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3236 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3237 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3238 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3239 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3240 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3241 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3242 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3243 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3249 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3250 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3251 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3252 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3254 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3255 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3257 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3258 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3259 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3261 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3262 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3263 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3264 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3265 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3266 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3267 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3271 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3273 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3276 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3277 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3278 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3279 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3280 macro_rules! return_err {
3281 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3283 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3284 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3285 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3286 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3287 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3288 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3294 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3296 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3297 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3300 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3301 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3302 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3303 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3304 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3306 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3309 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3310 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3311 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3312 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3313 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3319 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3320 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3321 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3323 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3324 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3325 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3327 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3328 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3329 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3330 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3331 return Err(LightningError {
3332 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3333 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3336 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3337 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3339 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3340 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3343 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3344 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3345 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3346 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3348 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3349 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3350 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3352 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3353 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3354 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3355 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3356 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3357 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3361 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3364 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3365 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3366 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3368 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3369 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3370 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3371 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3372 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3375 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3376 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3378 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3379 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3380 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3381 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3382 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3383 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3384 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3385 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3387 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3388 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3389 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3391 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3393 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3400 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3401 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3402 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3403 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3408 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3409 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3410 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3413 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3414 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3416 log_trace!(self.logger,
3417 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3418 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3419 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3420 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3422 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3423 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3424 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3426 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3427 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3429 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3430 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3431 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3432 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3435 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3436 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3437 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3438 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3439 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3440 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3441 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3442 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3443 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3444 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3446 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3447 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3448 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3450 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3451 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3453 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3454 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3455 Some(monitor_update) => {
3456 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3458 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3459 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3460 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3461 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3462 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3463 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3464 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3472 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3475 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3476 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3477 // `channel_by_id` map.
3478 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3479 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3484 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3485 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3487 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3492 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3494 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3495 /// fields for more info.
3497 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3498 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3500 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3502 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3503 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3504 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3505 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3506 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3508 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3509 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3510 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3511 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3512 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3514 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3515 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3516 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3517 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3519 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3521 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3522 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3523 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3525 /// In general, a path may raise:
3526 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3527 /// node public key) is specified.
3528 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3529 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3530 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3531 /// relevant updates.
3533 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3534 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3535 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3537 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3538 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3539 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3540 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3541 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3542 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3543 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3544 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3545 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3546 self.pending_outbound_payments
3547 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3548 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3549 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3552 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3553 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3554 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3555 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3556 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3557 self.pending_outbound_payments
3558 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3559 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3560 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3561 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3565 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3566 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3567 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3568 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3569 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3570 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3574 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3575 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3576 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3580 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3581 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3584 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3585 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3587 self.pending_outbound_payments
3588 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3589 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3590 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3591 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3592 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3596 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3597 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3598 /// retries are exhausted.
3600 /// # Event Generation
3602 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3603 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3605 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3606 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3607 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3609 /// # Restart Behavior
3611 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3612 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3613 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3614 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3615 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3618 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3619 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3620 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3621 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3622 /// never reach the recipient.
3624 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3625 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3627 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3628 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3630 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3631 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3632 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3634 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3635 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3636 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3639 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3640 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3642 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3645 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3646 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3647 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3648 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3649 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3650 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3651 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3652 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3655 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3656 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3657 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3658 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3659 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3660 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3661 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3662 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3663 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3666 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3669 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3670 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3673 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3674 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3676 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3677 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3678 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3679 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3680 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3681 let payment_params =
3682 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3684 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3686 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3689 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3690 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3692 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3693 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3694 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3695 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3697 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3698 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3699 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3700 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3701 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3702 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3703 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3704 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3705 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3706 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3708 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3709 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3710 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3711 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3715 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3717 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3718 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3721 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3723 let mut res = Vec::new();
3725 for mut path in route.paths {
3726 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3727 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3728 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3729 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3730 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3733 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3736 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3737 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3739 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3741 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3742 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3747 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3750 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3755 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3756 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3757 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3759 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3760 let used_liquidity =
3761 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3763 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3764 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3766 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3769 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3774 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3775 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3776 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3783 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3784 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3785 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3786 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3787 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3788 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3789 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3790 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3791 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3793 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3794 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3795 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3796 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3797 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3799 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3800 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3801 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3802 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3803 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3804 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3805 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3806 } else { unreachable!(); });
3808 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3809 Err((chan, err)) => {
3810 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3811 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3813 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3814 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3815 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3821 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3822 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3824 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3825 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3828 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3829 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3830 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3834 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3835 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3838 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3839 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3840 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3842 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3843 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3844 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3845 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3847 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3854 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3855 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3856 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3860 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3862 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3863 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3865 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3866 /// across the p2p network.
3868 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3869 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3871 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3872 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3873 /// keys per-channel).
3875 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3876 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3877 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3879 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3880 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3881 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3883 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3884 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3885 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3886 /// for more details.
3888 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3889 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3890 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3891 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3894 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3896 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3897 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3899 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
3900 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3901 /// signature for each channel.
3903 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3904 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3905 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3906 let mut result = Ok(());
3908 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3909 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3910 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3911 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3912 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3917 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3918 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3919 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3923 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3924 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3925 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3926 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3927 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3928 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3929 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3930 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3935 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3936 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3937 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3938 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3942 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3943 match states.entry(txid) {
3944 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3945 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3946 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3950 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3953 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels.iter() {
3954 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3955 temporary_channel_id,
3956 counterparty_node_id,
3957 funding_transaction.clone(),
3960 let mut output_index = None;
3961 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3962 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3963 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3964 if output_index.is_some() {
3965 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3966 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3969 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3972 if output_index.is_none() {
3973 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3974 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3977 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3978 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3979 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3985 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3986 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3987 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3988 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3989 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3990 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3991 .into_iter().flatten()
3992 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3994 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3995 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3997 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3999 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4000 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4001 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4002 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4003 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4005 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4006 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
4007 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
4011 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4012 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4018 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4020 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4021 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4022 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4023 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4025 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4026 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4028 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4029 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4031 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4033 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4034 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4035 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4036 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4037 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4038 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4039 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4040 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4041 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4042 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4043 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4044 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4045 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4049 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4050 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4051 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4052 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4053 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4054 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4055 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4056 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4057 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4058 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4062 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4063 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4064 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4065 config.apply(config_update);
4066 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4069 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4070 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4071 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4072 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4073 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4074 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4081 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4082 debug_assert!(false);
4083 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4085 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4086 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4093 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4095 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4096 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4097 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4098 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4100 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4101 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4103 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4104 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4106 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4108 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4109 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4110 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4111 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4112 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4113 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4114 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4115 pub fn update_channel_config(
4116 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4117 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4118 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4121 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4122 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4124 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4125 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4127 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4128 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4129 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4130 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4131 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4133 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4134 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4135 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4138 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4141 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4142 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4143 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4144 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4145 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4146 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4147 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4149 let next_hop_scid = {
4150 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4151 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4152 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4153 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4154 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4155 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4156 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4157 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4158 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4159 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4162 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4164 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4165 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4166 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4168 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4169 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4170 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4175 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4176 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4177 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4180 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4181 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4182 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4184 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4186 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4187 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4188 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4189 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4190 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4193 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4194 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4195 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4196 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4197 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4199 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4203 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4204 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4206 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4209 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4210 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4211 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4213 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4214 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4215 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4218 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4219 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4220 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4221 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4222 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4223 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4224 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4225 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4228 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4229 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4230 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4231 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4236 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4238 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4239 /// Will likely generate further events.
4240 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4241 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4243 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4244 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4245 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4247 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4248 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4250 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4251 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4252 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4254 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4255 match forward_info {
4256 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4257 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4258 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4259 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4260 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4263 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4264 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4265 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4267 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4268 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4269 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4270 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4271 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4272 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4273 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4276 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4277 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4279 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4282 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4283 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4289 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4290 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4292 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4296 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4297 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4299 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4303 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4304 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4305 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4306 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4307 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4308 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4309 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4312 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4313 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4314 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4315 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4316 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4318 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4320 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4321 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4325 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4326 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4327 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4328 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4330 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4331 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4337 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4340 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4343 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4344 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4345 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4346 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4347 // problem, not ours.
4353 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4354 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4355 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4357 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4361 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4362 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4363 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4364 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4367 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4368 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4369 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4370 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4371 match forward_info {
4372 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4373 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4374 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4375 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4376 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4379 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4380 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4381 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4382 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4383 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4384 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4385 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4386 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4387 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4389 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4390 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4391 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4394 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4395 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4397 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4399 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4400 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4401 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4402 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4407 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4408 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4410 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4411 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4412 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4413 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4415 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4416 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4418 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4420 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4421 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4422 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4429 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4433 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4434 match forward_info {
4435 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4436 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4437 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4438 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4439 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4442 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4443 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4444 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4445 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4446 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4447 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4448 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4450 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4451 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4452 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4456 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4457 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4460 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4463 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4464 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4465 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4466 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4467 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4468 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4469 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4470 phantom_shared_secret,
4472 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4473 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4474 // if routing nodes overpay
4475 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4476 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4478 total_value_received: None,
4479 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4482 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4485 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4487 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4488 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4489 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4490 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4491 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4492 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4494 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4495 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4496 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4497 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4498 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4499 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4500 phantom_shared_secret,
4502 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4503 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4505 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4508 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4509 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4510 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4511 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4512 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4515 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4516 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4517 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4518 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4519 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4520 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4522 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4523 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4524 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4526 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4527 .entry(payment_hash)
4528 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4529 .or_insert_with(|| {
4530 committed_to_claimable = true;
4532 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4535 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4536 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4537 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4538 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4540 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4541 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4542 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4544 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4545 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4546 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4549 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4551 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4552 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4553 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4554 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4555 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4556 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4557 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4558 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4559 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4560 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4562 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4564 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4565 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4566 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4567 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4568 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4569 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4571 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4572 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4573 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4574 committed_to_claimable = true;
4576 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4577 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4578 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4579 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4580 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4581 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4582 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4583 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4584 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4585 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4589 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4590 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4591 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4592 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4593 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4595 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4597 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4598 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4600 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4601 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4602 committed_to_claimable = true;
4605 payment_claimable_generated
4609 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4610 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4611 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4612 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4613 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4614 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4615 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4616 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4617 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4618 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4619 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4620 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4621 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4622 Ok(result) => result,
4624 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4625 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4628 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4629 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4630 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4631 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4632 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4633 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4636 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4637 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4638 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4640 check_total_value!(purpose);
4642 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4643 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4644 check_total_value!(purpose);
4648 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4649 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4650 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4651 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4653 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4654 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4655 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4656 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4657 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4658 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4659 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4660 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4662 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4663 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4664 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4666 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4667 if payment_claimable_generated {
4668 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4674 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4675 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4683 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4684 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4685 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4686 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4688 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4689 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4691 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4693 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4694 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4695 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4697 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4699 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4700 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4701 events.append(&mut new_events);
4704 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4706 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4707 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4708 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4710 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4712 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4713 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4714 if background_events.is_empty() {
4715 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4718 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4720 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4721 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4722 // monitor updating completing.
4723 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4725 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4726 let mut updated_chan = false;
4728 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4729 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4730 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4731 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4732 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4733 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4734 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4735 updated_chan = true;
4736 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4737 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4739 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4747 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4748 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4751 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4752 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4753 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4754 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4755 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4756 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4757 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4759 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4760 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4761 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4762 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4763 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4769 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4772 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4773 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4774 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4775 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4776 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4779 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4780 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4781 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4782 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4783 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4784 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4785 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4787 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4789 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4790 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4791 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4792 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4794 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4795 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4797 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4798 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4802 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4803 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4804 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4805 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4806 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4807 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4808 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4810 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4811 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4813 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4814 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4815 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4816 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4817 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4818 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4820 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4825 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4826 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4834 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4836 /// This currently includes:
4837 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4838 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4839 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4841 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4842 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4843 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4844 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4845 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4846 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4847 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4848 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4850 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4851 /// estimate fetches.
4853 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4854 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4855 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4856 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4857 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4859 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4860 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4862 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4863 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4864 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4865 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4867 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4868 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4869 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4870 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4871 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4872 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4874 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4875 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4876 log_error!(self.logger,
4877 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4878 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4879 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4880 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4881 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4882 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4883 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4884 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4885 channel_id: *chan_id,
4886 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4897 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4898 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4899 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4900 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4901 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4902 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4903 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4905 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4906 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4911 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4912 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4914 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4915 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4916 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4917 if needs_close { return false; }
4920 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4921 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4922 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4923 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4924 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4925 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4926 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4927 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4929 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4930 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4931 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4932 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4936 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4938 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4941 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4943 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4944 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4945 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4946 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4950 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4952 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4958 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4960 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4961 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4962 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4963 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4964 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4965 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4966 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4967 channel_id: *chan_id,
4968 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4976 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4977 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4978 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4980 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4981 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4982 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4987 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4988 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4989 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4990 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4991 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4992 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4993 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4994 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5000 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5002 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5003 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5008 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5009 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5010 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5011 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5012 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5013 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5014 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5015 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5016 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5017 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5018 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5019 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5020 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5021 // have no channels to the peer.
5022 let remove_entry = {
5023 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5024 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5027 entry.remove_entry();
5030 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5035 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5036 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5037 // This should be unreachable
5038 debug_assert!(false);
5041 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5042 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5043 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5044 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5045 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5046 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5047 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5050 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5051 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5052 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5054 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5055 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5062 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5063 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5064 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5065 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5066 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5069 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5070 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5073 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5074 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5077 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5078 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5079 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5080 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5081 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5082 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5083 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5086 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5087 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5090 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5091 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5092 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5093 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5094 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5101 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5102 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5103 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5105 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5106 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5107 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5108 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5110 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5111 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5112 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5113 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5114 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5115 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5118 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5119 /// reason for the failure.
5121 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5122 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5123 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5125 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5126 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5127 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5128 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5129 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5130 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5131 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5136 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5137 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5138 match failure_code {
5139 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5140 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5141 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5142 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5143 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5144 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5146 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5147 let fail_data = match data {
5148 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5151 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5156 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5157 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5159 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5161 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5162 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5163 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5164 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5165 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5166 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5167 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5169 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5171 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5172 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5174 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5179 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5180 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5181 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5182 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5183 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5184 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5185 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5186 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5187 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5188 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5190 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5191 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5192 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5193 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5195 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5196 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5197 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5198 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5199 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5203 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5204 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5205 // be surfaced to the user.
5206 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5207 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5208 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5210 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5211 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5212 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5213 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5214 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5215 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5216 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5217 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5218 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5220 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5221 debug_assert!(false);
5222 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5225 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5227 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5230 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5231 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5232 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5233 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5237 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5238 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5239 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5240 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5241 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5242 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5243 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5244 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5245 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5246 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5249 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5250 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5251 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5254 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5255 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5256 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5258 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5259 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5260 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5261 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5262 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5264 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5265 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5266 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5268 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5269 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5270 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5271 push_forward_ev = true;
5273 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5274 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5275 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5277 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5278 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5281 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5282 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5283 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5284 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5285 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5286 failed_next_destination: destination,
5292 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5293 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5295 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5296 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5297 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5298 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5300 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5301 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5302 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5303 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5305 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5306 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5307 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5309 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5310 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5311 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5312 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5313 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5314 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5315 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5316 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5317 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5320 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5321 /// even type numbers.
5325 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5326 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5328 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5329 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5330 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5333 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5334 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5336 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5339 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5340 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5341 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5342 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5343 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5344 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5345 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5346 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5351 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5352 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5353 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5354 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5355 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5357 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5358 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5359 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5363 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5364 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5365 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5366 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5367 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5368 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5369 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5370 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5371 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5372 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5373 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5382 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5384 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5385 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5386 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5387 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5388 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5389 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5390 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5391 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5392 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5393 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5394 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5395 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5396 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5397 debug_assert!(false);
5401 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5403 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5404 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5405 debug_assert!(false);
5409 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5410 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5412 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5413 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5414 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5415 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5418 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5419 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5420 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5421 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5425 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5426 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5427 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5428 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5429 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5430 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5433 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5434 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5435 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5436 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5437 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5442 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5443 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5444 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5445 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5446 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5447 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5448 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5450 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5453 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5454 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5455 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5456 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5460 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5461 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5462 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5463 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5465 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5466 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5467 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5468 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5470 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5471 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5472 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5473 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5476 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5477 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5478 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5479 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5483 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5484 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5485 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5488 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5489 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5490 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5491 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5492 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5493 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5494 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5497 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5498 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5499 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5501 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5504 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5505 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5507 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5508 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5509 // monitor update as a background event.
5510 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5511 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5512 counterparty_node_id,
5513 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5514 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5518 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5519 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5524 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5526 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5528 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5529 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5530 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5531 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5532 blocking_action: blocker,
5534 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5536 debug_assert!(false,
5537 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5540 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5541 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5542 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5543 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5544 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5546 let mut found_blocker = false;
5547 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5548 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5549 // which case we need to only remove the one
5550 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5551 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5552 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5553 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5555 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5558 debug_assert!(false);
5567 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5568 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5569 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5575 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5576 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5577 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5578 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5579 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5580 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5581 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5582 // again on restart.
5583 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5584 payment_preimage, update_res);
5587 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5588 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5590 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5591 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5592 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5593 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5594 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5595 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5596 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5597 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5598 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5599 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5602 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5603 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5604 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5605 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5606 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5607 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5611 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5612 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5615 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5616 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5617 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5620 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5621 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5622 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5623 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5624 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5626 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5627 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5628 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5630 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5631 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5634 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5635 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5636 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5637 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5638 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5639 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5640 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5641 let chan_to_release =
5642 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5643 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5645 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5646 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5647 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5648 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5653 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5654 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5655 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5656 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5657 // in the background.
5658 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5659 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5660 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5661 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5663 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5664 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5665 funding_txo, update, ..
5667 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5668 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5669 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5670 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5672 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5678 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5679 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5680 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5682 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5683 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5685 monitor_update.updates[0],
5686 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5691 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5692 // immediately once we get going.
5693 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5696 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5698 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5701 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5702 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5703 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5704 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5705 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5706 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5710 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5711 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5712 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5715 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5716 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5718 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5719 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5720 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5721 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5723 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5727 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5728 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5729 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5735 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5736 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5737 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5740 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5741 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5742 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5743 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5745 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5747 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5748 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5749 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5751 payment_purpose: purpose,
5754 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5756 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5760 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5762 sender_intended_total_msat,
5766 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5767 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5769 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5770 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5771 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5774 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5775 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5777 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5778 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5779 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5780 Some(blocking_action),
5787 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5788 /// update completion.
5789 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5790 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5791 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5792 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5793 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5794 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5795 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5796 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5797 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5798 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5799 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5800 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5801 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5803 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5805 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5806 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5807 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5808 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5811 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5812 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5814 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5815 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5816 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5821 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5822 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5823 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5824 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5829 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5830 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5831 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5832 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5833 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5838 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5842 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5848 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5849 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5850 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5854 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5855 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5856 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5862 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5863 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5865 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5866 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5868 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5869 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5870 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5871 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5872 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5877 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5878 let mut peer_state_lock;
5879 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5880 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5881 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5882 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5884 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5887 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5888 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5889 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5890 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5891 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5894 let remaining_in_flight =
5895 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5896 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5899 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5900 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5901 remaining_in_flight);
5902 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5905 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5908 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5910 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5911 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5914 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5915 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5916 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5918 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5919 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5920 /// used to accept such channels.
5922 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5923 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5924 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5925 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5928 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5929 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5931 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5932 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5933 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5935 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5936 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5938 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5939 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5941 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5942 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5944 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5945 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5946 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5947 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5950 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5951 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5953 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5954 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5955 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5956 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5957 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5958 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5959 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5960 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5962 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5963 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5964 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5966 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5967 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5968 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5969 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5970 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5971 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5972 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5974 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5978 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5979 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5980 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5981 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5982 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5983 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5984 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5987 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5988 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5990 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5991 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5992 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5993 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5994 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5995 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5996 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5997 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6000 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6001 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
6005 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6006 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6007 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6009 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6010 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6011 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6014 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6019 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6020 /// or 0-conf channels.
6022 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6023 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6024 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6025 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6026 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6027 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6029 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6030 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6031 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6032 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6033 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6034 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6035 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6039 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6042 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6043 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6045 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6046 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6048 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6049 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6050 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6051 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6052 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6054 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6057 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6058 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6059 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6062 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6063 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6068 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6071 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6072 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6073 // likely to be lost on restart!
6074 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6075 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6078 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6079 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6082 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6083 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6084 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6085 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6086 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6088 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6089 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6091 debug_assert!(false);
6092 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6094 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6095 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6097 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6098 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6099 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6100 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6101 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6102 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6104 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6105 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6106 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6109 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6110 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6111 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6112 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6113 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6116 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6117 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6119 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6122 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6123 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6124 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6125 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6126 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6127 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6128 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6129 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6130 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6132 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6133 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6134 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6139 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6140 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6141 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6142 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6143 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6144 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6145 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6148 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6153 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6154 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6155 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6157 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6158 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6161 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6162 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6164 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6165 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6166 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6168 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6172 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6173 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6174 // likely to be lost on restart!
6175 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6176 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6177 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6179 debug_assert!(false);
6180 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6182 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6183 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6184 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6185 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6186 match phase.get_mut() {
6187 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6188 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6189 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6192 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6196 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6199 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6200 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6201 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6202 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6203 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6205 user_channel_id: user_id,
6210 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6211 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6213 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6214 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6216 debug_assert!(false);
6217 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6220 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6221 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6222 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
6223 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6224 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6225 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6227 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6228 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6229 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6230 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6231 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6232 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6233 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6234 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6235 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6239 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6240 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6242 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6245 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
6246 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6247 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
6249 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6250 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6251 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6252 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6253 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6254 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6255 funding_msg.channel_id))
6257 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6258 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6259 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6260 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6261 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6263 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6264 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6265 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6266 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6267 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6268 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6272 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6273 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6274 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6276 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6280 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6281 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6282 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6283 funding_msg.channel_id));
6291 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6292 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6293 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6294 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6296 debug_assert!(false);
6297 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6300 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6301 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6302 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6303 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6304 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6305 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6306 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6307 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6308 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6309 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6312 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6316 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6320 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6324 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6325 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6326 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6327 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6328 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6330 debug_assert!(false);
6331 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6333 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6334 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6335 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6336 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6337 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6338 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6339 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6340 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6341 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6342 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6343 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6344 msg: announcement_sigs,
6346 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6347 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6348 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6349 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6350 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6351 // announcement_signatures.
6352 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6353 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6354 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6355 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6362 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6363 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6368 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6369 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6372 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6373 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6378 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6379 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6380 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6382 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6383 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6385 debug_assert!(false);
6386 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6388 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6389 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6390 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6391 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6393 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6394 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6395 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6397 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6400 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6401 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6402 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6403 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6405 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6406 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6407 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6408 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6409 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6410 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6414 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6415 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6416 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6417 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6420 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6421 let context = phase.context_mut();
6422 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6423 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6424 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6425 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6429 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6432 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6433 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6434 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6435 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6437 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6438 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6444 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6445 let mut shutdown_result = None;
6446 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid;
6447 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6448 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6450 debug_assert!(false);
6451 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6453 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6454 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6455 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6456 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6457 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6458 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6459 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6460 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6461 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6462 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6463 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6468 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6469 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6470 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6471 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6472 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6473 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6474 } else { (tx, None) }
6476 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6477 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6480 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6483 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6484 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6485 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6487 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6488 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6489 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6490 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6491 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6495 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6496 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
6498 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6499 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6500 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6505 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6506 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6507 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6508 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6510 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6511 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6512 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6513 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6515 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6516 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6518 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6519 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6520 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6522 debug_assert!(false);
6523 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6525 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6526 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6527 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6528 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6529 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6530 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6531 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6532 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6533 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6534 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6536 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6537 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6538 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6539 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6540 match pending_forward_info {
6541 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6542 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6543 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6544 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6546 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6547 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6548 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6549 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6550 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6553 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6555 _ => pending_forward_info
6558 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6560 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6561 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6564 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6569 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6571 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6572 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6573 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6575 debug_assert!(false);
6576 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6578 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6579 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6580 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6582 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6583 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6584 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6585 log_trace!(self.logger,
6586 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6588 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6589 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6590 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6592 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6593 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6594 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6595 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6596 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6597 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6598 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6601 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6602 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6605 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6608 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6612 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6613 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6614 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6615 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6616 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6618 debug_assert!(false);
6619 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6621 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6622 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6623 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6624 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6625 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6626 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6628 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6629 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6632 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6637 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6638 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6639 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6640 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6641 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6643 debug_assert!(false);
6644 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6646 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6647 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6648 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6649 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6650 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6651 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6652 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6654 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6655 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6657 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6658 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6662 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6666 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6667 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6668 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6670 debug_assert!(false);
6671 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6673 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6674 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6675 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6676 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6677 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6678 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6679 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6680 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6681 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6682 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6686 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6687 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6690 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6695 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6696 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6697 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6698 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6699 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6700 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6701 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6702 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6703 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6704 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6705 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6707 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6708 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6710 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6711 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6712 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6713 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6714 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6715 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6717 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6718 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6719 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6721 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6722 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6723 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6725 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6726 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6727 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6728 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6729 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6732 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6733 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6735 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6736 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6737 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6738 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6739 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6740 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6741 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6742 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6743 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6746 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6747 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6748 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6753 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6754 // payments are being processed.
6755 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6756 push_forward_event = true;
6758 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6759 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6766 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6767 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6770 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6771 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6772 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6774 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6778 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6779 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6780 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6781 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6782 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6784 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6785 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6786 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6787 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6788 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6789 // real by taking more time.
6790 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6791 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6792 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6797 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6798 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6799 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6800 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6801 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6802 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6803 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6805 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6806 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6807 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6808 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6809 channel_funding_outpoint,
6810 counterparty_node_id,
6815 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6816 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6817 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6819 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6820 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6821 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6822 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6824 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6825 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6826 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6832 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6833 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6834 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6835 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6837 debug_assert!(false);
6838 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6839 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6840 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6841 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6842 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6843 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6844 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6845 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6846 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6847 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6848 *counterparty_node_id)
6850 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6851 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6852 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6853 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6854 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6855 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6856 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6860 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6861 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6864 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6867 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6871 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6872 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6873 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6875 debug_assert!(false);
6876 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6878 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6879 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6880 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6881 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6882 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6883 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6885 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6886 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6889 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6894 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6895 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6896 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6898 debug_assert!(false);
6899 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6901 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6902 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6903 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6904 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6905 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6906 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6907 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6910 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6911 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6912 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6913 msg, &self.default_configuration
6914 ), chan_phase_entry),
6915 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6916 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6917 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6920 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6921 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6924 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6929 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6930 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6931 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6932 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6934 // It's not a local channel
6935 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6938 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6939 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6940 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6941 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6943 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6944 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6945 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6946 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6947 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6948 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6949 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6950 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6951 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6952 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6953 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6955 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6957 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6958 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6959 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6960 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6962 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6963 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6964 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6967 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6971 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6972 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6975 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6977 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6980 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6982 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6983 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6985 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6987 debug_assert!(false);
6988 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6989 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6993 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6994 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6995 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6996 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6997 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6998 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6999 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7000 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7001 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7002 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7003 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7004 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7005 let mut channel_update = None;
7006 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7007 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7008 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7011 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7012 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7013 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7014 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7015 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7016 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7017 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7022 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7023 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7024 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7025 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7026 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7027 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7031 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7032 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7035 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7036 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7037 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
7038 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7039 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7040 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7041 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7042 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7043 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7045 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7046 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7047 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7048 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7049 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7050 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7051 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7052 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7053 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7054 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7055 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7056 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7057 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7058 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7059 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7060 next_funding_txid: None,
7063 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7064 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7065 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7071 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7072 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7073 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7074 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7077 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7078 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7083 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7084 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7085 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7087 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7088 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7089 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7090 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7091 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7092 match monitor_event {
7093 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7094 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7095 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7096 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7098 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7099 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7100 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7101 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7104 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7105 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7106 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7108 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7109 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7110 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7111 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7114 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7115 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7116 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7117 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7118 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7119 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7120 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7121 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7122 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7123 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7124 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7128 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7129 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7130 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7131 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7132 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7140 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7141 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7147 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7148 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7151 has_pending_monitor_events
7154 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7155 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7156 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7158 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7159 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7160 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7163 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7164 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7165 /// update was applied.
7166 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7167 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7168 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7170 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7171 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7172 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7173 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7175 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7176 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7178 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7179 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7180 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7181 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7183 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7184 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7185 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7186 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7187 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7188 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7190 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7191 has_monitor_update = true;
7193 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7194 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7195 continue 'peer_loop;
7204 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7205 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7206 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7212 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7213 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7214 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7215 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7216 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7217 let mut has_update = false;
7218 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7220 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7222 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7223 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7224 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7225 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7226 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7228 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7229 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
7230 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7231 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
7232 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7234 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7235 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7238 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7239 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7240 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7241 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7242 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7247 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7249 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7250 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7251 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7252 shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
7258 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7259 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7264 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7270 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7271 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7274 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7275 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7281 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7282 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7284 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7285 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7286 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7287 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7288 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7289 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7290 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7291 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7292 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7293 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
7294 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7295 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7296 assert!(should_broadcast);
7297 } else { unreachable!(); }
7298 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7299 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7300 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7303 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7307 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7308 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7309 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7311 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7312 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7313 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7314 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7316 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7317 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7318 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7319 &self, description: String
7320 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7321 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7322 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7323 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7324 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7325 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7327 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7328 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7332 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7333 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7335 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7336 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7337 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7340 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund. To
7341 /// revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the invoice.
7343 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7344 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for sender privacy. As such, currently, the
7345 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7346 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7348 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7349 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7350 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7351 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7352 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7353 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7354 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7355 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7356 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7357 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7358 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7360 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7361 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7363 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7364 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7367 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7368 self.pending_outbound_payments
7369 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7370 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7372 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7377 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7378 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7379 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7381 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7382 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7383 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7384 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7385 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7386 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7387 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7389 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7390 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7391 /// been sent. To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving
7394 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link.
7396 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7397 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7398 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7399 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7400 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7401 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7402 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7403 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7404 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7405 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7406 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7407 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7408 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7409 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7412 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7413 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7414 let builder = match quantity {
7416 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7418 let builder = match amount_msats {
7420 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7422 let builder = match payer_note {
7424 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7427 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7428 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7430 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7431 self.pending_outbound_payments
7432 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7433 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7435 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7437 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7438 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7439 let message = PendingOnionMessage {
7440 contents: OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7441 destination: Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7442 reply_path: Some(reply_path),
7444 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7446 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7447 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7448 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7449 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7450 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7451 let message = PendingOnionMessage {
7452 contents: OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7453 destination: Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7454 reply_path: Some(reply_path.clone()),
7456 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7463 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7466 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7467 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7468 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7470 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7471 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7472 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7473 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7474 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7476 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7477 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7479 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7480 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7481 let payment_paths = vec![
7482 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7484 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7485 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7486 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7488 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7489 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7490 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7492 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7493 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7494 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7496 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7497 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7499 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7500 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7501 let message = PendingOnionMessage {
7502 contents: OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7503 destination: Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7504 reply_path: Some(reply_path),
7506 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7508 for path in refund.paths() {
7509 let message = PendingOnionMessage {
7510 contents: OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7511 destination: Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7512 reply_path: Some(reply_path.clone()),
7514 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7520 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7524 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7527 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7528 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7530 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7531 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7532 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7533 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7535 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7537 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7538 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7542 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7543 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7545 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7547 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7548 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7550 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7551 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7552 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7553 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7554 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7555 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7556 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7557 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7558 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7559 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7560 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7563 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7564 /// stored external to LDK.
7566 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7567 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7568 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7570 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7571 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7574 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7575 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7576 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7577 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7579 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7580 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7581 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7582 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7583 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7585 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7586 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7587 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7588 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7589 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7591 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7592 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7594 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7595 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7599 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7600 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7602 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7604 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7605 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7607 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7608 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7609 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7610 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7611 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7612 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7613 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7616 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7617 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7619 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7620 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7621 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7624 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7626 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7627 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7628 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7629 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7632 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7634 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7635 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7636 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7637 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7638 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7640 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7641 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7642 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7644 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7646 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7649 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7650 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7651 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7655 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7656 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7658 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7659 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7660 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7661 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7663 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7664 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7665 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7666 Some(_) => continue,
7667 None => return scid_candidate
7672 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7674 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7675 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7677 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7678 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7679 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7683 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7684 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7685 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7687 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7688 /// times to get a unique scid.
7689 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7690 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7691 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7693 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7694 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7695 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7696 return scid_candidate
7700 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7701 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7702 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7703 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7705 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7706 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7707 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7708 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7709 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7710 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7712 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7713 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7714 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7723 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7724 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7725 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7726 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7727 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7731 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7732 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7733 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7734 events.push_back((event, None));
7738 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7739 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7740 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7744 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7745 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7749 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7750 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7753 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7754 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7755 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7756 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7757 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7759 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7760 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7761 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7762 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7764 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7765 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7766 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7767 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7769 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7773 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7774 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7775 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7776 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7777 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7778 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7779 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7783 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7784 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7785 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7786 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7787 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7788 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7789 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7790 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7791 if further_update_exists {
7792 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7797 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7798 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7803 log_debug!(self.logger,
7804 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7805 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7811 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7812 for action in actions {
7814 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7815 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7817 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7823 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7824 /// using the given event handler.
7826 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7827 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7831 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7835 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7837 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7838 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7839 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7840 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7841 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7842 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7846 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7847 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7848 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7849 /// is always placed next to each other.
7851 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7852 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7853 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7854 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7856 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7857 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7858 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7859 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7860 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7861 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7862 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7864 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7865 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7866 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7867 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7870 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7871 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7873 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7874 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7877 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7878 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7879 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7880 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7881 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7882 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7883 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7887 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7888 events.replace(pending_events);
7897 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7899 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7900 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7901 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7902 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7903 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7904 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7908 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7910 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7911 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7912 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7914 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7918 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7920 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7921 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7922 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7923 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7924 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7925 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7929 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7931 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7932 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7933 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7934 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7935 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7938 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7939 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7942 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7943 let _persistence_guard =
7944 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7945 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7946 let new_height = height - 1;
7948 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7949 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7950 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7951 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7952 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7953 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7956 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7960 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7962 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7963 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7964 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7965 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7966 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7967 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7971 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7972 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7973 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7974 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7976 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7977 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7979 let _persistence_guard =
7980 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7981 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7982 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7983 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7985 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7986 if height < last_best_block_height {
7987 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7988 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7992 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7993 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7994 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7995 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7997 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7998 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8000 let _persistence_guard =
8001 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8002 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8003 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8005 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8007 macro_rules! max_time {
8008 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8010 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8011 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8012 // having an explicit local time source.
8013 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8014 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8015 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8016 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8017 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8023 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8024 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8025 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8026 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8030 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8031 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8032 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8033 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8034 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8035 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8036 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
8037 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
8044 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8045 let _persistence_guard =
8046 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8047 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8048 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8049 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8050 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8051 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8052 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8053 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8058 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8060 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8061 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8062 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8063 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8064 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8065 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8069 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8070 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8072 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8073 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8074 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8075 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8076 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8078 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8079 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8081 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8082 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8083 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8084 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8085 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8086 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8088 // Retain unfunded channels.
8089 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8090 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8091 let res = f(channel);
8092 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8093 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8094 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8095 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8096 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8098 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8099 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8100 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8101 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8102 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8103 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8104 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8109 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8114 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8115 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8118 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8119 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8120 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8121 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8122 msg: announcement_sigs,
8124 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8125 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8126 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8128 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8129 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8130 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8135 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8136 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8137 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8138 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8139 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8140 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8141 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8142 // is always consistent.
8143 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8144 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8145 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8146 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8147 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8150 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8151 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8152 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8153 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8154 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8155 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8156 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8160 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8161 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8162 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8163 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8164 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8165 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8166 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8167 data: reason_message,
8180 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8181 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8182 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8183 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8184 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8185 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8186 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8187 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8188 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8189 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8191 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8192 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8193 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8197 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8200 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8201 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8202 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8203 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8204 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8205 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8206 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8207 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8208 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8209 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8212 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8213 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8214 _ => unreachable!(),
8216 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8217 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8218 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8219 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8225 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8227 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8228 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8232 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8233 /// may have events that need processing.
8235 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8236 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8238 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8239 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8240 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8241 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8244 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8245 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8246 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8249 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8250 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8251 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8254 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8255 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8256 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8257 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8260 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8261 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8262 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8263 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8266 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8267 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8269 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8270 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8271 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8272 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8273 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8276 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8277 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8278 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8279 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8282 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8283 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8284 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8285 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8288 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8289 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8290 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8291 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8294 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8295 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8296 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8297 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8301 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8302 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8304 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8305 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8306 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8307 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8308 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8309 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8313 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8314 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8315 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8316 // change to the contents.
8317 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8318 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8319 let persist = match &res {
8320 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8321 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8322 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8324 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8326 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8331 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8332 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8333 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8334 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8337 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8338 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8339 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8340 // change to the contents.
8341 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8342 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8343 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8347 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8348 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8349 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8350 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8353 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8354 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8355 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8358 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8359 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8360 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8363 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8364 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8365 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8366 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8367 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8368 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8369 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8370 let persist = match &res {
8371 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8372 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8374 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8379 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8380 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8381 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8384 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8385 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8386 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8389 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8390 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8391 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8392 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8393 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8394 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8395 let persist = match &res {
8396 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8397 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8398 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8400 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8405 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8406 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8407 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8410 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8411 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8412 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8413 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8414 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8415 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8416 let persist = match &res {
8417 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8418 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8419 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8421 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8426 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8427 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8428 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8429 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8430 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8431 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8432 let persist = match &res {
8433 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8434 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8435 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8437 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8442 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8443 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8444 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8447 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8448 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8449 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8452 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8453 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8454 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8455 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8456 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8457 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8458 let persist = match &res {
8459 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8460 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8461 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8463 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8468 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8469 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8470 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8473 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8474 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8475 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8478 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8483 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8484 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8485 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8486 let persist = match &res {
8487 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8488 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8489 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8491 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8496 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8497 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8498 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8499 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8500 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8502 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8503 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8504 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8505 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8506 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8507 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8508 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8509 let context = match phase {
8510 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8511 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8512 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8517 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8518 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8521 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8525 // Clean up for removal.
8526 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8527 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8528 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8531 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8532 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8533 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8534 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8536 // V1 Channel Establishment
8537 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8538 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8539 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8540 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8541 // V2 Channel Establishment
8542 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8543 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8544 // Common Channel Establishment
8545 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8546 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8547 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8548 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8549 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8550 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8551 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8552 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8553 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8554 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8555 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8556 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8557 // Channel Operations
8558 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8559 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8560 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8561 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8562 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8563 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8565 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8566 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8567 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8568 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8569 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8570 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8571 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8572 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8573 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8576 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8577 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8578 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8579 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8582 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8584 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8586 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8587 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8591 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8592 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8593 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8597 let mut res = Ok(());
8599 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8600 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8601 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8602 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8603 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8604 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8605 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8608 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8609 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8610 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8611 if inbound_peer_limited {
8613 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8615 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8616 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8617 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8618 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8619 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8620 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8621 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8622 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8626 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8627 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8628 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8630 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8631 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8632 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8633 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8636 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8639 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8640 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8645 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8647 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8648 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8649 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8650 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8651 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8653 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8654 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8655 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8656 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8657 // worry about closing and removing them.
8658 debug_assert!(false);
8662 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8663 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8664 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8669 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8670 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8675 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8678 match &msg.data as &str {
8679 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8680 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8682 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8683 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8684 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8685 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8686 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8687 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8688 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8689 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8690 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8691 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8692 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8693 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8694 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8695 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8696 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8697 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8701 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8702 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8703 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8704 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8705 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8706 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8708 log_level: Level::Trace,
8718 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8719 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8720 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8721 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8722 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8723 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8724 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8725 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8726 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8727 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8728 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8730 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8731 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8732 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8736 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8737 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8738 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8739 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8740 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8741 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8742 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8743 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8744 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8745 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8753 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8754 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8758 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8759 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8762 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8763 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8766 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8767 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8770 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8771 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8772 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8773 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8776 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8777 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8778 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8779 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8782 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8783 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8784 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8785 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8788 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8789 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8790 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8791 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8794 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8795 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8796 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8797 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8800 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8801 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8802 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8803 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8806 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8807 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8808 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8809 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8812 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8813 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8814 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8815 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8818 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8819 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8820 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8821 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8825 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8826 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8828 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8829 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8830 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8831 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8832 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8833 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8837 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
8838 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8839 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8842 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
8843 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
8846 Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
8847 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8849 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8850 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
8852 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
8853 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
8856 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8858 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
8859 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
8860 let payment_paths = vec![
8861 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8863 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8864 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
8865 payment_paths, payment_hash
8867 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8868 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8869 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8871 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8872 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8873 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8875 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
8876 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8877 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8880 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8881 let payment_paths = vec![
8882 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8884 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8885 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
8886 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8887 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8888 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8890 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8891 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
8892 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8894 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
8895 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
8897 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
8898 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8899 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8900 InvoiceError::from_str("Failed signing invoice")
8902 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8903 InvoiceError::from_str("Failed invoice signature verification")
8907 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
8908 Err(error) => Some(error),
8912 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
8916 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
8917 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8919 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_str("Unrecognized invoice")))
8921 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
8922 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
8925 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
8926 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
8927 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_str(&format!("{:?}", e))))
8934 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
8935 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
8941 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
8942 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
8946 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8947 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8948 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8949 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8950 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8954 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8955 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8957 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8958 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8959 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8960 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8961 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8964 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8965 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8966 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8967 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8970 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8971 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8972 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8973 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8976 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8977 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8978 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8979 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8982 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8983 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8984 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8985 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8986 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8987 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8988 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8989 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8990 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8991 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8992 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8993 features.set_payment_secret_required();
8994 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8995 features.set_wumbo_optional();
8996 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8997 features.set_channel_type_optional();
8998 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8999 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9000 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9001 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9006 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9007 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9009 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9010 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9011 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9012 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9015 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9016 (2, node_id, required),
9017 (4, features, required),
9018 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9019 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9020 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9021 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9024 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9025 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9026 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9027 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9028 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9029 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9030 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9031 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9032 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9033 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9034 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9035 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9036 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9037 (7, self.config, option),
9038 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9039 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9040 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9041 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9042 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9043 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9044 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9045 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9046 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9047 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9048 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9049 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9050 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9051 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9052 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9053 (32, self.is_public, required),
9054 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9055 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9056 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9057 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9058 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9064 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9065 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9066 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9067 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9068 (2, channel_id, required),
9069 (3, channel_type, option),
9070 (4, counterparty, required),
9071 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9072 (6, funding_txo, option),
9073 (7, config, option),
9074 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9075 (9, confirmations, option),
9076 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9077 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9078 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9079 (16, balance_msat, required),
9080 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9081 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9082 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9083 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9084 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9085 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9086 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9087 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9088 (26, is_outbound, required),
9089 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9090 (30, is_usable, required),
9091 (32, is_public, required),
9092 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9093 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9094 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9095 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9096 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9099 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9100 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9101 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9102 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9103 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9107 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9109 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9110 outbound_scid_alias,
9114 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9115 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9117 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9118 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9119 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9120 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9121 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9122 confirmations_required,
9124 force_close_spend_delay,
9125 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9126 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9127 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9128 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9129 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9130 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9131 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9132 channel_shutdown_state,
9137 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9138 (2, channels, required_vec),
9139 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9140 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9143 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9145 (0, onion_packet, required),
9146 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9149 (0, payment_data, required),
9150 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9151 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9152 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9153 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9155 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9156 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9157 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9158 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9159 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9160 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9164 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9165 (0, routing, required),
9166 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9167 (4, payment_hash, required),
9168 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9169 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9170 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9171 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9175 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9176 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9178 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9180 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9181 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9182 reason.write(writer)?;
9184 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9185 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9188 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9189 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9190 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9191 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9198 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9199 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9200 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9203 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9204 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9205 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9206 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9210 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9211 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9212 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9213 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9214 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9217 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9218 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9219 // messages contained in the variants.
9220 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9221 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9222 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9224 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9225 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9226 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9227 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9228 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9231 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9232 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9233 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9234 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9235 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9237 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9242 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9247 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9248 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9249 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9250 (2, outpoint, required),
9251 (4, htlc_id, required),
9252 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9253 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9256 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9257 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9258 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9259 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9260 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9262 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9263 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9264 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9265 (2, self.value, required),
9266 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9267 (4, payment_data, option),
9268 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9269 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9270 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9271 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9277 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9278 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9279 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9280 (0, prev_hop, required),
9281 (1, total_msat, option),
9282 (2, value_ser, required),
9283 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9284 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9285 (5, total_value_received, option),
9286 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9287 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9288 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9290 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9291 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9292 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9294 if payment_data.is_some() {
9295 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9297 if total_msat.is_none() {
9298 total_msat = Some(value);
9300 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9303 if total_msat.is_none() {
9304 if payment_data.is_none() {
9305 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9307 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9309 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9313 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9316 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9317 total_value_received,
9318 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9320 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9321 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9326 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9327 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9328 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9331 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9332 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9333 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9334 let mut payment_id = None;
9335 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9336 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9337 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9338 (0, session_priv, required),
9339 (1, payment_id, option),
9340 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9341 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9342 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9343 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9345 if payment_id.is_none() {
9346 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9348 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9350 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9351 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9352 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9354 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9355 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9356 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9357 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9361 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9362 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9363 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9365 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9368 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9369 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9374 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9375 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9377 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9379 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9380 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9381 (0, session_priv, required),
9382 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9383 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9384 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9385 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9386 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9387 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9390 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9392 field.write(writer)?;
9399 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9400 (0, forward_info, required),
9401 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9402 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9403 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9404 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9407 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9409 (0, htlc_id, required),
9410 (2, err_packet, required),
9415 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9416 (0, payment_secret, required),
9417 (2, expiry_time, required),
9418 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9419 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9420 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9423 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9425 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9426 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9427 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9428 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9429 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9430 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9434 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9435 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9437 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9439 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9441 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9442 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9443 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9446 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9448 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9449 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9450 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9451 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9452 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9453 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9454 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9457 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9458 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9462 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9464 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9465 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9466 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9467 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9468 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9469 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9472 channel.write(writer)?;
9478 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9479 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9480 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9481 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9482 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9483 for forward in pending_forwards {
9484 forward.write(writer)?;
9489 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9491 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9492 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9493 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9495 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9496 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9497 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9498 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9499 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9500 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9501 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9502 htlc.write(writer)?;
9504 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9505 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9508 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9509 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9510 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9511 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9512 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9513 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9514 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9517 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9518 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9519 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9520 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9521 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9523 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9524 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9525 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9526 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9527 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9528 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9529 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9534 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9535 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9536 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9537 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9538 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9539 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9540 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9541 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9542 0u64.write(writer)?;
9544 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9545 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9546 event.write(writer)?;
9550 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9551 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9552 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9553 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9554 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9555 0u64.write(writer)?;
9557 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9558 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9559 // likely to be identical.
9560 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9561 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9563 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9564 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9565 hash.write(writer)?;
9566 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9569 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9570 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9571 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9572 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9573 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9576 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9577 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9579 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9580 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9581 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9582 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9585 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9586 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9587 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9588 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9592 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9593 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9594 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9596 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9597 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9598 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9604 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9605 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9606 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9607 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9610 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9611 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9612 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9613 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9614 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9617 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9618 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9619 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9620 if !updates.is_empty() {
9621 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9622 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9627 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9628 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9629 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9630 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9631 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9632 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9633 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9634 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9635 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9636 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9637 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9638 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9639 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9646 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9647 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9648 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9649 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9652 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9653 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9654 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9655 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9656 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9657 // check that the event is sane here.
9658 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9659 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9660 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9661 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9667 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9668 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9669 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9670 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9671 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9672 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9675 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9676 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9677 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9678 events.push_back((ev, action));
9679 } else if action.is_some() {
9680 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9687 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9688 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9689 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9690 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9691 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9692 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9695 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9697 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9699 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9700 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9701 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9702 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9703 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9704 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9705 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9706 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9707 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9708 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9709 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9710 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9711 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9713 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9714 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9716 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9717 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9719 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9720 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9721 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9722 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9723 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9724 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9726 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9727 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9729 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9730 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9731 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9732 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9733 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9734 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9738 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9739 pub entropy_source: ES,
9741 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9742 pub node_signer: NS,
9744 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9745 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9747 pub signer_provider: SP,
9749 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9751 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9752 pub fee_estimator: F,
9753 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9755 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9756 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9757 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9758 pub chain_monitor: M,
9760 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9761 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9762 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9763 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9764 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9765 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9767 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9769 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9770 /// deserialization.
9772 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9773 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9774 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9776 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9777 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9779 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9780 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9781 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9782 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9784 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9787 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9788 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9791 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9792 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9794 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9795 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9796 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9797 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9798 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9799 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9803 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9804 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9805 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9806 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9807 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9809 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9810 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9815 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9816 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9817 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9818 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9820 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9821 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9822 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9823 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9824 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9825 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9829 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9830 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9831 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9835 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9836 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9838 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9839 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9840 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9841 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9842 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9843 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9847 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9848 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9850 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9851 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9852 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9854 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9856 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9857 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9858 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9859 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9860 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9861 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9862 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9863 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9864 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9865 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9867 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9868 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9869 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9870 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9871 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9872 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9873 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9874 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9875 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9876 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9877 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9878 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9879 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9881 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9882 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9883 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9885 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9886 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9887 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9889 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9890 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9891 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9893 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9894 if batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9895 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9897 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9898 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9899 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9902 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9903 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9904 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9905 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9906 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9907 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9908 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9910 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9911 let mut found_htlc = false;
9912 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9913 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9916 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9917 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9918 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9919 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9920 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9921 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9922 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9923 log_info!(args.logger,
9924 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9925 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9926 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9930 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9931 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9932 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9933 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9934 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9936 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
9937 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9939 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9940 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9941 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9942 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9944 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9945 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9946 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9947 entry.insert(by_id_map);
9951 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9952 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9953 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9954 // safely discard the channel.
9955 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9956 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9957 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9958 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9959 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9960 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9961 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9964 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9965 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9966 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9967 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9968 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9969 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9973 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9974 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9975 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9976 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9977 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9978 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9979 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9981 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9985 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9986 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9987 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9988 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9989 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9990 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9991 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9992 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9993 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9995 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9998 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9999 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10000 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10001 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10002 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10003 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10004 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10005 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10007 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10010 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10013 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10014 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10015 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10016 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10017 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10018 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10019 is_connected: false,
10023 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10024 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10025 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10026 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10027 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10028 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10029 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10030 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10033 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10034 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10035 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10036 for _ in 0..event_count {
10037 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10038 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10043 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10044 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10045 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10047 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10048 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10049 // on-startup monitor updates.
10050 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10051 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10053 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10057 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10058 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10060 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10061 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10062 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10063 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10064 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10068 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10069 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10070 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10071 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10072 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10073 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10074 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10076 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10077 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10081 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10082 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10083 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10084 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10085 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10086 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10087 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10088 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10089 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10090 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10091 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10092 let mut events_override = None;
10093 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10094 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10095 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10096 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10097 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10098 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10099 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10100 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10101 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10102 (8, events_override, option),
10103 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10104 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10105 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10106 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10108 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10109 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10112 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10113 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10116 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10117 pending_events_read = events;
10120 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10121 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10124 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10125 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10126 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10127 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10128 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10129 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10131 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10133 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10134 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10135 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10138 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10139 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10140 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10141 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10142 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10144 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10145 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10146 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10148 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10149 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10150 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10151 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10152 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10154 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10155 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10156 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10157 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10158 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10159 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10160 pending_background_events.push(
10161 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10162 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10163 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10164 update: update.clone(),
10167 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10168 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10169 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10170 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10171 pending_background_events.push(
10172 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10173 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10174 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10177 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10178 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10179 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10181 max_in_flight_update_id
10185 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10186 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10187 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10188 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10189 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10190 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10192 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10193 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10194 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10195 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10196 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10197 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10198 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10199 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10200 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10203 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10204 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10205 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10206 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10207 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10208 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10209 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10210 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10211 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10212 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10213 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10216 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10217 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10218 debug_assert!(false);
10219 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10224 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10225 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10226 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10227 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10228 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10229 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10230 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10231 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10233 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10234 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10235 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10237 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10238 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10239 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10240 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10241 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10242 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10243 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10244 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10249 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10250 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10252 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10253 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10254 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10255 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10258 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10259 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10260 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10261 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10262 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10263 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10264 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10266 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10267 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10268 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10269 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10270 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10271 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10272 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10273 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10276 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10277 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10278 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10279 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10280 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10281 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10282 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10283 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10285 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10286 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10287 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10288 retry_strategy: None,
10289 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10290 payment_params: None,
10291 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10292 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10293 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10294 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10295 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10296 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10297 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10298 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10299 total_msat: path_amt,
10300 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10301 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10303 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10304 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10309 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10310 match htlc_source {
10311 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10312 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10313 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10314 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10316 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10317 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10318 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10319 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10320 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10321 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10322 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10323 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10324 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10325 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10326 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10331 !forwards.is_empty()
10333 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10334 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10335 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10336 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10337 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10338 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10339 intercepted_id != ev_id
10346 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10347 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10348 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10349 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10350 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10351 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10352 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10353 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10354 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10355 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10356 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10358 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10359 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10360 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10362 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10363 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10364 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10371 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10372 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10374 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10376 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10377 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10378 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10379 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10380 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10381 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10382 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10383 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10384 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10385 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10388 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10389 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10390 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10391 // channel still live case here.
10395 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10396 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10401 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10402 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10403 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10404 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10405 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10406 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10407 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10408 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10412 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10413 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10415 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10416 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10417 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10418 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10420 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10421 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10422 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10424 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10425 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10427 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10428 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10430 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10433 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10434 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10435 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10437 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10441 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10442 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10443 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10444 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10445 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10447 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10448 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10449 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10450 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10451 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10452 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10453 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10454 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10456 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10457 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10461 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10463 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10465 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10466 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10468 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10469 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10474 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10475 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10477 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10479 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10481 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10482 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10483 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10484 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10488 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10489 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10490 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10491 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10492 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10493 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10494 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10495 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10497 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10498 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10499 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10501 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10502 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10503 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10504 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10505 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10506 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10508 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10509 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10510 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10511 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10512 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10513 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10517 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10518 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10519 debug_assert!(false);
10520 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10525 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10527 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10528 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10529 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10530 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10531 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10532 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10533 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10534 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10535 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10536 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10537 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10539 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10540 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10542 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10543 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10544 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10545 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10547 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10548 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10549 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10550 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10552 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10553 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10554 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10555 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10557 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10558 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10559 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10560 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10561 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10562 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10563 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10566 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10567 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10570 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10573 purpose: payment.purpose,
10574 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10575 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10576 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10582 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10583 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10584 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10585 for action in actions.iter() {
10586 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10587 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10588 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10590 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10591 log_trace!(args.logger,
10592 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10593 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10594 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10595 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10596 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10598 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10599 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10600 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10601 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10605 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10606 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10610 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10612 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10613 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10617 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10619 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10620 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10621 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10622 router: args.router,
10624 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10626 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10627 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10628 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10629 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10631 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10632 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10633 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10634 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10635 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10636 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10638 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10640 our_network_pubkey,
10643 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10645 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10647 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10648 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10649 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10650 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10651 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10653 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10654 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10656 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10658 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10660 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10661 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10662 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10664 logger: args.logger,
10665 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10668 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10669 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10670 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10671 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10672 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10675 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10676 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10677 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10678 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10679 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10680 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10683 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10684 //connection or two.
10686 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10692 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10693 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10694 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10695 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10696 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10697 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10698 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10699 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10700 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10701 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10702 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10703 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10704 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10705 use crate::util::test_utils;
10706 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10707 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10710 fn test_notify_limits() {
10711 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10712 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10713 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10714 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10715 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10716 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10718 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10719 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10720 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10721 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10722 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10724 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10726 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10727 // to connect messages with new values
10728 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10729 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10730 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10731 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10732 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10733 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10735 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10736 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10737 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10738 // ... but the last node should not.
10739 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10740 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10741 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10742 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10744 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10745 // about the channel.
10746 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10747 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10748 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10750 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10752 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10753 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10754 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10755 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10756 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10757 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10759 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10760 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10761 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10763 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10764 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10765 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10766 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10767 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10768 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10770 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10771 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10772 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10773 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10774 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10775 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10776 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10777 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10779 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10780 // the channel info has updated.
10781 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10782 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10783 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10784 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10785 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10786 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10790 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10791 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10793 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10794 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10795 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10796 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10797 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10799 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10800 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10801 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10802 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10804 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10805 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10806 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10807 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10808 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10809 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10810 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10811 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10813 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10814 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10815 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10817 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10818 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10819 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10821 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10822 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10823 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10824 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10825 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10827 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10828 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10829 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10831 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10832 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10833 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10834 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10835 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10836 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10837 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10838 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10839 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10841 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10842 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10843 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10845 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10846 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10847 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10849 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10850 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10851 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10852 // lightning messages manually.
10853 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10854 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10857 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10858 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10859 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10860 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10862 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10863 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10864 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10865 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10866 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10868 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10869 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10870 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10872 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10873 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10874 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10875 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10876 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10878 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10880 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10881 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10884 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10885 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10886 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10887 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10889 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10890 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10891 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10892 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10894 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10897 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10898 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10899 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10900 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10902 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10907 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10908 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10909 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10912 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10913 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10914 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10915 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10916 // fails as expected.
10917 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10918 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10919 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10920 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10921 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10922 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10923 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10924 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10925 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10926 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10927 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10928 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10929 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10930 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10931 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10933 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10934 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10935 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10937 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10938 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10939 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10940 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10941 let route = find_route(
10942 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10943 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10945 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10946 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10948 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10949 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10950 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10951 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10952 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10954 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10955 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10956 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10957 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10958 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10960 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10961 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10962 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10963 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10964 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10965 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10966 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10967 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10968 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10970 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10971 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10973 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10974 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10975 let route = find_route(
10976 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10977 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10979 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10980 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10982 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10983 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10984 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10985 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10986 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10988 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10989 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10990 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10991 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10993 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10994 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10995 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10996 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10997 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10999 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11000 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11001 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11003 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11004 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11005 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11006 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11007 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11008 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11009 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11010 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11011 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11013 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11014 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11016 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11017 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11018 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11019 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11021 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11022 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11023 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11024 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11025 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11027 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11028 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11029 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11032 let route = find_route(
11033 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11034 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11036 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11037 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11038 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11040 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11041 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11042 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11043 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11044 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11046 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11047 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11048 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11050 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11051 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11052 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11053 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11054 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11055 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11056 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11057 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11058 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11060 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11061 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11065 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11066 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11067 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11068 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11069 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11070 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11071 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11073 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11074 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11076 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11077 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11078 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11079 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11080 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11081 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11082 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11083 let route = find_route(
11084 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11085 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11088 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11089 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11090 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11091 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11092 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11093 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11096 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11097 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11098 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11099 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11100 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11101 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11102 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11104 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11108 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11109 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11110 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11111 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11112 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11113 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11114 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11115 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11116 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11118 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11119 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11121 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11122 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11123 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11124 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11125 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11126 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11127 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11128 let route = find_route(
11129 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11130 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11133 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11134 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11135 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
11136 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11137 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11138 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11139 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11140 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11143 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11144 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11145 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11146 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11147 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11148 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11149 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11151 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11155 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11156 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11157 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11158 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11159 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11161 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11162 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11163 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11164 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11166 // Marshall an MPP route.
11167 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11168 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11169 route.paths.push(path);
11170 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11171 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11172 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11173 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11174 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11175 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11177 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11178 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11180 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11181 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11183 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11188 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11189 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11190 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11191 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11192 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11194 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11196 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11197 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11199 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11200 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11202 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11205 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11206 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11207 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11208 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11209 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11210 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11213 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11216 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11217 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11222 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11223 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11224 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11225 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11226 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11227 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11229 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11230 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11232 total_msat: 100_000,
11235 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11236 // payment verification fails as expected.
11237 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11238 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11239 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11240 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11242 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11246 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11247 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11251 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11252 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11253 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11254 // the channel is successfully closed.
11255 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11256 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11257 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11258 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11260 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11261 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11262 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11263 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11264 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11266 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11267 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
11269 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11270 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11271 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11272 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11275 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11277 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11278 // as it has the funding transaction.
11279 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11280 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11281 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11284 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11286 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11288 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11290 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11291 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11292 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11294 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11297 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11298 // as it has the funding transaction.
11299 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11300 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11301 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11304 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11305 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11307 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11308 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11309 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11310 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11312 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11313 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11314 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11315 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11317 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11318 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11320 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11321 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11322 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11323 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11324 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11325 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11326 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11330 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11331 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11332 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11333 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11334 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11335 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11336 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11339 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11341 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11342 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11343 // closing transaction).
11344 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11345 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11346 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11348 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11349 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11350 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11351 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11352 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11355 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11357 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11359 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11360 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11361 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11363 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11365 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11366 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11369 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11370 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11371 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11374 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11375 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11376 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11379 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11380 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11381 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11384 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11385 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11386 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11389 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11391 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11392 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11394 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11395 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11397 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11398 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11403 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11404 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11405 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11406 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11407 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11408 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11409 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11410 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11413 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11414 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11415 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11417 // Test the API functions.
11418 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
11420 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11422 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11424 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11426 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11428 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11430 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11434 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11435 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11436 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11437 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11438 // the given `channel_id`.
11439 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11440 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11441 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11442 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11444 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11447 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11449 // Test the API functions.
11450 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11452 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11454 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11456 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11458 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11460 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11464 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11465 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11466 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11467 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11468 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11469 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11471 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11473 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11474 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11476 let mut funding_tx = None;
11477 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11478 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11479 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11482 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11483 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11484 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11485 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11486 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11488 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11490 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11492 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11494 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11496 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11498 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11501 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11502 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11503 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11504 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11505 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11507 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11508 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11510 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11511 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11512 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11513 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11514 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11515 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11516 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11519 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11520 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11521 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11522 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11523 }, true).unwrap_err();
11525 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11526 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11527 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11528 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11529 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11530 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11531 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11533 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11534 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11536 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11537 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11538 }, true).unwrap_err();
11540 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11541 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11542 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11543 }, false).unwrap();
11544 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11546 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11547 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11549 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11550 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11551 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11552 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11553 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11555 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11556 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11557 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11559 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11560 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11561 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11563 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11564 // "protected" and can connect again.
11565 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11566 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11567 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11569 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11571 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11573 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11574 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11578 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11579 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11580 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11581 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11582 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11583 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11585 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11587 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11588 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11590 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11591 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11592 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11593 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11596 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11598 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11599 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11600 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11602 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11603 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11604 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11606 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11607 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11608 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11609 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11613 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11614 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11615 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11616 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11617 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11618 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11619 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11620 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11621 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11623 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11625 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11626 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11628 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11629 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11630 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11631 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11632 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11633 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11636 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11637 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11639 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11640 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11642 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11644 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11645 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11648 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11649 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11650 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11651 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11652 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11654 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11655 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11657 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11658 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11659 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11660 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11664 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11666 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11667 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11669 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11670 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11671 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11673 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11674 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11676 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11678 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11682 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11683 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11684 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11685 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11686 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11687 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11688 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11689 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11691 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11692 payment_metadata: None,
11693 keysend_preimage: None,
11694 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11695 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11697 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11699 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11700 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11701 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11702 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11703 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11705 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11706 } else { panic!(); }
11708 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11709 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11711 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11712 payment_metadata: None,
11713 keysend_preimage: None,
11714 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11715 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11717 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11719 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11720 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11724 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11725 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11726 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11727 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11728 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11730 let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11732 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11733 payment_metadata: None,
11734 keysend_preimage: None,
11735 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11736 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11738 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11739 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None);
11741 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11742 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11743 // is not satisfied.
11744 assert!(result.is_ok());
11748 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11749 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11750 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11751 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11752 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11754 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11755 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11757 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11758 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11759 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11760 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11761 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11763 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11764 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11766 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11767 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11768 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11769 match &msg_events[0] {
11770 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11771 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11773 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11774 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11775 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11778 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11781 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11782 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11784 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11785 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11786 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11788 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11792 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11793 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11794 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11795 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11796 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11797 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11798 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11799 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11800 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11801 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11802 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11804 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
11805 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11806 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11808 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11809 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11811 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11812 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11814 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11817 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11818 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11820 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11821 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11823 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11824 // not have generated any events.
11825 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11829 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11830 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11831 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11832 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11833 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11834 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11835 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11836 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11838 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11839 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11840 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11842 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11843 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11844 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11845 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11846 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11848 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11849 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11852 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11853 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11854 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11856 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11857 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11858 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11859 ..Default::default()
11861 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11862 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11863 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11865 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11866 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11869 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11870 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11871 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11872 ..Default::default()
11874 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11875 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11876 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11877 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11879 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11880 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11883 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11884 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11885 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11886 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11887 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11890 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11891 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11892 ..Default::default()
11894 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11897 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11898 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11899 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11900 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11904 fn test_payment_display() {
11905 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11906 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11907 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11908 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11909 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11910 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11914 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
11915 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11916 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11917 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11918 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11919 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11921 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
11922 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11923 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11924 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11925 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11926 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
11927 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11928 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11930 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11931 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11932 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11935 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
11936 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
11938 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11939 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11941 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11942 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11943 }, false).unwrap();
11944 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
11945 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
11946 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
11948 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
11950 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
11951 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
11952 // close even if it was an lnd node.
11953 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11954 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11955 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
11956 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11957 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
11958 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
11959 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
11960 } else { panic!() };
11961 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
11962 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
11963 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
11964 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
11966 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11968 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11969 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11970 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11977 use crate::chain::Listen;
11978 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
11979 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
11980 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
11981 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
11982 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11983 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
11984 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
11985 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
11986 use crate::util::test_utils;
11987 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
11989 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11990 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11991 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
11993 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
11995 use criterion::Criterion;
11997 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
11998 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
11999 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12000 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12001 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12002 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12003 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12005 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12006 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12008 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12009 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12011 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12013 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12016 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12017 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12020 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12021 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12022 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12024 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12025 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12027 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12028 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12029 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12030 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12031 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12033 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12034 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12035 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12037 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12038 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12039 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12040 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12042 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12043 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12044 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12046 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12047 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12048 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12049 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12050 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12052 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12053 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12054 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12056 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12057 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12059 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12060 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12061 }, false).unwrap();
12062 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
12063 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12064 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12067 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12068 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12069 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12071 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12072 } else { panic!(); }
12074 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12075 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12076 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12077 match events_b[0] {
12078 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12079 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12081 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12084 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12085 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12086 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12087 match events_a[0] {
12088 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12089 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12091 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12094 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12096 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12097 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12098 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12100 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12101 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12102 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12103 match msg_events[0] {
12104 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12105 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12106 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12110 match msg_events[1] {
12111 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12115 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12116 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12117 match events_a[0] {
12118 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12119 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12121 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12124 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12125 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12126 match events_b[0] {
12127 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12128 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12130 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12133 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12134 macro_rules! send_payment {
12135 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12136 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12137 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12138 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12139 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12140 payment_count += 1;
12141 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
12142 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12144 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12145 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12146 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12147 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12148 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12149 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12150 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12151 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12152 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12153 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12154 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12156 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12157 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12158 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12159 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12161 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12162 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12163 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12164 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12165 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12167 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12170 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12171 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12172 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12173 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12175 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12179 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12180 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12181 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);