1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PendingOutboundPayment};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysInterface, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, Sign, SignerProvider};
61 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
62 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
63 use crate::util::events;
64 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
65 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
66 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
67 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
68 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
71 use crate::prelude::*;
73 use core::cell::RefCell;
75 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
76 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
77 use core::time::Duration;
80 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
81 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::PaymentSendFailure;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
121 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
122 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
123 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
126 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
131 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
132 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
135 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
138 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
139 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
142 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
143 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
145 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
146 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
147 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
150 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
151 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
153 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
154 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
157 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
158 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
161 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
167 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
168 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
169 short_channel_id: u64,
171 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
172 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
175 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
180 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
182 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
183 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
184 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
187 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
190 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
191 struct ClaimableHTLC {
192 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
194 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
196 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
198 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
202 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
203 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
204 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
205 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
207 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
208 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
213 impl Readable for PaymentId {
214 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
215 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
220 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
221 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
222 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
223 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
225 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
226 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
231 impl Readable for InterceptId {
232 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
233 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
237 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
238 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
239 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
240 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
241 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
244 session_priv: SecretKey,
245 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
246 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
247 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
248 payment_id: PaymentId,
249 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
250 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
253 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
254 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
255 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
257 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
259 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
264 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
265 payment_id.hash(hasher);
266 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
267 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
268 payment_params.hash(hasher);
273 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
276 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
277 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
279 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
280 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
281 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
282 payment_secret: None,
283 payment_params: None,
288 struct ReceiveError {
294 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
296 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
297 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
298 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
299 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
300 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
302 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
303 err: msgs::LightningError,
304 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
305 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
307 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
309 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
311 err: LightningError {
313 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
314 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
321 shutdown_finish: None,
325 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
327 err: LightningError {
329 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
332 shutdown_finish: None,
336 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
337 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
340 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
342 err: LightningError {
344 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
345 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
351 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
352 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
356 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
359 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
362 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
366 log_level: Level::Warn,
369 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
371 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
373 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
375 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
376 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
384 shutdown_finish: None,
389 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
390 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
391 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
392 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
393 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
395 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
396 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
397 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
398 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
399 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
400 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
401 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
403 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
407 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
408 struct ClaimingPayment {
410 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
411 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
413 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
414 (0, amount_msat, required),
415 (2, payment_purpose, required),
416 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
419 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
420 struct ClaimablePayments {
421 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
422 /// failed/claimed by the user.
424 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
425 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
427 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
428 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
429 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
431 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
432 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
433 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
434 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
437 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
438 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
439 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
440 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
441 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
444 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
445 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
446 /// quite some time lag.
447 enum BackgroundEvent {
448 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
449 /// commitment transaction.
450 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
453 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
454 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
455 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
456 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
457 /// event can be generated.
458 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
459 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
460 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
463 /// State we hold per-peer.
464 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: Sign> {
465 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
467 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
468 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
470 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
471 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
472 latest_features: InitFeatures,
475 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
476 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
478 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
481 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
482 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
483 struct PendingInboundPayment {
484 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
485 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
486 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
487 /// this payment being removed.
489 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
490 user_payment_id: u64,
491 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
492 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
493 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
496 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
497 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
498 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
499 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
500 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
501 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
502 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
504 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
505 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
511 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
513 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
518 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
519 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
520 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
521 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
522 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
523 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
524 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
525 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
527 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
528 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
530 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
531 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
533 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
534 /// to individual Channels.
536 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
537 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
538 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
539 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
541 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
542 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
543 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
544 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
545 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
546 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
547 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
549 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
550 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
551 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
552 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
555 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
556 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
557 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
558 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
559 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
561 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
562 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
563 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
564 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
565 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
568 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
569 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
570 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
571 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
572 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
576 // `total_consistency_lock`
578 // |__`forward_htlcs`
580 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
582 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
584 // | |__`claimable_payments`
586 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
588 // | |__`channel_state`
590 // | |__`per_peer_state`
596 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
598 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
602 // | |__`pending_events`
604 // | |__`pending_background_events`
606 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
608 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
609 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
610 K::Target: KeysInterface,
611 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
615 default_configuration: UserConfig,
616 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
617 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
623 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
625 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
627 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
628 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
630 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
631 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
632 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
633 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
634 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
636 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
637 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
638 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
639 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
641 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
642 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
644 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
645 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
646 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
647 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
648 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
649 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
650 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
651 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
653 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
655 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
656 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
658 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
660 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
661 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
662 /// and via the classic SCID.
664 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
665 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
667 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
669 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
671 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
672 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
673 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
675 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
676 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
678 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
679 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
681 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
682 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
684 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
685 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
686 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
687 /// active channel list on load.
689 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
690 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
692 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
694 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
695 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
696 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
698 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
699 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
700 /// the handling of the events.
703 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
704 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
705 /// would break backwards compatability.
706 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
707 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
708 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
710 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
711 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
713 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
715 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
716 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
717 /// confirmation depth.
719 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
720 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
721 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
723 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
725 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
727 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
729 our_network_key: SecretKey,
730 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
732 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
734 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
735 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
736 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
738 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
739 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
741 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
742 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
743 /// keeping additional state.
744 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
746 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
747 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
748 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
749 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
751 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (message queues and the like). Currently
752 /// the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer basis, as well as the peer's latest
755 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
756 /// are currently open with that peer.
758 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
759 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
762 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
764 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
765 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
766 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
767 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
768 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
770 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
771 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
772 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
773 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
774 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
775 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
776 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
777 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
778 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
779 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
780 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
782 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
789 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
791 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
792 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
793 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
794 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
795 pub struct ChainParameters {
796 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
797 pub network: Network,
799 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
801 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
802 pub best_block: BestBlock,
805 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
811 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
812 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
813 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
814 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
815 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
816 /// updates are ready for persistence).
818 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
819 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
820 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
821 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
822 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
824 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
825 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
828 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
829 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
830 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
833 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
834 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
836 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
837 persistence_notifier: notifier,
838 should_persist: persist_check,
839 _read_guard: read_guard,
844 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
846 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
847 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
852 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
853 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
855 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
857 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
858 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
859 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
860 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
861 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
863 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
864 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
866 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
868 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
869 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
870 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
871 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
872 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
873 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
874 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
875 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
876 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
877 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
878 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
879 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
880 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
882 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
883 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
885 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
886 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
887 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
888 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
890 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
891 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
892 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
893 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
894 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
895 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
898 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
900 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
901 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
904 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
906 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
907 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
909 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
910 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
911 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
912 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
914 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
915 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
916 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
917 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
918 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
919 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
920 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
921 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
922 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
923 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
924 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
927 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
928 /// to better separate parameters.
929 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
930 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
931 /// The node_id of our counterparty
932 pub node_id: PublicKey,
933 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
934 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
935 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
936 pub features: InitFeatures,
937 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
938 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
939 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
941 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
943 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
944 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
945 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
946 /// payments to us through this channel.
947 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
948 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
949 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
950 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
951 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
952 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
953 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
956 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
957 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
958 pub struct ChannelDetails {
959 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
960 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
961 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
962 /// lifetime of the channel.
963 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
964 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
965 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
966 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
967 /// our counterparty already.
969 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
970 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
971 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
972 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
974 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
975 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
976 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
977 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
979 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
980 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
982 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
983 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
985 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
986 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
987 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
988 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
989 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
990 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
991 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
992 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
993 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
996 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
998 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
999 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1000 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1001 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1002 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1003 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1004 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1006 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1007 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1009 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1010 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1011 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1012 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1013 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1014 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1015 /// this value on chain.
1017 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1019 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1021 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1022 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1023 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1024 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1026 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1027 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1028 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1029 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1031 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1032 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1033 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1034 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1036 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1037 pub balance_msat: u64,
1038 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1039 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1040 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1041 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1043 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1045 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1046 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1047 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1048 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1049 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1050 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1051 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1052 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1054 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1055 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1056 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1057 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1058 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1059 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1060 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1062 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1063 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1064 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1065 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1066 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1067 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1068 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1069 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1070 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1072 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1074 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1075 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1076 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1077 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1078 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1080 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1081 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1082 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1083 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1084 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1085 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1086 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1088 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1089 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1090 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1091 pub is_outbound: bool,
1092 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1093 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1094 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1095 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1096 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1098 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1099 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1100 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1101 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1103 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1104 pub is_usable: bool,
1105 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1106 pub is_public: bool,
1107 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1108 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1109 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1110 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1111 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1112 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1114 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1115 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1118 impl ChannelDetails {
1119 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1120 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1121 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1123 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1124 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1125 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1126 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1129 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1130 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1131 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1133 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1134 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1135 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1136 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1140 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1142 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1144 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1145 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1146 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1147 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1149 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1150 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1151 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1154 macro_rules! handle_error {
1155 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1158 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1159 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1161 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1162 // entering the macro.
1163 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1164 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1167 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1169 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1170 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1171 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1172 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1176 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1177 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1178 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1179 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1184 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1185 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1187 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1188 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1189 action: err.action.clone()
1193 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1194 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1197 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1204 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1205 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1206 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1207 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1208 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1209 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1211 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1212 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1213 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1214 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1215 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1217 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1218 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1220 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1224 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1225 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1226 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1228 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1229 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1231 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1232 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1234 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1235 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1236 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1237 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1238 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1239 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1245 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1246 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1250 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1252 $entry.remove_entry();
1260 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1261 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1265 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1267 $entry.remove_entry();
1275 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1276 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1278 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1279 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1285 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1286 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1288 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1289 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1290 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1291 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1292 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1293 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1294 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1295 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1296 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1297 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1298 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1299 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1300 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1301 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1304 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1305 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1306 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1307 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1308 match $action_type {
1309 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1310 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1312 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1313 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1315 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1316 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1317 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1318 if !$resend_commitment {
1319 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1322 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1324 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1325 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1327 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1332 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1333 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1335 $entry.remove_entry();
1339 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1340 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1341 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1343 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1344 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1346 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1347 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1349 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1350 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1352 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1353 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1357 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1358 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1359 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1360 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1361 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1363 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1364 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1365 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1366 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1367 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1368 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1369 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1370 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1371 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1372 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1377 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1378 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1379 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1381 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1382 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1383 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1384 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1385 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1386 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1389 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1394 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
1396 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1397 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1398 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1399 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1403 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1405 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1406 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1408 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1410 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1411 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1412 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1413 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1414 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1415 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1416 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1417 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1419 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1420 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1421 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1426 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1428 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1429 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1431 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1432 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1433 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1434 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1435 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1436 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1437 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1438 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1440 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1441 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1444 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1445 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1447 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1449 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1451 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1453 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1454 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1455 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1456 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1464 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1465 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1466 &self.default_configuration
1469 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1470 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1471 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1474 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1475 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1477 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1479 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1483 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1488 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1490 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1491 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1492 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1493 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1494 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1496 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1497 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1499 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1500 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1501 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1503 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1504 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1505 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1506 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1507 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1508 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1510 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1511 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1512 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1513 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1514 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1515 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1519 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1520 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1521 Some(peer_state) => {
1522 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1523 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1524 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1525 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1526 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1527 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1528 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1532 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1537 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1540 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1542 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1543 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1544 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1546 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1547 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1548 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1549 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key){
1550 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1551 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1552 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1553 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1555 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1557 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1560 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1562 } else { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }) }
1563 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1564 node_id: their_network_key,
1567 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1570 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1571 let mut res = Vec::new();
1572 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1573 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1574 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1575 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1576 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1577 // the same channel.
1578 res.reserve(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1580 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1581 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1582 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1583 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1584 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1585 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1586 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1587 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1588 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1589 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1590 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1591 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1592 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1593 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1594 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1595 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1596 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1597 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1598 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1599 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1600 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1601 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1602 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1603 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1605 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1606 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1607 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1608 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1609 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1610 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1611 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1612 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1613 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1614 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1615 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1616 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1617 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1618 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1619 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1620 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1621 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1622 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1623 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1624 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1625 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1626 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1627 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1628 config: Some(channel.config()),
1633 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1634 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1635 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1636 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1642 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1643 /// more information.
1644 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1645 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1648 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1649 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1651 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1652 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1655 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1656 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1657 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1658 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1659 // really wanted anyway.
1660 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1663 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1664 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1665 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1666 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1667 Some(transaction) => {
1668 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1672 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1673 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1674 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1675 reason: closure_reason
1679 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1680 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1682 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1683 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1684 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1685 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1686 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1687 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1688 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1689 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1690 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1691 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1692 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1693 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1695 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1696 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1698 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1699 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1700 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1701 let (result, is_permanent) =
1702 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1704 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1709 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1710 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1714 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1715 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1716 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1717 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1721 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1725 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() })
1728 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) });
1732 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1733 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1734 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1735 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1738 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1742 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1743 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1744 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1746 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1747 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1749 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1750 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1751 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1752 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1754 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1756 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1757 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1758 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1759 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1760 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1763 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1764 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1765 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1767 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1768 /// the channel being closed or not:
1769 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1770 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1771 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1772 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1773 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1774 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1775 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1777 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1779 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1780 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1781 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1782 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1783 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1787 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1788 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1789 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1790 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1791 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1792 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1793 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1794 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1796 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1797 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1798 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1799 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1800 // ignore the result here.
1801 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1805 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1806 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1807 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1808 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1810 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1811 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id) {
1812 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1813 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1814 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1815 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1816 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1818 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1819 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1821 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1823 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1825 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1828 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", peer_node_id) });
1831 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1832 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1833 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1834 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1835 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1840 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1843 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1844 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1845 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1846 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1847 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1848 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1849 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1850 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1851 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1861 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1862 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1863 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1865 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1866 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1867 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1870 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1871 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1872 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1874 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1875 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1876 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1877 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1878 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1881 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1882 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1883 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1884 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1885 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1889 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1890 /// local transaction(s).
1891 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1892 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1893 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1897 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1898 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1900 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1901 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1902 return Err(ReceiveError {
1903 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1905 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
1908 // final_expiry_too_soon
1909 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1910 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1911 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1912 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1913 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1914 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1915 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1916 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
1917 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
1918 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
1919 return Err(ReceiveError {
1920 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
1921 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1924 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1925 return Err(ReceiveError {
1927 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
1928 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1932 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1933 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
1934 return Err(ReceiveError {
1935 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1936 err_data: Vec::new(),
1937 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
1940 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1941 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1942 return Err(ReceiveError {
1943 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1944 err_data: Vec::new(),
1945 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
1947 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1948 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1950 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1951 phantom_shared_secret,
1953 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1954 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1955 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1956 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1957 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1958 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1959 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1960 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
1961 return Err(ReceiveError {
1962 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1963 err_data: Vec::new(),
1964 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
1968 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1970 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1973 return Err(ReceiveError {
1974 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
1975 err_data: Vec::new(),
1976 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
1981 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
1984 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1985 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
1986 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
1987 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1991 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
1992 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1993 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1995 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1996 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1997 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1998 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1999 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2000 failure_code: $err_code,
2006 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2007 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2010 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2012 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2013 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2014 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2015 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2016 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2017 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2018 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2019 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2021 macro_rules! return_err {
2022 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2024 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2025 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2026 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2027 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2028 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2029 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2035 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2037 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2038 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2040 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2041 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2045 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2046 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2048 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2050 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2051 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2052 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2053 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2054 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2056 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2059 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2060 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2061 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2063 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2064 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2065 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2068 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2069 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2070 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2071 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2075 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2076 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2077 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2080 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2081 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2082 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2083 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2084 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2089 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2090 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2091 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2092 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2093 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2094 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2095 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2096 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2097 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2098 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2099 // phantom or an intercept.
2100 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2101 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2102 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2106 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2109 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2111 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2112 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2113 if let None = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2114 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2116 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
2117 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2118 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2119 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2121 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2122 // have no consistency guarantees.
2123 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2127 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2128 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2129 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2130 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2131 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2133 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2134 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2135 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2136 // we don't have the channel here.
2137 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2139 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2141 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2142 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2143 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2144 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2145 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2146 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2147 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2149 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2150 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2152 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2153 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2157 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2158 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2159 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2160 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2162 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2169 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2170 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2171 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2172 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2173 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2174 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2176 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2177 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2179 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2180 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2181 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2182 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2183 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2184 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2185 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2186 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2187 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2188 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2194 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2195 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2196 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2197 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2199 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2200 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2202 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2203 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2204 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2206 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2207 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2208 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2209 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2210 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2211 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2212 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2216 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2221 pending_forward_info
2224 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2225 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2226 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2228 /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
2229 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2230 if !chan.should_announce() {
2231 return Err(LightningError {
2232 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2233 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2236 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2237 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2240 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2243 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2244 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2245 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2246 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2247 /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
2248 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2249 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2250 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2251 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2255 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2257 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2258 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2259 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2261 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2262 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2264 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2265 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2266 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2267 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2268 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2269 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2270 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2271 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2274 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2275 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2277 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2283 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2284 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2285 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2286 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2287 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2289 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2290 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2291 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2292 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2293 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2295 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2297 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2299 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2300 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2301 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2302 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2305 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2306 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2307 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2308 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2309 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2310 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2311 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2313 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2314 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2316 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2317 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2319 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2320 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2322 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2323 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2324 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2327 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2328 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2329 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2331 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2332 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2334 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2335 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2336 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2337 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2338 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2339 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2340 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2341 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2342 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2343 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2345 _ => unreachable!(),
2348 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2349 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2350 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2351 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2352 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2353 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2354 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2355 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2364 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2365 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2366 // `channel_by_id` map.
2367 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2368 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2370 } else { return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" })}
2374 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2375 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2377 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2382 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2384 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2385 /// fields for more info.
2387 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2388 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2389 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2390 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2393 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2394 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2395 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2396 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2397 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2399 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2400 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2402 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2403 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2404 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2406 /// In general, a path may raise:
2407 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2408 /// node public key) is specified.
2409 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2410 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2412 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2413 /// relevant updates.
2415 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2416 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2417 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2419 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2420 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2421 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2422 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2425 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2426 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2427 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2429 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2430 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2431 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2432 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2433 self.pending_outbound_payments
2434 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2435 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2436 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2440 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2441 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2442 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2443 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2444 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2448 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2449 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2450 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height)
2454 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2456 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2457 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2458 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2459 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2460 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2462 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2463 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2464 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2465 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2466 self.pending_outbound_payments.retry_payment_with_route(route, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2467 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2468 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2471 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2473 /// After this method returns, no future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2474 /// are allowed. If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be
2475 /// generated as soon as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2477 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2478 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2479 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2481 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2482 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, the payment may still be in the pending state
2483 /// upon restart. This allows further calls to [`retry_payment`] (and requiring a second call
2484 /// to [`abandon_payment`] to mark the payment as failed again). Otherwise, future calls to
2485 /// [`retry_payment`] will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`].
2487 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
2488 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2489 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2490 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2491 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2492 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2493 if let Some(payment_failed_ev) = self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id) {
2494 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(payment_failed_ev);
2498 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2499 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2500 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2501 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2502 /// never reach the recipient.
2504 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2505 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2507 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2508 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2510 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2512 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2513 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2514 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2515 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2516 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2517 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2520 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2521 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2522 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2523 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2524 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2525 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2526 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2527 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2530 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2533 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2534 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2537 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2538 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2539 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2540 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2541 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2544 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2545 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2546 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2547 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2548 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2550 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2552 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2553 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2554 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2555 } else { unreachable!(); })
2558 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2561 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })
2564 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2565 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2568 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2569 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2574 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2575 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2576 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2579 mem::drop(channel_state);
2580 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2581 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2582 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2583 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2584 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2585 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2586 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2588 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2589 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2590 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2591 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2596 } else { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Peer with counterparty_node_id {} disconnected and closed the channel", counterparty_node_id) }) }
2601 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2602 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2603 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2607 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2609 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2610 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2612 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2613 /// across the p2p network.
2615 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2616 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2618 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2619 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2620 /// keys per-channel).
2622 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2623 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2624 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2626 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2627 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2628 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2630 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2631 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2632 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2633 /// for more details.
2635 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2636 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2637 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2638 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2640 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2641 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2642 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2643 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2648 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2649 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2650 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2651 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2652 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2653 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2654 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2658 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2659 let mut output_index = None;
2660 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2661 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2662 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2663 if output_index.is_some() {
2664 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2665 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2668 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2669 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2670 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2673 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2676 if output_index.is_none() {
2677 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2678 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2681 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2685 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2687 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2688 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2689 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2690 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2692 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2693 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2695 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2696 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2698 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2700 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2701 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2702 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2703 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2704 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2705 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2706 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2707 pub fn update_channel_config(
2708 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2709 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2710 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2711 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2712 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2716 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2717 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2720 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2721 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2722 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2723 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2724 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2725 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2726 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2727 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2728 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2729 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
2733 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2734 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2735 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2738 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2739 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2740 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2741 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2742 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2748 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
2754 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2755 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2757 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2758 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2760 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2761 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2762 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2763 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2764 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2766 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2767 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2769 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2772 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2773 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2774 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2775 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2776 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2777 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2779 let next_hop_scid = {
2780 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2781 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id) {
2782 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2783 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2784 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2786 if !chan.is_usable() {
2787 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2788 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2791 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2793 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2794 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2798 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", next_node_id) });
2802 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2803 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2804 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2807 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2808 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2809 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2811 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2813 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2814 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2817 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2818 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2819 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2820 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2821 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2823 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2827 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2828 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2830 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2833 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2834 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2835 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2837 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2838 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2839 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2842 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2843 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2844 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2845 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2846 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2847 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2848 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2851 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2852 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2853 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2854 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2859 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2861 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2862 /// Will likely generate further events.
2863 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2864 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2866 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2867 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2868 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2870 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2871 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
2873 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
2874 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2875 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
2877 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2878 match forward_info {
2879 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2880 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2881 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2882 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
2883 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
2886 macro_rules! failure_handler {
2887 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
2888 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2890 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2891 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2892 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2893 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2894 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2895 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2898 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
2899 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
2901 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
2904 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2905 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
2911 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2912 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2914 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
2918 macro_rules! failed_payment {
2919 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2921 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
2925 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2926 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2927 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
2928 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
2929 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2931 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2932 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2933 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2934 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2935 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2937 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2939 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2940 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2944 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2945 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2946 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2947 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
2953 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2956 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2959 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2960 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2961 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2962 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2963 // problem, not ours.
2969 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
2970 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2972 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2976 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2977 if let None = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2978 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2981 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
2982 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2983 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2984 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2985 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2986 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2989 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2990 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2991 match forward_info {
2992 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2993 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
2994 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2995 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
2996 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
2999 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3000 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3001 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3002 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3003 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3004 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3005 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3006 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3008 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3009 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3010 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3012 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3013 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3015 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3017 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3018 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3019 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3020 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3025 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3026 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3028 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3029 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3030 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3031 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3033 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3034 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3036 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3038 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3039 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3040 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3049 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3050 match forward_info {
3051 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3052 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3053 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3054 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3057 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3058 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3059 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3060 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3062 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3063 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3065 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3068 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3069 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3070 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3071 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3072 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3073 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3074 phantom_shared_secret,
3076 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3078 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3083 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3084 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3085 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3086 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3087 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3089 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3090 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3091 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3092 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3093 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3094 phantom_shared_secret,
3096 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3097 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3101 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3102 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3103 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3104 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3105 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3108 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3109 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3110 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3112 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3113 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3114 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3117 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3118 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3119 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3122 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3123 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3124 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3125 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3126 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3127 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3131 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3132 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3133 total_value += htlc.value;
3134 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3135 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3136 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3137 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3138 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3139 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3141 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3143 _ => unreachable!(),
3146 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3147 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3148 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3149 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3150 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3151 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3152 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3153 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3154 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3157 amount_msat: total_value,
3158 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3159 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3161 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3163 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3164 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3166 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3168 payment_claimable_generated
3172 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3173 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3174 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3175 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3176 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3177 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3178 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3179 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3181 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3182 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3183 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3184 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3185 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3187 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3191 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3193 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3194 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3195 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3196 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3199 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3200 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3201 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3202 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3203 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3204 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3205 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3207 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3209 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3210 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3213 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3214 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3215 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3221 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3222 if payment_data.is_none() {
3223 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3224 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3227 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3228 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3229 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3230 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3231 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3232 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3233 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3234 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3236 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3237 if payment_claimable_generated {
3238 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3244 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3245 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3253 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3254 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3256 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3258 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3259 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3260 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3262 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3264 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3265 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3266 events.append(&mut new_events);
3269 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3271 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3272 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3274 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3275 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3276 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3277 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3278 if background_events.is_empty() {
3282 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3284 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3285 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3286 // monitor updating completing.
3287 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3294 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3295 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3296 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3297 self.process_background_events();
3300 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3301 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3302 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3303 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3304 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3305 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3306 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3308 if !chan.is_live() {
3309 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3310 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3311 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3313 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3314 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3316 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3317 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3321 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3322 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3323 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3324 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3325 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3326 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3327 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3329 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3331 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3332 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3333 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3334 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3335 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3336 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3337 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3345 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3347 /// This currently includes:
3348 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3349 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3350 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3352 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3353 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3355 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3356 /// estimate fetches.
3357 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3358 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3359 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3360 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3362 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3364 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3365 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3367 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3368 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3369 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3370 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3371 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3372 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3373 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3374 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3375 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3376 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3378 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3379 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3380 handle_errors.push((Err(err), *counterparty_node_id));
3381 if needs_close { return false; }
3384 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3385 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3386 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3387 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3388 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3389 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3390 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3391 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3395 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3396 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3398 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3399 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3400 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3404 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3405 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3410 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3417 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3418 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3419 // This should be unreachable
3420 debug_assert!(false);
3423 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3424 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3425 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3426 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3428 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3429 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3430 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3432 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3439 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3440 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3441 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3442 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3443 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3446 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3447 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3450 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3452 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3453 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3454 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3455 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3456 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3463 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3464 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3465 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3467 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3468 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3469 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3470 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3472 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3473 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3474 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3475 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3476 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3477 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3479 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3480 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3481 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3482 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3483 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3484 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3485 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3486 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3487 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3492 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3493 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3495 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3497 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3498 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3499 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3500 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3501 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3502 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3503 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3505 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3507 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3508 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3510 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3515 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3516 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3517 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3518 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3519 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3520 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3521 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3522 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3523 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3524 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3526 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3527 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3528 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3529 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3531 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3532 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3533 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3534 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3535 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3539 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3540 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3541 // be surfaced to the user.
3542 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3543 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3544 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3546 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3547 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3548 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3549 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3550 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3551 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3552 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3553 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3555 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3557 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3560 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3561 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3562 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3563 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3567 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3568 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3569 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3570 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3572 // Ensure that the `channel_state` and no peer state channel storage lock is not held
3573 // when calling this function.
3574 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3575 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` and `per_peer_state` locks,
3576 // which calling this function with the locks aquired would.
3577 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3578 assert!(self.per_peer_state.try_write().is_ok());
3581 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3582 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3583 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3586 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3587 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3588 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3590 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3591 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3593 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3594 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3595 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3597 let mut forward_event = None;
3598 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3599 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3600 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3602 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3603 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3604 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3606 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3607 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3610 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3611 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3612 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3613 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3614 time_forwardable: time
3617 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3618 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3619 failed_next_destination: destination,
3625 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3626 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3628 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3629 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3630 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3632 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3633 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3634 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3635 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3637 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3638 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3639 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3640 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3641 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3642 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3643 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3645 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3648 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3649 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3650 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3651 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3652 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3653 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3654 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3655 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3660 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3661 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3662 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3664 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3665 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3666 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3667 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3672 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3674 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3675 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3676 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3677 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3678 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3680 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3681 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3683 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3684 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3685 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3686 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3687 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3689 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3690 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3691 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3692 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3693 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3694 let mut per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap());
3695 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3696 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3697 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3704 if let None = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3709 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
3710 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3711 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3713 if let None = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id) {
3718 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3719 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3720 debug_assert!(false);
3725 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3726 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3727 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3728 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3729 if sources.len() != 1 {
3730 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3731 debug_assert!(false);
3737 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3739 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3740 mem::drop(channel_state);
3741 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3742 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3743 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3746 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3747 mem::drop(channel_state);
3748 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3749 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3750 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3751 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3755 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3756 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3757 if per_peer_state.is_none() { per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()); }
3758 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.take().unwrap(), per_peer_state.take().unwrap(),
3759 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3760 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3762 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3763 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3764 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3765 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3766 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3770 mem::drop(channel_state);
3771 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3773 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3774 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3775 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3776 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3777 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3778 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3779 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3781 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3784 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3785 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3786 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3787 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3791 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3792 mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>,
3793 per_peer_state_lock: RwLockReadGuard<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
3794 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3795 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3796 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3798 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
3799 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3801 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3802 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
3806 let (found_channel, mut peer_state_opt) = if counterparty_node_id_opt.is_some() && per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).is_some() {
3807 let peer_mutex = per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).unwrap();
3808 let peer_state = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3809 let found_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&chan_id);
3810 (found_channel, Some(peer_state))
3811 } else { (false, None) };
3814 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap().channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3815 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3816 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3817 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3818 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3819 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3820 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3822 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3823 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3824 payment_preimage, e);
3825 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
3826 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3827 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3828 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3829 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3830 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
3833 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3834 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3835 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3836 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3837 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3838 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3839 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3840 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3841 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3842 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3848 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3849 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3850 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3851 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3857 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3858 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3859 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3861 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3862 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3863 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
3864 // again on restart.
3865 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3866 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3867 payment_preimage, e);
3870 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3872 chan.remove_entry();
3874 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3875 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3876 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3877 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3878 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
3882 // We've held the peer_state mutex since finding the channel and setting
3883 // found_channel to true, so the channel can't have been dropped.
3887 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3888 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3889 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3893 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3894 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
3895 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update);
3896 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
3897 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3898 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3899 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
3900 // again on restart.
3901 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3902 payment_preimage, update_res);
3904 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3905 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3906 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3907 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
3908 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
3909 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
3910 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
3911 // `PaymentForwarded`).
3912 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3917 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3918 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
3921 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3923 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3924 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3925 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3927 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3928 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3929 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state_lock, self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(), hop_data, payment_preimage,
3930 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
3931 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3932 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3933 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3936 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
3937 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
3939 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3941 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3947 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
3948 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3949 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3955 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3956 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3957 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3960 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
3961 for action in actions.into_iter() {
3963 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
3964 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3965 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
3966 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
3967 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3971 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
3972 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
3978 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
3979 /// update completion.
3980 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
3981 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
3982 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
3983 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
3984 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
3985 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
3986 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
3988 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
3989 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3990 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
3991 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
3994 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
3995 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
3997 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
3998 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3999 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4004 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4006 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4007 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4008 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4009 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4014 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4015 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4016 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4017 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4018 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4023 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4027 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4033 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4034 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4035 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4041 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4042 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4045 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4046 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4047 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4048 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4049 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4051 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4052 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4053 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4054 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4055 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4060 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4061 let mut peer_state_lock;
4063 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4064 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4065 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4066 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4067 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4068 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4072 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4076 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4077 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4078 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4079 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4080 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4081 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4083 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4084 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4085 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4090 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4091 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4092 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4095 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4097 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4098 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4100 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4101 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4102 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4103 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4107 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4109 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4110 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4113 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4114 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4115 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4117 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4118 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4119 /// used to accept such channels.
4121 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4122 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4123 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4124 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4127 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4128 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4130 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4131 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4132 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4134 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4135 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4137 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4138 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4140 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4141 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4143 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4144 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4145 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4146 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4149 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4150 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4152 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4153 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4154 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4155 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4156 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4157 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4158 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4159 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4160 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4161 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4163 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4164 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4167 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4168 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4169 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4170 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4171 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4172 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4175 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4176 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4177 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4180 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4181 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4182 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4186 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4190 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
4195 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4196 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4197 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4200 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4201 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4204 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4205 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4206 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4208 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4209 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4210 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4211 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4214 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4215 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4219 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4220 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4221 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4222 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4223 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4224 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4225 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4226 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4227 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4228 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4230 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4231 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4232 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4233 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4235 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4236 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4237 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4240 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4241 pending_events.push(
4242 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4243 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4244 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4245 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4246 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4247 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4252 entry.insert(channel);
4256 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4261 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4262 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4263 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4264 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4265 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4266 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4267 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4268 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4269 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4270 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4272 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4273 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4275 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4278 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4281 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4282 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4283 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4284 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4285 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4287 user_channel_id: user_id,
4292 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4293 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4294 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4295 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4296 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4297 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4298 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4299 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4300 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4301 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4302 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4303 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4304 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4306 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4308 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4311 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4314 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state
4315 // lock before watch_channel
4316 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4317 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4318 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4319 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4320 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4321 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4322 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4323 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4324 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4325 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4326 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4327 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4328 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4330 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4331 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4332 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4333 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4334 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4335 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4336 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4339 // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the
4340 // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing
4341 // the channel above.
4342 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
4343 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4344 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4345 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4346 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4347 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4349 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4350 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4351 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4352 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4353 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4354 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4355 funding_msg.channel_id))
4357 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4358 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4361 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4362 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4365 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4366 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4374 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4376 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4377 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4378 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4379 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4380 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4381 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4382 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4383 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4384 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4385 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4386 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4388 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger) {
4389 Ok(update) => update,
4390 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4392 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4393 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4395 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4396 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4397 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4398 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4399 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4400 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4401 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4407 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4408 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4412 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4415 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4418 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4419 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4423 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4424 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4425 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4426 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4427 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4428 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4429 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4430 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4431 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4432 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4433 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4435 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4436 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4437 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4438 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4439 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4440 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4441 msg: announcement_sigs,
4443 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4444 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4445 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4446 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4447 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4448 // announcement_signatures.
4449 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4450 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4451 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4452 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4458 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4462 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4465 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4469 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4470 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4471 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4472 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4473 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4474 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4475 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4476 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4477 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4478 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4479 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4480 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4481 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4484 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4485 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4486 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4487 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4490 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4491 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4493 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4494 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4495 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4496 let (result, is_permanent) =
4497 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4499 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4504 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4505 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4506 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4516 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4519 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4520 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4521 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4522 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4525 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4529 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4530 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4531 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4532 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4533 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4534 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4535 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4536 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4537 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4538 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4539 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4540 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4542 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4543 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4544 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4545 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4550 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4551 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4552 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4553 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4554 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4555 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4556 } else { (tx, None) }
4558 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4561 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4564 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4565 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4566 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4568 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4569 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4570 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4571 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4575 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4580 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4581 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4582 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4583 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4585 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4586 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4587 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4588 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4590 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4591 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4592 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4593 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4594 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4595 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4596 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4597 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4598 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4601 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4602 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4603 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4604 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4605 match pending_forward_info {
4606 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4607 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4608 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4609 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4611 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4612 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4613 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4614 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4615 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4618 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4620 _ => pending_forward_info
4623 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4625 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4628 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4633 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4634 let channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4635 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4636 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4637 if let None = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4638 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4640 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
4641 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4642 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4643 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4644 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4645 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4646 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4648 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4650 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4653 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4657 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4658 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4659 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4660 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4661 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4662 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4663 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4664 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4665 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4667 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4669 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4672 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4677 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4678 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4679 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4680 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4681 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4682 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4683 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4684 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4685 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4687 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4688 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4689 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4691 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4694 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4697 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4701 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4702 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4703 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4704 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4705 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4706 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4707 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4708 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4709 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4710 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4711 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4713 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4714 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4715 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4716 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4717 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4718 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4719 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4724 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4725 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4729 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4730 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4731 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4733 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4734 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4735 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4736 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4737 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4738 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4739 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4740 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4742 commitment_signed: msg,
4748 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4751 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4756 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4757 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4758 let mut forward_event = None;
4759 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4760 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4761 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4762 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4763 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4764 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4765 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4766 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4768 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4769 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4771 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4772 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4773 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4774 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4775 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4776 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4778 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4779 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4780 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4782 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4783 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4784 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4785 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4786 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4787 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4788 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4789 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4790 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4793 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4794 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4796 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4797 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4798 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4799 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4800 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4801 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4802 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4803 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4806 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4807 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4808 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4813 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4814 // payments are being processed.
4815 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4816 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4818 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4819 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4826 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4827 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4830 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4831 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4832 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4835 match forward_event {
4837 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4838 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4839 time_forwardable: time
4847 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4848 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4850 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4851 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4853 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4854 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4855 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4856 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4857 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4858 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4859 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4861 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4862 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4863 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4864 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4865 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
4866 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
4867 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4868 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4869 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4870 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4871 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4872 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4874 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4875 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
4876 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4877 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4878 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4879 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4881 } else { unreachable!(); }
4883 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4884 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4885 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4889 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4890 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4891 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4892 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4893 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
4894 chan.get().get_user_id()))
4896 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4899 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4902 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4904 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4905 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
4907 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4908 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4909 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4911 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
4912 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4919 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4920 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4921 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4922 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4923 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4924 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4925 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4926 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4927 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4929 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
4931 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4934 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4939 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4940 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4941 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4942 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4943 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4944 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4945 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4946 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4947 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4948 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4949 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4951 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4952 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4955 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4956 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4957 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
4958 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4959 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4960 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4963 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4966 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4971 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4972 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4973 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4974 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4976 // It's not a local channel
4977 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4980 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4981 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id) {
4982 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4983 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4984 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4985 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4986 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4987 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4988 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4989 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4990 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4991 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4993 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4995 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4996 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4997 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4998 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5000 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5001 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5004 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5007 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5009 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5012 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5014 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5015 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5016 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5017 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5019 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5020 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5021 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5022 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5023 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5024 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5025 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5027 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5028 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5029 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5030 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5031 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5032 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5033 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5034 let mut channel_update = None;
5035 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5036 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5037 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5040 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5041 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5042 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5043 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5044 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5045 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5046 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5051 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5052 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5053 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5054 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5055 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5056 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5060 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5063 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer with a node_id matching the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
5067 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5068 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5071 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5072 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5077 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5078 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5079 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5080 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5081 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5082 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5083 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5084 match monitor_event {
5085 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5086 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5087 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5088 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5090 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5091 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5092 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5093 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5096 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5097 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5098 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5099 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5100 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5101 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5103 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5104 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5105 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5106 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5109 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5110 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5111 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5112 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5113 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5114 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5115 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5116 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5117 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5118 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5119 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5123 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5124 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5126 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5128 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5129 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5130 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5131 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5132 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5139 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5140 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5146 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5147 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5150 has_pending_monitor_events
5153 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5154 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5155 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5157 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5158 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5161 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5162 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5163 /// update was applied.
5164 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5165 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5166 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5167 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5169 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5170 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5171 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5172 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5174 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5175 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5176 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5177 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5178 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5179 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5180 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5182 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5184 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5187 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5188 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5189 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5190 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5191 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5192 updates: commitment_update,
5196 has_monitor_update = true;
5197 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5198 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5199 if close_channel { return false; }
5206 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5207 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5208 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5216 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5217 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5218 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5221 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5222 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5228 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5229 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5230 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5231 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5232 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5233 let mut has_update = false;
5235 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5236 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5237 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5238 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5240 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5241 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5242 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5243 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5244 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5245 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5246 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5248 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5249 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5252 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5253 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5254 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5255 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5256 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5261 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5263 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5264 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5265 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5271 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5272 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5280 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5281 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5287 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5288 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5290 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5291 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5292 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5293 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5294 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5295 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5296 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5297 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5298 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5299 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5300 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5301 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5302 assert!(should_broadcast);
5303 } else { unreachable!(); }
5304 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5306 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5310 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5311 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5313 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5314 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5317 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5319 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5320 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5321 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5322 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5323 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5324 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5325 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5326 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5327 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5328 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5329 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5330 // never fail a payment too early.
5331 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5333 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5336 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5341 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5344 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5345 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5347 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5348 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5349 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5351 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5353 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5354 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5358 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5359 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5361 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5363 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5364 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5365 /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5366 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5367 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5368 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5371 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5372 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5374 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5377 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5379 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5381 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5382 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5383 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5384 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5385 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5388 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5389 /// stored external to LDK.
5391 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5392 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5393 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5395 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5396 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5399 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5400 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5401 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5402 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5404 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5405 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5406 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5407 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5408 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5410 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5411 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5412 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5413 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5414 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5416 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5417 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5419 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5420 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5424 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5425 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5427 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5429 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5430 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5431 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5432 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5435 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5436 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5438 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5441 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5443 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5445 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5446 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5449 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5450 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5452 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5453 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5454 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5457 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5458 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5460 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5461 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5462 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5463 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5465 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5466 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5467 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5468 Some(_) => continue,
5469 None => return scid_candidate
5474 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5476 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5477 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5479 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5480 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5481 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5485 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5486 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5487 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5489 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5490 /// times to get a unique scid.
5491 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5492 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5493 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5495 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5496 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5497 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5498 return scid_candidate
5502 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5503 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5504 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5505 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5507 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5508 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5509 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5510 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5511 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5512 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5513 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5514 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5523 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5524 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5525 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5526 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5527 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5532 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5533 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5534 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5538 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5539 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5543 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5544 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5547 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5548 /// using the given event handler.
5550 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5551 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5554 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5555 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5556 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5558 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5560 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5561 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5562 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5563 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5566 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5567 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5568 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5571 for event in pending_events {
5572 handler(event).await;
5575 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5576 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5581 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5583 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5584 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5585 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5586 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5590 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5591 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5592 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5593 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5595 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5596 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5597 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5598 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5601 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5602 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5604 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5605 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5608 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5609 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5610 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5612 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5613 events.replace(pending_events);
5622 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5624 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5625 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5626 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5627 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5631 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5633 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5634 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5635 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5636 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5637 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5639 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5640 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5641 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5642 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5645 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5646 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5647 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5650 for event in pending_events {
5651 handler.handle_event(event);
5659 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5661 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5662 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5663 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5664 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5668 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5670 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5671 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5672 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5673 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5674 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5677 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5678 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5681 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5682 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5683 let new_height = height - 1;
5685 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5686 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5687 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5688 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5689 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5690 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5693 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5697 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5699 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5700 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5701 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5702 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5706 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5707 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5708 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5709 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5711 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5712 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5714 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5715 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5716 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5718 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5719 if height < last_best_block_height {
5720 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5721 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5725 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5726 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5727 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5728 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5730 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5731 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5733 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5735 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5737 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5739 macro_rules! max_time {
5740 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5742 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5743 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5744 // having an explicit local time source.
5745 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5746 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5747 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5748 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5749 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5755 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5756 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5757 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5758 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5762 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5763 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5764 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5765 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5766 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5767 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5768 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5769 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
5776 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5777 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5778 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5779 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5780 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5781 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5782 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5783 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5788 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5790 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5791 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5792 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5793 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5797 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5798 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5800 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5801 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5802 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5803 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5804 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5806 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5807 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5809 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5810 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5811 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5812 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5813 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5814 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5815 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5816 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5817 let res = f(channel);
5818 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5819 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5820 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5821 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5822 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5824 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5825 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5826 if channel.is_usable() {
5827 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5828 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5829 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5830 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5835 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5839 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5841 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5842 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5843 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5844 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5845 msg: announcement_sigs,
5847 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5848 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5849 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5851 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5852 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5853 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5858 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5859 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5860 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5861 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5862 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5863 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5864 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5865 // is always consistent.
5866 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5867 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5868 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5869 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5870 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5873 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5874 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5875 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5876 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5877 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5878 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5879 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5883 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5884 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5885 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5886 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5887 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5888 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5889 data: reason_message,
5899 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5900 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5901 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5902 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5903 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5904 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5905 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5906 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5907 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5908 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
5910 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
5911 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5912 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5916 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5919 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5920 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
5921 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5922 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5923 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
5924 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
5925 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5926 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5927 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
5930 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
5931 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5932 _ => unreachable!(),
5934 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
5935 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
5936 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
5937 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
5943 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5945 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5946 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
5950 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5951 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5952 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
5953 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5955 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5957 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5958 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
5959 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5960 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5961 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5962 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5965 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5966 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
5967 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5969 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5970 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5971 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5972 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5975 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
5976 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
5977 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
5978 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
5979 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
5982 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5983 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5984 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
5987 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5988 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5989 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5990 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5994 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
5995 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5997 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5998 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5999 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6000 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6004 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6005 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6006 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6009 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6010 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6011 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6014 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6015 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6016 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6019 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6020 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6021 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6024 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6025 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6026 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6029 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6030 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6031 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6034 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6035 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6036 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6039 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6040 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6041 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6044 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6045 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6046 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6049 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6050 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6051 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6054 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6055 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6056 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6059 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6060 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6061 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6064 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6065 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6066 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6069 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6070 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6071 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6074 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6075 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6076 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6079 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6080 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6081 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6084 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6089 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6090 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6091 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6094 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6095 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6096 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6097 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6098 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6099 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6101 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6102 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6103 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6104 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6105 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6106 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6107 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6108 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6109 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6110 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6111 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6112 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6115 no_channels_remain = false;
6121 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6123 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6124 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6125 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6126 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6127 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6128 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6129 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6130 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6131 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6132 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6133 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6134 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6135 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6136 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6137 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6138 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6139 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6140 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6141 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6142 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6145 mem::drop(channel_state);
6147 if no_channels_remain {
6148 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6150 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6152 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6153 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6157 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6158 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6159 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6163 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6165 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6168 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6169 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6170 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6171 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6172 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6173 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6176 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6177 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6182 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6183 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6184 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6185 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6187 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6188 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6189 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6190 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6191 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6192 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6193 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6194 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6195 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6199 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6200 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6201 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6206 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6207 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6208 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6209 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6210 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6219 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6223 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6224 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6226 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6227 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6228 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6229 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6230 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6235 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6236 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6237 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6238 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6239 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6240 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6241 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6242 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6245 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6246 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6247 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6256 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6257 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6261 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6262 provided_node_features()
6265 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6266 provided_init_features()
6270 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6271 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6272 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6273 provided_init_features().to_context()
6276 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6277 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6279 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6280 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6281 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6282 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6283 provided_init_features().to_context()
6286 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6287 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6288 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6289 provided_init_features().to_context()
6292 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6293 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6294 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6295 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6296 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6297 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6298 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6299 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6300 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6301 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6302 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6303 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6304 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6305 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6306 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6307 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6308 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6309 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6313 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6314 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6316 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6317 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6318 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6319 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6322 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6323 (2, node_id, required),
6324 (4, features, required),
6325 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6326 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6327 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6328 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6331 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6332 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6333 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6334 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6335 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6336 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6337 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6338 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6339 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6340 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6341 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6342 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6343 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6344 (7, self.config, option),
6345 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6346 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6347 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6348 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6349 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6350 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6351 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6352 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6353 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6354 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6355 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6356 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6357 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6358 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6359 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6360 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6361 (32, self.is_public, required),
6362 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6363 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6364 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6370 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6371 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6372 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6373 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6374 (2, channel_id, required),
6375 (3, channel_type, option),
6376 (4, counterparty, required),
6377 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6378 (6, funding_txo, option),
6379 (7, config, option),
6380 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6381 (9, confirmations, option),
6382 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6383 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6384 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6385 (16, balance_msat, required),
6386 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6387 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6388 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6389 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6390 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6391 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6392 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6393 (26, is_outbound, required),
6394 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6395 (30, is_usable, required),
6396 (32, is_public, required),
6397 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6398 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6399 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6402 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6403 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6404 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6405 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6406 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6410 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6412 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6413 outbound_scid_alias,
6417 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6418 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6420 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6421 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6422 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6423 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6424 confirmations_required,
6426 force_close_spend_delay,
6427 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6428 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6429 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6430 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6431 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6432 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6437 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6438 (2, channels, vec_type),
6439 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6440 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6443 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6445 (0, onion_packet, required),
6446 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6449 (0, payment_data, required),
6450 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6451 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6453 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6454 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6455 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6459 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6460 (0, routing, required),
6461 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6462 (4, payment_hash, required),
6463 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6464 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6465 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6469 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6470 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6472 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6474 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6475 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6476 reason.write(writer)?;
6478 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6479 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6482 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6483 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6484 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6485 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6492 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6493 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6494 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6497 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6498 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6499 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6500 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6504 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6505 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6506 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6507 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6508 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6511 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6512 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6513 // messages contained in the variants.
6514 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6515 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6516 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6518 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6519 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6520 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6521 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6522 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6525 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6526 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6527 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6528 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6529 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6531 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6536 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6541 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6542 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6543 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6544 (2, outpoint, required),
6545 (4, htlc_id, required),
6546 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6549 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6550 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6551 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6552 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6553 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6555 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6556 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6557 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6558 (2, self.value, required),
6559 (4, payment_data, option),
6560 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6561 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6567 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6568 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6569 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6571 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6572 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6573 let mut total_msat = None;
6574 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6575 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6576 (0, prev_hop, required),
6577 (1, total_msat, option),
6578 (2, value, required),
6579 (4, payment_data, option),
6580 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6581 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6583 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6585 if payment_data.is_some() {
6586 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6588 if total_msat.is_none() {
6589 total_msat = Some(value);
6591 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6594 if total_msat.is_none() {
6595 if payment_data.is_none() {
6596 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6598 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6600 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6604 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6607 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6614 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6615 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6616 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6619 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6620 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6621 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6622 let mut payment_id = None;
6623 let mut payment_secret = None;
6624 let mut payment_params = None;
6625 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6626 (0, session_priv, required),
6627 (1, payment_id, option),
6628 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6629 (3, payment_secret, option),
6630 (4, path, vec_type),
6631 (5, payment_params, option),
6633 if payment_id.is_none() {
6634 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6636 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6638 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6639 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6640 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6641 path: path.unwrap(),
6642 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6647 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6648 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6653 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6654 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6656 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6658 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6659 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6660 (0, session_priv, required),
6661 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6662 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6663 (3, payment_secret, option),
6664 (4, *path, vec_type),
6665 (5, payment_params, option),
6668 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6670 field.write(writer)?;
6677 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6678 (0, forward_info, required),
6679 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6680 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6681 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6682 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6685 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6687 (0, htlc_id, required),
6688 (2, err_packet, required),
6693 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6694 (0, payment_secret, required),
6695 (2, expiry_time, required),
6696 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6697 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6698 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6701 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
6703 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6704 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6705 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6706 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6710 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6711 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6713 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6715 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6717 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6718 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6719 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6723 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6724 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6725 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6726 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6727 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6728 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6729 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6730 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6731 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6732 unfunded_channels += 1;
6737 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6739 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6740 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6741 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6742 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6743 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6744 channel.write(writer)?;
6751 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6752 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6753 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6754 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6755 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6756 for forward in pending_forwards {
6757 forward.write(writer)?;
6762 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6763 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6764 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6766 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6767 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6768 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6769 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6770 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6771 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6772 htlc.write(writer)?;
6774 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6777 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6778 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6779 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6780 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6781 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6782 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6785 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6786 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6787 for event in events.iter() {
6788 event.write(writer)?;
6791 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6792 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6793 for event in background_events.iter() {
6795 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6797 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6798 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6803 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6804 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6805 // likely to be identical.
6806 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6807 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6809 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6810 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6811 hash.write(writer)?;
6812 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6815 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6816 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6817 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6818 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6819 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6822 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6823 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6825 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6826 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6827 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6828 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6831 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6832 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6836 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6837 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6838 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6840 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6841 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6842 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6848 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
6849 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6850 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
6851 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
6854 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
6855 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6856 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
6857 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
6858 pending_claiming_payments = None;
6860 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
6863 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6864 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6865 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
6866 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6867 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
6868 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6869 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6870 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6871 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6878 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6880 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6882 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6883 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6884 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6885 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6886 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6887 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6888 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6889 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6890 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6891 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6892 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6893 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6894 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6896 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6897 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6899 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6900 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6902 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6903 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6904 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6905 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6906 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6907 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6909 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6910 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6912 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6913 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6914 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6915 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6919 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6920 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6922 pub keys_manager: K,
6924 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6926 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6927 pub fee_estimator: F,
6928 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6930 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6931 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6932 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6933 pub chain_monitor: M,
6935 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6936 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6937 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6938 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6939 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
6940 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
6942 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
6944 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6945 /// deserialization.
6947 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6948 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6949 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6951 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6952 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6954 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6955 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6956 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6957 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6959 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6962 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6963 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
6966 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6967 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>
6969 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6970 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6971 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6972 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6976 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6977 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6978 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6979 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6980 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
6982 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
6983 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6988 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6989 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6990 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6991 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>>)
6993 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6994 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6995 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6996 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7000 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7001 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7002 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7006 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7007 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>)
7009 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7010 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7011 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7012 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7016 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7017 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7019 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7020 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7021 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7023 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7025 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7026 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7027 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7028 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7029 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7030 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7031 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7032 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7033 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7034 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7035 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7036 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7037 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7038 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7039 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7040 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7041 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7042 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7043 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7044 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7045 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7046 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7047 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7048 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7049 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7050 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7051 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7052 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7053 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7054 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7055 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7056 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7057 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7058 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7059 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7060 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7061 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7062 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7063 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7064 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7066 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7067 let mut found_htlc = false;
7068 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7069 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7072 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7073 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7074 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7075 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7076 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7077 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7078 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7079 log_info!(args.logger,
7080 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7081 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7082 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7086 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7087 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7088 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7090 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7091 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7093 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7094 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7095 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7096 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7098 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7099 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7100 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7101 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7105 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7106 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7107 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7108 // safely discard the channel.
7109 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7110 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7111 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7112 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7113 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7116 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7117 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7118 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7119 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7120 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7121 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7125 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7126 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7127 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7128 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7132 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7133 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7134 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7135 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7136 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7137 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7138 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7139 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7140 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7142 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7145 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7146 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7147 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7148 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7149 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7150 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7151 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7152 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7154 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7157 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7158 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7159 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7160 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7161 let peer_state = PeerState {
7162 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7163 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7165 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7168 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7169 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7170 for _ in 0..event_count {
7171 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7172 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7177 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7178 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7179 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7180 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7181 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7182 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7186 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7187 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7189 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7190 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7191 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7192 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7193 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7197 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7198 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7199 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7200 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7201 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7202 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7203 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7205 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7206 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7210 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7211 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7212 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7213 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7214 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7215 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7216 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7217 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7218 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7219 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7220 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7221 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7222 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7223 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7224 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7225 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7226 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7227 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7229 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7230 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7233 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7234 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7237 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7238 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7239 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7240 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7241 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7242 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7244 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7246 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7247 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7248 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7249 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7250 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7251 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7252 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7254 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7255 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7256 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7257 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7258 if path.is_empty() {
7259 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7260 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7262 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7263 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7264 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7265 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7266 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7267 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7268 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7269 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7271 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7272 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7273 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7274 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7275 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7277 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7278 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7279 total_msat: path_amt,
7280 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7282 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7283 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7288 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7289 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7290 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7291 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7292 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7294 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7295 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7296 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7297 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7298 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7299 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7300 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7301 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7302 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7303 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7304 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7309 !forwards.is_empty()
7311 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7312 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7313 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7314 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7315 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7316 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7317 intercepted_id != ev_id
7329 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7330 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7331 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7332 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7333 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7334 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7335 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7336 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7340 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7341 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7343 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7344 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7345 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7346 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7348 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7349 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7352 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7353 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7354 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7355 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7356 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7358 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7359 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7360 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7361 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7362 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7363 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7364 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7365 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7367 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7368 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7372 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7374 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7376 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7377 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7379 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7383 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7384 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7386 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7387 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7390 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7392 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7394 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7395 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7396 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7397 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7398 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7402 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7403 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7404 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7405 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7406 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7407 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7408 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7410 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7411 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7412 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7414 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7415 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7416 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7417 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7418 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7419 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7421 if chan.is_usable() {
7422 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7423 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7424 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7425 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7426 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7432 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7434 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7435 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7436 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7437 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7438 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7439 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7440 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7441 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7442 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7443 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7444 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7446 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7447 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7449 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7450 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7451 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7452 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7454 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7455 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7456 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7457 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7459 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7460 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7461 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7462 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7464 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7465 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7466 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7467 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7468 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7469 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7470 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7473 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7474 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7477 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7480 purpose: payment_purpose,
7481 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7487 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7489 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7490 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7491 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7492 router: args.router,
7494 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7496 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7497 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7499 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7500 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7501 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()) },
7502 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7504 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7505 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7506 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7507 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7508 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7509 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7511 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7517 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7519 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7521 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7522 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7523 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7524 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7526 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7527 logger: args.logger,
7528 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7531 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7532 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7533 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7534 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7535 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7538 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7539 //connection or two.
7541 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7547 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7548 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7549 use core::time::Duration;
7550 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7551 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7552 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7553 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7554 use crate::ln::msgs;
7555 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7556 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7557 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7558 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7559 use crate::util::test_utils;
7560 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysInterface};
7563 fn test_notify_limits() {
7564 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7565 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7566 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7567 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7568 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7569 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7571 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7572 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7573 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7574 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7575 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7577 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7579 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7580 // to connect messages with new values
7581 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7582 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7583 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7584 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7586 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7587 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7588 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7589 // ... but the last node should not.
7590 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7591 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7592 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7593 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7595 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7596 // about the channel.
7597 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7598 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7599 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7601 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7603 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7604 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7605 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7606 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7607 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7608 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7610 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7611 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7612 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7614 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7615 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7616 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7617 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7618 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7619 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7621 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7622 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7623 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7624 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7625 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7626 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7627 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7628 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7630 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7631 // the channel info has updated.
7632 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7633 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7634 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7635 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7636 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7637 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7641 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7642 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7647 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7648 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7650 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7651 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7652 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7653 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7655 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7656 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7657 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7658 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7659 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7660 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7662 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7663 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7664 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7666 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7667 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7669 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7670 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7671 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7672 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7673 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7675 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7676 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7677 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7679 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7680 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7681 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7682 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7683 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7684 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7685 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7686 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7687 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7689 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7690 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7692 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7693 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7694 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7696 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7697 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7698 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7699 // lightning messages manually.
7700 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7701 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7704 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7705 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7706 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7708 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7709 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7711 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7712 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7714 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7715 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7716 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7718 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7719 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7720 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7722 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7724 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7726 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7727 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7730 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7731 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7732 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7733 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7735 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7736 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7737 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7738 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7743 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7744 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7745 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7746 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7748 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7751 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7752 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7753 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7754 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7756 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7761 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7762 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7763 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7764 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7765 // fails as expected.
7766 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7767 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7768 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7769 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7770 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7771 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7772 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7774 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7775 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7776 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7778 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7779 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7780 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7781 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7782 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7784 let route = find_route(
7785 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7786 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7788 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7790 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7791 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7792 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7793 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7794 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7796 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7797 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7798 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7799 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7800 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7802 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7803 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7804 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7805 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7806 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7807 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7808 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7809 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7810 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7812 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7813 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7815 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7816 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7817 let route = find_route(
7818 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7819 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7821 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7823 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7824 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7825 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7826 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7827 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7829 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7830 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7831 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7833 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7834 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7835 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7836 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7837 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7839 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7840 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7841 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7843 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7844 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7845 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7846 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7847 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7848 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7849 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7850 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7851 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7853 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7854 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7858 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7859 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7860 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7861 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7862 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7863 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7864 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7866 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7867 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7868 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7869 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7871 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7872 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7873 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7874 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7875 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7877 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
7878 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7879 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7880 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7881 let route = find_route(
7882 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7883 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7886 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7887 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7888 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7889 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7892 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7893 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7894 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7895 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7896 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7897 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7898 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7900 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7904 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7905 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7906 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7907 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7908 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7909 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7911 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7912 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7913 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7914 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7916 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7917 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7918 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7919 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7920 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7922 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
7923 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7924 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7925 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7926 let route = find_route(
7927 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7928 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7931 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7932 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7933 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7934 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7935 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7938 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7939 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7940 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7941 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7942 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7943 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7944 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7946 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7950 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7951 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7952 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7953 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7954 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7956 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7957 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7958 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7959 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7961 // Marshall an MPP route.
7962 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7963 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7964 route.paths.push(path);
7965 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7966 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7967 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7968 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7969 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7970 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7972 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
7973 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7974 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7975 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7980 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7981 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7982 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7983 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7984 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7985 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7987 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7988 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7990 total_msat: 100_000,
7993 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7994 // payment verification fails as expected.
7995 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7996 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7997 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7998 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8000 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8004 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8005 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8009 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8010 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8011 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8012 // the channel is successfully closed.
8013 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8014 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8015 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8016 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8018 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8019 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8020 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8021 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8022 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8024 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8025 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8027 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8028 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8029 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8030 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8033 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8035 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8036 // as it has the funding transaction.
8037 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8038 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8039 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8041 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8044 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8046 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8048 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8049 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8050 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8052 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8053 // as it has the funding transaction.
8054 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8055 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8056 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8059 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8060 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8062 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8063 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8064 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8066 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8067 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8068 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8069 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8071 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8072 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8074 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8075 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8076 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8077 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8078 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8079 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8080 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8082 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8083 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8084 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8085 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8086 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8087 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8088 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8091 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8093 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8094 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8095 // closing transaction).
8096 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8097 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8098 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8100 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8101 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8102 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8103 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8104 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8107 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8109 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8111 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8112 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8113 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8115 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8117 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8118 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8122 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8124 use crate::chain::Listen;
8125 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8126 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8127 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8128 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8129 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8130 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8131 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8132 use crate::util::test_utils;
8133 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8134 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8136 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8137 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8138 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8140 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8144 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8145 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8146 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8147 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8148 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8149 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8150 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8151 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8156 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8157 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8160 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8161 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8162 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8164 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8165 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8167 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8168 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8169 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8170 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)));
8172 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8173 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8175 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8176 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8177 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8178 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8180 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8182 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8184 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8185 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8186 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8187 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8188 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8190 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8192 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8194 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8195 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8196 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8197 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8198 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8201 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8202 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8203 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8205 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8206 } else { panic!(); }
8208 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8209 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8211 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8214 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8217 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8218 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8220 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8221 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8222 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8223 match msg_events[0] {
8224 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8225 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8226 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8230 match msg_events[1] {
8231 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8235 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8236 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8238 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8239 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8241 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8244 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8245 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8247 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8248 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8250 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8253 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8255 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8256 macro_rules! send_payment {
8257 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8258 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8259 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8260 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8261 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8262 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8263 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8264 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8265 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8266 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8268 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8269 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8271 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8272 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8274 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8275 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8276 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8277 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8278 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8279 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8280 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8281 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8283 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8284 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8285 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8286 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8288 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8289 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8290 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8291 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8292 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8294 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8297 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8298 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8299 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8300 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8302 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8307 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8308 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);