1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
39 // construct one themselves.
40 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
41 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
42 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
43 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
44 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
45 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
46 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
47 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
49 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
50 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
51 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
54 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
55 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
56 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
57 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
58 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
59 use crate::util::events;
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
63 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
64 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
66 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
69 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
74 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
75 use core::time::Duration;
78 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
79 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
81 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
83 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
84 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
85 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
87 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
88 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
89 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
90 // before we forward it.
92 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
93 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
94 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
95 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
96 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
101 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
102 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
103 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
104 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
112 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
113 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
119 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
120 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
121 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
122 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
123 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
124 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
129 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
130 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
133 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
136 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
137 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
140 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
141 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
143 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
144 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
145 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
148 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
149 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
151 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
152 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
155 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
156 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
159 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
163 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
164 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
165 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
166 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
167 short_channel_id: u64,
169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
170 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
172 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
173 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
178 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
180 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
181 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
182 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
184 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
185 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
188 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
189 struct ClaimableHTLC {
190 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
192 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
194 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
196 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
200 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
205 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
206 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
211 impl Readable for PaymentId {
212 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
213 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
218 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
219 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
220 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
221 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
223 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
224 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
229 impl Readable for InterceptId {
230 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
231 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
236 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
237 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
238 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
239 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
240 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
243 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
245 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
246 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
247 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
249 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
250 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
254 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
255 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
256 (0, short_channel_id, required),
257 (2, htlc_id, required),
259 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
260 (0, session_priv, required),
265 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
266 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
267 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
268 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
269 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
272 session_priv: SecretKey,
273 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
274 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
275 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
276 payment_id: PaymentId,
277 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
278 /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
279 /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
280 /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
282 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
285 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
286 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
287 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
289 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
291 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
293 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
296 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
297 payment_id.hash(hasher);
298 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
299 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
300 payment_params.hash(hasher);
306 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
308 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
309 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
311 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
312 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
313 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
314 payment_secret: None,
315 payment_params: None,
319 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
320 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
321 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
322 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
323 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
324 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
326 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
332 struct ReceiveError {
338 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
339 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
341 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
342 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
343 pub enum FailureCode {
344 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
345 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
346 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
347 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
348 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
349 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
350 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
351 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
352 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
353 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
354 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
357 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
359 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
360 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
361 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
362 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
363 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
365 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
366 err: msgs::LightningError,
367 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
368 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
370 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
372 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
374 err: LightningError {
376 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
377 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
384 shutdown_finish: None,
388 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
389 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
392 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
394 err: LightningError {
396 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
397 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
403 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
404 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
408 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
411 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
413 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
414 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
418 log_level: Level::Warn,
421 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
423 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
425 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
427 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
428 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
436 shutdown_finish: None,
441 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
442 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
443 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
444 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
445 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
447 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
448 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
449 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
450 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
451 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
452 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
453 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
455 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
459 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
460 struct ClaimingPayment {
462 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
463 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
465 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
466 (0, amount_msat, required),
467 (2, payment_purpose, required),
468 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
471 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
472 struct ClaimablePayments {
473 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
474 /// failed/claimed by the user.
476 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
477 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
479 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
480 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
481 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
483 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
484 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
485 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
486 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
489 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
490 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
491 /// quite some time lag.
492 enum BackgroundEvent {
493 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
494 /// commitment transaction.
495 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
499 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
500 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
501 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
502 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
503 /// event can be generated.
504 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
505 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
506 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
509 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
510 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
511 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
514 /// State we hold per-peer.
515 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
516 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
518 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
519 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
521 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
522 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
523 latest_features: InitFeatures,
524 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
525 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
526 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
527 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
528 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
530 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
531 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
532 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
533 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
535 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
536 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
537 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
538 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
539 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
540 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
541 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
542 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
543 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
544 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
548 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
549 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
550 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
551 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
552 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
553 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
556 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
560 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
561 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
563 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
566 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
567 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
568 struct PendingInboundPayment {
569 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
570 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
571 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
572 /// this payment being removed.
574 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
575 user_payment_id: u64,
576 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
577 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
578 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
581 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
582 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
583 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
584 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
585 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
586 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
587 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
589 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
590 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
598 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
600 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
605 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
606 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
607 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
608 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
609 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
610 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
611 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
612 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
614 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
615 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
617 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
618 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
620 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
621 /// to individual Channels.
623 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
624 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
625 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
626 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
628 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
629 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
630 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
631 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
632 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
633 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
634 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
636 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
637 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
638 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
639 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
642 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
643 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
644 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
645 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
646 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
648 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, ChannelManager limits the number of inbound connections and
649 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
650 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
651 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
653 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
654 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
655 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
657 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
658 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
659 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
660 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
661 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
664 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
665 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
666 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
667 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
668 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
672 // `total_consistency_lock`
674 // |__`forward_htlcs`
676 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
678 // |__`per_peer_state`
680 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
682 // | |__`claimable_payments`
684 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
690 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
692 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
696 // | |__`pending_events`
698 // | |__`pending_background_events`
700 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
702 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
703 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
704 ES::Target: EntropySource,
705 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
706 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
707 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
711 default_configuration: UserConfig,
712 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
713 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
719 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
721 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
723 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
724 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
726 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
727 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
728 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
729 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
731 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
732 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
734 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
735 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
736 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
737 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
738 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
739 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
740 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
741 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
743 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
745 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
746 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
748 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
750 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
751 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
752 /// and via the classic SCID.
754 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
755 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
757 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
759 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
761 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
762 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
763 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
765 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
766 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
768 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
769 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
771 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
772 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
774 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
775 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
776 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
777 /// active channel list on load.
779 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
780 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
782 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
784 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
785 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
786 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
788 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
789 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
790 /// the handling of the events.
792 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
793 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
796 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
797 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
798 /// would break backwards compatability.
799 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
800 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
801 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
803 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
804 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
806 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
808 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
809 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
810 /// confirmation depth.
812 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
813 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
814 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
816 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
818 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
820 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
822 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
824 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
826 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
827 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
828 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
830 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
831 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
833 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
834 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
835 /// keeping additional state.
836 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
838 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
839 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
840 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
841 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
843 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
844 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
846 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
847 /// are currently open with that peer.
849 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
850 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
853 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
855 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
856 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
857 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
858 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
859 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
861 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
862 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
863 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
864 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
865 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
866 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
867 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
868 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
869 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
870 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
871 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
873 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
882 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
884 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
885 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
886 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
887 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
888 pub struct ChainParameters {
889 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
890 pub network: Network,
892 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
894 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
895 pub best_block: BestBlock,
898 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
904 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
905 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
906 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
907 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
908 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
909 /// updates are ready for persistence).
911 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
912 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
913 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
914 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
915 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
917 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
918 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
921 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
922 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
923 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
926 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
927 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
929 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
930 persistence_notifier: notifier,
931 should_persist: persist_check,
932 _read_guard: read_guard,
937 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
939 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
940 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
945 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
946 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
948 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
950 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
951 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
952 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
953 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
954 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
956 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
957 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
959 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
961 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
962 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
963 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
964 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
965 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
966 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
967 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
968 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
969 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
970 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
971 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
972 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
973 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
975 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
976 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
978 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
979 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
980 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
981 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
983 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
984 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
985 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
986 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
987 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
988 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
991 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
993 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
994 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
997 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
999 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1000 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1002 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1003 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1004 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1005 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1007 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1008 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1009 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1010 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1012 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1013 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1014 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1016 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1017 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1018 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1020 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1021 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1022 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1023 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1024 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1025 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1026 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1027 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1028 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1029 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1030 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1033 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1034 /// to better separate parameters.
1035 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1036 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1037 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1038 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1039 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1040 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1041 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1042 pub features: InitFeatures,
1043 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1044 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1045 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1047 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1049 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1050 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1051 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1052 /// payments to us through this channel.
1053 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1054 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1055 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1056 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1057 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1058 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1059 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1062 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1063 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1064 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1065 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1066 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1067 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1068 /// lifetime of the channel.
1069 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1070 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1071 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1072 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1073 /// our counterparty already.
1075 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1076 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1077 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1078 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1080 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1081 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1082 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1083 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1085 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1086 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1088 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1089 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1091 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1092 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1093 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1094 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1095 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1096 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1097 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1098 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1099 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1102 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1104 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1105 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1106 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1107 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1108 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1109 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1110 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1112 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1113 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1115 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1116 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1117 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1118 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1119 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1120 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1121 /// this value on chain.
1123 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1125 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1127 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1128 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1129 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1130 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1132 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1133 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1134 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1135 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1137 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1138 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1139 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1140 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1142 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1143 pub balance_msat: u64,
1144 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1145 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1146 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1147 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1149 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1151 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1152 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1153 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1154 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1155 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1156 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1157 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1158 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1160 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1161 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1162 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1163 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1164 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1165 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1166 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1168 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1169 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1170 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1171 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1172 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1173 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1174 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1175 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1176 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1178 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1180 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1181 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1182 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1183 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1184 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1186 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1187 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1188 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1189 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1190 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1191 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1192 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1194 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1195 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1196 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1197 pub is_outbound: bool,
1198 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1199 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1200 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1201 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1202 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1204 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1205 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1206 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1207 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1209 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1210 pub is_usable: bool,
1211 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1212 pub is_public: bool,
1213 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1214 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1215 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1216 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1217 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1218 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1220 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1221 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1224 impl ChannelDetails {
1225 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1226 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1227 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1229 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1230 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1231 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1232 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1235 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1236 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1237 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1239 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1240 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1241 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1242 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1245 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1246 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1248 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1249 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1250 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1252 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1253 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1254 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1255 features: latest_features,
1256 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1257 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1258 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1259 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1260 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1261 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1262 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1263 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1264 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1265 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1267 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1268 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1269 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1270 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1271 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1272 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1273 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1274 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1275 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1276 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1277 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1278 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1279 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1280 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1281 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1282 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1283 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1284 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1285 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1286 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1287 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1288 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1289 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1290 config: Some(channel.config()),
1295 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1296 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1297 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1298 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1299 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1301 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1303 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1304 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1305 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1308 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1309 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1310 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1312 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1313 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1314 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1316 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1317 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1318 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1320 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1321 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1325 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1327 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1329 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1330 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1331 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1332 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1334 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1335 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1336 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1339 macro_rules! handle_error {
1340 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1343 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1344 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1345 // entering the macro.
1346 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1347 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1349 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1351 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1352 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1353 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1354 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1358 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1359 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1360 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1361 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1366 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1367 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1369 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1370 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1371 action: err.action.clone()
1375 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1376 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1377 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1378 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1379 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1383 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1390 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1391 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1392 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1393 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1394 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1395 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1397 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1398 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1399 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1400 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1401 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1403 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1404 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1406 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1410 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1411 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1412 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1414 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1415 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1417 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1418 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1420 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1421 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1422 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1423 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1424 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1425 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1431 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1432 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1436 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1438 $entry.remove_entry();
1446 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1447 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1451 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1453 $entry.remove_entry();
1461 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1462 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1464 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1465 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1471 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1472 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1473 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1474 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1475 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1477 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1478 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1479 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1480 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1481 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1482 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1483 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1484 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1485 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1486 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1491 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1492 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1493 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1495 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1496 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1497 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1498 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1499 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1500 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1503 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1508 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1509 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1510 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1511 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1512 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1513 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1514 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1515 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1516 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1517 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1518 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1520 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1521 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1522 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1528 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1529 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1531 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1532 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1533 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1534 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1535 updates.announcement_sigs);
1536 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1537 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1540 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1541 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1542 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1544 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1546 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1547 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1549 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1550 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1551 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1552 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1557 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1558 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1559 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1560 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1561 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1563 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1564 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1565 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1568 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1569 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1570 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1571 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1572 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1573 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1574 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1575 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1579 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1580 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1581 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1582 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1583 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1585 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1591 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1592 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1596 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1598 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1599 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1600 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1601 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1602 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1603 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1607 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1609 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1610 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1612 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1614 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1615 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1616 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1617 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1618 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1619 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1620 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1621 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1623 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1624 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1625 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1630 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1632 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1633 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1634 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1635 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1636 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1637 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1638 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1639 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1641 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1644 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1645 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1647 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1649 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1651 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1653 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1654 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1655 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1656 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1666 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1667 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1668 &self.default_configuration
1671 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1672 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1673 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1676 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1677 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1679 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1681 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1685 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1690 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1692 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1693 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1694 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1695 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1696 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1698 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1699 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1701 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1702 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1703 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1705 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1706 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1707 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1708 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1709 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1710 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1712 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1713 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1714 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1715 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1716 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1717 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1720 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1721 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1722 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1724 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1726 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1727 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1729 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1731 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1732 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1733 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1734 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1735 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1736 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1740 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1745 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1747 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1748 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1749 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1751 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1753 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1756 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1759 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1760 node_id: their_network_key,
1763 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1766 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1767 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1768 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1769 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1770 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1771 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1772 // the same channel.
1773 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1775 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1776 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1777 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1778 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1779 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1780 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1781 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1782 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1790 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1791 /// more information.
1792 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1793 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1796 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1797 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1799 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1800 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1802 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1803 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1804 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1805 // really wanted anyway.
1806 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1809 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1810 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1811 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1812 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1814 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1815 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1816 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1817 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1818 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1821 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1827 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1828 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1830 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1831 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1832 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1834 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1835 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1836 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1837 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1838 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1839 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1840 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1841 total_msat: *total_msat,
1844 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1845 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1847 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1848 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1850 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1855 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1856 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1857 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1858 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1859 Some(transaction) => {
1860 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1864 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1865 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1866 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1867 reason: closure_reason
1871 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1872 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1874 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1875 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1876 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1878 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1879 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1881 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1882 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1883 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1884 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1885 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1886 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1887 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1888 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1889 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1891 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1892 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1893 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1894 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1895 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1899 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1900 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1901 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1902 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1903 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1906 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1907 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1908 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1909 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1913 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1917 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1921 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1922 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1923 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1924 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1927 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1931 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1932 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1933 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1935 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1936 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1938 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1939 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1940 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1941 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1943 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1945 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1946 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1947 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1948 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1949 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1952 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1953 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1954 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1956 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1957 /// the channel being closed or not:
1958 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1959 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1960 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1961 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1962 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1963 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1964 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1966 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1968 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1969 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1970 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1971 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1972 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1976 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1977 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1978 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1979 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1980 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1981 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1982 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1983 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1985 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1986 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1987 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1988 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1989 // ignore the result here.
1990 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1994 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1995 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1996 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1997 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1998 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1999 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2000 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2002 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2003 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2004 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2005 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2006 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2008 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2010 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2012 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2015 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2016 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2017 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2018 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2019 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2024 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2027 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2028 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2029 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2030 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2031 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2032 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2033 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2034 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2035 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2036 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2037 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2038 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2049 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2050 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2051 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2053 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2054 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2055 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2058 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2059 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2060 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2062 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2063 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2064 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2065 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2066 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2069 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2070 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2071 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2072 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2073 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2077 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2078 /// local transaction(s).
2079 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2080 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2081 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2085 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2086 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2088 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2089 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2090 return Err(ReceiveError {
2091 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2093 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2096 // final_expiry_too_soon
2097 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2098 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2100 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2101 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2102 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2103 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2104 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2105 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2106 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2107 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2108 return Err(ReceiveError {
2109 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2110 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2113 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2114 return Err(ReceiveError {
2116 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2117 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2121 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2122 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2123 return Err(ReceiveError {
2124 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2125 err_data: Vec::new(),
2126 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2129 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2130 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2131 return Err(ReceiveError {
2132 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2133 err_data: Vec::new(),
2134 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2136 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2137 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2139 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2140 phantom_shared_secret,
2142 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2143 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2144 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2145 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2146 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2147 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2148 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2149 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2150 return Err(ReceiveError {
2151 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2152 err_data: Vec::new(),
2153 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2157 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2159 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2162 return Err(ReceiveError {
2163 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2164 err_data: Vec::new(),
2165 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2170 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2173 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2174 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2175 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2176 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2180 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2181 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2182 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2184 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2185 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2186 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2187 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2188 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2189 failure_code: $err_code,
2195 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2196 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2199 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2200 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2201 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2203 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2204 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2205 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2206 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2207 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2208 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2209 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2210 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2212 macro_rules! return_err {
2213 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2215 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2216 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2217 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2218 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2219 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2220 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2226 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2228 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2229 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2231 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2232 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2236 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2237 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2239 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2241 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2242 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2243 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2244 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2245 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2247 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2250 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2251 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2252 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2254 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2255 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2256 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2259 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2260 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2261 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2262 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2266 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2267 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2268 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2271 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2272 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2273 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2274 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2275 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2280 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2281 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2282 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2283 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2284 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2285 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2286 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2287 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2288 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2289 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2290 // phantom or an intercept.
2291 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2292 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2293 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2297 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2300 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2302 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2303 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2304 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2305 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2306 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2308 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2309 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2310 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2312 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2313 // have no consistency guarantees.
2314 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2318 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2319 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2320 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2321 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2322 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2324 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2325 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2326 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2327 // we don't have the channel here.
2328 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2330 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2332 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2333 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2334 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2335 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2336 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2337 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2338 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2340 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2341 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2343 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2344 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2348 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2349 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2350 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2351 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2353 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2360 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2361 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2362 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2363 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2364 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2365 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2367 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2368 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2370 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2371 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2372 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2373 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2374 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2375 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2376 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2377 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2378 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2379 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2385 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2386 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2387 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2388 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2390 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2391 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2393 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2394 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2395 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2397 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2398 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2399 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2400 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2401 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2402 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2403 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2407 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2412 pending_forward_info
2415 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2416 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2417 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2419 /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
2420 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2421 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2422 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2423 if !chan.should_announce() {
2424 return Err(LightningError {
2425 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2426 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2429 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2430 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2432 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2433 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2436 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2437 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2438 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2439 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2441 /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
2442 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2443 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2444 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2445 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2446 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2447 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2451 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2453 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2454 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2455 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2457 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2458 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2460 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2461 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2462 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2463 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2464 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2465 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2466 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2467 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2469 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2470 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2471 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2473 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2475 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2482 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2483 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2484 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2487 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2488 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2489 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2491 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2492 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2493 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2495 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2496 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2497 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2498 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2499 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2501 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2503 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2504 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2505 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2506 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2509 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2510 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2511 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2512 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2513 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2514 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2515 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2516 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2518 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2519 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2520 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2522 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2523 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2525 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2526 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2527 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2528 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2529 Some(monitor_update) => {
2530 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2531 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2532 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2535 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2536 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2537 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2538 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2539 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2540 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2541 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2542 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2548 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2549 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2550 // `channel_by_id` map.
2551 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2552 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2557 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2558 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2560 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2565 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2567 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2568 /// fields for more info.
2570 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2571 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2573 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2575 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2576 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2577 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2578 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2579 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2581 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2582 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2583 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2584 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2585 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2587 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2588 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2589 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2590 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2592 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2594 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2595 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2596 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2598 /// In general, a path may raise:
2599 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2600 /// node public key) is specified.
2601 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2602 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2604 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2605 /// relevant updates.
2607 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2608 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2609 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2611 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2613 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2614 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2615 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2616 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2617 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2619 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2620 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2621 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2623 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2624 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2625 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2626 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2627 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2628 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2629 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2630 self.pending_outbound_payments
2631 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2632 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2633 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2636 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2637 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2638 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2639 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2640 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2641 self.pending_outbound_payments
2642 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2643 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2644 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2645 &self.pending_events,
2646 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2647 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2651 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2652 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2653 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2654 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2655 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2656 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2660 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2661 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2662 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2666 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2667 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2668 /// retries are exhausted.
2670 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2671 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2673 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2674 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2675 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2677 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2678 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2680 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2681 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2682 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2683 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2684 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2687 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2688 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2689 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2690 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2691 /// never reach the recipient.
2693 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2694 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2696 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2697 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2699 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2701 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2702 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2703 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2704 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2705 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2706 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2708 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2709 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2712 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2713 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2715 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2718 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2719 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2720 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2721 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2722 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2723 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2724 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2725 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2726 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2727 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2730 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2731 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2732 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2733 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2734 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2735 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2736 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2737 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2738 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2741 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2744 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2745 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2748 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2749 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2750 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2751 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2752 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2753 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2754 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2755 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2757 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2758 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2761 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2763 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2765 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2766 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2767 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2768 } else { unreachable!(); })
2771 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2774 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2775 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2778 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2779 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2784 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2785 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2788 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2789 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2790 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2792 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2793 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2794 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2795 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2804 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2805 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2806 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2810 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2812 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2813 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2815 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2816 /// across the p2p network.
2818 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2819 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2821 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2822 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2823 /// keys per-channel).
2825 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2826 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2827 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2829 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2830 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2831 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2833 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2834 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2835 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2836 /// for more details.
2838 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2839 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2840 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2841 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2843 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2844 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2845 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2846 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2851 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2852 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2853 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2854 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2855 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2856 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2857 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2861 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2862 let mut output_index = None;
2863 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2864 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2865 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2866 if output_index.is_some() {
2867 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2868 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2871 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2872 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2873 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2876 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2879 if output_index.is_none() {
2880 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2881 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2884 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2888 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2890 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2891 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2892 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2893 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2895 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2896 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2898 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2899 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2901 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2903 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2904 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2905 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2906 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2907 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2908 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2909 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2910 pub fn update_channel_config(
2911 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2912 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2913 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2914 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2915 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2919 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2920 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2922 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2923 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2924 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2925 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2926 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2927 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2928 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2929 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2930 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2934 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2935 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2936 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2939 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2940 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2941 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2942 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2943 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2951 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2952 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2954 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2955 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2957 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2958 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2959 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2960 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2961 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2963 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2964 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2966 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2969 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2970 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2971 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2972 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2973 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2974 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2976 let next_hop_scid = {
2977 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2978 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2979 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2980 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2981 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2982 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2984 if !chan.is_usable() {
2985 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2986 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2989 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2991 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2992 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2997 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2998 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2999 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3002 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3003 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3004 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3006 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3008 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3009 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3012 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3013 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3014 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3015 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3016 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3018 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3022 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3023 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3025 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3028 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3029 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3030 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3032 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3033 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3034 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3037 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3038 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3039 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3040 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3041 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3042 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3043 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3046 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3047 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3048 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3049 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3054 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3056 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3057 /// Will likely generate further events.
3058 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3059 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3061 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3062 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3063 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3065 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3066 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3068 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3069 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3070 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3072 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3073 match forward_info {
3074 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3075 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3076 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3077 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3078 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3081 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3082 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3083 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3085 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3086 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3087 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3088 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3089 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3090 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3093 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3094 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3096 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3099 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3100 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3106 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3107 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3109 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3113 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3114 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3116 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3120 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3121 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3122 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3123 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3124 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3126 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3127 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3128 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3129 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3130 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3132 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3134 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3135 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3139 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3140 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3141 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3142 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3148 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3151 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3154 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3155 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3156 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3157 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3158 // problem, not ours.
3164 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3165 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3167 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3171 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3172 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3173 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3174 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3177 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3178 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3179 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3181 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3184 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3185 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3186 match forward_info {
3187 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3188 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3189 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3190 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3191 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3194 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3195 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3196 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3197 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3198 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3199 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3200 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3201 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3203 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3204 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3205 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3207 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3208 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3210 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3212 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3213 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3214 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3215 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3220 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3221 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3223 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3224 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3225 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3226 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3228 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3229 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3231 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3233 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3234 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3235 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3244 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3245 match forward_info {
3246 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3247 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3248 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3249 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3252 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3253 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3254 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3255 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3257 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3258 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3260 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3263 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3264 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3265 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3266 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3267 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3268 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3269 phantom_shared_secret,
3271 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3273 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3278 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3279 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3280 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3281 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3282 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3284 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3285 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3286 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3287 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3288 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3289 phantom_shared_secret,
3291 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3292 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3296 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3297 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3298 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3299 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3300 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3303 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3304 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3305 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3307 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3308 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3309 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3312 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3313 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3314 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3317 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3318 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3319 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3320 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3321 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3322 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3326 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3327 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3328 total_value += htlc.value;
3329 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3330 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3331 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3332 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3333 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3334 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3336 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3338 _ => unreachable!(),
3341 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3342 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3343 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3344 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3345 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3346 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3347 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3348 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3349 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3352 amount_msat: total_value,
3353 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3354 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3356 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3358 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3359 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3361 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3363 payment_claimable_generated
3367 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3368 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3369 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3370 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3371 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3372 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3373 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3374 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3375 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3376 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3377 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3378 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3379 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3380 Ok(result) => result,
3382 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3383 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3387 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3388 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3389 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3390 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3391 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3392 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3396 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3398 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3399 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3400 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3401 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3404 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3405 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3406 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3407 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3408 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3409 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3410 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3412 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3414 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3415 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3418 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3419 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3420 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3426 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3427 if payment_data.is_none() {
3428 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3429 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3432 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3433 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3434 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3435 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3436 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3437 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3438 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3439 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3441 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3442 if payment_claimable_generated {
3443 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3449 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3450 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3458 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3459 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3460 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3461 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3462 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3463 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3465 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3466 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3468 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3470 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3471 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3472 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3474 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3476 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3477 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3478 events.append(&mut new_events);
3481 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3483 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3484 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3486 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3487 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3488 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3489 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3490 if background_events.is_empty() {
3494 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3496 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3497 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3498 // monitor updating completing.
3499 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3506 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3507 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3508 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3509 self.process_background_events();
3512 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3513 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3514 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3515 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3516 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3517 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3518 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3520 if !chan.is_live() {
3521 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3522 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3523 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3525 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3526 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3528 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3529 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3533 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3534 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3535 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3536 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3537 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3538 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3539 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3541 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3543 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3544 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3545 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3546 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3547 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3548 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3549 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3557 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3559 /// This currently includes:
3560 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3561 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3562 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3564 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3565 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3566 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3568 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3569 /// estimate fetches.
3570 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3571 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3572 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3573 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3575 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3577 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3578 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3579 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3581 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3582 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3583 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3584 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3585 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3586 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3587 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3588 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3589 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3591 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3592 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3593 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3594 if needs_close { return false; }
3597 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3598 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3599 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3600 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3601 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3602 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3603 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3604 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3608 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3609 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3611 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3612 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3613 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3617 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3618 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3623 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3627 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3628 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3633 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3634 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3635 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3636 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3637 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3638 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3639 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3640 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3641 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3642 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3643 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3644 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3645 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3646 // have no channels to the peer.
3647 let remove_entry = {
3648 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3649 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3652 entry.remove_entry();
3655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3660 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3661 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3662 // This should be unreachable
3663 debug_assert!(false);
3666 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3667 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3668 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3669 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3671 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3672 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3673 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3675 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3682 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3683 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3684 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3685 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3686 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3689 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3690 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3693 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3695 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3696 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3697 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3698 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3699 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3706 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3707 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3708 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3710 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3711 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3712 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3713 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3715 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3716 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3717 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3718 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3719 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3720 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3723 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3724 /// reason for the failure.
3726 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3727 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3728 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3730 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3731 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3732 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3733 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3734 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3735 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3736 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3741 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3742 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3743 match failure_code {
3744 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3745 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3746 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3747 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3748 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3749 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3754 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3755 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3757 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3759 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3760 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3761 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3762 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3763 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3764 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3765 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3767 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3769 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3770 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3772 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3777 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3778 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3779 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3780 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3781 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3782 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3783 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3784 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3785 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3786 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3788 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3789 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3790 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3791 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3793 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3794 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3795 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3796 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3797 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3801 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3802 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3803 // be surfaced to the user.
3804 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3805 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3806 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3808 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3809 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3810 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3811 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3812 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3813 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3814 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3815 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3817 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3819 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3822 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3823 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3824 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3825 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3829 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3830 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3831 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3832 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3833 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3834 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3835 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3836 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3837 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3840 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3841 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3842 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3845 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3846 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3847 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3849 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3850 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3851 session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3852 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3853 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3855 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3856 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3857 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3859 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3860 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3861 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3862 push_forward_ev = true;
3864 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3865 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3866 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3868 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3869 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3872 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3873 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3874 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3875 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3876 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3877 failed_next_destination: destination,
3883 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3884 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3886 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3887 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3888 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3890 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3891 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3892 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3893 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3895 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3896 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3897 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3898 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3899 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3900 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3901 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3903 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3906 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3907 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3908 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3909 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3910 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3911 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3912 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3913 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3918 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3919 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3920 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3922 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3923 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3924 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3925 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3930 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3932 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3933 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3934 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3935 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3936 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3938 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3939 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3941 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3942 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3943 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3944 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3945 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3947 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3948 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3949 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3950 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3951 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3952 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3953 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3954 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3961 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3962 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3967 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3968 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3970 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3975 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3976 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3977 debug_assert!(false);
3982 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3983 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3984 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3985 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3986 if sources.len() != 1 {
3987 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3988 debug_assert!(false);
3994 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3996 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3997 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3998 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3999 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4002 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4003 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4004 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4005 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4009 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4010 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4011 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4012 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4014 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4015 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4016 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4017 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4018 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4023 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4024 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4025 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4026 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4027 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4028 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4029 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4031 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4034 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4035 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4036 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4037 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4041 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4042 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4043 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4044 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4046 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4047 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4048 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4049 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4053 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4054 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4055 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4059 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4060 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4061 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4062 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4063 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4064 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4066 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4067 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4068 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4069 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4070 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4072 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4073 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4074 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4075 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4076 if let Err(e) = res {
4077 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4078 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4079 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4080 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4081 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4087 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4088 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4089 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4093 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4094 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4095 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4096 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4097 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4098 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4099 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4100 // again on restart.
4101 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4102 payment_preimage, update_res);
4104 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4105 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4106 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4107 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4108 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4109 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4113 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4114 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4117 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4119 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4120 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4122 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4123 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4124 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4125 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4126 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4127 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4128 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4131 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4132 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4134 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4136 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4142 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4143 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4144 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4150 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4151 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4152 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4155 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4156 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4158 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4159 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4160 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4161 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4162 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4166 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4167 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4173 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4174 /// update completion.
4175 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4176 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4177 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4178 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4179 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4180 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4181 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4182 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4183 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4184 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4185 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4186 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4187 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4189 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4191 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4192 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4193 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4194 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4197 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4198 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4200 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4201 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4202 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4207 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4209 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4210 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4211 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4212 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4217 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4218 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4219 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4220 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4221 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4226 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4230 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4236 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4237 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4238 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4244 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4245 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4247 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4248 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4250 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4251 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4252 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4253 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4254 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4259 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4260 let mut peer_state_lock;
4261 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4262 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4263 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4264 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4266 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4267 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4268 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4271 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4272 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4273 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4276 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4279 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4281 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4282 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4285 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4286 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4287 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4289 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4290 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4291 /// used to accept such channels.
4293 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4294 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4295 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4296 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4299 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4300 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4302 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4303 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4304 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4306 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4307 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4309 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4310 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4312 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4313 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4315 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4316 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4317 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4318 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4321 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4322 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4324 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4325 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4326 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4327 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4328 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4329 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4330 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4331 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4332 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4333 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4334 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4337 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4338 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4339 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4340 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4341 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4342 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4345 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4346 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4347 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4349 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4350 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4351 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4352 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4353 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4354 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4355 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4356 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4359 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4360 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4361 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4365 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4366 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4367 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4370 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4371 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4377 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4378 /// or 0-conf channels.
4380 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4381 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4382 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4383 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4384 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4385 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4387 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4388 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4389 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4390 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4391 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4392 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4393 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4397 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4400 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4401 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4403 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4404 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4405 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4406 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4408 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4411 num_unfunded_channels
4414 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4415 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4416 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4419 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4420 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4423 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4424 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4425 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4426 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4428 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4429 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4430 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4431 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4433 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4434 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4436 debug_assert!(false);
4437 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4439 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4440 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4442 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4443 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4444 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4445 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4446 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4447 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4449 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4450 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4451 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4454 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4455 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4456 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4457 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4458 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4461 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4462 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4463 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4466 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4467 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4471 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4472 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4473 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4474 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4476 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4477 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4478 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4479 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4481 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4482 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4483 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4486 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4487 pending_events.push(
4488 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4489 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4490 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4491 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4492 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4493 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4498 entry.insert(channel);
4504 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4505 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4506 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4507 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4509 debug_assert!(false);
4510 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4512 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4513 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4514 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4515 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4516 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4517 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4519 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4522 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4523 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4524 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4525 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4526 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4528 user_channel_id: user_id,
4533 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4534 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4536 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4537 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4539 debug_assert!(false);
4540 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4543 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4544 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4545 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4546 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4547 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4548 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4550 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4553 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4554 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4555 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4558 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4559 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4560 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4561 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4562 funding_msg.channel_id))
4564 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4565 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4569 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4570 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4571 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4572 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4573 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4574 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4575 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4579 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4581 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4582 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4583 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4585 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4586 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4587 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4588 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4589 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4590 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4591 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4592 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4600 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4601 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4602 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4603 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4605 debug_assert!(false);
4606 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4609 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4610 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4611 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4612 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4613 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4614 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4615 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4616 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4617 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4618 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4619 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4620 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4621 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4622 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4627 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4631 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4632 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4633 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4635 debug_assert!(false);
4636 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4638 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4639 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4640 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4641 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4642 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4643 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4644 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4645 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4646 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4647 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4648 msg: announcement_sigs,
4650 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4651 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4652 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4653 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4654 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4655 // announcement_signatures.
4656 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4657 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4658 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4659 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4665 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4669 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4673 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4674 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4675 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4676 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4677 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4679 debug_assert!(false);
4680 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4682 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4683 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4684 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4685 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4687 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4688 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4689 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4690 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4693 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4694 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4695 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4696 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4698 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4699 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4700 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4701 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4702 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4703 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4708 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4709 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4710 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4711 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4712 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4716 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4719 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4720 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4721 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4722 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4728 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4729 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4730 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4732 debug_assert!(false);
4733 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4735 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4736 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4737 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4738 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4739 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4740 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4741 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4742 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4743 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4748 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4749 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4750 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4751 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4752 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4753 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4754 } else { (tx, None) }
4756 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4759 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4760 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4761 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4763 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4764 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4765 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4766 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4767 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4771 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4776 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4777 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4778 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4779 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4781 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4782 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4783 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4784 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4786 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4787 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4788 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4790 debug_assert!(false);
4791 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4793 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4794 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4795 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4796 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4798 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4799 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4800 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4801 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4802 match pending_forward_info {
4803 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4804 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4805 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4806 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4808 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4809 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4810 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4811 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4812 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4815 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4817 _ => pending_forward_info
4820 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4822 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4827 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4828 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4829 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4830 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4832 debug_assert!(false);
4833 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4835 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4836 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4837 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4838 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4839 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4841 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4844 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4848 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4849 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4850 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4852 debug_assert!(false);
4853 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4855 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4856 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4857 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4858 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4859 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4861 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4866 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4867 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4868 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4870 debug_assert!(false);
4871 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4873 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4874 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4875 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4876 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4877 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4878 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4879 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4881 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4884 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4888 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4889 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4890 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4892 debug_assert!(false);
4893 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4895 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4896 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4897 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4898 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4899 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4900 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4901 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4902 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4903 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4904 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4911 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4912 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4913 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4914 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4915 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4916 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4917 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4918 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4919 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4920 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4921 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4923 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4924 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4926 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4927 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4928 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4929 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4930 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4931 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4933 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4934 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4935 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4937 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4938 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4939 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4940 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4941 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4942 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4943 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4944 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4945 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4948 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4949 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4951 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4952 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4953 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4954 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4955 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4956 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4957 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4958 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4961 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4962 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4963 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4968 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4969 // payments are being processed.
4970 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4971 push_forward_event = true;
4973 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4974 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4981 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4982 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4985 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4986 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4987 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4989 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
4993 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
4994 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
4995 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4996 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
4997 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
4999 if !forward_ev_exists {
5000 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5002 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5007 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5008 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5009 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5010 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5012 debug_assert!(false);
5013 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5014 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5015 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5016 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5017 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5018 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5019 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5020 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5021 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5022 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5023 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5024 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5026 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5029 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5033 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5034 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5035 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5037 debug_assert!(false);
5038 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5040 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5041 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5042 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5043 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5044 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5046 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5051 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5052 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5053 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5055 debug_assert!(false);
5056 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5058 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5059 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5060 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5061 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5062 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5063 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5066 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5067 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5068 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5069 msg, &self.default_configuration
5071 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5072 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5073 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5076 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5081 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5082 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5083 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5084 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5086 // It's not a local channel
5087 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5090 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5091 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5092 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5093 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5095 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5096 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5097 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5098 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5099 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5100 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5101 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5102 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5103 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5104 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5106 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5108 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5109 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5110 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5111 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5113 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5114 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5117 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5119 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5122 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5124 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5125 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5127 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5129 debug_assert!(false);
5130 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5132 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5133 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5134 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5135 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5136 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5137 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5138 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5139 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5140 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5141 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5142 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5143 let mut channel_update = None;
5144 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5145 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5146 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5149 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5150 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5151 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5152 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5153 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5154 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5155 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5160 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5161 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5162 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5163 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5164 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5165 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5169 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5173 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5174 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5177 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5178 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5183 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5184 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5185 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5187 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5188 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5189 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5190 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5191 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5192 match monitor_event {
5193 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5194 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5195 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5196 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5198 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5199 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5200 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5201 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5204 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5205 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5206 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5207 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5209 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5210 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5211 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5212 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5215 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5216 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5217 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5218 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5219 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5220 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5221 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5222 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5223 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5224 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5225 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5229 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5230 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5232 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5234 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5235 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5236 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5237 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5238 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5245 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5246 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5252 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5253 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5256 has_pending_monitor_events
5259 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5260 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5261 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5263 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5264 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5265 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5266 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5268 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5273 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5274 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5275 /// update was applied.
5276 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5277 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5278 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5279 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5281 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5282 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5283 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5284 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5286 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5287 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5289 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5290 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5291 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5292 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5293 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5294 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5295 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5296 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5297 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5299 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5300 has_monitor_update = true;
5302 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5303 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5304 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5305 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5306 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5307 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5308 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5310 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5312 continue 'peer_loop;
5321 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5322 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5323 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5326 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5327 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5333 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5334 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5335 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5336 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5337 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5338 let mut has_update = false;
5340 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5342 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5343 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5344 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5345 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5346 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5347 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5348 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5349 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5351 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5352 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5355 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5356 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5357 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5358 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5359 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5364 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5366 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5367 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5368 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5374 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5375 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5383 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5384 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5390 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5391 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5393 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5394 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5395 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5396 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5397 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5398 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5399 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5400 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5401 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5402 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5403 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5404 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5405 assert!(should_broadcast);
5406 } else { unreachable!(); }
5407 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5409 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5413 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5414 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5416 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5417 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5420 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5422 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5423 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5424 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5425 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5426 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5427 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5428 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5429 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5430 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5431 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5432 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5433 // never fail a payment too early.
5434 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5436 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5439 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5444 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5447 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5448 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5450 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5451 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5452 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5453 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5455 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5457 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5458 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5462 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5463 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5465 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5467 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5468 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5470 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5471 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5472 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5473 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5474 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5475 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5476 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5477 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5478 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5479 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5480 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5483 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5484 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5486 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5489 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5491 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5493 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5494 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5495 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5496 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5497 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5500 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5501 /// stored external to LDK.
5503 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5504 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5505 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5507 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5508 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5511 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5512 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5513 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5514 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5516 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5517 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5518 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5519 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5520 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5522 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5523 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5524 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5525 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5526 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5528 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5529 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5531 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5532 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5536 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5537 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5539 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5541 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5542 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5544 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5545 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5546 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5547 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5548 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5549 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5550 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5553 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5554 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5556 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5559 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5561 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5563 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5564 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5567 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5568 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5570 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5571 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5572 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5575 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5576 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5578 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5579 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5580 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5581 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5583 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5584 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5585 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5586 Some(_) => continue,
5587 None => return scid_candidate
5592 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5594 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5595 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5597 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5598 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5599 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5603 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5604 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5605 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5607 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5608 /// times to get a unique scid.
5609 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5610 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5611 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5613 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5614 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5615 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5616 return scid_candidate
5620 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5621 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5622 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5623 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5625 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5626 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5627 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5628 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5629 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5630 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5631 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5632 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5641 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5642 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5643 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5644 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5645 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5649 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5650 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5651 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5656 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5657 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5658 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5662 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5663 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5667 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5668 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5671 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5672 /// using the given event handler.
5674 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5675 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5678 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5679 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5680 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5682 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5684 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5685 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5686 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5687 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5690 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5691 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5692 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5695 for event in pending_events {
5696 handler(event).await;
5699 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5700 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5705 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5707 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5708 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5709 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5710 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5711 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5712 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5716 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5717 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5718 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5719 /// is always placed next to each other.
5721 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5722 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5723 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5724 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5726 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5727 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5728 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5729 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5730 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5731 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5732 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5734 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5735 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5736 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5737 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5740 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5741 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5743 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5744 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5747 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5748 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5749 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5750 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5751 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5752 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5753 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5757 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5758 events.replace(pending_events);
5767 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5769 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5770 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5771 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5772 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5773 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5774 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5778 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5780 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5781 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5782 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5783 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5784 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5786 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5787 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5788 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5789 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5792 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5793 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5794 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5797 for event in pending_events {
5798 handler.handle_event(event);
5806 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5808 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5809 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5810 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5811 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5812 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5813 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5817 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5819 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5820 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5821 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5822 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5823 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5826 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5827 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5830 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5831 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5832 let new_height = height - 1;
5834 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5835 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5836 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5837 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5838 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5839 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5842 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5846 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5848 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5849 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5850 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5851 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5852 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5853 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5857 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5858 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5859 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5860 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5862 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5863 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5865 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5866 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5867 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5869 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5870 if height < last_best_block_height {
5871 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5872 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5876 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5877 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5878 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5879 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5881 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5882 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5884 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5886 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5888 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5890 macro_rules! max_time {
5891 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5893 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5894 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5895 // having an explicit local time source.
5896 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5897 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5898 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5899 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5900 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5906 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5907 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5908 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5909 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5913 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5914 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5915 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5916 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5917 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5918 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5919 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5920 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5927 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5928 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5929 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5930 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5931 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5932 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5933 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5934 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5939 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5941 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5942 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5943 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5944 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5945 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5946 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5950 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5951 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5953 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5954 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5955 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5956 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5957 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5959 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5960 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5962 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5963 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5964 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5965 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5966 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5967 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5968 let res = f(channel);
5969 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5970 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5971 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5972 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5973 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5975 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5976 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5977 if channel.is_usable() {
5978 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5979 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5980 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5981 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5986 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5990 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5992 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5993 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5994 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5995 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5996 msg: announcement_sigs,
5998 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5999 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6000 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6002 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6003 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6004 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6009 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6010 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6011 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6012 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6013 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6014 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6015 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6016 // is always consistent.
6017 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6018 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6019 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6020 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6021 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6024 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6025 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6026 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6027 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6028 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6029 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6030 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6034 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6035 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6036 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6037 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6038 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6039 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6040 data: reason_message,
6050 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6051 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6052 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6053 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6054 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6055 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6056 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6057 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6058 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6059 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6061 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6062 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6063 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6067 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6070 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6071 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6072 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6073 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6074 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6075 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6076 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6077 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6078 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6081 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6082 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6083 _ => unreachable!(),
6085 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6086 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6087 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6088 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6094 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6096 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6097 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6101 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6102 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6103 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6104 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6106 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6108 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6109 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6110 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6111 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6112 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6113 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6116 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6117 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6118 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6120 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6121 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6122 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6123 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6126 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6127 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6128 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6129 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6130 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6133 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6134 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6135 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6138 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6139 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6140 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6141 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6144 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6145 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6146 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6147 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6150 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6151 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6153 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6154 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6155 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6156 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6157 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6160 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6161 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6162 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6163 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6166 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6167 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6168 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6169 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6172 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6173 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6174 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6175 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6179 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6180 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6182 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6183 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6184 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6185 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6186 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6187 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6191 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6192 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6193 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6196 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6197 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6198 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6201 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6202 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6203 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6206 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6207 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6208 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6211 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6212 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6213 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6216 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6217 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6218 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6221 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6222 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6223 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6226 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6227 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6228 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6231 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6232 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6233 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6236 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6237 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6238 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6241 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6242 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6243 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6246 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6247 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6248 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6251 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6252 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6253 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6256 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6257 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6258 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6261 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6263 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6266 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6267 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6268 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6271 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6276 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6277 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6278 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6281 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6282 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6283 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6284 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6286 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6287 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6288 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6289 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6290 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6291 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6292 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6293 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6294 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6295 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6296 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6301 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6303 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6304 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6305 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6306 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6307 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6308 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6309 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6310 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6311 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6312 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6313 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6314 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6315 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6316 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6317 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6318 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6319 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6320 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6321 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6322 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6323 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6326 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6327 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6328 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6329 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6332 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6334 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6336 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6337 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6341 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6342 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6343 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6347 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6349 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6350 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6351 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6352 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6353 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6354 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6357 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6358 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6359 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6360 if inbound_peer_limited {
6363 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6364 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6365 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6366 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6367 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6371 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6372 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6373 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6375 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6376 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6377 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6378 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6383 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6384 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6389 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6391 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6392 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6393 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6394 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6395 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6396 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6397 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6398 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6399 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6400 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6401 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6405 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6406 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6407 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6412 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6413 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6414 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6415 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6416 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6425 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6429 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6430 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6432 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6433 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6434 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6435 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6436 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6437 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6438 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6439 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6441 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6442 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6443 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6447 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6448 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6449 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6450 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6451 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6452 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6453 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6454 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6455 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6456 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6464 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6465 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6469 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6470 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6473 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6474 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6478 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6479 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6480 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6481 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6484 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6485 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6487 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6488 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6489 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6490 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6491 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6494 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6495 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6496 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6497 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6500 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6501 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6502 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6503 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6506 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6507 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6508 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6509 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6510 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6511 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6512 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6513 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6514 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6515 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6516 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6517 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6518 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6519 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6520 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6521 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6522 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6523 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6525 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6526 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6527 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6533 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6534 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6536 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6537 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6538 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6539 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6542 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6543 (2, node_id, required),
6544 (4, features, required),
6545 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6546 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6547 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6548 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6551 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6552 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6553 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6554 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6555 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6556 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6557 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6558 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6559 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6560 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6561 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6562 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6563 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6564 (7, self.config, option),
6565 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6566 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6567 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6568 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6569 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6570 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6571 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6572 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6573 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6574 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6575 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6576 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6577 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6578 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6579 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6580 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6581 (32, self.is_public, required),
6582 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6583 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6584 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6590 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6591 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6592 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6593 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6594 (2, channel_id, required),
6595 (3, channel_type, option),
6596 (4, counterparty, required),
6597 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6598 (6, funding_txo, option),
6599 (7, config, option),
6600 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6601 (9, confirmations, option),
6602 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6603 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6604 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6605 (16, balance_msat, required),
6606 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6607 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6608 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6609 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6610 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6611 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6612 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6613 (26, is_outbound, required),
6614 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6615 (30, is_usable, required),
6616 (32, is_public, required),
6617 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6618 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6619 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6622 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6623 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6624 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6625 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6626 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6630 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6632 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6633 outbound_scid_alias,
6637 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6638 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6640 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6641 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6642 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6643 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6644 confirmations_required,
6646 force_close_spend_delay,
6647 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6648 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6649 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6650 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6651 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6652 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6657 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6658 (2, channels, vec_type),
6659 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6660 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6663 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6665 (0, onion_packet, required),
6666 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6669 (0, payment_data, required),
6670 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6671 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6673 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6674 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6675 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6679 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6680 (0, routing, required),
6681 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6682 (4, payment_hash, required),
6683 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6684 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6685 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6689 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6690 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6692 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6694 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6695 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6696 reason.write(writer)?;
6698 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6699 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6702 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6703 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6704 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6705 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6712 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6713 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6714 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6717 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6718 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6719 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6720 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6724 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6725 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6726 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6727 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6728 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6731 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6732 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6733 // messages contained in the variants.
6734 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6735 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6736 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6738 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6739 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6740 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6741 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6742 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6745 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6746 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6747 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6748 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6749 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6751 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6756 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6761 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6762 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6763 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6764 (2, outpoint, required),
6765 (4, htlc_id, required),
6766 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6769 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6770 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6771 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6772 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6773 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6775 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6776 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6777 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6778 (2, self.value, required),
6779 (4, payment_data, option),
6780 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6781 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6787 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6788 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6789 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6791 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6792 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6793 let mut total_msat = None;
6794 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6795 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6796 (0, prev_hop, required),
6797 (1, total_msat, option),
6798 (2, value, required),
6799 (4, payment_data, option),
6800 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6801 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6803 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6805 if payment_data.is_some() {
6806 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6808 if total_msat.is_none() {
6809 total_msat = Some(value);
6811 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6814 if total_msat.is_none() {
6815 if payment_data.is_none() {
6816 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6818 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6820 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6824 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6827 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6834 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6835 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6836 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6839 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6840 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6841 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6842 let mut payment_id = None;
6843 let mut payment_secret = None;
6844 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6845 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6846 (0, session_priv, required),
6847 (1, payment_id, option),
6848 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6849 (3, payment_secret, option),
6850 (4, path, vec_type),
6851 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6853 if payment_id.is_none() {
6854 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6856 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6858 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6859 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6861 let path = path.unwrap();
6862 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6863 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6864 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6867 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6868 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6869 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6871 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6876 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6877 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6882 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6883 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6885 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6887 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6888 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6889 (0, session_priv, required),
6890 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6891 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6892 (3, payment_secret, option),
6893 (4, *path, vec_type),
6894 (5, payment_params, option),
6897 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6899 field.write(writer)?;
6906 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6907 (0, forward_info, required),
6908 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6909 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6910 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6911 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6914 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6916 (0, htlc_id, required),
6917 (2, err_packet, required),
6922 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6923 (0, payment_secret, required),
6924 (2, expiry_time, required),
6925 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6926 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6927 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6930 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6932 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6933 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6934 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6935 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6936 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6937 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6941 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6942 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6944 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6946 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6948 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6949 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6950 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6953 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6955 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6956 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6957 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6958 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6959 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6960 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6961 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6962 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6964 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6965 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6966 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6967 unfunded_channels += 1;
6972 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6974 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6975 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6976 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6977 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6978 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6979 channel.write(writer)?;
6986 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6987 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6988 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6989 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6990 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6991 for forward in pending_forwards {
6992 forward.write(writer)?;
6997 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6999 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7000 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7001 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7003 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7004 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7005 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7006 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7007 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7008 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7009 htlc.write(writer)?;
7011 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7014 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7015 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7016 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7017 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7018 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7019 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7020 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7023 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7024 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7025 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7026 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7027 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7029 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7030 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7031 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7032 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7033 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7034 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7035 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7040 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7041 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7042 for event in events.iter() {
7043 event.write(writer)?;
7046 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7047 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7048 for event in background_events.iter() {
7050 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7052 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7053 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7058 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7059 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7060 // likely to be identical.
7061 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7062 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7064 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7065 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7066 hash.write(writer)?;
7067 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7070 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7071 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7072 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7073 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7074 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7077 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7078 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7080 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7081 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7082 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7083 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7086 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7087 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7091 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7092 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7093 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7095 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7096 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7097 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7103 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7104 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7105 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7106 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7109 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7110 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7111 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7112 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7113 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7116 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7117 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7118 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7119 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7120 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7121 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7122 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7123 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7124 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7125 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7132 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7134 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7136 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7137 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7138 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7139 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7140 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7141 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7142 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7143 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7144 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7145 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7146 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7147 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7148 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7150 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7151 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7153 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7154 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7156 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7157 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7158 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7159 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7160 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7161 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7163 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7164 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7166 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7167 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7168 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7169 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7170 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7171 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7175 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7176 pub entropy_source: ES,
7178 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7179 pub node_signer: NS,
7181 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7182 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7184 pub signer_provider: SP,
7186 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7188 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7189 pub fee_estimator: F,
7190 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7192 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7193 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7194 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7195 pub chain_monitor: M,
7197 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7198 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7199 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7200 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7201 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7202 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7204 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7206 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7207 /// deserialization.
7209 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7210 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7211 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7213 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7214 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7216 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7217 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7218 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7219 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7221 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7224 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7225 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7228 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7229 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7231 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7232 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7233 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7234 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7235 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7236 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7240 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7241 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7242 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7243 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7244 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7246 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7247 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7252 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7253 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7254 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7255 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7257 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7258 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7259 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7260 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7261 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7262 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7266 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7267 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7268 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7272 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7273 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7275 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7276 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7277 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7278 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7279 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7280 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7284 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7285 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7287 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7288 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7289 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7291 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7293 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7294 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7295 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7296 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7297 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7298 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7299 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7300 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7301 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7303 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7304 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7305 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7306 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7307 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7308 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7309 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7310 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7311 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7312 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7313 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7314 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7315 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7316 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7317 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7318 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7319 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7320 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7321 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7322 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7323 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7324 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7325 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7326 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7327 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7328 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7329 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7330 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7331 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7332 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7333 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7334 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7336 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7337 let mut found_htlc = false;
7338 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7339 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7342 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7343 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7344 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7345 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7346 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7347 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7348 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7349 log_info!(args.logger,
7350 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7351 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7352 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7356 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7357 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7358 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7360 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7361 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7363 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7364 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7365 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7366 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7368 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7369 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7370 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7371 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7375 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7376 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7377 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7378 // safely discard the channel.
7379 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7380 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7381 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7382 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7383 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7386 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7387 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7388 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7389 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7390 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7391 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7395 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7396 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7397 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7398 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7402 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7403 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7404 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7405 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7406 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7407 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7408 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7409 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7410 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7412 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7415 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7416 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7417 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7418 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7419 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7420 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7421 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7422 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7424 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7427 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7428 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7429 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7430 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7431 let peer_state = PeerState {
7432 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7433 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7434 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7435 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7436 is_connected: false,
7438 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7441 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7442 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7443 for _ in 0..event_count {
7444 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7445 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7450 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7451 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7452 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7453 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7454 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7455 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7459 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7460 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7462 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7463 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7464 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7465 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7466 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7470 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7471 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7472 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7473 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7474 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7475 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7476 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7478 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7479 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7483 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7484 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7485 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7486 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7487 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7488 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7489 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7490 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7491 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7492 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7493 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7494 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7495 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7496 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7497 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7498 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7499 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7500 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7501 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7502 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7504 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7505 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7508 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7509 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7512 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7513 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7516 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7517 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7518 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7519 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7520 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7521 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7523 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7525 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7526 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7527 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7531 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7532 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7533 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7534 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7535 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7536 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7537 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7539 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7540 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7541 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7542 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7543 if path.is_empty() {
7544 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7545 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7548 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7549 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7550 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7551 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7552 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7553 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7554 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7555 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7558 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7559 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7560 retry_strategy: None,
7561 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7562 payment_params: None,
7563 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7564 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7566 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7567 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7568 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7569 total_msat: path_amt,
7570 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7572 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7573 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7578 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7580 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7581 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7582 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7583 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7585 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7586 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7587 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7588 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7589 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7590 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7591 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7592 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7593 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7594 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7595 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7600 !forwards.is_empty()
7602 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7603 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7604 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7605 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7606 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7607 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7608 intercepted_id != ev_id
7615 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7616 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7617 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7618 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7619 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7620 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7621 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7622 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7623 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7624 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7625 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7626 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7627 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7636 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7637 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7638 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7639 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7640 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7641 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7642 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7643 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7647 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7648 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7650 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7651 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7652 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7653 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7655 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7656 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7659 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7660 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7661 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7662 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7663 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7665 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7666 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7667 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7668 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7669 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7670 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7671 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7672 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7674 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7675 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7679 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7681 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7683 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7684 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7686 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7690 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7691 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7693 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7695 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7697 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7698 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7699 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7700 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7704 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7705 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7706 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7707 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7708 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7709 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7710 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7712 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7713 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7714 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7716 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7717 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7718 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7719 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7720 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7721 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7723 if chan.is_usable() {
7724 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7725 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7726 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7727 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7728 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7734 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7736 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7737 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7738 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7739 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7740 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7741 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7742 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7743 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7744 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7745 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7746 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7748 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7749 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7751 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7752 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7753 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7754 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7756 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7757 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7758 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7759 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7761 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7762 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7763 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7764 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7766 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7767 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7768 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7769 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7770 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7771 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7772 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7775 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7776 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7779 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7782 purpose: payment_purpose,
7783 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7789 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7790 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7791 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7793 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7794 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7798 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7800 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7801 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7802 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7803 router: args.router,
7805 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7807 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7808 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7809 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7810 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7812 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7813 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7814 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7815 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7816 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7817 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7819 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7824 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7826 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7828 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7829 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7830 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7831 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7833 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7834 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7835 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7837 logger: args.logger,
7838 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7841 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7842 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7843 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7844 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7845 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7848 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7849 //connection or two.
7851 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7857 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7858 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7859 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7860 use core::time::Duration;
7861 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7862 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7863 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7864 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7865 use crate::ln::msgs;
7866 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7867 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7868 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7869 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7870 use crate::util::test_utils;
7871 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7872 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7875 fn test_notify_limits() {
7876 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7877 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7878 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7879 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7880 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7881 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7883 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7884 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7885 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7886 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7887 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7889 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7891 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7892 // to connect messages with new values
7893 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7894 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7895 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7896 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7897 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7898 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7900 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7901 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7902 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7903 // ... but the last node should not.
7904 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7905 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7906 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7907 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7909 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7910 // about the channel.
7911 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7912 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7913 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7915 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7917 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7918 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7919 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7920 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7921 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7922 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7924 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7925 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7926 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7928 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7929 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7930 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7931 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7932 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7933 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7935 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7936 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7937 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7938 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7939 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7940 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7941 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7942 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7944 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7945 // the channel info has updated.
7946 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7947 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7948 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7949 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7950 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7951 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7955 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7956 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7958 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7959 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7960 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7961 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7962 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7964 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7965 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7966 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7967 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7969 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7970 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7971 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7972 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7973 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7974 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7976 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7977 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7978 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7980 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7981 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7983 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7984 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7985 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7986 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7987 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7989 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7990 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7991 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7993 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7994 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7995 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7996 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7997 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7998 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7999 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8000 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8001 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8003 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8004 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8006 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8007 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8008 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8010 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8011 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8012 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8013 // lightning messages manually.
8014 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8015 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8018 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8019 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8020 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8022 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8023 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8025 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8026 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8028 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8029 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8030 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8032 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8033 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8034 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8036 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8038 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8040 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8041 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8044 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8045 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8046 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8047 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8049 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8050 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8051 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8052 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8054 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8057 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8058 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8059 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8060 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8062 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8065 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8066 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8067 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8068 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8070 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8075 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8076 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8077 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8078 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8079 // fails as expected.
8080 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8081 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8082 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8083 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8084 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8085 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8086 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8088 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8089 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8090 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8092 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8093 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8094 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8095 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8097 let route = find_route(
8098 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8099 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8101 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8103 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8104 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8105 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8106 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8107 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8109 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8110 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8111 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8112 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8113 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8115 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8116 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8117 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8118 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8119 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8120 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8121 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8122 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8123 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8125 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8126 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8128 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8129 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8130 let route = find_route(
8131 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8132 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8134 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8136 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8137 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8138 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8139 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8140 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8142 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8143 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8144 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8146 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8147 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8148 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8149 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8150 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8152 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8153 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8154 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8156 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8157 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8158 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8159 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8160 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8161 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8162 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8163 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8164 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8166 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8167 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8171 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8172 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8173 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8174 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8175 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8176 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8177 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8179 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8180 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8182 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8183 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8184 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8185 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8187 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8188 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8189 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8190 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8191 let route = find_route(
8192 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8193 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8196 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8197 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8198 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8199 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8202 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8203 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8204 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8205 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8206 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8207 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8208 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8210 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8214 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8215 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8216 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8217 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8218 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8219 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8221 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8222 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8224 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8225 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8226 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8227 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8229 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8230 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8231 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8232 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8233 let route = find_route(
8234 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8235 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8238 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8239 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8240 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8241 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8242 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8245 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8246 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8247 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8248 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8249 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8250 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8251 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8253 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8257 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8258 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8259 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8260 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8261 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8263 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8264 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8265 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8266 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8268 // Marshall an MPP route.
8269 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8270 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8271 route.paths.push(path);
8272 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8273 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8274 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8275 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8276 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8277 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8279 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8280 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8281 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8282 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8287 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8288 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8289 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8290 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8291 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8293 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8295 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8296 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8298 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8299 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8301 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8304 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8305 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8306 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8307 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8308 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8309 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8312 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8315 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8316 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8321 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8322 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8323 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8324 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8325 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8326 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8328 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8329 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8331 total_msat: 100_000,
8334 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8335 // payment verification fails as expected.
8336 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8337 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8338 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8339 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8341 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8345 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8346 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8350 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8351 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8352 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8353 // the channel is successfully closed.
8354 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8355 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8356 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8357 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8359 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8360 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8361 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8362 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8363 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8365 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8366 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8368 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8369 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8370 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8371 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8374 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8376 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8377 // as it has the funding transaction.
8378 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8379 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8380 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8383 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8385 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8387 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8389 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8390 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8391 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8395 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8396 // as it has the funding transaction.
8397 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8398 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8399 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8402 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8403 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8405 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8406 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8407 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8409 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8410 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8411 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8412 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8414 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8415 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8417 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8418 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8419 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8420 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8421 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8422 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8423 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8427 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8428 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8429 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8430 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8431 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8432 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8433 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8436 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8438 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8439 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8440 // closing transaction).
8441 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8442 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8443 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8445 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8446 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8447 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8448 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8449 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8452 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8454 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8456 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8457 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8458 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8460 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8462 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8463 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8466 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8467 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8468 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8471 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8472 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8473 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8476 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8478 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8479 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8481 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8482 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8484 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8485 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8490 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8491 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8492 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8493 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8494 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8495 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8496 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8497 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8500 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8501 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8502 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8504 // Test the API functions.
8505 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8507 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8509 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8511 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8513 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8515 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8517 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8521 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8522 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8523 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8526 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8528 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8530 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8531 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8533 let mut funding_tx = None;
8534 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8535 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8536 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8539 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8540 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8541 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8542 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8543 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8545 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8547 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8549 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8552 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8555 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8556 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8557 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8558 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8559 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8561 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8562 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8564 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8565 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8566 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8567 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8568 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8569 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8570 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8572 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8573 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8574 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8575 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8577 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8578 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8579 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8580 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8581 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8582 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8583 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8585 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8586 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8587 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8588 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8590 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8591 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8592 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8593 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8595 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8596 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8598 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8599 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8600 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8601 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8602 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8604 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8605 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8606 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8608 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8609 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8610 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8612 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8613 // "protected" and can connect again.
8614 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8615 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8616 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8617 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8619 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8621 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8622 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8626 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8627 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8628 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8629 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8630 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8631 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8633 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8635 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8636 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8638 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8639 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8640 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8641 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8644 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8646 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8647 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8648 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8650 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8651 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8652 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8654 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8655 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8656 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8657 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8661 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8662 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8663 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8664 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8665 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8666 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8667 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8668 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8669 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8671 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8673 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8674 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8676 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8677 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8678 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8679 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8680 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8681 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8683 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8684 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8686 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8687 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8689 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8691 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8692 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8695 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8696 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8697 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8698 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8699 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8700 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8701 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8703 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8704 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8705 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8706 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8710 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8712 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8713 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8715 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8716 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8717 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8719 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8720 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8722 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8724 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8729 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8730 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8731 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8732 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8733 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8734 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8735 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8736 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8737 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8738 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8739 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8741 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8742 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8743 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8745 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8746 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8748 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8749 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8754 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8755 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8757 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8758 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8760 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8764 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8766 use crate::chain::Listen;
8767 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8768 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8769 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8770 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8771 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8772 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8773 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8774 use crate::util::test_utils;
8775 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8776 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8778 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8779 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8780 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8782 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8786 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8787 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8788 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8789 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8790 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8791 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8792 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8793 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8798 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8799 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8802 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8803 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8804 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8806 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8808 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8809 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8810 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8811 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8812 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8814 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8815 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8817 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8818 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8819 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8820 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8822 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8824 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8826 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8827 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8828 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8829 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8830 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8832 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8834 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8836 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8837 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8838 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8839 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8840 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8843 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8844 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8845 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8847 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8848 } else { panic!(); }
8850 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8851 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8853 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8856 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8859 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8860 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8862 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8863 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8864 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8865 match msg_events[0] {
8866 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8867 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8868 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8872 match msg_events[1] {
8873 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8877 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8878 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8880 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8881 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8883 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8886 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8887 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8889 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8890 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8892 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8895 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
8897 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8898 macro_rules! send_payment {
8899 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8900 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8901 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8902 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8903 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8904 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8905 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8906 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8907 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8908 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8910 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8911 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8913 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8914 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8916 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8917 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8918 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8919 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8920 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
8921 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8922 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8923 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8925 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8926 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8927 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8928 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8930 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8931 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8932 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8933 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8934 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8936 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8939 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
8940 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8941 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8942 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8944 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8949 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8950 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);