1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
51 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
52 use util::config::UserConfig;
53 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
54 use util::{byte_utils, events};
55 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
56 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
57 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
58 use util::errors::APIError;
63 use core::cell::RefCell;
65 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
66 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
67 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 use alloc::string::ToString;
75 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
76 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
77 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
78 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
79 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
80 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
81 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
83 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
84 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
85 use util::crypto::hkdf_extract_expand_thrice;
86 use util::logger::Logger;
88 use core::convert::TryInto;
91 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
92 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
93 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
94 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
95 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
96 // retrieve said payment type bits.
97 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
99 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
100 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
102 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
103 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
104 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
105 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
106 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
107 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
108 /// registered with LDK.
109 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
110 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
111 /// registered with LDK.
112 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
116 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
117 let (metadata_key, ldk_pmt_hash_key, user_pmt_hash_key) =
118 hkdf_extract_expand_thrice(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material.0);
133 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
135 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
136 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
137 unknown => Err(unknown),
142 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
143 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
145 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
147 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
148 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
149 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
151 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
152 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
153 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
154 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
156 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
157 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
158 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
161 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
162 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
164 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
165 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
166 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
167 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
169 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
170 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
172 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
175 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
176 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
180 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
181 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
182 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
184 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
186 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
187 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
188 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
189 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
190 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
191 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
193 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
194 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
195 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
200 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
201 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
202 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
203 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
205 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
206 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
207 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
209 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
212 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
214 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
215 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
218 /// The metadata is constructed as:
219 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
220 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
222 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
223 /// match what was constructed.
225 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
226 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
227 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
228 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
230 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
231 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
232 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
235 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
236 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
237 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
239 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
241 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
242 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
243 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
244 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
245 where L::Target: Logger
247 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
249 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
250 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
251 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
252 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
253 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
254 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
255 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
257 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
259 let mut payment_preimage = None;
260 match payment_type_res {
261 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
262 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
263 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
264 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
265 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
266 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
270 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
271 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
272 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
273 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
274 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
279 Err(unknown_bits) => {
280 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
285 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
286 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
290 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
291 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
298 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
299 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
301 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
302 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
303 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
304 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
305 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
308 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
309 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
311 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
315 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
316 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
317 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
318 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
320 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
321 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
322 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
323 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
326 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
329 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
331 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
332 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
333 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
334 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
335 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
336 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
337 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
339 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
343 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
345 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
346 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
347 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
349 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
350 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
351 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
352 // before we forward it.
354 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
355 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
356 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
357 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
358 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
360 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
361 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
363 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
364 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
367 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
368 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
371 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
372 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
376 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
377 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
378 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
379 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
380 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
381 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
382 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
385 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
386 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
387 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
388 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
391 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
392 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
393 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
394 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
395 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
398 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
400 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
402 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
403 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
404 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
406 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
408 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
412 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
416 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
417 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
418 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
419 short_channel_id: u64,
421 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
423 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
424 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
429 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
430 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
431 /// are part of the same payment.
432 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
433 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
434 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
437 struct ClaimableHTLC {
438 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
441 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
444 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
445 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
446 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
447 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
449 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
450 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
455 impl Readable for PaymentId {
456 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
457 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
461 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
462 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
463 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
464 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
465 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
468 session_priv: SecretKey,
469 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
470 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
471 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
472 payment_id: PaymentId,
473 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
474 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
477 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
478 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
479 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
481 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
483 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
485 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
488 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
489 payment_id.hash(hasher);
490 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
491 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
492 payment_params.hash(hasher);
499 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
500 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
502 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
503 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
504 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
505 payment_secret: None,
506 payment_params: None,
511 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
512 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
514 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
522 struct ReceiveError {
528 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
529 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
531 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
536 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
538 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
539 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
540 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
541 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
542 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
544 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
545 err: msgs::LightningError,
546 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
547 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
549 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
551 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
553 err: LightningError {
555 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
556 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
563 shutdown_finish: None,
567 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
569 err: LightningError {
571 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
574 shutdown_finish: None,
578 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
579 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
582 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
584 err: LightningError {
586 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
587 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
593 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
594 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
598 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
601 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
603 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
604 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
608 log_level: Level::Warn,
611 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
613 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
615 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
617 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
618 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
624 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
626 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
627 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
635 shutdown_finish: None,
640 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
641 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
642 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
643 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
644 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
646 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
647 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
648 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
649 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
650 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
651 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
652 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
654 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
658 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
659 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
660 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
661 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
662 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
663 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
664 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
665 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
666 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
667 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
668 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
669 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
671 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
672 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
673 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
674 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
677 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
678 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
679 /// quite some time lag.
680 enum BackgroundEvent {
681 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
682 /// commitment transaction.
683 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
686 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
687 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
689 latest_features: InitFeatures,
692 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
693 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
695 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
698 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
699 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
700 struct PendingInboundPayment {
701 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
702 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
703 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
704 /// this payment being removed.
706 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
707 user_payment_id: u64,
708 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
709 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
710 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
713 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
714 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
715 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
717 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
720 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
721 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
722 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
723 pending_amt_msat: u64,
724 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
725 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
726 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
728 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
729 starting_block_height: u32,
731 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
732 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
733 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
735 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
736 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
738 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
739 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
740 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
741 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
742 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
744 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
746 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
747 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
751 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
752 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
754 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
758 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
760 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
764 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
766 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
770 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
772 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
777 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
779 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
780 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
781 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
782 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
786 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
787 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
788 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
789 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
790 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
791 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
792 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
795 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
796 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
799 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
800 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
801 let our_payment_hash;
802 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
803 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
804 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
806 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
807 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
808 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
812 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
816 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
817 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
818 let remove_res = match self {
819 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
820 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
821 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
822 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
823 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
827 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
828 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
829 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
830 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
831 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
832 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
839 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
840 let insert_res = match self {
841 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
842 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
843 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
845 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
846 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
849 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
850 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
851 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
852 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
853 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
860 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
862 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
863 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
864 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
865 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
872 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
873 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
874 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
875 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
876 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
877 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
878 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
879 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
881 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
882 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
883 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
884 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
885 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
886 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
887 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
888 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
889 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
891 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
892 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
894 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
895 /// to individual Channels.
897 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
898 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
899 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
900 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
902 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
903 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
904 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
905 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
906 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
907 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
908 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
910 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
911 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
912 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
913 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
916 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
917 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
918 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
919 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
920 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
922 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
923 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
924 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
925 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
926 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
927 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
928 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
929 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
930 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
931 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
934 default_configuration: UserConfig,
935 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
941 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
943 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
944 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
946 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
947 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
948 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
949 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
951 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
952 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
953 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
954 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
955 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
956 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
958 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
959 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
960 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
961 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
962 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
963 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
964 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
965 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
967 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
969 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
970 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
972 our_network_key: SecretKey,
973 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
975 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
977 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
978 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
979 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
981 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
982 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
984 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
985 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
986 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
988 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
989 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
990 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
991 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
993 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
994 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
995 /// are currently open with that peer.
996 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
997 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
1000 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
1001 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
1003 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
1004 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1005 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1006 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1007 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1008 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1009 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1010 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1011 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1013 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1020 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1022 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1023 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1024 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1025 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1026 pub struct ChainParameters {
1027 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1028 pub network: Network,
1030 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1032 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1033 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1036 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1042 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1043 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1044 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1045 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1046 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1047 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1049 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1050 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1051 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1052 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1053 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1055 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1056 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1059 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1060 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1061 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1064 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1065 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1067 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1068 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1069 should_persist: persist_check,
1070 _read_guard: read_guard,
1075 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1076 fn drop(&mut self) {
1077 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1078 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1083 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1084 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1086 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1088 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1089 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1090 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1091 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1092 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1094 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1095 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1097 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1099 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1100 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1101 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1102 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1103 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1104 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1105 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1107 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1108 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1110 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1111 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1112 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1113 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1115 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1116 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1117 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1118 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1119 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1120 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1123 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1125 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1126 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1129 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1131 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1132 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1133 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1135 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1136 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1137 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1138 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1139 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1140 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1141 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1142 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1143 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1144 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1145 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1148 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1149 /// to better separate parameters.
1150 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1151 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1152 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1153 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1154 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1155 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1156 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1157 pub features: InitFeatures,
1158 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1159 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1160 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1162 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1164 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1165 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1166 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1167 /// payments to us through this channel.
1168 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1171 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1172 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1173 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1174 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1175 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1176 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1177 /// lifetime of the channel.
1178 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1179 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1180 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1181 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1182 /// our counterparty already.
1184 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1185 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1186 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1187 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1188 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1189 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1190 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1191 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1192 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1193 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1194 /// this value on chain.
1196 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1198 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1200 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1201 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1202 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1203 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1204 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1205 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1206 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1208 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1209 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1210 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1211 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1213 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1214 pub balance_msat: u64,
1215 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1216 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1217 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1218 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1220 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1222 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1223 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1224 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1225 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1226 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1227 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1228 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1229 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1230 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1232 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1233 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1234 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1235 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1236 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1237 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1238 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1239 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1240 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1242 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1244 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1245 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1246 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1247 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1248 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1249 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1250 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1251 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1252 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1254 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1255 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1256 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1257 pub is_outbound: bool,
1258 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1259 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1260 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1261 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1262 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1264 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1265 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1266 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1267 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1269 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1270 pub is_usable: bool,
1271 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1272 pub is_public: bool,
1275 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1276 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1277 /// states for more.
1278 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1279 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1280 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1281 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1282 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1283 ParameterError(APIError),
1284 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1285 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1286 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1287 /// payment in full.
1289 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1291 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1292 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1293 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1294 /// paths than the ones selected).
1295 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1296 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1297 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1298 /// in over-/re-payment.
1300 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1301 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1302 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1304 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1305 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1306 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1307 /// with the latest update_id.
1309 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1310 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1311 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1312 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1313 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1314 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1315 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1316 payment_id: PaymentId,
1320 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1322 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1323 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1324 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1325 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1326 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1328 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1329 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1330 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1333 macro_rules! handle_error {
1334 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1337 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1338 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1340 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1341 // entering the macro.
1342 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1343 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1346 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1348 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1349 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1350 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1351 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1355 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1356 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1357 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1358 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1363 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1364 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1366 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1367 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1368 action: err.action.clone()
1372 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1373 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1376 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1383 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1384 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1385 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1387 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1388 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1390 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1391 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1393 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1394 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1395 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1396 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1398 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1399 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1400 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1402 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1403 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1404 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1405 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1407 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1408 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1409 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1415 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1416 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1420 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1422 $entry.remove_entry();
1430 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1431 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1435 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1437 $entry.remove_entry();
1445 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1446 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1448 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1449 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1450 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1457 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1458 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1459 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1461 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1463 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1464 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1465 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1466 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1468 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1469 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1470 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1471 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1472 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1473 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1474 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1475 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1476 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1477 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1478 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1481 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1482 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1483 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1484 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1485 match $action_type {
1486 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1487 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1489 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1490 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1492 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1493 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1494 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1495 if !$resend_commitment {
1496 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1499 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1501 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1502 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1506 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1507 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1509 $entry.remove_entry();
1513 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1514 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1518 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1519 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1520 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1522 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1523 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1527 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1528 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1529 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1530 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1531 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1534 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1539 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1540 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1541 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1542 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1543 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1544 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1546 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1547 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1549 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1550 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1551 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1552 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1555 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1556 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1557 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1558 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1559 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1560 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1561 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1562 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1563 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1564 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1565 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1566 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1569 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1570 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1571 // before it should be allowed to.
1572 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1573 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1574 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1577 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1579 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1580 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1581 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1586 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1587 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1588 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1589 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1590 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1591 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1592 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1593 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1594 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1595 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1596 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1597 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1598 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1599 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1600 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1601 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1602 let mut order = $order;
1604 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1606 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1610 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1611 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1612 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1613 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1618 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1619 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1620 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1621 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1622 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1627 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1631 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1636 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1637 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1638 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1643 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1644 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1645 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1646 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1647 assert!(res.is_ok());
1650 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1654 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1655 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1656 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1658 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1660 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1661 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1666 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1667 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1668 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1669 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1670 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1673 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1675 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1676 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1678 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1680 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1682 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1683 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1684 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1685 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1686 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1687 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1688 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1689 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1691 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1692 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1693 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1697 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1699 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1700 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1701 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1702 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1703 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1704 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1706 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1707 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1709 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1710 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1713 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1714 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1716 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1717 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1719 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1721 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1722 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1723 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1724 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1732 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1733 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1734 &self.default_configuration
1737 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1739 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1740 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1741 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1742 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1743 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1746 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1747 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1749 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1750 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1751 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1753 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1754 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1755 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1756 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1757 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1758 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1760 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1761 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1762 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1763 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1764 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1765 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1769 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1770 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1771 Some(peer_state) => {
1772 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1773 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1774 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1775 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1776 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1778 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1781 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1783 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1784 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1785 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1787 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1788 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1789 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1790 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1791 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1792 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1794 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1797 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1799 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1800 node_id: their_network_key,
1803 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1806 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1807 let mut res = Vec::new();
1809 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1810 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1811 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1812 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1813 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1814 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1815 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1816 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1817 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1818 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1819 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1820 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1821 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1822 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1824 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1825 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1826 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1827 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1829 inbound_capacity_msat,
1830 outbound_capacity_msat,
1831 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1832 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1833 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1834 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1835 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1836 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1837 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1841 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1842 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1843 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1844 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1850 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1851 /// more information.
1852 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1853 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1856 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1857 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1859 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1860 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1862 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1863 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1864 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1865 // really wanted anyway.
1866 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1869 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1870 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1871 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1872 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1873 Some(transaction) => {
1874 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1878 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1879 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1880 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1881 reason: closure_reason
1885 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1886 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1888 let counterparty_node_id;
1889 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1890 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1891 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1892 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1893 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1895 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1896 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1897 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1898 Some(peer_state) => {
1899 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1900 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1901 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1903 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1905 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1907 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1908 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1909 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1910 let (result, is_permanent) =
1911 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1913 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1919 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1920 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1924 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1925 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1926 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1927 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1931 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1935 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1939 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1940 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1943 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1947 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1948 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1949 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1951 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1952 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1954 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1955 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1956 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1957 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1959 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1961 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1962 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1963 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1964 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1965 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1968 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1969 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1970 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1972 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1973 /// the channel being closed or not:
1974 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1975 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1976 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1977 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1978 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1979 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1980 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1982 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1984 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1985 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1986 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1987 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1988 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1992 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1993 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1994 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1995 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1996 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1998 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1999 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2000 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2001 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2002 // ignore the result here.
2003 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2007 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2008 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2009 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2011 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2012 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2013 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2014 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
2015 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
2016 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2019 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2020 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2022 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
2023 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2024 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2027 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2029 chan.remove_entry().1
2031 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2034 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2035 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2036 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2037 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2038 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2043 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2046 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2047 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2048 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2049 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2050 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2051 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2052 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2053 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2054 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2055 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2056 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2066 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2067 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2068 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2069 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2070 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2074 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2075 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2077 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2078 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2079 return Err(ReceiveError {
2080 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2082 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2085 // final_expiry_too_soon
2086 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2087 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2088 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2089 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2090 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2091 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2092 return Err(ReceiveError {
2094 err_data: Vec::new(),
2095 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2098 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2099 return Err(ReceiveError {
2101 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2102 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2106 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2107 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2108 return Err(ReceiveError {
2109 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2110 err_data: Vec::new(),
2111 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2114 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2115 return Err(ReceiveError {
2116 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2117 err_data: Vec::new(),
2118 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2121 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2122 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2123 return Err(ReceiveError {
2124 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2125 err_data: Vec::new(),
2126 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2128 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2129 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2131 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2133 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2134 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2135 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2136 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2137 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2138 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2139 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2140 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2141 return Err(ReceiveError {
2142 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2143 err_data: Vec::new(),
2144 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2148 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2150 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2153 return Err(ReceiveError {
2154 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2155 err_data: Vec::new(),
2156 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2161 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2164 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2165 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2166 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2170 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2171 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2172 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2174 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2175 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2176 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2177 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2178 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2179 failure_code: $err_code,
2180 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2185 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2186 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2189 let shared_secret = {
2190 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2191 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2195 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2196 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2197 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2198 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2199 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2200 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2201 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2202 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2205 let mut channel_state = None;
2206 macro_rules! return_err {
2207 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2209 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2210 if channel_state.is_none() {
2211 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2213 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2214 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2215 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2216 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2217 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2222 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2224 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2225 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2227 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2228 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2232 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2233 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2235 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry) {
2237 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2238 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2239 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2240 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2241 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2243 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2246 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2247 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2249 let blinding_factor = {
2250 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2251 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2252 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2253 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2256 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2258 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2260 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2263 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2264 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2267 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2268 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2269 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2270 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2271 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2275 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2276 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2277 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2280 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2281 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2282 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2283 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2288 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2289 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2290 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2291 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2292 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2293 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2294 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2295 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2296 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2297 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2298 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2300 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2303 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2306 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2308 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2309 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2310 // Leave channel updates as None for private channels.
2311 let chan_update_opt = if chan.should_announce() {
2312 Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap()) } else { None };
2313 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2314 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2315 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2316 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2317 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2320 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2321 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2322 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2323 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2324 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2325 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2326 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2328 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2329 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2331 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2332 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2333 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2334 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2335 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2337 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2338 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2340 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2341 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2343 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2344 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2345 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2346 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2347 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2348 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2350 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2351 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2353 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2354 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2355 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2356 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2357 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2358 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2359 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2360 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2361 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2362 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2368 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2369 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2370 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2371 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2373 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2374 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2376 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2377 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2378 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2380 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2382 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2387 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2390 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2391 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2392 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2394 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2395 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2396 if !chan.should_announce() {
2397 return Err(LightningError {
2398 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2399 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2402 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2403 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2406 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2407 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2408 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2409 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2410 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2411 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2412 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2413 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2414 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2418 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2420 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2421 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2423 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2424 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2425 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2426 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2427 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2428 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2429 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2430 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2433 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2434 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2436 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2442 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2443 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2444 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2445 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2446 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2447 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2449 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2450 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2451 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2452 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2453 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2455 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2457 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2459 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2460 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2462 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2463 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2464 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2465 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2466 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2467 err: "Payment already completed"
2472 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2473 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2474 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2477 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2479 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2480 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2481 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2482 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2483 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2484 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2485 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2486 total_msat: total_value,
2488 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2492 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2493 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2495 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2496 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2498 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2499 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2501 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2502 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2504 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2505 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2507 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2508 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2509 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2510 channel_state, chan)
2512 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2513 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2514 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2515 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2516 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2517 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2518 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2519 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2520 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2521 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2523 insert_outbound_payment!();
2525 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2526 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2527 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2528 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2529 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2530 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2531 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2532 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2538 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2540 } else { unreachable!(); }
2544 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2545 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2547 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2552 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2554 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2555 /// fields for more info.
2557 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2558 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2559 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2560 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2561 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2562 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2564 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2566 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2567 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2568 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2570 /// In general, a path may raise:
2571 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2572 /// node public key) is specified.
2573 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2574 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2576 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2577 /// relevant updates.
2579 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2580 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2581 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2583 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2584 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2585 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2586 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2588 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2589 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2590 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2591 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2592 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2595 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2596 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2597 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2599 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2600 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2601 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2602 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2603 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2605 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2606 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2608 let mut total_value = 0;
2609 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2610 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2611 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2612 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2613 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2614 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2615 continue 'path_check;
2617 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2618 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2619 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2620 continue 'path_check;
2623 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2624 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2626 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2627 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2629 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2630 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2631 total_value = amt_msat;
2634 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2635 let mut results = Vec::new();
2636 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2637 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2639 let mut has_ok = false;
2640 let mut has_err = false;
2641 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2642 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2643 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2644 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2645 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2646 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2647 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2651 } else if res.is_err() {
2652 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2653 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2656 if has_err && has_ok {
2657 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2660 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2661 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2662 Some(RouteParameters {
2663 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2664 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2665 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2671 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2672 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2673 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2674 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2680 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2682 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2683 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2684 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2685 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2686 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2688 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2689 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2690 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2691 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2692 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2693 if path.len() == 0 {
2694 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2695 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2700 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2701 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2702 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2704 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2705 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2707 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2708 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2709 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2710 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2713 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2715 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2716 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2717 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2720 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2721 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2722 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2725 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2726 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2727 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2732 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2733 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2737 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2740 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2742 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2743 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2744 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2745 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2747 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2748 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2749 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2751 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2752 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2753 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2754 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2755 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2757 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2758 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2759 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2760 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2761 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2763 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2771 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2772 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2773 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2774 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2775 /// never reach the recipient.
2777 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2779 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2780 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2782 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2784 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2785 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2786 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2788 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2790 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2791 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2792 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2797 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2798 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2799 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2800 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2802 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2804 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2806 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2807 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2808 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2809 } else { unreachable!(); })
2812 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2814 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2815 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2818 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2819 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2824 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2825 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2826 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2829 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2830 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2831 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2833 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2841 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2842 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2843 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2847 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2849 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2850 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2852 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2853 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2855 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2856 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2857 /// keys per-channel).
2859 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2860 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2861 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2863 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2864 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2865 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2867 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2868 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2869 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2870 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2872 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2873 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2874 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2875 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2879 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2880 let mut output_index = None;
2881 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2882 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2883 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2884 if output_index.is_some() {
2885 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2886 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2889 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2890 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2891 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2894 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2897 if output_index.is_none() {
2898 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2899 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2902 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2907 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2908 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2909 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2911 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2914 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2915 // smaller than 500:
2916 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2918 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2919 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2920 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2921 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2922 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2923 /// our network addresses.
2925 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2926 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2928 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2929 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2930 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2931 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2933 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2935 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2936 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2937 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2939 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2940 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2943 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2944 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2945 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2947 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2948 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2949 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2950 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2951 rgb, alias, addresses,
2952 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2953 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2955 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2956 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2958 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2959 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2961 let mut announced_chans = false;
2962 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2963 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2964 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2966 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2971 announced_chans = true;
2973 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2974 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2975 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2979 if announced_chans {
2980 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2981 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2982 signature: node_announce_sig,
2983 contents: announcement
2989 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2991 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2992 /// Will likely generate further events.
2993 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2994 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2996 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2997 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2998 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2999 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3001 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3002 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3004 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3005 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3006 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3007 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3009 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3010 match forward_info {
3011 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3012 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3013 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3014 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3015 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr) => {
3017 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3018 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3019 short_channel_id: short_chan_id,
3020 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3021 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3022 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3024 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3025 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
3031 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3032 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3033 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3034 let shared_secret = {
3035 let mut arr = [0; 32];
3036 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
3039 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3041 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3042 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new());
3044 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3045 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new());
3049 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3050 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3051 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3052 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data)
3058 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new());
3061 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new());
3064 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3065 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3066 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3067 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3068 // problem, not ours.
3070 // `fail_htlc_backwards_internal` is never called for
3071 // phantom payments, so this is unreachable for them.
3078 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3079 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3080 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3081 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3082 match forward_info {
3083 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3084 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3086 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3087 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3088 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3089 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3090 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3091 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3092 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3093 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3095 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3097 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3098 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3100 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3102 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
3103 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3104 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
3110 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3112 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3113 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3114 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3115 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3116 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3117 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3118 // this channel currently :/.
3124 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3125 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3127 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3128 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3129 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3131 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3132 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3134 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3136 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3137 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3138 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3141 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3143 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3144 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3145 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3146 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3147 // messages when we can.
3148 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3149 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3150 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3157 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3158 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3161 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3162 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3163 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3164 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3165 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3166 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3168 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3169 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3170 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
3171 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3172 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3174 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3175 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3177 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3179 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3183 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3184 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3187 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3188 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3189 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3190 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3191 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3192 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3193 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3194 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3195 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3197 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3205 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3206 match forward_info {
3207 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3208 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3209 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3210 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
3211 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3212 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
3213 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3214 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
3216 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3219 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3220 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3221 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3222 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3223 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3224 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3226 value: amt_to_forward,
3231 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3233 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3234 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3235 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3237 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3238 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3239 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3240 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3241 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3243 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3248 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3249 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3250 let mut total_value = 0;
3251 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3252 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3253 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3254 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3255 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3256 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3257 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3261 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3262 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3263 total_value += htlc.value;
3264 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3265 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3266 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3267 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3268 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3269 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3271 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3273 _ => unreachable!(),
3276 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3277 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3278 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3279 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3282 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3283 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3285 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3286 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3287 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3291 payment_received_generated = true;
3293 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3294 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3297 payment_received_generated
3301 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3302 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3303 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3304 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3305 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3306 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3307 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3308 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3309 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3310 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3311 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3312 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3313 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3315 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3319 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3320 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3321 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3323 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3324 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3326 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3327 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3329 amt: amt_to_forward,
3330 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3333 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3334 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3335 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3341 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3343 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3346 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3347 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3350 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3351 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3352 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3353 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3354 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3355 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3356 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3358 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3359 if payment_received_generated {
3360 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3366 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3367 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3375 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3376 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3378 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3380 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3381 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3384 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3385 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3386 events.append(&mut new_events);
3389 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3391 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3392 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3394 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3395 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3396 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3397 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3398 if background_events.is_empty() {
3402 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3404 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3405 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3406 // monitor updating completing.
3407 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3414 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3415 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3416 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3417 self.process_background_events();
3420 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3421 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3422 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3423 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3424 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3425 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3426 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3428 if !chan.is_live() {
3429 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3430 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3431 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3433 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3434 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3436 let mut retain_channel = true;
3437 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3440 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3441 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3445 let ret_err = match res {
3446 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3447 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3448 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3449 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3452 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3453 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3454 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3455 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3456 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3457 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3458 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3459 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3469 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3473 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3474 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3475 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3476 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3477 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3478 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3479 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3481 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3483 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3485 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3486 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3487 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3488 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3489 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3490 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3491 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3493 handle_errors.push(err);
3503 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3505 /// This currently includes:
3506 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3507 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3508 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3511 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3512 /// estimate fetches.
3513 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3514 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3515 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3516 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3518 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3520 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3522 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3523 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3524 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3525 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3526 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3527 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3528 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3529 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3531 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3533 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3535 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3536 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3537 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3538 if needs_close { return false; }
3541 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3542 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3543 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3544 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3545 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3546 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3547 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3548 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3552 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3553 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3555 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3556 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3557 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3561 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3562 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3571 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3572 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3578 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3579 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3580 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3581 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3582 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3583 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3584 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3586 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3587 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3588 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3589 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3590 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3591 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3592 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3593 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3594 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3595 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3596 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3602 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3603 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3604 // be surfaced to the user.
3605 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3606 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3608 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3609 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3610 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3611 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3612 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3613 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3615 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3618 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3620 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3621 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3622 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3624 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3625 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3626 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3627 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3628 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3629 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3630 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3631 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3632 Some(RouteParameters {
3633 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3634 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3635 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3638 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3639 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3640 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3642 rejected_by_dest: false,
3643 network_update: None,
3644 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3646 short_channel_id: None,
3653 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3654 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3656 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3669 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3670 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3671 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3672 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3673 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3674 /// still-available channels.
3675 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3676 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3677 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3678 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3681 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3682 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3683 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3685 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3686 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3687 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3688 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3689 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3690 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3691 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3692 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3693 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3696 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3697 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3700 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3701 all_paths_failed = true;
3702 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3703 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3705 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3711 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3714 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3715 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3716 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3717 Some(RouteParameters {
3718 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3719 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3720 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3723 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3725 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3726 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3728 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3730 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3731 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3732 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3733 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3734 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3735 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3736 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3737 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3744 error_code: onion_error_code,
3746 error_data: onion_error_data
3749 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3755 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3756 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3757 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3758 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3760 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3761 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3762 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3763 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3764 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3765 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3766 network_update: None,
3769 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3772 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3774 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3778 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3779 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3780 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3782 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3783 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3784 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3785 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3786 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3787 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3789 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3790 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3791 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3795 let mut forward_event = None;
3796 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3797 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3799 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3800 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3801 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3803 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3804 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3807 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3808 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3809 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3810 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3811 time_forwardable: time
3818 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3819 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3821 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3822 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3823 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3824 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3826 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3827 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3829 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3830 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3831 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3832 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3833 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3834 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3836 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3838 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3839 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3840 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3841 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3843 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3844 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3845 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3846 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3848 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3849 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3850 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3851 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3852 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3854 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3855 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3856 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3862 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3863 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3864 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3866 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3867 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3868 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3869 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3870 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3871 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3872 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3874 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3875 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3876 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3877 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3878 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3879 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3880 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3881 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3883 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3884 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3885 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3886 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3887 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3888 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3890 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3895 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3896 // which were generated.
3897 channel_state.take();
3899 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3900 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3901 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3908 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3909 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3910 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3911 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3912 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3914 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3918 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3919 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3920 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3921 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3922 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3923 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3924 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3925 payment_preimage, e);
3926 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3927 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3928 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3929 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3932 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3933 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3934 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3935 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3936 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3937 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3938 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3939 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3940 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3941 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3947 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3949 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3952 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3953 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3954 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3955 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3956 payment_preimage, e);
3958 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3959 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3961 chan.remove_entry();
3963 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3966 } else { unreachable!(); }
3969 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3970 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3971 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3972 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3973 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3974 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3975 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3976 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3977 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3978 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3979 pending_events.push(
3980 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3982 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3987 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3995 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3997 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3998 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3999 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4000 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4001 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4002 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4003 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4004 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4005 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4006 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4007 pending_events.push(
4008 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4009 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4015 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4019 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4020 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4021 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4023 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4024 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4025 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4026 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4027 pending_events.push(
4028 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4036 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4041 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4044 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4045 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4046 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4047 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4048 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4049 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4050 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4053 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4054 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4055 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4056 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4057 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4060 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4061 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4062 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4063 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4064 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4065 payment_preimage, e);
4067 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4068 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4069 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4070 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4073 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4074 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4075 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4076 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4080 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4081 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4082 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4085 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4086 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4088 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4096 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4097 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4098 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4101 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4102 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4104 let chan_restoration_res;
4105 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4106 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4107 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4108 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4109 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4110 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4112 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4116 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4117 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4118 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4119 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4120 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4121 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4123 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4124 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4125 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
4128 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4129 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4130 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4132 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4134 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4135 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4136 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4137 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4141 /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
4144 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
4146 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::util::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4147 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4148 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4150 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4151 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4152 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4154 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4155 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4157 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4158 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4159 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(),
4162 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4163 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4169 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4170 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4171 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4174 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4175 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4178 let mut channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4179 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
4180 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
4181 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4182 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4183 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4184 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
4185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4186 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4187 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4188 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4189 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
4192 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4193 pending_events.push(
4194 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4195 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4196 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4197 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4198 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4203 entry.insert(channel);
4209 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4210 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4211 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4212 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4213 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4214 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4215 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4216 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4218 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4219 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4221 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4224 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4225 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4226 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4227 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4229 user_channel_id: user_id,
4234 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4235 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4236 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4237 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4238 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4239 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4240 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4241 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4242 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4244 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4246 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4249 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4250 // lock before watch_channel
4251 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4253 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4254 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4255 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4256 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4257 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4258 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4259 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4260 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4261 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4262 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4263 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4265 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4266 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4267 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4268 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4269 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4270 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4274 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4275 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4276 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4277 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4278 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4280 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4281 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4282 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4291 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4293 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4294 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4295 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4296 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4297 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4298 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4299 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4301 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4302 Ok(update) => update,
4303 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4305 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4306 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4307 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4308 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4309 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4310 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4311 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4312 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4319 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4322 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4323 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4327 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4328 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4329 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4330 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4331 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4332 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4333 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4335 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4336 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4337 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4338 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4339 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4340 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4341 msg: announcement_sigs,
4343 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4344 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4345 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4346 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4347 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4348 // announcement_signatures.
4349 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4350 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4351 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4352 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4357 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4361 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4362 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4363 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4364 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4365 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4367 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4368 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4369 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4370 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4373 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4374 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4375 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4376 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4379 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4380 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4382 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4383 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4384 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4385 let (result, is_permanent) =
4386 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
4388 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
4394 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4395 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4396 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4403 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4406 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4407 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4410 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4414 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4415 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4416 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4417 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4418 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4419 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4420 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4421 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4423 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4424 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4425 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4426 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4431 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4432 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4433 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4434 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4435 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4436 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4437 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4439 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4440 } else { (tx, None) }
4442 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4445 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4446 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4447 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4449 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4450 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4451 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4452 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4456 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4461 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4462 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4463 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4464 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4466 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4467 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4468 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4469 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4471 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4472 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4474 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4475 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4476 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4477 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4480 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4481 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4482 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4483 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4484 match pending_forward_info {
4485 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4486 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4487 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4488 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4489 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4490 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4491 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4492 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4496 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4497 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4498 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4499 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4500 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4501 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4502 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4503 // no problem just calling this
4504 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4505 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4508 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4510 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4511 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4512 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4515 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4517 _ => pending_forward_info
4520 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4522 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4527 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4528 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4529 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4530 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4531 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4532 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4533 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4534 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4536 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4538 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4541 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4545 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4546 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4547 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4548 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4549 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4550 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4551 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4553 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4555 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4560 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4561 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4562 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4563 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4564 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4565 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4566 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4568 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4569 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4570 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4572 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4575 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4579 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4580 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4581 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4582 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4583 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4584 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4585 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4587 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4588 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4589 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4590 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4591 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4592 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4593 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4598 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4599 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4601 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4602 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4603 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4605 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4606 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4607 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4608 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4609 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4610 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4611 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4612 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4614 commitment_signed: msg,
4620 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4625 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4626 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4627 let mut forward_event = None;
4628 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4629 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4630 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4631 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4633 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4634 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4635 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4636 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4637 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4639 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4640 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4641 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4643 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4644 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4645 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4650 match forward_event {
4652 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4653 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4654 time_forwardable: time
4662 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4663 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4665 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4666 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4667 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4668 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4669 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4670 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4672 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4673 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4674 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4675 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4676 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4677 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4678 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4679 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4680 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4681 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4682 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4684 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4685 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4686 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4687 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4688 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4690 } else { unreachable!(); }
4693 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4694 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4695 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4699 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4700 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4701 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4702 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4703 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4705 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4708 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4710 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4711 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4713 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4714 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4716 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4717 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4724 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4725 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4726 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4727 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4728 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4729 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4730 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4732 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4734 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4739 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4740 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4741 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4743 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4744 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4745 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4746 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4748 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4749 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4752 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4753 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4754 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4755 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4756 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4757 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4760 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4765 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4766 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4767 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4768 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4769 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4770 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4772 // It's not a local channel
4773 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4776 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4777 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4778 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4779 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4780 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4781 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4782 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4783 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4785 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4787 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4788 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4789 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4790 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4792 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4795 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4797 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4800 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4801 let chan_restoration_res;
4802 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4803 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4804 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4806 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4807 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4808 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4809 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4811 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4812 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4813 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4814 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4815 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4816 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4817 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4818 let mut channel_update = None;
4819 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4820 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4821 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4824 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4825 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4826 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4827 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4828 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4829 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4830 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4833 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4834 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4835 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4836 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
4837 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4838 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4840 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4842 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4845 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4846 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4848 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4849 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4854 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4855 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4856 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4857 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4858 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4859 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4860 match monitor_event {
4861 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4862 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4863 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4864 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4866 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4867 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4870 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4871 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4872 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4873 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4874 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4875 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4876 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4877 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4878 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4879 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4881 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4882 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4883 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4887 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4888 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4890 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4892 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4893 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4894 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4895 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4896 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4901 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4902 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4907 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4908 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4911 has_pending_monitor_events
4914 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4915 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4916 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4917 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4918 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4919 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4922 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4923 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4924 /// update was applied.
4926 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4927 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4928 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4929 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4930 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4931 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4932 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4933 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4935 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4936 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4937 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4938 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4939 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4941 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4942 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4943 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4944 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4945 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4947 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4948 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4949 has_monitor_update = true;
4950 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4951 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4952 if close_channel { return false; }
4954 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4955 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4956 updates: commitment_update,
4963 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4964 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4965 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4972 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4973 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4974 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4977 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4978 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4984 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4985 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4986 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4987 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4988 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4989 let mut has_update = false;
4991 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4992 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4993 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4994 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4995 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4997 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4998 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4999 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5000 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5002 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5003 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5006 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5007 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5008 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5009 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5010 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5013 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5014 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5019 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5021 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5022 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5028 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5029 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5036 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5037 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5043 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5044 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5046 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5047 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5048 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5049 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5050 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5051 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5052 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5053 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5054 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5055 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5056 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5057 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5058 assert!(should_broadcast);
5059 } else { unreachable!(); }
5060 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5062 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5066 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5067 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5069 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5070 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5073 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5075 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5076 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5077 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5078 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5079 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5080 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5081 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5082 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5083 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5084 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5085 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5086 // never fail a payment too early.
5087 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5089 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5092 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5097 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5100 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5101 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5103 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5104 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5105 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5107 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5109 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5110 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5114 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5115 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5117 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5119 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5120 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5121 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5122 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5123 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5124 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5127 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5128 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5131 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5133 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5135 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5136 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5137 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5138 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5139 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5142 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5143 /// stored external to LDK.
5145 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5146 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5147 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5149 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5150 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5153 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5154 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5155 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5156 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5158 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5159 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5160 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5161 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5162 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5164 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5165 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5166 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5167 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5168 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5170 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5172 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5173 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5175 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5176 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5180 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5181 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5183 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5185 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5186 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5187 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5188 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5191 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5192 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5195 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5197 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5199 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5200 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5203 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5204 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5206 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5207 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5208 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5211 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5212 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5214 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5215 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5216 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5217 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5219 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::get_phantom_scid(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.keys_manager);
5220 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5221 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5222 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5223 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5228 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5230 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5231 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5233 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5234 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5235 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5239 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
5240 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5241 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5242 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5243 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5248 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5249 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5253 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5254 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5258 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5259 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5260 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5261 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5262 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5265 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5266 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5267 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5268 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5270 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5271 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5272 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5273 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5276 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5277 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5279 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5280 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5283 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5284 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5285 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5287 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5288 events.replace(pending_events);
5297 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5299 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5300 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5301 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5302 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5305 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5307 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5308 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5310 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5311 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5312 /// restarting from an old state.
5313 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5314 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5315 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5317 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5318 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5319 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5320 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5323 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5324 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5325 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5328 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5329 handler.handle_event(&event);
5337 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5339 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5340 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5341 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5342 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5345 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5347 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5348 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5349 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5350 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5351 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5354 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5355 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5356 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5359 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5360 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5361 let new_height = height - 1;
5363 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5364 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5365 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5366 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5367 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5368 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5371 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5375 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5377 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5378 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5379 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5380 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5383 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5384 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5385 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5386 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5388 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5389 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5391 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5392 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5393 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5396 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5397 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5398 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5399 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5401 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5402 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5404 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5406 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5408 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5410 macro_rules! max_time {
5411 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5413 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5414 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5415 // having an explicit local time source.
5416 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5417 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5418 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5419 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5420 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5426 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5427 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5428 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5429 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5430 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5433 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5434 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5435 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5436 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5437 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5438 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5439 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5440 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5441 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5449 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5450 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5451 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5452 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5453 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5454 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5460 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5461 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5462 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5463 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5464 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5465 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5466 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5467 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5472 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5474 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5475 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5476 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5477 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5480 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5481 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5483 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5484 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5485 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5486 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5487 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5489 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5490 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5492 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5493 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5494 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5495 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5496 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5497 let res = f(channel);
5498 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5499 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5500 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5501 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5502 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5506 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5507 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5508 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5509 msg: funding_locked,
5511 if channel.is_usable() {
5512 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5513 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5514 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5515 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5518 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5520 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5522 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5523 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5524 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5525 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5526 msg: announcement_sigs,
5528 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5529 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5530 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5532 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5533 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5534 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5539 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5540 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5541 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5543 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5544 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5545 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5546 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5547 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5551 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5552 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5553 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5554 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5555 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5556 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5557 data: reason_message,
5565 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5566 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5567 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5568 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5569 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5570 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5571 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5572 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5573 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5574 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5575 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5576 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5577 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5582 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5587 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5589 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5590 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5594 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5595 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5596 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5599 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5600 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5601 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5602 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5605 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5606 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5608 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5609 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5612 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5613 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5614 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5615 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5616 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5620 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5621 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5622 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5623 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5627 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5628 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5629 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5630 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5631 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5632 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5635 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5636 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5637 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5640 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5641 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5642 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5645 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5646 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5647 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5650 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5651 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5652 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5655 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5656 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5657 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5660 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5661 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5662 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5665 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5666 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5667 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5670 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5671 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5672 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5675 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5677 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5680 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5681 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5682 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5685 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5686 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5687 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5690 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5691 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5692 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5695 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5696 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5697 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5700 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5701 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5702 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5705 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5706 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5707 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5710 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5711 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5712 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5715 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5720 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5721 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5722 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5725 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5726 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5727 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5728 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5730 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5731 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5732 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5733 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5734 if no_connection_possible {
5735 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5736 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5737 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5738 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5739 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5741 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5742 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5743 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5747 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5754 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5755 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5756 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5757 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5758 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5759 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5760 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5762 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5765 no_channels_remain = false;
5771 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5773 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5774 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5775 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5776 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5777 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5778 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5779 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5780 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5781 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5782 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5783 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5784 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5785 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5786 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5787 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5788 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5789 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5790 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5791 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5795 if no_channels_remain {
5796 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5799 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5800 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5804 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5805 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5807 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5810 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5811 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5812 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5813 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5814 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5817 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5818 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5823 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5824 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5825 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5826 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5827 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5828 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5829 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5830 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5831 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5835 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5836 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5837 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5843 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5846 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5847 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5849 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5850 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5851 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5852 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5853 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5857 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5858 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5863 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5864 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5865 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5866 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5867 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5868 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5871 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5874 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5880 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5881 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5886 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5887 let result = *guard;
5895 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5896 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5897 let current_time = Instant::now();
5899 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5900 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5905 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5906 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5907 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5908 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5909 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5911 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5912 let result = *guard;
5913 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5917 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5918 None => return result,
5924 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5926 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5927 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5928 *persistence_lock = true;
5929 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5934 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5935 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5937 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
5938 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
5939 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
5940 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
5943 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
5944 (2, node_id, required),
5945 (4, features, required),
5946 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
5947 (8, forwarding_info, option),
5950 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
5951 (2, channel_id, required),
5952 (4, counterparty, required),
5953 (6, funding_txo, option),
5954 (8, short_channel_id, option),
5955 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
5956 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
5957 (14, user_channel_id, required),
5958 (16, balance_msat, required),
5959 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
5960 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
5961 (22, confirmations_required, option),
5962 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
5963 (26, is_outbound, required),
5964 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
5965 (30, is_usable, required),
5966 (32, is_public, required),
5969 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
5970 (2, channels, vec_type),
5971 (4, phantom_scid, required),
5972 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
5975 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5977 (0, onion_packet, required),
5978 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5981 (0, payment_data, required),
5982 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5984 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5985 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5986 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5990 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5991 (0, routing, required),
5992 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5993 (4, payment_hash, required),
5994 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5995 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5999 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6000 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6002 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6004 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6005 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6006 reason.write(writer)?;
6008 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6009 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6012 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6013 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6014 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6015 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6022 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6023 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6024 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6027 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6028 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6029 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6030 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6034 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6035 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6036 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6037 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6038 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6041 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6042 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6043 // messages contained in the variants.
6044 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6045 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6046 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6048 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6049 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6050 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6051 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6052 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6055 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6056 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6057 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6058 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6059 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6061 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6066 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6071 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6072 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6073 (2, outpoint, required),
6074 (4, htlc_id, required),
6075 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6078 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6079 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6080 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
6081 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
6084 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
6085 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
6086 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
6091 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
6092 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6093 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6099 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6100 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6101 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6103 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6104 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6105 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6109 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
6110 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6111 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6113 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6115 if payment_data.is_some() {
6116 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6118 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6121 if payment_data.is_none() {
6122 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6124 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
6128 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6136 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6137 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6138 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6141 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6142 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6143 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6144 let mut payment_id = None;
6145 let mut payment_secret = None;
6146 let mut payment_params = None;
6147 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6148 (0, session_priv, required),
6149 (1, payment_id, option),
6150 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6151 (3, payment_secret, option),
6152 (4, path, vec_type),
6153 (5, payment_params, option),
6155 if payment_id.is_none() {
6156 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6158 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6160 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6161 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6162 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6163 path: path.unwrap(),
6164 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6169 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6170 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6175 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6176 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6178 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6180 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6181 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6182 (0, session_priv, required),
6183 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6184 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6185 (3, payment_secret, option),
6186 (4, path, vec_type),
6187 (5, payment_params, option),
6190 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6192 field.write(writer)?;
6199 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6200 (0, LightningError) => {
6204 (0, failure_code, required),
6205 (2, data, vec_type),
6209 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6211 (0, forward_info, required),
6212 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6213 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6214 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6217 (0, htlc_id, required),
6218 (2, err_packet, required),
6222 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6223 (0, payment_secret, required),
6224 (2, expiry_time, required),
6225 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6226 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6227 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6230 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6232 (0, session_privs, required),
6235 (0, session_privs, required),
6236 (1, payment_hash, option),
6239 (0, session_privs, required),
6240 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6241 (2, payment_hash, required),
6242 (4, payment_secret, option),
6243 (6, total_msat, required),
6244 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6245 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6248 (0, session_privs, required),
6249 (2, payment_hash, required),
6253 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6254 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6255 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6256 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6257 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6260 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6261 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6263 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6265 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6267 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6268 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6269 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6272 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6273 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6274 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6275 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6276 unfunded_channels += 1;
6279 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6280 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6281 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6282 channel.write(writer)?;
6286 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6287 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6288 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6289 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6290 for forward in pending_forwards {
6291 forward.write(writer)?;
6295 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6296 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6297 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6298 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6299 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6300 htlc.write(writer)?;
6304 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6305 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6306 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6307 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6308 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6309 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6312 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6313 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6314 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6315 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6316 for event in events.iter() {
6317 event.write(writer)?;
6320 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6321 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6322 for event in background_events.iter() {
6324 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6326 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6327 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6332 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6333 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6335 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6336 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6337 hash.write(writer)?;
6338 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6341 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6342 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6343 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6344 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6345 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6348 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6349 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6351 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6352 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6353 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6354 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6357 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6358 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6362 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6363 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6364 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6366 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6367 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6368 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6373 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6374 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6375 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6376 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6377 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6384 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6386 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6388 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6389 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6390 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6391 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6392 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6393 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6394 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6395 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6396 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6397 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6398 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6399 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6400 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6402 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6403 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6405 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6406 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6408 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6409 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6410 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6411 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6412 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6413 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6415 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6416 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6417 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6418 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6419 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6420 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6423 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6424 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6426 pub keys_manager: K,
6428 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6430 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6431 pub fee_estimator: F,
6432 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6434 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6435 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6436 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6437 pub chain_monitor: M,
6439 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6440 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6441 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6442 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6443 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6444 /// deserialization.
6446 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6447 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6448 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6450 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6451 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6453 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6454 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6455 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6456 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6458 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6461 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6462 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6465 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6466 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6467 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6468 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6469 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6470 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6473 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6474 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6475 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6476 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6477 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6479 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6480 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6485 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6486 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6487 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6488 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6489 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6490 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6491 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6492 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6495 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6496 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6497 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6501 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6502 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6503 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6504 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6505 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6506 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6509 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6510 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6512 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6513 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6514 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6516 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6518 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6519 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6520 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6521 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6522 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6523 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6524 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6525 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6526 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6527 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6528 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6529 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6530 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6531 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6532 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6533 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6534 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6535 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6536 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6537 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6538 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6539 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6540 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6541 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6542 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6543 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6544 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6545 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6546 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6547 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6548 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6549 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6550 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6551 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6552 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6553 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6554 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6555 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6556 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6559 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6560 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6561 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6563 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6566 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6567 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6568 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6569 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6570 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6571 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6575 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6576 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6577 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6578 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6582 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6583 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6584 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6585 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6586 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6587 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6588 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6589 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6590 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6592 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6595 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6596 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6597 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6598 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6599 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6600 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6601 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6602 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6604 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6607 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6608 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6609 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6610 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6611 let peer_state = PeerState {
6612 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6614 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6617 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6618 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6619 for _ in 0..event_count {
6620 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6621 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6625 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6626 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6627 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6628 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6629 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6630 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6631 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6632 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6636 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6637 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6638 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6639 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6640 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6641 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6645 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6646 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6648 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6649 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6650 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6651 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6652 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6656 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6657 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6658 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6659 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6660 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6661 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6662 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6664 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6665 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6669 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6670 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6671 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6672 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6673 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6674 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6675 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6676 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6677 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6678 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6680 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6681 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6684 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6685 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6686 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6687 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6688 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6689 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6691 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6693 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6694 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6695 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6696 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6697 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6698 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6699 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6701 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6702 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6703 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6704 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6705 if path.is_empty() {
6706 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6707 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6709 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6710 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6711 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6712 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6713 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6714 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6715 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6716 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6718 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6719 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6720 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6721 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6722 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6724 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6725 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6726 total_msat: path_amt,
6727 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6729 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6730 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6739 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6740 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6742 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6743 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6746 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6748 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6750 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6751 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6752 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6753 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6754 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6758 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6759 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6760 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6762 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6763 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6764 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6766 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6768 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6773 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6775 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6776 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6777 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6778 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
6784 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6785 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6787 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6789 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6790 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6791 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6792 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6794 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6795 logger: args.logger,
6796 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6799 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6800 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6803 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6804 //connection or two.
6806 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6812 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6813 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6814 use core::time::Duration;
6815 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6816 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6817 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6818 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6819 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6820 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6822 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6823 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6824 use util::errors::APIError;
6825 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6826 use util::test_utils;
6828 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6830 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6831 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6833 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6836 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6837 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6839 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6840 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6841 thread::spawn(move || {
6843 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6844 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6845 *persistence_lock = true;
6848 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6854 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6855 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6857 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6860 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6865 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6867 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6870 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6877 fn test_notify_limits() {
6878 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6879 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6880 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6881 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6882 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6883 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6885 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6886 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6887 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6888 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6889 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6891 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6893 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6894 // to connect messages with new values
6895 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6896 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6897 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6898 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6900 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6901 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6902 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6903 // ... but the last node should not.
6904 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6905 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6906 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6907 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6909 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6910 // about the channel.
6911 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6912 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6913 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6915 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6917 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6918 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6919 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6920 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6921 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6922 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6924 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6925 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6926 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6928 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6929 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6930 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6931 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6932 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6933 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6935 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6936 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6937 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6938 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6939 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6940 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6941 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6942 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6944 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6945 // the channel info has updated.
6946 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6947 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6948 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6949 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6950 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6951 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6955 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6956 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6958 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6959 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6960 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6961 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6962 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6964 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6965 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6966 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6967 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6968 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6969 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6970 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6972 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6973 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6974 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6976 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6977 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6979 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6980 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6981 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6982 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6983 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6985 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6986 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6987 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6989 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6990 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6991 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6992 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6993 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6994 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6995 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6996 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6997 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6999 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7000 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7002 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7003 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7004 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7006 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7007 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7008 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7009 // lightning messages manually.
7010 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7012 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7013 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7014 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7016 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7017 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7019 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7020 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7022 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7023 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7024 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7026 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7027 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7028 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7030 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7032 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7034 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7035 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7038 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7039 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7040 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7041 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7043 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7044 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7045 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7046 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7048 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7051 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7052 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7053 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7054 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7056 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7059 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7060 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7061 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7062 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7064 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7069 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7070 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7071 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7072 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7073 // fails as expected.
7074 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7075 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7076 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7077 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7078 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7079 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7081 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7082 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7083 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7085 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7086 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7087 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7088 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7089 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7091 let route = find_route(
7092 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7093 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7095 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7097 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7098 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7099 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7100 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7101 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7103 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7104 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7105 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7107 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7108 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7109 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7110 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7111 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7112 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7113 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7114 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7115 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7117 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7118 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7120 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7121 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7122 let route = find_route(
7123 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7124 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7126 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7128 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7129 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7130 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7131 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7132 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7134 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7135 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7136 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7138 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7139 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7140 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7141 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7142 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7144 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7145 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7146 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7148 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7149 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7150 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7151 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7152 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7153 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7154 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7155 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7156 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7158 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7159 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7163 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7164 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7165 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7166 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7167 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7168 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7169 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7171 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7172 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7173 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7174 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7176 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7177 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7178 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7179 final_value_msat: 10000,
7180 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7182 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7183 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7184 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7185 let route = find_route(
7186 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7187 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7190 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7191 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7192 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7195 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7196 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7197 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7198 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7199 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7200 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7201 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7203 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7207 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7208 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7209 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7210 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7211 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7212 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7214 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7215 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7216 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7217 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7219 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7220 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7221 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7222 final_value_msat: 10000,
7223 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7225 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7226 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7227 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7228 let route = find_route(
7229 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7230 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7233 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7234 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7235 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7236 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7239 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7240 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7241 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7242 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7243 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7244 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7245 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7247 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7251 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7252 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7253 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7254 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7255 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7257 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7258 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7259 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7260 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7262 // Marshall an MPP route.
7263 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7264 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7265 route.paths.push(path);
7266 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7267 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7268 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7269 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7270 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7271 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7273 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7274 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7275 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7276 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7281 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7282 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7283 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7284 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7285 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7286 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7288 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7289 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7291 total_msat: 100_000,
7294 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7295 // payment verification fails as expected.
7296 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7297 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7298 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7299 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7301 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7305 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7306 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7310 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7313 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7314 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
7315 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7316 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7317 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7318 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7319 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7320 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7321 use util::test_utils;
7322 use util::config::UserConfig;
7323 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
7325 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7326 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7327 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7329 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7333 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7334 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7335 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7336 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7337 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7338 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7339 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7344 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7345 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7348 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7349 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7350 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7352 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7353 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7355 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7356 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7358 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7359 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7361 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7362 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7363 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7364 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7365 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7367 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7369 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7371 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7372 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7373 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7374 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7375 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7377 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7379 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7381 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7382 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7383 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7384 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7385 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7388 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7389 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7390 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7392 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7393 } else { panic!(); }
7395 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7396 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7398 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7401 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7404 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7405 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7407 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7408 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7409 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7410 match msg_events[0] {
7411 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7412 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7413 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7417 match msg_events[1] {
7418 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7422 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7424 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7425 macro_rules! send_payment {
7426 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7427 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7428 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7429 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7430 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7431 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph,
7432 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
7434 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7435 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7437 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7438 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7440 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7441 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7442 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7443 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7444 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7445 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7446 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7447 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7449 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7450 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7451 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7453 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7454 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7455 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7456 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7457 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7459 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7462 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7463 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7464 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7465 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7467 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7472 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7473 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);