1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
116 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
117 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
123 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
124 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
125 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
127 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
128 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
129 /// may overshoot this in either case)
130 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
131 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
136 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
137 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
140 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
141 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
142 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
143 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
144 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
147 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
148 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
150 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
151 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
152 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
158 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
159 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
162 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
163 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
166 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
170 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
171 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
172 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 short_channel_id: u64,
176 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
177 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
179 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
180 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
185 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
187 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
188 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
189 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
191 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
192 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
195 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
196 struct ClaimableHTLC {
197 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
199 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
201 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
202 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
203 sender_intended_value: u64,
204 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
206 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
207 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
208 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
209 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
213 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
215 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
216 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
217 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
219 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
220 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
225 impl Readable for PaymentId {
226 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
227 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
232 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
234 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
235 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
236 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
238 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
239 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
244 impl Readable for InterceptId {
245 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
246 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
251 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
252 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
253 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
254 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
255 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
258 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
260 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
261 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
262 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
264 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
265 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
269 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
270 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
271 (0, short_channel_id, required),
272 (2, htlc_id, required),
274 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
275 (0, session_priv, required),
280 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
281 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
282 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
283 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
284 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
287 session_priv: SecretKey,
288 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
289 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
290 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
291 payment_id: PaymentId,
294 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
295 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
296 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
298 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
300 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
302 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
305 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
306 payment_id.hash(hasher);
307 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
313 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
315 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
316 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
317 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
318 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
319 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
320 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
324 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
325 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
326 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
327 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
328 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
329 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
331 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
337 struct ReceiveError {
343 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
344 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
346 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
347 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
348 pub enum FailureCode {
349 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
350 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
351 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
352 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
353 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
354 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
355 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
356 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
357 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
358 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
359 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
362 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
363 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
364 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
365 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
366 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
368 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
369 err: msgs::LightningError,
370 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
371 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
373 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
375 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
377 err: LightningError {
379 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
380 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
387 shutdown_finish: None,
391 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
392 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
395 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
397 err: LightningError {
399 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
400 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
406 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
407 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
411 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
414 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
416 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
417 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
421 log_level: Level::Warn,
424 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
426 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
428 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
430 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
431 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
439 shutdown_finish: None,
444 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
445 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
446 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
447 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
448 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
450 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
451 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
452 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
453 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
454 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
455 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
456 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
458 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
462 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
463 struct ClaimingPayment {
465 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
466 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
468 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
469 (0, amount_msat, required),
470 (2, payment_purpose, required),
471 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
474 struct ClaimablePayment {
475 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
476 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
477 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
480 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
481 struct ClaimablePayments {
482 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
483 /// failed/claimed by the user.
485 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
486 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
488 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
489 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
490 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
492 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
493 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
494 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
495 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
498 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
499 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
500 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
501 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
502 enum BackgroundEvent {
503 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
504 /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
505 /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
506 /// need the counterparty node_id.
508 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
509 /// are regenerated on startup.
510 ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
511 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
512 /// channel to continue normal operation.
514 /// In general this should be used rather than
515 /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
516 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
517 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
519 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
520 /// are regenerated on startup.
521 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
522 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
523 funding_txo: OutPoint,
524 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
529 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
530 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
531 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
532 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
533 /// event can be generated.
534 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
535 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
536 /// operation of another channel.
538 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
539 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
540 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
541 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
543 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
544 event: events::Event,
545 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
549 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
550 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
551 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
552 (0, event, upgradable_required),
553 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
554 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
555 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
556 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
557 // downgrades to prior versions.
558 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
562 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
563 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
564 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
565 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
566 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
569 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
570 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
571 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
572 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
576 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
577 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
578 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
579 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
580 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
581 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
583 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
584 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
585 channel_id: [u8; 32],
586 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
591 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
593 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
594 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
595 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
596 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
601 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
602 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
606 /// State we hold per-peer.
607 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
608 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
610 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
611 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
613 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
614 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
615 latest_features: InitFeatures,
616 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
617 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
618 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
619 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
620 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
622 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
623 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
624 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
625 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
627 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
628 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
629 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
630 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
631 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
632 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
633 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
634 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
635 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
636 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
637 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
638 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
639 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
640 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
641 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
645 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
646 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
647 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
648 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
649 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
650 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
653 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
657 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
658 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
660 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
663 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
664 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
665 struct PendingInboundPayment {
666 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
667 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
668 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
669 /// this payment being removed.
671 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
672 user_payment_id: u64,
673 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
674 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
675 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
678 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
679 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
680 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
681 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
682 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
683 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
684 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
685 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
687 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
688 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
696 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
698 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
699 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
700 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
705 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
706 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
707 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
708 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
709 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
710 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
711 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
712 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
713 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
715 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
716 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, &'g L>;
718 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
719 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
720 $vis trait AChannelManager {
721 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
722 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
723 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
724 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
725 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
726 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
727 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
728 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
729 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
730 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
731 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
732 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
733 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
734 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
735 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
736 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
737 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
738 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
741 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
742 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
743 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
744 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
745 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
746 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
748 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
749 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
750 ES::Target: EntropySource,
751 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
752 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
753 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
757 type Watch = M::Target;
759 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
761 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
763 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
765 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
766 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
768 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
770 type Router = R::Target;
772 type Logger = L::Target;
774 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
777 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
778 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
780 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
781 /// to individual Channels.
783 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
784 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
785 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
786 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
788 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
789 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
790 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
791 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
792 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
793 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
794 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
796 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
797 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
798 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
800 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
801 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
802 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
803 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
804 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
806 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
807 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
808 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
809 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
811 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
812 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
813 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
815 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
816 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
817 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
818 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
819 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
821 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
822 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
823 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
824 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
825 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
826 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
827 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
828 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
831 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
832 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
833 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
834 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
835 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
839 // `total_consistency_lock`
841 // |__`forward_htlcs`
843 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
845 // |__`per_peer_state`
847 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
849 // | |__`claimable_payments`
851 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
857 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
859 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
863 // | |__`pending_events`
865 // | |__`pending_background_events`
867 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
869 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
870 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
871 ES::Target: EntropySource,
872 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
873 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
874 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
878 default_configuration: UserConfig,
879 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
880 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
886 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
888 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
890 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
891 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
893 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
894 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
895 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
896 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
898 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
899 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
901 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
902 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
903 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
904 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
905 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
906 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
907 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
908 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
910 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
912 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
913 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
915 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
917 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
918 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
919 /// and via the classic SCID.
921 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
922 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
924 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
926 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
928 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
929 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
930 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
932 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
933 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
935 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
936 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
938 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
939 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
941 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
942 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
943 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
944 /// active channel list on load.
946 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
947 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
949 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
951 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
952 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
953 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
955 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
956 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
957 /// the handling of the events.
959 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
960 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
963 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
964 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
965 /// would break backwards compatability.
966 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
967 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
968 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
970 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
971 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
973 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
975 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
976 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
977 /// confirmation depth.
979 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
980 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
981 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
983 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
985 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
987 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
989 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
991 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
993 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
994 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
995 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
997 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
998 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1000 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1001 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1002 /// keeping additional state.
1003 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1005 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1006 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1007 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1008 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1010 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1011 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1013 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1014 /// are currently open with that peer.
1016 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1017 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1020 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1022 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1023 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1024 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1025 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1026 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1028 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1029 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1030 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1031 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1032 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1034 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1035 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1037 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1038 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1039 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1040 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1042 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1043 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1044 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1045 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1046 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1048 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1050 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1052 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1053 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1054 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1055 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1056 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1057 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1058 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1059 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1060 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1062 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1063 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1065 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1069 signer_provider: SP,
1074 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1076 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1077 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1078 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1079 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1080 pub struct ChainParameters {
1081 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1082 pub network: Network,
1084 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1086 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1087 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1090 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1097 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1098 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1099 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1100 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1101 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1102 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1104 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1105 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1106 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1107 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1108 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1110 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1111 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1114 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1115 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1116 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1117 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1119 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1120 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1121 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1122 _read_guard: read_guard,
1127 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1128 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1129 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1130 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1132 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1133 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1134 should_persist: persist_check,
1135 _read_guard: read_guard,
1140 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1141 fn drop(&mut self) {
1142 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1143 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1148 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1149 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1151 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1153 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1154 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1155 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1156 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1157 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1159 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1160 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1162 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1164 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1165 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1166 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1167 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1168 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1169 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1170 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1171 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1172 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1173 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1174 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1175 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1176 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1178 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1179 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1181 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1182 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1183 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1184 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1186 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1187 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1188 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1189 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1190 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1191 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1194 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1196 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1197 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1200 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1202 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1203 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1205 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1206 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1207 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1208 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1210 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1211 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1212 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1214 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1215 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1216 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1218 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1219 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1220 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1221 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1223 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1224 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1225 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1227 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1228 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1229 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1231 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1232 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1233 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1234 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1235 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1236 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1237 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1238 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1239 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1240 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1241 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1244 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1245 /// to better separate parameters.
1246 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1247 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1248 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1249 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1250 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1251 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1252 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1253 pub features: InitFeatures,
1254 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1255 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1256 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1258 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1260 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1261 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1262 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1263 /// payments to us through this channel.
1264 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1265 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1266 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1267 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1268 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1269 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1270 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1273 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1274 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1275 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1276 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1277 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1278 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1279 /// lifetime of the channel.
1280 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1281 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1282 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1283 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1284 /// our counterparty already.
1286 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1287 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1288 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1289 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1291 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1292 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1293 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1294 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1296 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1297 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1299 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1300 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1302 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1303 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1304 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1305 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1306 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1307 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1308 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1309 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1310 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1313 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1315 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1316 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1317 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1318 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1319 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1320 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1321 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1323 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1324 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1326 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1327 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1328 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1329 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1330 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1331 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1332 /// this value on chain.
1334 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1336 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1338 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1339 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1340 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1341 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1343 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1344 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1345 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1347 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1348 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1349 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1350 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1351 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1353 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1354 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1355 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1356 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1358 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1359 pub balance_msat: u64,
1360 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1361 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1362 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1363 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1365 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1367 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1368 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1369 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1370 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1371 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1372 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1373 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1374 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1376 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1377 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1378 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1379 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1380 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1381 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1382 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1384 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1385 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1386 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1387 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1388 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1389 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1390 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1391 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1392 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1394 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1396 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1397 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1398 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1399 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1400 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1402 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1403 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1404 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1405 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1406 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1407 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1408 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1410 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1411 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1412 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1413 pub is_outbound: bool,
1414 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1415 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1416 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1417 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1418 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1420 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1421 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1422 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1423 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1425 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1426 pub is_usable: bool,
1427 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1428 pub is_public: bool,
1429 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1430 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1431 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1432 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1433 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1434 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1436 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1437 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1440 impl ChannelDetails {
1441 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1442 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1443 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1445 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1446 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1447 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1448 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1451 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1452 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1453 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1455 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1456 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1457 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1458 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1461 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1462 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1464 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1465 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1466 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1468 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1469 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1470 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1471 features: latest_features,
1472 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1473 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1474 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1475 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1476 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1477 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1478 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1479 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1480 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1481 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1483 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1484 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1485 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1486 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1487 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1488 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1489 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1490 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1491 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1492 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1493 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1494 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1495 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1496 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1497 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1498 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1499 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1500 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1501 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1502 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1503 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1504 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1505 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1506 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1507 config: Some(channel.config()),
1512 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1513 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1514 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1515 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1516 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1518 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1520 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1521 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1522 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1525 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1526 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1527 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1529 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1530 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1531 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1533 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1534 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1535 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1537 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1538 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1542 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1544 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1546 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1547 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1548 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1549 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1551 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1552 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1553 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1556 macro_rules! handle_error {
1557 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1558 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1559 // entering the macro.
1560 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1561 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1565 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1566 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1568 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1569 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1570 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1571 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1575 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1576 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1577 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1578 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1583 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1584 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1586 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1587 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1588 action: err.action.clone()
1592 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1593 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1594 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1595 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1596 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1600 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1607 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1608 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1609 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1610 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1611 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1612 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1614 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1615 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1616 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1617 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1618 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1620 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1621 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1623 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1627 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1628 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1629 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1631 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1632 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1634 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1635 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1637 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1638 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1639 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1640 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1641 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1642 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1648 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1649 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1653 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1655 $entry.remove_entry();
1663 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1664 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1668 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1670 $entry.remove_entry();
1678 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1679 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1681 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1682 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1688 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1689 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1690 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1691 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1692 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1694 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1695 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1696 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1697 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1698 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1699 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1700 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1701 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1702 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1703 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1708 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1709 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1710 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1711 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1712 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1713 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1714 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1715 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1716 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1718 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1723 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1724 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1725 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1726 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1727 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1728 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1729 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1730 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1731 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1733 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1738 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1739 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1740 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1741 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1742 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1743 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1744 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1745 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1746 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1747 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1748 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1750 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1751 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1752 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1758 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1759 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1761 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1762 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1763 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1764 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1765 updates.announcement_sigs);
1766 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1767 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1770 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1771 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1772 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1774 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1776 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1777 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1779 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1780 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1781 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1782 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1787 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1788 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1789 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1790 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1791 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1792 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1793 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1796 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1797 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1798 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1801 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1802 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1803 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1804 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1805 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1806 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1807 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1808 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1812 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1813 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1814 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1815 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1821 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1822 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1826 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1827 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1828 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1829 while !processed_all_events {
1830 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1834 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1837 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1838 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1839 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1841 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
1842 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
1843 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
1845 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1846 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1847 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1848 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1852 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1853 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1854 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1855 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1858 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1860 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1861 $event_to_handle = event;
1863 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1864 post_event_actions.push(action);
1869 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1870 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1871 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1872 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1875 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1876 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1877 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1878 processed_all_events = false;
1881 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1882 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1888 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1890 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1891 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1892 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1893 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1894 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1895 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1899 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1901 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1902 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1904 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1906 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1907 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1908 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1911 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1912 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1913 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1914 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1915 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1916 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1917 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1918 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1920 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1921 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1922 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1927 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1929 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1930 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1931 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1932 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1933 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1934 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1935 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1936 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1938 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1941 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1942 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1944 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1946 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1948 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1950 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
1951 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1952 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1953 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1954 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1955 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
1956 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1966 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1967 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1968 &self.default_configuration
1971 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1972 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1973 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1976 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1977 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1979 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1981 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1985 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1990 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1992 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1993 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1994 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1995 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1996 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1998 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1999 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2001 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2002 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2003 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2005 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2006 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2007 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2009 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2010 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2011 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2012 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2013 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2014 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2016 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2017 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2018 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2019 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2020 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2021 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2024 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2025 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2026 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2028 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2030 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2031 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2033 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2035 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2036 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2037 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2038 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2039 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2040 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2044 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2049 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2051 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
2052 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2053 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2055 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2057 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2060 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2063 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2064 node_id: their_network_key,
2067 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2070 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2071 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2072 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2073 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2074 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2075 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2076 // the same channel.
2077 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2079 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2080 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2081 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2082 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2083 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2084 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2085 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
2086 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2094 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2095 /// more information.
2096 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2097 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
2100 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2101 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2103 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2104 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2106 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2107 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2108 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2109 // really wanted anyway.
2110 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
2113 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2114 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2115 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2116 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2118 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2119 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2120 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2121 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2122 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2125 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2131 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2132 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2134 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2135 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2136 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2138 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2139 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2140 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2141 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2142 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2143 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2144 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2145 total_msat: *total_msat,
2148 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2149 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2151 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2152 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2154 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2159 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2160 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2161 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2162 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2163 Some(transaction) => {
2164 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2165 channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction
2170 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2171 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2172 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2173 reason: closure_reason
2177 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2178 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2180 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2181 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2182 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2184 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2185 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2187 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2188 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2189 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2190 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2191 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2192 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2193 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2194 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2195 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2197 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2198 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2199 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2200 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2201 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2205 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2206 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2207 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2208 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2209 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2212 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2213 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2214 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2215 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2219 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2223 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2227 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2228 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2229 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2230 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2233 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2237 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2238 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2239 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2241 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2242 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2244 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2245 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2246 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2247 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2249 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2251 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2252 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2253 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2256 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2257 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2258 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2259 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2260 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2261 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2264 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2265 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2266 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2268 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2269 /// the channel being closed or not:
2270 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2271 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2272 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2273 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2274 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2275 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2276 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2278 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2279 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2280 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2281 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2283 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2285 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2286 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2287 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2290 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2291 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2292 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2293 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2294 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2295 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2299 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2300 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2301 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2302 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2303 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2304 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2305 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2306 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2308 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2309 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2310 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2311 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2312 // ignore the result here.
2313 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2317 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2318 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2319 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2320 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2321 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2322 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2323 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2325 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2326 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2327 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2328 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2329 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2331 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2333 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2335 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2338 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2339 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2340 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2341 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2342 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2347 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2350 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2351 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2352 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2353 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2354 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2355 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2356 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2357 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2358 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2359 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2360 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2361 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2372 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2373 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2374 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2376 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2377 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2378 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2381 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2382 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2383 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2385 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2386 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2387 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2388 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2389 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2392 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2393 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2394 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2395 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2396 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2400 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2401 /// local transaction(s).
2402 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2403 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2404 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2408 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2409 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2411 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2412 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2413 return Err(ReceiveError {
2414 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2416 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2419 // final_expiry_too_soon
2420 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2421 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2423 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2424 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2425 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2426 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2427 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2428 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2429 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2430 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2431 return Err(ReceiveError {
2432 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2433 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2436 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2437 return Err(ReceiveError {
2439 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2440 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2444 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2445 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2446 return Err(ReceiveError {
2447 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2448 err_data: Vec::new(),
2449 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2452 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2453 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2454 return Err(ReceiveError {
2455 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2456 err_data: Vec::new(),
2457 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2459 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2460 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2463 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2464 phantom_shared_secret,
2466 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2467 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2468 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2469 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2470 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2471 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2472 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2473 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2474 return Err(ReceiveError {
2475 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2476 err_data: Vec::new(),
2477 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2481 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2484 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2487 return Err(ReceiveError {
2488 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2489 err_data: Vec::new(),
2490 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2495 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2498 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2499 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2500 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2501 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2505 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2506 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2507 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2509 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2510 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2511 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2512 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2513 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2514 failure_code: $err_code,
2520 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2521 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2524 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2525 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2526 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2528 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2529 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2530 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2531 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2532 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2533 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2534 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2535 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2537 macro_rules! return_err {
2538 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2540 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2541 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2542 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2543 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2544 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2545 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2551 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2553 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2554 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2556 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2557 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2561 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2562 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2564 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2566 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2567 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2568 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2569 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2570 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2572 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2575 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2576 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2577 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2579 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2580 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2581 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2584 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2585 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2586 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2587 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2591 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2592 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2593 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2596 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2597 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2598 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2599 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2600 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2605 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2606 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2607 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2608 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2609 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2610 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2611 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2612 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2613 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2614 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2615 // phantom or an intercept.
2616 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2617 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2618 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2622 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2625 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2627 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2628 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2629 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2630 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2631 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2633 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2634 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2635 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2637 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2638 // have no consistency guarantees.
2639 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2643 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2644 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2645 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2646 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2647 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2649 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2650 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2651 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2652 // we don't have the channel here.
2653 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2655 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2657 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2658 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2659 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2660 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2661 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2662 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2663 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2664 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2665 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2666 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2667 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2669 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2672 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2673 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2675 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2676 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2680 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2681 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2682 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2683 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2685 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2692 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2693 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2694 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2695 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2696 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2697 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2699 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2700 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2702 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2703 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2704 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2705 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2706 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2707 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2708 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2709 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2710 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2711 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2717 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2718 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2719 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2720 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2722 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2723 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2725 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2726 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2727 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2729 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2730 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2731 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2732 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2733 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2734 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2735 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2739 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2744 pending_forward_info
2747 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2748 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2749 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2751 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2752 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2753 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2755 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2756 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2757 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2758 if !chan.should_announce() {
2759 return Err(LightningError {
2760 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2761 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2764 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2765 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2767 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2768 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2771 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2772 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2773 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2774 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2776 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2777 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2778 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2780 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2781 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2782 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2783 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2784 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2785 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2789 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2791 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2792 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2793 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2795 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2796 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2797 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2798 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2799 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2802 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2803 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2805 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2806 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2807 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2808 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2809 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2810 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2811 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2812 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2814 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2815 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2816 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2818 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2820 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2827 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2828 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2829 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2832 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2833 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2834 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2836 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2837 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2838 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2840 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2841 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2842 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2844 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
2845 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
2847 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2848 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2849 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2850 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2853 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2854 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2855 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2856 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2857 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2858 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2859 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2860 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2862 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2863 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2864 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2866 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2867 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2869 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2870 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2871 Some(monitor_update) => {
2872 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2873 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2874 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2877 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2878 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2879 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2880 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2881 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2882 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2883 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2884 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2890 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2891 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2892 // `channel_by_id` map.
2893 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2894 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2899 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2900 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2902 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2907 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2909 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2910 /// fields for more info.
2912 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2913 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2915 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2917 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2918 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2919 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2920 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2921 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2923 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2924 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2925 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2926 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2927 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2929 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2930 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2931 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2932 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2934 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2936 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2937 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2938 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2940 /// In general, a path may raise:
2941 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2942 /// node public key) is specified.
2943 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2944 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2946 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2947 /// relevant updates.
2949 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2950 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2951 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2953 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2954 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2955 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2956 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2957 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2958 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2959 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2960 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2961 self.pending_outbound_payments
2962 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2963 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2964 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2967 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2968 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2969 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2970 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2971 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2972 self.pending_outbound_payments
2973 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2974 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2975 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2976 &self.pending_events,
2977 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2978 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2982 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2983 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2984 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2985 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2986 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2987 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2991 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2992 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2993 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2997 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
2998 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3002 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3003 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3004 /// retries are exhausted.
3006 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3007 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3009 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3010 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3011 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3013 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3014 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3016 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3017 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3018 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3019 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3020 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3023 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3024 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3025 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3026 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3027 /// never reach the recipient.
3029 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3030 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3032 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3033 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3035 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
3037 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3038 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3039 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3040 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3041 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3042 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3043 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3044 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3045 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3048 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3049 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3051 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3054 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3055 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3056 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3057 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3058 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3059 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3060 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3061 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3062 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3063 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3066 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3067 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3068 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3069 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3070 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3071 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3072 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3073 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3074 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3077 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3080 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3081 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3084 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3085 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3086 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3087 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3088 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3089 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3090 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3091 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3093 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3094 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3095 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3097 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3099 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3100 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3101 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
3102 } else { unreachable!(); });
3104 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
3106 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3107 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3109 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
3110 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3111 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3117 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3119 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3120 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3125 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3126 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3129 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
3130 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3131 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3134 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3135 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3136 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3145 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3146 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3147 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3151 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3153 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3154 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3156 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3157 /// across the p2p network.
3159 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3160 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3162 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3163 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3164 /// keys per-channel).
3166 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3167 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3168 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3170 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3171 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3172 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3174 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3175 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3176 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3177 /// for more details.
3179 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3180 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3181 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3182 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3184 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3185 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3186 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3187 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3192 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3193 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3194 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3195 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3196 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3197 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3198 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3199 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3203 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3204 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3205 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3206 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3210 let mut output_index = None;
3211 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3212 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3213 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3214 if output_index.is_some() {
3215 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3216 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3219 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3222 if output_index.is_none() {
3223 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3224 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3227 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3231 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3233 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3234 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3235 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3236 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3238 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3239 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3241 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3242 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3244 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3246 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3247 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3248 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3249 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3250 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3251 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3252 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3253 pub fn update_channel_config(
3254 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3255 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3256 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3257 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3258 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3263 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3264 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3265 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3266 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3267 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3268 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3269 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3270 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3271 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3275 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3276 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3277 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3280 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3281 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3282 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3283 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3284 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3292 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3293 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3295 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3296 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3298 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3299 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3300 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3301 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3302 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3304 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3305 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3307 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3310 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3311 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3312 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3313 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3314 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3315 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3317 let next_hop_scid = {
3318 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3319 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3320 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3321 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3322 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3323 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3325 if !chan.is_usable() {
3326 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3327 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3330 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3332 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3333 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3338 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3339 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3340 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3343 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3344 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3345 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3347 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3349 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3350 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3353 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3354 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3355 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3356 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3357 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3359 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3363 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3364 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3366 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3369 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3370 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3371 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3373 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3374 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3375 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3378 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3379 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3380 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3381 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3382 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3383 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3384 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3387 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3388 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3389 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3390 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3395 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3397 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3398 /// Will likely generate further events.
3399 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3400 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3402 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3403 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3404 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3406 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3407 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3409 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3410 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3411 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3413 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3414 match forward_info {
3415 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3416 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3417 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3418 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3419 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3422 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3423 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3424 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3426 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3427 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3428 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3429 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3430 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3431 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3434 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3435 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3437 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3440 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3441 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3447 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3448 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3450 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3454 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3455 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3457 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3461 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3462 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3463 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3464 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3465 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3467 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3468 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3469 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3470 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3471 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3473 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3475 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3476 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3480 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3481 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3482 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3483 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3489 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3492 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3495 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3496 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3497 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3498 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3499 // problem, not ours.
3505 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3506 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3508 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3512 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3513 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3514 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3515 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3518 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3519 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3520 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3521 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3522 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3525 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3526 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3527 match forward_info {
3528 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3529 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3530 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3531 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3532 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3535 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3536 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3537 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3538 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3539 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3540 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3541 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3542 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3544 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3545 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3546 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3548 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3549 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3551 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3553 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3554 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3555 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3556 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3561 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3562 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3564 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3565 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3566 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3567 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3569 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3570 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3572 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3574 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3575 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3576 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3585 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3586 match forward_info {
3587 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3588 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3589 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3590 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3593 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3594 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3595 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3597 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3598 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3599 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3601 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3602 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3603 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3604 None, None, onion_fields)
3607 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3610 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3611 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3612 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3613 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3614 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3615 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3616 phantom_shared_secret,
3618 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3619 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3620 // if routing nodes overpay
3621 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3622 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3624 total_value_received: None,
3625 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3630 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3632 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3633 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3634 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3635 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3636 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3637 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3639 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3640 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3641 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3642 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3643 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3644 phantom_shared_secret,
3646 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3647 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3649 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3652 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3653 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3654 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3655 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3656 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3659 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3660 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3661 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3663 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3664 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3665 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3668 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3669 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3670 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3672 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3673 .entry(payment_hash)
3674 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3675 .or_insert_with(|| {
3676 committed_to_claimable = true;
3678 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3681 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3682 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3683 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3686 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3688 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3689 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3690 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3691 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3692 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3695 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3696 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3697 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3698 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3699 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3700 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3701 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3702 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3703 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3704 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3705 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3707 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3709 _ => unreachable!(),
3712 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3713 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3714 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3715 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3716 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3717 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3718 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3719 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3720 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3721 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3722 committed_to_claimable = true;
3724 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3725 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3726 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3727 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3728 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3729 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3733 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3734 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3735 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3736 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3738 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3740 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3741 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3743 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3744 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3745 committed_to_claimable = true;
3748 payment_claimable_generated
3752 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3753 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3754 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3755 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3756 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3757 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3758 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3759 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3760 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3761 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3762 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3763 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3764 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3765 Ok(result) => result,
3767 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3768 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3771 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3772 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3773 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3774 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3775 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3776 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3779 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3781 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3782 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3783 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3784 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3786 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3787 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3788 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3789 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3790 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3791 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3792 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3793 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3794 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3795 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3797 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3798 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3799 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3803 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3804 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3806 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3809 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3810 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3811 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3817 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3818 if payment_data.is_none() {
3819 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3820 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3822 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3823 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3824 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3825 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3826 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3827 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3828 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3829 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3831 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3832 if payment_claimable_generated {
3833 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3839 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3840 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3848 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3849 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3850 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3851 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3852 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3853 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3855 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3856 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3858 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3860 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3861 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3862 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3864 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3866 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3867 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3868 events.append(&mut new_events);
3871 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
3873 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3874 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
3875 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
3877 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3878 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3880 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3881 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3882 if background_events.is_empty() {
3883 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3886 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3888 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
3889 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3890 // monitor updating completing.
3891 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3893 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
3894 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3897 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3898 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3899 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3900 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3901 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3902 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3903 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update.update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
3905 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
3909 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
3910 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
3911 // however, ensure that.
3913 log_error!(self.logger,
3914 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
3916 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3920 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3923 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3924 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3925 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3926 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3927 let _ = self.process_background_events();
3930 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3931 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3932 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3933 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3934 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3935 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3936 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3938 if !chan.is_live() {
3939 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3940 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3941 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3943 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3944 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3946 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3947 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3951 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3952 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3953 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3954 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3955 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3956 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3957 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
3959 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3961 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3962 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3963 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3964 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3965 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3966 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3967 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3975 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3977 /// This currently includes:
3978 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3979 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3980 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3982 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3983 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3984 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3986 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3987 /// estimate fetches.
3989 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3990 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3991 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3992 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3993 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
3995 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3997 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3998 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3999 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4001 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4002 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4003 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4004 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4005 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4006 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4007 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4008 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4009 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4011 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4012 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4013 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4014 if needs_close { return false; }
4017 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4018 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4019 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4020 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
4021 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4022 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
4023 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4024 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
4026 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4027 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4028 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4029 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4033 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4035 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4038 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
4040 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4041 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4042 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4043 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4047 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4049 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4055 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4057 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4058 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4059 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4060 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4061 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4062 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4063 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4064 channel_id: *chan_id,
4065 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4073 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4074 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4079 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4080 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4081 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4082 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4083 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4084 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4085 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4086 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4087 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4088 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4089 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4090 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4091 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4092 // have no channels to the peer.
4093 let remove_entry = {
4094 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4095 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4098 entry.remove_entry();
4101 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4106 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4107 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4108 // This should be unreachable
4109 debug_assert!(false);
4112 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4113 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4114 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4115 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4116 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4117 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4118 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4121 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4122 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4123 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4125 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4126 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4133 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4134 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4135 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4136 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4137 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4140 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4141 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4144 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4146 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4147 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4148 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4149 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4150 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4157 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4158 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4159 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4161 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4162 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4163 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4164 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4166 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4167 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4168 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4169 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4170 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4171 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4174 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4175 /// reason for the failure.
4177 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4178 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4179 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4181 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4182 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4183 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4184 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4185 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4186 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4187 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4192 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4193 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4194 match failure_code {
4195 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4196 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4197 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4198 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4199 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4200 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4205 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4206 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4208 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4210 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4211 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4212 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4213 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4214 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4215 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
4216 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4218 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
4220 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4221 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4223 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4228 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4229 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4230 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4231 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4232 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4233 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4234 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4235 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4236 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4237 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4239 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4240 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4241 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4242 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4244 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4245 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4246 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4247 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4248 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4252 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4253 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4254 // be surfaced to the user.
4255 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4256 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4257 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4259 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4260 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4261 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4262 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4263 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4264 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4265 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4266 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4268 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4270 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4273 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4274 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4275 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4276 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4280 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4281 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4282 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4283 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4284 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4285 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4286 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4287 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4288 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4291 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4292 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4293 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4296 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4297 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4298 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4300 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4301 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4302 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4303 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4304 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4306 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4307 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4308 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4310 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4311 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4312 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4313 push_forward_ev = true;
4315 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4316 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4317 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4319 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4320 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4323 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4324 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4325 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4326 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4327 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4328 failed_next_destination: destination,
4334 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4335 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4337 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4338 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4339 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4340 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4342 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4343 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4344 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4345 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4347 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4348 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4349 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4350 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4351 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4352 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4353 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4354 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4356 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4359 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4360 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4361 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4362 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4363 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4364 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4365 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4366 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4371 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4372 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4373 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4375 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4376 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4377 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4378 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4383 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4385 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4386 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4387 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4388 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4389 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4390 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4391 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4392 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4393 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4394 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4395 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4396 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4397 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4398 debug_assert!(false);
4402 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4404 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4405 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4406 debug_assert!(false);
4410 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4412 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4413 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4414 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4415 if sources.len() != 1 {
4416 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4417 debug_assert!(false);
4423 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4425 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4426 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4427 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4428 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4431 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4432 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4433 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4434 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4438 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4439 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4440 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4441 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4443 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4444 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4445 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4446 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4447 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4452 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4453 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4454 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4455 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4456 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4457 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4458 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4460 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4463 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4464 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4465 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4466 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4470 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4471 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4472 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4473 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4476 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4477 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4478 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4479 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4483 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4484 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4485 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4488 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4489 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4490 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4491 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4492 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4493 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4495 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4496 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4497 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4498 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4499 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4501 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4502 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4503 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4504 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4505 if let Err(e) = res {
4506 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4507 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4508 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4509 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4510 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4517 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4518 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4519 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4523 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4524 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4525 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4526 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4527 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4528 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4529 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4530 // again on restart.
4531 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4532 payment_preimage, update_res);
4534 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4535 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4536 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4537 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4538 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4539 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4543 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4544 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4547 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4549 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4550 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4552 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4553 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4554 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4555 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4556 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4557 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4558 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4561 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4562 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4564 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4565 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4566 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4567 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4569 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4573 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4574 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4575 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4581 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4582 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4583 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4586 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4587 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4589 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4590 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4591 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4592 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4593 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4597 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4598 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
4600 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4601 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
4602 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
4609 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4610 /// update completion.
4611 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4612 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4613 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4614 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4615 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4616 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4617 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4618 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4619 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4620 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4621 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4622 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4623 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4625 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4627 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4628 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4629 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4630 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4633 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4634 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4636 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4637 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4638 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4643 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4644 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4645 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4646 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4651 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4652 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4653 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4654 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4655 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4660 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4664 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4670 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4671 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4672 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
4676 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4677 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4678 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4684 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4685 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4687 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4688 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4690 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4691 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4692 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4693 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4694 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4699 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4700 let mut peer_state_lock;
4701 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4702 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4703 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4704 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4706 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4707 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4708 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4711 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4712 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4713 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4716 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4719 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4721 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4722 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4725 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4726 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4727 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4729 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4730 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4731 /// used to accept such channels.
4733 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4734 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4735 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4736 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4739 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4740 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4742 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4743 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4744 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4746 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4747 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4749 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4750 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4752 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4753 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4755 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4756 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4757 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4758 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4761 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4762 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4764 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4765 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4766 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4767 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4768 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4769 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4770 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4771 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4772 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4773 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4774 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4777 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4778 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4779 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4780 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4781 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4782 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4785 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4786 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4787 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4789 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4790 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4791 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4792 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4793 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4794 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4795 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4796 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4799 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4800 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4801 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4805 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4806 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4807 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4810 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4811 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4817 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4818 /// or 0-conf channels.
4820 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4821 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4822 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4823 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4824 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4825 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4827 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4828 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4829 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4830 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4831 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4832 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4833 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4837 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4840 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4841 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4843 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4844 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4845 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4846 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4848 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4851 num_unfunded_channels
4854 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4855 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4856 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4859 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4860 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4863 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4864 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4865 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4866 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4868 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4869 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4870 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4871 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4873 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4874 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4876 debug_assert!(false);
4877 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4879 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4880 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4882 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4883 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4884 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4885 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4886 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4887 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4889 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4890 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4891 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4894 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4895 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4896 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4897 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4898 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4901 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4902 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4903 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4906 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4907 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4911 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4912 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4913 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4914 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4916 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4917 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4918 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4919 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4921 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4922 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4923 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4926 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4927 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4928 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4929 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4930 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4931 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4932 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4936 entry.insert(channel);
4942 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4943 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4944 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4945 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4947 debug_assert!(false);
4948 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4950 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4951 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4952 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4953 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4954 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4955 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4957 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4960 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4961 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4962 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4963 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4964 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4966 user_channel_id: user_id,
4971 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4972 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4974 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4975 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4977 debug_assert!(false);
4978 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4981 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4982 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4983 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4984 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4985 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4986 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4988 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4991 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4992 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4993 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4995 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4996 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4998 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4999 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5000 funding_msg.channel_id))
5002 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5003 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
5007 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5008 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5009 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5010 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5011 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5012 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5013 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5017 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5019 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5020 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5021 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5023 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5024 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5025 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5026 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5027 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5028 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5029 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5030 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5038 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5039 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5040 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5041 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5043 debug_assert!(false);
5044 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5047 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5048 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5049 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5050 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5051 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5052 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5053 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5054 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5055 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5056 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5057 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5058 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5059 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5060 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5065 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5069 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5070 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5071 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5073 debug_assert!(false);
5074 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5076 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5077 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5078 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5079 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5080 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5081 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5082 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5083 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
5084 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5085 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5086 msg: announcement_sigs,
5088 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5089 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5090 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5091 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5092 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5093 // announcement_signatures.
5094 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
5095 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5096 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5097 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5104 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5105 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5110 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5114 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5115 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5116 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5117 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5118 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5120 debug_assert!(false);
5121 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5123 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5124 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5125 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5128 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5129 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5130 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5131 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5134 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
5135 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5136 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5137 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5139 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5140 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5141 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5142 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5143 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5144 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5149 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5150 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5151 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5152 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5153 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5160 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5161 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5162 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5163 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5169 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5170 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5171 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5173 debug_assert!(false);
5174 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5176 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5177 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5178 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5179 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5180 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5181 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5182 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5183 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5184 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5189 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5190 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5191 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5192 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5193 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5194 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5195 } else { (tx, None) }
5197 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5200 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5201 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5202 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5204 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5205 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5206 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5207 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5208 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5212 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5217 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5218 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5219 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5220 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5222 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5223 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5224 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5225 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5227 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5228 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5229 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5231 debug_assert!(false);
5232 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5234 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5235 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5236 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5237 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5239 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5240 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5241 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5242 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5243 match pending_forward_info {
5244 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5245 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5246 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5247 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5249 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5250 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5251 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5252 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5253 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5256 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5258 _ => pending_forward_info
5261 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5263 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5268 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5269 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5270 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5271 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5273 debug_assert!(false);
5274 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5276 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5277 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5278 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5279 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5280 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5282 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5285 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5289 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5290 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5291 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5293 debug_assert!(false);
5294 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5296 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5297 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5298 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5300 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5302 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5307 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5308 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5309 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5311 debug_assert!(false);
5312 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5314 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5315 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5316 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5318 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5319 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5320 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5322 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5329 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5330 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5331 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5333 debug_assert!(false);
5334 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5336 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5337 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5338 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5339 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5340 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5341 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5342 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5343 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5344 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5345 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5346 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5349 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5354 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5355 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5356 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5357 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5358 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5359 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5360 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5361 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5362 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5363 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5364 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5366 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5367 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5369 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5370 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5371 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5372 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5373 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5374 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5376 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5377 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5378 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5380 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5381 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5382 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5383 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5384 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5385 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5386 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5387 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5388 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5391 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5392 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5394 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5395 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5396 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5397 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5398 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5399 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5400 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5401 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5404 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5405 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5406 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5411 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5412 // payments are being processed.
5413 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5414 push_forward_event = true;
5416 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5417 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5424 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5425 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5428 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5429 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5430 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5432 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5436 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5437 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5438 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5439 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5440 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5442 if !forward_ev_exists {
5443 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5445 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5450 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5451 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other event
5452 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5453 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5454 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5455 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5456 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5458 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5459 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5460 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5461 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5462 channel_funding_outpoint,
5463 counterparty_node_id,
5468 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5469 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5470 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5471 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5473 debug_assert!(false);
5474 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5475 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5476 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5477 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5478 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5479 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5480 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5481 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5482 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5483 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5484 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5485 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5487 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5492 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5496 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5497 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5498 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5500 debug_assert!(false);
5501 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5503 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5504 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5505 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5506 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5507 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5509 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5514 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5515 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5516 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5518 debug_assert!(false);
5519 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5521 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5522 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5523 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5524 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5525 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5526 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5529 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5530 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5531 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5532 msg, &self.default_configuration
5534 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5535 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5536 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5539 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5544 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5545 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5546 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5547 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5549 // It's not a local channel
5550 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5553 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5554 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5555 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5556 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5558 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5559 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5560 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5561 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5562 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5563 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5564 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5565 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5566 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5567 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5569 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5571 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5572 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5573 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5574 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5576 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5577 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5580 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5582 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5585 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5587 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5588 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5590 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5592 debug_assert!(false);
5593 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5595 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5596 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5597 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5598 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5599 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5600 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5601 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5602 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5603 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5604 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5605 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5606 let mut channel_update = None;
5607 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5608 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5609 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5612 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5613 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5614 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5615 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5616 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5617 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5618 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5623 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5624 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5625 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5626 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5627 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5628 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5632 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5636 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5637 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5640 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5641 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5646 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5647 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5648 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5650 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5651 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5652 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5653 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5654 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5655 match monitor_event {
5656 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5657 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5658 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5659 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5661 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5662 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5663 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5664 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5667 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5668 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5669 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5670 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5672 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5673 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5674 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5675 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5678 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5679 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5680 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5681 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5682 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5683 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5684 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5685 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5686 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5687 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5688 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5692 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5693 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5695 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5697 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5698 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5699 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5700 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5701 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5708 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5709 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5715 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5716 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5719 has_pending_monitor_events
5722 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5723 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5724 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5726 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5727 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5728 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5731 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5732 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5733 /// update was applied.
5734 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5735 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5736 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5737 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5739 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5740 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5741 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5742 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5744 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5745 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5747 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5748 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5749 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5750 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5751 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5752 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5753 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5754 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5755 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5757 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5758 has_monitor_update = true;
5760 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5761 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5762 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5763 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5764 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5765 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5766 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5768 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5770 continue 'peer_loop;
5779 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5780 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5781 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5784 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5785 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5791 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5792 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5793 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5794 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5795 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5796 let mut has_update = false;
5798 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5800 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5801 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5802 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5803 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5804 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5805 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5806 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5807 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5809 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5810 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5813 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5814 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5815 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5816 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5817 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5822 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5824 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5825 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5826 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5832 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5833 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5841 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5842 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5848 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5849 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5851 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5852 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5853 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5854 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5855 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5856 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5857 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5858 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5859 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5860 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5861 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5862 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5863 assert!(should_broadcast);
5864 } else { unreachable!(); }
5865 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5866 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5867 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
5870 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5874 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5875 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5877 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5878 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5881 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5883 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5884 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5885 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5886 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5887 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5888 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5889 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5890 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5891 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5892 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5893 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5894 // never fail a payment too early.
5895 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5897 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5900 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5905 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5908 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5909 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5911 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5912 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5913 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5914 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5916 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5918 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5919 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5923 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5924 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5926 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5928 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5929 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5931 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5932 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5933 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5934 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5935 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5936 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5937 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5938 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5939 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5940 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5941 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5944 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5945 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5947 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5950 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5952 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5954 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5955 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5956 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5957 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5958 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5961 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5962 /// stored external to LDK.
5964 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5965 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5966 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5968 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5969 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5972 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5973 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5974 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5975 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5977 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5978 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5979 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5980 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5981 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5983 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5984 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5985 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5986 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5987 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5989 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5990 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5992 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5993 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5997 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5998 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6000 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6002 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6003 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6005 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6006 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6007 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6008 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6009 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6010 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6011 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6014 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
6015 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
6017 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
6020 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
6022 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6024 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
6025 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
6028 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6029 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6031 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6032 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6033 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6036 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6037 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6039 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6040 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6041 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6042 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6044 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6045 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6046 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6047 Some(_) => continue,
6048 None => return scid_candidate
6053 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6055 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6056 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6058 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6059 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6060 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6064 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6065 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6066 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6068 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6069 /// times to get a unique scid.
6070 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6071 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6072 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6074 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6075 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6076 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6077 return scid_candidate
6081 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6082 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6083 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6084 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6086 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6087 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6088 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6089 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6090 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6091 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6092 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6093 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6102 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6103 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6104 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6105 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6106 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6110 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6111 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6112 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6113 events.push_back((event, None));
6117 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6118 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6119 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6123 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6124 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6128 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6129 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6132 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6133 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6134 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6135 /// making progress and then any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6136 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6137 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6139 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6140 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6141 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6142 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6144 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6145 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6146 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6147 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6149 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6153 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6154 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6155 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6156 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6157 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6158 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6159 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6163 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6164 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6165 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6166 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6167 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6168 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
6169 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
6170 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
6171 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6173 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6175 if further_update_exists {
6176 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6181 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6182 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6186 log_debug!(self.logger,
6187 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6188 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6192 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6193 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6194 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6198 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6199 for action in actions {
6201 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6202 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6204 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6210 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6211 /// using the given event handler.
6213 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6214 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6218 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6222 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6224 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6225 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6226 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6227 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6228 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6229 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6233 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6234 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6235 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6236 /// is always placed next to each other.
6238 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6239 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6240 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6241 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6243 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6244 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6245 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6246 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6247 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6248 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6249 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6251 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6252 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6253 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6254 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6257 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6258 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6260 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6261 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6264 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6265 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6266 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6267 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6268 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6269 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6270 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6274 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6275 events.replace(pending_events);
6284 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6286 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6287 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6288 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6289 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6290 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6291 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6295 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6297 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6298 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6299 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6301 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6305 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6307 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6308 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6309 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6310 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6311 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6312 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6316 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6318 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6319 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6320 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6321 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6322 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6325 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6326 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6329 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6330 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6331 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6332 let new_height = height - 1;
6334 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6335 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6336 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6337 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6338 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6339 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6342 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6346 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6348 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6349 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6350 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6351 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6352 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6353 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6357 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6358 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6359 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6360 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6362 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6363 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6365 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6366 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6367 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6368 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6370 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6371 if height < last_best_block_height {
6372 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6373 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6377 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6378 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6379 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6380 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6382 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6383 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6385 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6386 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6387 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6389 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6391 macro_rules! max_time {
6392 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6394 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6395 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6396 // having an explicit local time source.
6397 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6398 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6399 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6400 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6401 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6407 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6408 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6409 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6410 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6414 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6415 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6416 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6417 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6418 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6419 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6420 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6421 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6428 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6429 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6430 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6431 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6432 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6433 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6434 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6435 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6436 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6441 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6443 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6444 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6445 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6446 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6447 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6448 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6452 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6453 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6455 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6456 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6457 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6458 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6459 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6461 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6462 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6464 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6465 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6466 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6467 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6468 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6469 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6470 let res = f(channel);
6471 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6472 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6473 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6474 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6475 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6477 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6478 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6479 if channel.is_usable() {
6480 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6481 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6482 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6483 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6488 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6493 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6494 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6497 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6498 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6499 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6500 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6501 msg: announcement_sigs,
6503 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6504 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6505 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6507 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6508 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6509 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6514 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6515 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6516 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6517 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6518 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6519 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6520 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6521 // is always consistent.
6522 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6523 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6524 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6525 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6526 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6529 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6530 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6531 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6532 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6533 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6534 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6535 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6539 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6540 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6541 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6542 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6543 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6544 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6545 data: reason_message,
6555 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6556 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6557 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6558 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6559 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6560 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6561 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6562 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6563 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6564 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6566 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6567 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6568 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6572 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6575 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6576 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6577 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6578 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6579 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6580 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6581 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6582 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6583 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6586 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6587 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6588 _ => unreachable!(),
6590 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6591 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6592 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6593 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6599 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6601 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6602 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6606 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6608 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6609 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6611 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6612 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6615 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6616 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6617 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6620 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6621 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6622 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6623 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6626 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6627 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6628 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6629 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6632 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6633 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6635 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6636 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6637 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6638 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6639 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6642 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6643 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6644 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6645 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6648 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6649 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6650 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6651 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6654 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6655 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6656 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6657 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6661 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6662 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6664 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6665 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6666 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6667 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6668 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6669 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6673 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6674 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6675 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6678 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6679 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6680 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6681 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6684 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6685 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6686 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6689 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6690 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6691 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6692 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6695 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6696 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6697 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6700 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6701 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6702 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6705 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6706 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6707 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6710 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6711 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6712 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6715 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6716 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6717 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6720 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6721 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6722 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6725 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6726 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6727 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6730 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6731 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6732 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6735 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6736 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6737 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6740 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6741 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6742 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6745 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6746 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6747 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6750 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6751 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6752 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6755 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6756 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6757 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6760 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6761 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6762 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
6763 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6764 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
6766 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6771 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6772 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6773 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6776 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6777 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6778 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6779 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6781 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6782 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6783 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6784 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6785 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6786 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6787 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6788 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6789 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6790 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6791 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6796 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6798 // V1 Channel Establishment
6799 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6800 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6801 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6802 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6803 // V2 Channel Establishment
6804 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6805 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6806 // Common Channel Establishment
6807 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6808 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6809 // Interactive Transaction Construction
6810 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
6811 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
6812 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
6813 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
6814 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
6815 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
6816 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
6817 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
6818 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
6819 // Channel Operations
6820 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6821 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6822 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6823 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6824 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6825 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6827 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6828 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6829 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6830 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6831 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6832 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6833 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6834 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6835 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6838 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6839 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6840 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6841 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6844 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6846 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6848 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6849 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6853 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6854 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6855 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6859 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6861 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6862 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6863 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6864 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6865 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6866 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6869 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6870 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6872 if inbound_peer_limited {
6875 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6876 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6877 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6878 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6879 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6880 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
6884 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6885 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6886 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6888 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6889 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6890 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6891 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6896 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6897 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6902 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6904 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6905 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6906 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6907 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6908 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6909 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6910 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6911 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6912 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6913 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6914 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6918 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6919 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6920 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6925 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6926 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6927 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6928 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6929 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6938 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6942 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6943 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6945 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6946 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6947 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6948 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6949 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6950 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6951 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6952 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6954 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6955 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6956 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6960 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6961 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6962 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6963 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6964 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6965 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6966 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6967 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6968 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6969 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6977 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6978 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6982 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6983 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6986 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6987 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6990 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
6991 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6992 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6993 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6996 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
6997 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6998 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6999 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7002 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7003 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7004 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7005 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7008 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7009 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7010 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7011 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7014 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7015 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7016 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7017 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7020 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7021 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7022 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7023 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7026 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7027 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7028 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7029 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7032 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7033 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7034 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7035 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7038 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7039 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7040 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7041 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7045 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7046 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7047 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7048 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7051 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7052 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7054 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7055 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7056 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7057 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
7058 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7061 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7062 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7063 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7064 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7067 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7068 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7069 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7070 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7073 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7074 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7075 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7076 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7077 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7078 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7079 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7080 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7081 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7082 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7083 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7084 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7085 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7086 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7087 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7088 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7089 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7090 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7092 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
7093 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7094 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7100 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7101 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7103 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7104 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7105 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7106 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7109 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7110 (2, node_id, required),
7111 (4, features, required),
7112 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7113 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7114 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7115 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7118 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7119 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7120 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7121 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7122 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7123 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7124 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7125 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7126 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7127 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7128 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7129 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7130 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7131 (7, self.config, option),
7132 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7133 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7134 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7135 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7136 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7137 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7138 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7139 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7140 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7141 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7142 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7143 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7144 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7145 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7146 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7147 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7148 (32, self.is_public, required),
7149 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7150 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7151 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7152 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7158 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7159 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7160 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7161 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7162 (2, channel_id, required),
7163 (3, channel_type, option),
7164 (4, counterparty, required),
7165 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7166 (6, funding_txo, option),
7167 (7, config, option),
7168 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7169 (9, confirmations, option),
7170 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7171 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7172 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7173 (16, balance_msat, required),
7174 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7175 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7176 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7177 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7178 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7179 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7180 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7181 (26, is_outbound, required),
7182 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7183 (30, is_usable, required),
7184 (32, is_public, required),
7185 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7186 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7187 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7188 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7191 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7192 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7193 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7194 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7195 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7199 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7201 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7202 outbound_scid_alias,
7206 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7207 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7209 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7210 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7211 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7212 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7213 confirmations_required,
7215 force_close_spend_delay,
7216 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7217 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7218 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7219 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7220 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7221 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7222 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7227 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7228 (2, channels, vec_type),
7229 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7230 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7233 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7235 (0, onion_packet, required),
7236 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7239 (0, payment_data, required),
7240 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7241 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7242 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7244 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7245 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7246 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7247 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7251 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7252 (0, routing, required),
7253 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7254 (4, payment_hash, required),
7255 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7256 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7257 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7261 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7262 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7264 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7266 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7267 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7268 reason.write(writer)?;
7270 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7271 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7274 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7275 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7276 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7277 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7284 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7285 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7286 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7289 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7290 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7291 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7292 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7296 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7297 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7298 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7299 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7300 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7303 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7304 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7305 // messages contained in the variants.
7306 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7307 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7308 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7310 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7311 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7312 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7313 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7314 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7317 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7318 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7319 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7320 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7321 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7323 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7328 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7333 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7334 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7335 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7336 (2, outpoint, required),
7337 (4, htlc_id, required),
7338 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7341 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7342 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7343 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7344 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7345 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7347 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7348 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7349 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7350 (2, self.value, required),
7351 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7352 (4, payment_data, option),
7353 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7354 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7355 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7361 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7362 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7363 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7365 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7366 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7367 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7368 let mut total_value_received = None;
7369 let mut total_msat = None;
7370 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7371 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7372 (0, prev_hop, required),
7373 (1, total_msat, option),
7374 (2, value, required),
7375 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7376 (4, payment_data, option),
7377 (5, total_value_received, option),
7378 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7379 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7381 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7383 if payment_data.is_some() {
7384 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7386 if total_msat.is_none() {
7387 total_msat = Some(value);
7389 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7392 if total_msat.is_none() {
7393 if payment_data.is_none() {
7394 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7396 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7398 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7402 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7405 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7406 total_value_received,
7407 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7414 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7415 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7416 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7419 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7420 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7421 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7422 let mut payment_id = None;
7423 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7424 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7425 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7426 (0, session_priv, required),
7427 (1, payment_id, option),
7428 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7429 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7430 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7431 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7433 if payment_id.is_none() {
7434 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7436 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7438 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7439 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7440 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7442 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7443 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7444 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7445 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7449 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7450 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7451 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7453 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7456 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7457 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7462 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7463 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7465 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7467 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7468 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7469 (0, session_priv, required),
7470 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7471 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7472 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7473 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7474 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7475 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7478 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7480 field.write(writer)?;
7487 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7488 (0, forward_info, required),
7489 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7490 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7491 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7492 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7495 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7497 (0, htlc_id, required),
7498 (2, err_packet, required),
7503 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7504 (0, payment_secret, required),
7505 (2, expiry_time, required),
7506 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7507 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7508 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7511 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7513 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7514 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7515 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7516 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7517 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7518 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7522 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7523 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7525 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7527 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7529 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7530 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7531 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7534 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7536 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7537 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7538 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7539 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7540 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7541 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7542 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7543 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7545 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7546 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7547 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7548 unfunded_channels += 1;
7553 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7555 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7556 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7557 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7558 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7559 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7560 channel.write(writer)?;
7567 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7568 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7569 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7570 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7571 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7572 for forward in pending_forwards {
7573 forward.write(writer)?;
7578 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7580 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7581 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7582 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7584 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7585 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7586 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7587 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7588 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7589 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7590 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7591 htlc.write(writer)?;
7593 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7594 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7597 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7598 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7599 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7600 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7601 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7602 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7603 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7606 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7607 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7608 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7609 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7610 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7612 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7613 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7614 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7615 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7616 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7617 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7618 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7623 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7624 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7625 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7626 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7627 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7628 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7629 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7630 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7631 0u64.write(writer)?;
7633 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7634 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7635 event.write(writer)?;
7639 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7640 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7641 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7642 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7643 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7644 0u64.write(writer)?;
7646 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7647 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7648 // likely to be identical.
7649 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7650 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7652 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7653 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7654 hash.write(writer)?;
7655 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7658 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7659 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7660 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7661 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7662 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7665 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7666 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7668 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7669 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7670 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7671 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7674 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7675 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7679 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7680 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7681 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7683 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7684 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7685 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7691 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7692 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7693 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7694 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7697 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7698 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7699 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7700 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7701 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7704 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7705 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7706 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7707 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7708 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7709 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7710 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7711 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7712 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7713 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7714 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7715 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7722 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7723 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7724 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7725 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7728 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7729 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7730 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7731 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7732 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7733 // check that the event is sane here.
7734 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7735 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7736 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7737 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7743 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7744 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7745 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7746 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7747 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7748 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7751 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7752 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7753 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7754 events.push_back((ev, action));
7755 } else if action.is_some() {
7756 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7763 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7765 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7767 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7768 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7769 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7770 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7771 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7772 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7773 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7774 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7775 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7776 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7777 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7778 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7779 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7781 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7782 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7784 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7785 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7787 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7788 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7789 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7790 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7791 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7792 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7794 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7795 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7797 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7798 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7799 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7800 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7801 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7802 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7806 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7807 pub entropy_source: ES,
7809 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7810 pub node_signer: NS,
7812 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7813 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7815 pub signer_provider: SP,
7817 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7819 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7820 pub fee_estimator: F,
7821 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7823 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7824 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7825 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7826 pub chain_monitor: M,
7828 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7829 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7830 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7831 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7832 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7833 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7835 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7837 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7838 /// deserialization.
7840 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7841 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7842 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7844 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7845 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7847 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7848 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7849 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7850 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7852 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7855 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7856 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7859 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7860 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7862 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7863 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7864 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7865 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7866 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7867 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7871 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7872 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7873 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7874 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7875 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7877 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7878 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7883 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7884 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7885 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7886 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7888 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7889 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7890 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7891 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7892 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7893 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7897 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7898 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7899 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7903 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7904 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7906 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7907 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7908 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7909 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7910 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7911 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7915 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7916 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7918 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7919 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7920 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7922 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7924 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7925 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7926 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7927 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7928 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7929 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
7930 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7931 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7932 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7933 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7935 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7936 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7937 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7938 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7939 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7940 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7941 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7942 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
7943 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7944 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7945 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7946 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7947 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7948 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7949 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7950 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7951 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7952 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7953 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7954 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7955 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7956 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7957 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7958 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
7959 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7960 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7963 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7964 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7965 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7966 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7967 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7969 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7970 let mut found_htlc = false;
7971 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7972 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7975 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7976 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7977 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7978 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7979 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7980 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7981 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7982 log_info!(args.logger,
7983 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7984 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7985 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7989 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
7990 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
7991 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
7992 channel.complete_all_mon_updates_through(monitor.get_latest_update_id());
7993 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7994 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7996 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7997 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7999 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8000 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8001 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8002 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
8004 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8005 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8006 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
8007 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8011 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8012 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8013 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8014 // safely discard the channel.
8015 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
8016 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8017 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
8018 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
8019 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8022 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
8023 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8024 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8025 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8026 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8027 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8031 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8032 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8033 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8034 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8035 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8036 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8037 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8039 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8043 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8044 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8045 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8046 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8047 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8048 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8049 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8050 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8051 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8053 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8056 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8057 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8058 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8059 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8060 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8061 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8062 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8063 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8065 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8068 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8069 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8070 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8071 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8072 let peer_state = PeerState {
8073 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
8074 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
8075 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8076 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8077 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8078 is_connected: false,
8080 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8083 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8084 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8085 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8086 for _ in 0..event_count {
8087 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8088 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8093 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8094 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8095 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8097 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8098 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8099 // on-startup monitor updates.
8100 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8101 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8103 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8107 for (node_id, peer_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8108 let peer_state = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8109 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8110 for update in chan.uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates() {
8111 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
8112 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for channel {}",
8113 update.update_id, log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8114 pending_background_events.push(
8115 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8116 counterparty_node_id: *node_id, funding_txo, update: update.clone(),
8119 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8125 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8126 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8128 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8129 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8130 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8131 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8132 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8136 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8137 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8138 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8139 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8140 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8141 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8142 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8144 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8145 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8149 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8150 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8151 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8152 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8153 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8154 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8155 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8156 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8157 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8158 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8159 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8160 let mut events_override = None;
8161 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8162 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8163 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8164 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8165 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8166 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8167 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8168 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8169 (8, events_override, option),
8170 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8171 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8172 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8174 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8175 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8178 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8179 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8182 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8183 pending_events_read = events;
8186 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8187 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8190 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8191 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8192 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8193 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8194 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8195 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8197 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8199 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8200 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8201 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8205 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8206 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8207 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8208 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8209 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8210 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8211 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8213 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8214 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8215 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8216 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8217 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8218 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8219 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8222 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8223 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8224 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8225 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8226 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8227 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8228 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8229 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8231 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8232 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8233 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8234 retry_strategy: None,
8235 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8236 payment_params: None,
8237 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8238 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8239 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8240 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8241 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8242 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8243 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8244 total_msat: path_amt,
8245 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8247 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8248 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8253 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8255 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8256 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8257 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8258 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8260 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8261 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8262 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8263 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8264 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8265 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8266 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8267 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8268 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8269 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8270 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8275 !forwards.is_empty()
8277 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8278 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8279 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8280 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8281 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8282 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8283 intercepted_id != ev_id
8290 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8291 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8292 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8293 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8294 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8295 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8296 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8297 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8298 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8299 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8300 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8301 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8302 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8311 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8312 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8313 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8314 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8315 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8316 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8317 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8318 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8322 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8323 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8325 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8326 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8327 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8328 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8330 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8331 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8332 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8334 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8335 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8337 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8338 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8340 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8343 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8344 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8345 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8347 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8351 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8352 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8353 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8354 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8355 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8357 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8358 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8359 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8360 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8361 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8362 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8363 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8364 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8366 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8367 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8371 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8373 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8375 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8376 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8378 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8379 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8384 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8385 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8387 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8389 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8391 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8392 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8393 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8394 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8398 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8399 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8400 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8401 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8402 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8403 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8404 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8406 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8407 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8408 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8410 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8411 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8412 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8413 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8414 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8415 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8417 if chan.is_usable() {
8418 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8419 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8420 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8421 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8422 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8428 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8430 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8431 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8432 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8433 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8434 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8435 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8436 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8437 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8438 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8439 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8440 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8442 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8443 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8445 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8446 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8447 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8448 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8450 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8451 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8452 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8453 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8455 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8456 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8457 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8458 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8460 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8461 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8462 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8463 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8464 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8465 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8466 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8469 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8470 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8473 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8476 purpose: payment.purpose,
8477 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8483 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8484 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
8485 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
8486 for action in actions.iter() {
8487 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
8488 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
8489 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
8491 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
8492 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8493 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8494 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
8499 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8501 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8502 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8506 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8508 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8509 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8510 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8511 router: args.router,
8513 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8515 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8516 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8517 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8518 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8520 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8521 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8522 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8523 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8524 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8525 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8527 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8532 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8534 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8536 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8537 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8538 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8539 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8540 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8541 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
8542 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8544 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8545 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8546 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8548 logger: args.logger,
8549 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8552 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8553 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8554 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8555 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8556 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8559 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8560 //connection or two.
8562 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8568 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8569 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8570 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8571 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8572 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8573 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8574 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8575 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8576 use crate::ln::msgs;
8577 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8578 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8579 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8580 use crate::util::test_utils;
8581 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
8582 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8585 fn test_notify_limits() {
8586 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8587 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8588 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8589 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8590 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8591 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8593 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8594 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8595 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8596 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8597 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8599 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8601 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8602 // to connect messages with new values
8603 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8604 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8605 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8606 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8607 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8608 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8610 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8611 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8612 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8613 // ... but the last node should not.
8614 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8615 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8616 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8617 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8619 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8620 // about the channel.
8621 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8622 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8623 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8625 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8627 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8628 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8629 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8630 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8631 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8632 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8634 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8635 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8636 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8638 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8639 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8640 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8641 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8642 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8643 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8645 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8646 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8647 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8648 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8649 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8650 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8651 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8652 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8654 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8655 // the channel info has updated.
8656 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8657 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8658 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8659 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8660 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8661 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8665 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8666 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8668 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8669 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8670 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8671 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8672 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8674 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8675 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8676 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8677 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8679 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8680 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8681 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8682 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8683 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8684 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8685 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8686 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8688 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8689 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8690 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8692 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8693 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8694 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8696 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8697 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8698 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8699 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8700 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8702 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8703 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8704 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8706 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8707 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8708 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8709 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8710 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8711 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8712 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8713 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8714 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8716 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8717 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8718 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8720 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8721 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8722 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8724 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8725 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8726 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8727 // lightning messages manually.
8728 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8729 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8732 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8733 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8734 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8736 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8737 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8739 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8740 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8742 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8743 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8744 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8746 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8747 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8748 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8750 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8752 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8753 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8754 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8755 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8758 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8759 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8760 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8761 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8763 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8764 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8765 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8766 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8768 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8771 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8772 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8773 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8774 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8776 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8779 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8780 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8781 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8782 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8789 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8790 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8791 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8792 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8793 // fails as expected.
8794 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8795 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8796 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8797 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8798 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8799 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8800 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8802 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8803 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8804 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8806 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8807 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8808 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8809 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8811 let route = find_route(
8812 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8813 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8815 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8816 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8818 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8819 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8820 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8821 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8822 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8824 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8825 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8826 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8827 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8828 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8830 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8831 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8832 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8833 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8834 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8835 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8836 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8837 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8838 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8840 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8841 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8843 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8844 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8845 let route = find_route(
8846 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8847 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8849 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8850 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8852 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8853 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8854 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8855 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8856 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8858 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8859 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8860 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8861 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8863 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8864 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8865 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8866 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8867 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8869 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8870 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8871 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8873 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8874 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8875 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8876 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8877 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8878 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8879 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8880 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8881 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8883 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8884 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8888 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8889 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8890 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8891 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8892 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8893 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8894 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8896 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8897 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8899 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8900 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8901 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8902 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8904 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8905 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8906 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8907 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8908 let route = find_route(
8909 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8910 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8913 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8914 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8915 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8916 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8917 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8918 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8921 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8922 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8923 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8924 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8925 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8926 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8927 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8929 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8933 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8934 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8935 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8936 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8937 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8938 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8940 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8941 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8943 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8944 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8945 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8946 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8948 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8949 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8950 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8951 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8952 let route = find_route(
8953 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8954 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8957 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8958 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8959 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8960 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8961 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8962 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8963 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8964 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8967 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8968 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8969 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8970 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8971 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8972 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8973 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8975 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8979 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8980 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8981 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8982 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8983 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8985 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8986 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8987 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8988 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8990 // Marshall an MPP route.
8991 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8992 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8993 route.paths.push(path);
8994 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8995 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8996 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8997 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8998 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8999 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9001 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9002 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9004 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9005 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9007 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9012 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9013 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9014 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9015 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9016 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9018 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9020 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9021 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9023 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9024 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9026 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9029 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9030 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9031 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9032 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9033 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9034 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9037 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9040 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9041 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9046 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9047 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9048 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9049 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9050 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9051 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9053 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9054 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9056 total_msat: 100_000,
9059 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9060 // payment verification fails as expected.
9061 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9062 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9063 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9064 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9066 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9070 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9071 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9075 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9076 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9077 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9078 // the channel is successfully closed.
9079 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9080 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9081 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9082 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9084 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9085 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9086 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9087 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9088 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9090 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9091 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9093 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9094 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9095 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9096 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9099 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9101 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9102 // as it has the funding transaction.
9103 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9104 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9105 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9108 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9110 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9112 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9114 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9115 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9116 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9118 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9121 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9122 // as it has the funding transaction.
9123 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9124 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9125 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9128 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9129 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9131 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9132 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9133 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9134 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9136 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9137 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9138 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9139 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9141 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9142 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9144 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9145 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9146 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9147 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9148 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9149 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9150 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9154 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9155 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9156 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9157 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9158 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9159 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9160 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9163 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9165 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9166 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9167 // closing transaction).
9168 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9169 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9170 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9172 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9173 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9174 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9175 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9176 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9179 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9181 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9183 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9184 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9185 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9187 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9189 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9190 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9193 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9194 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9195 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9198 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9199 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9200 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9203 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9205 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9206 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9208 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9209 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9211 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9212 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9217 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9218 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9219 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9220 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9221 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9222 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9223 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9224 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9227 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9228 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9229 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9231 // Test the API functions.
9232 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9234 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9236 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9238 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9240 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9242 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9244 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9248 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9249 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9250 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9251 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9252 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9253 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9255 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9257 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9258 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9260 let mut funding_tx = None;
9261 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9262 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9263 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9266 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9267 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9268 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9269 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9270 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9272 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9274 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9276 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9278 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9280 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9282 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9285 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9286 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9287 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9288 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9289 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9291 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9292 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9294 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9295 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9296 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9297 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9298 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9299 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9300 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9302 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9303 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9304 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9305 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9307 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9308 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9309 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9310 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9311 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9312 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9313 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9315 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9316 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9317 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9318 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9320 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9321 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9322 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9323 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9325 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9326 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9328 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9329 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9330 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9331 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9332 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9334 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9335 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9336 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9338 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9339 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9340 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9342 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9343 // "protected" and can connect again.
9344 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9345 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9346 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9347 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9349 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9351 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9352 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9356 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9357 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9358 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9359 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9360 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9361 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9363 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9365 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9366 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9368 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9369 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9370 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9371 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9374 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9376 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9377 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9378 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9380 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9381 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9382 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9384 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9385 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9386 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9387 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9391 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9392 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9393 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9394 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9395 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9396 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9397 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9398 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9399 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9401 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9403 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9404 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9406 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9407 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9408 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9409 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9410 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9411 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9413 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9414 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9416 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9417 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9419 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9421 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9422 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9425 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9426 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9427 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9428 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9429 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9430 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9431 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9433 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9434 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9435 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9436 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9440 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9442 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9443 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9445 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9446 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9447 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9449 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9450 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9452 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9454 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9459 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9460 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9461 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9462 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9463 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9464 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9465 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9466 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9467 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9468 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9469 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9471 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9472 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9473 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9475 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9476 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9478 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9479 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9481 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9484 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9485 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9487 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9488 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9490 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9496 use crate::chain::Listen;
9497 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9498 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9499 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9500 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9501 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9502 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9503 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9504 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9505 use crate::util::test_utils;
9506 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9508 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9509 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9510 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9512 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9514 use criterion::Criterion;
9516 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9517 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9518 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9519 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9520 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9521 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9522 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9524 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9525 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9527 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9528 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9530 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9532 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9535 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
9536 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9539 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9540 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9541 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9543 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9545 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9546 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9547 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9548 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9549 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9551 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9552 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9554 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9555 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9556 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9557 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9559 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9561 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9563 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9564 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9565 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9566 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9567 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9569 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9571 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9573 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9574 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9575 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9576 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9577 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9580 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9581 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9582 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9584 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9585 } else { panic!(); }
9587 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9588 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9589 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9591 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9592 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9594 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9597 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9598 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9599 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9601 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9602 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9604 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9607 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9609 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
9610 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9611 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9613 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9614 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9615 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9616 match msg_events[0] {
9617 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9618 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9619 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9623 match msg_events[1] {
9624 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9628 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9629 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9631 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9632 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9634 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9637 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9638 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9640 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9641 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9643 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9646 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9647 macro_rules! send_payment {
9648 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9649 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9650 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9651 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9652 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9654 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9655 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9657 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9658 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9659 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9660 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9661 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9662 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9663 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9664 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9665 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9666 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9667 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9669 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9670 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9671 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9672 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9674 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9675 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9676 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9677 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9678 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9680 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9683 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9684 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9685 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9686 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9688 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9692 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
9693 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9694 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);