1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
184 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
189 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
195 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
197 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
201 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
209 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
211 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213 sender_intended_value: u64,
214 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
216 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
221 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231 value_msat: val.value,
236 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
237 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
239 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
240 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
241 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
244 /// Number of bytes in the id.
245 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
248 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
249 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
254 impl Readable for PaymentId {
255 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
256 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
261 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
262 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
263 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
267 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
269 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
270 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
271 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
273 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
274 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
279 impl Readable for InterceptId {
280 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
281 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
286 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
287 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
288 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
289 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
290 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
293 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
296 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
297 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
300 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
304 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
305 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
306 (0, short_channel_id, required),
307 (2, htlc_id, required),
309 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
310 (0, session_priv, required),
315 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
316 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
317 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
318 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
319 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
322 session_priv: SecretKey,
323 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
324 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
325 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
326 payment_id: PaymentId,
329 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
330 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
331 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
333 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
335 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
337 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
340 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
341 payment_id.hash(hasher);
342 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
348 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
350 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
351 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
352 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
353 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
354 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
355 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
359 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
360 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
361 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
362 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
363 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
364 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
366 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
372 struct InboundOnionErr {
378 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
379 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
381 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
382 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
383 pub enum FailureCode {
384 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
385 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
386 TemporaryNodeFailure,
387 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
388 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
389 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
390 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
391 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
392 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
393 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
394 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
395 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
396 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
398 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
399 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
400 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
403 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
404 fn into(self) -> u16 {
406 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
407 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
408 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
409 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
414 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
415 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
416 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
417 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
418 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
420 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
421 err: msgs::LightningError,
422 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
423 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
424 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
426 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
428 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
430 err: LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
440 shutdown_finish: None,
441 channel_capacity: None,
445 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
446 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
449 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
451 err: LightningError {
453 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
454 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
460 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
461 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
462 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
466 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
469 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
471 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
472 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
476 log_level: Level::Warn,
479 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
481 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
483 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
485 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
486 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
494 shutdown_finish: None,
495 channel_capacity: None,
499 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
500 self.chan_id.is_some()
504 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
505 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
506 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
507 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
508 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
510 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
511 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
512 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
513 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
514 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
515 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
516 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
518 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
522 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
523 struct ClaimingPayment {
525 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
526 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
527 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
528 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
530 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
531 (0, amount_msat, required),
532 (2, payment_purpose, required),
533 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
534 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
535 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
538 struct ClaimablePayment {
539 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
540 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
541 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
544 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
545 struct ClaimablePayments {
546 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
547 /// failed/claimed by the user.
549 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
550 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
552 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
553 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
554 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
556 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
557 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
558 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
559 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
562 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
563 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
564 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
565 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
566 enum BackgroundEvent {
567 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
568 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
569 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
570 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
572 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
573 /// are regenerated on startup.
574 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
575 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
576 /// channel to continue normal operation.
578 /// In general this should be used rather than
579 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
580 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
581 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
583 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
584 /// are regenerated on startup.
585 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
586 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
587 funding_txo: OutPoint,
588 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
590 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
591 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
593 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
594 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
595 channel_id: ChannelId,
600 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
601 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
602 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
603 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
604 /// event can be generated.
605 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
606 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
607 /// operation of another channel.
609 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
610 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
611 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
612 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
614 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
615 event: events::Event,
616 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
620 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
621 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
622 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
623 (0, event, upgradable_required),
624 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
625 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
626 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
627 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
628 // downgrades to prior versions.
629 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
633 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
634 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
635 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
636 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
637 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
640 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
641 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
642 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
643 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
647 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
648 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
649 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
650 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
651 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
652 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
654 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
655 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
656 channel_id: ChannelId,
657 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
662 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
663 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
664 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
665 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
666 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
671 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
672 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
676 /// State we hold per-peer.
677 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
678 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
680 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
681 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
682 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
684 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
685 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
686 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
687 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
688 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
689 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
690 latest_features: InitFeatures,
691 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
692 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
693 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
694 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
695 /// user but which have not yet completed.
697 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
698 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
699 /// for a missing channel.
700 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
701 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
702 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
704 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
705 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
706 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
707 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
709 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
710 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
711 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
712 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
713 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
714 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
715 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
716 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
717 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
718 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
719 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
720 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
721 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
722 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
723 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
727 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
728 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
729 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
730 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
731 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
732 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
735 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
736 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
737 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
740 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
741 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
742 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
745 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
746 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
747 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
748 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
752 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
753 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
754 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
755 /// The original OpenChannel message.
756 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
757 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
758 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
761 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
762 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
763 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
765 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
766 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
768 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
771 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
772 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
773 struct PendingInboundPayment {
774 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
775 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
776 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
777 /// this payment being removed.
779 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
780 user_payment_id: u64,
781 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
782 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
783 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
786 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
787 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
788 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
789 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
790 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
791 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
792 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
793 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
795 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
796 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
804 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
806 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
807 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
808 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
813 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
814 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
815 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
816 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
817 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
818 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
819 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
820 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
821 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
823 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
824 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
833 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
835 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
836 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
837 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
842 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
843 pub trait AChannelManager {
844 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
845 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
846 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
847 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
848 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
849 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
850 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
851 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
852 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
853 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
854 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
855 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
856 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
857 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
858 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
859 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
860 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
861 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
862 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
863 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
864 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
865 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
866 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
867 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
868 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
869 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
870 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
871 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
872 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
873 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
874 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
875 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
876 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
877 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
878 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
879 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
882 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
883 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
885 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
886 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
887 ES::Target: EntropySource,
888 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
889 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
890 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
894 type Watch = M::Target;
896 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
898 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
900 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
902 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
903 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
905 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
907 type Router = R::Target;
909 type Logger = L::Target;
911 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
914 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
915 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
917 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
918 /// to individual Channels.
920 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
921 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
922 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
923 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
925 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
926 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
927 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
928 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
929 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
930 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
931 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
933 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
934 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
935 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
937 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
938 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
939 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
940 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
941 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
943 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
944 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
945 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
946 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
948 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
949 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
950 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
952 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
953 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
954 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
955 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
956 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
958 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
959 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
960 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
961 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
962 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
963 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
964 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
965 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
968 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
969 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
970 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
971 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
972 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
976 // `total_consistency_lock`
978 // |__`forward_htlcs`
980 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
982 // |__`per_peer_state`
984 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
986 // | |__`claimable_payments`
988 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
994 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
996 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1000 // | |__`pending_events`
1002 // | |__`pending_background_events`
1004 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1006 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1007 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1008 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1009 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1010 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1011 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1015 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1016 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1017 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1023 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1025 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1027 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1028 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1030 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1031 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1032 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1033 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1035 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1036 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1038 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1039 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1040 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1041 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1042 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1043 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1044 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1045 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1047 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1049 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1050 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1052 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1054 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1055 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1056 /// and via the classic SCID.
1058 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1059 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1061 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1063 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1065 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1066 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1067 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1069 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1070 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1072 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1073 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1075 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1076 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1078 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1079 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1080 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1081 /// active channel list on load.
1083 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1084 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1086 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1088 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1089 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1090 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1092 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1093 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1094 /// the handling of the events.
1096 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1097 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1100 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1101 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1102 /// would break backwards compatability.
1103 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1104 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1105 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1107 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1108 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1110 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1112 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1113 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1114 /// confirmation depth.
1116 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1117 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1118 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1120 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1122 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1124 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1126 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1128 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1130 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1131 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1132 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1134 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1135 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1137 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1138 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1139 /// keeping additional state.
1140 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1142 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1143 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1144 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1145 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1147 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1148 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1150 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1151 /// are currently open with that peer.
1153 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1154 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1157 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1159 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1160 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1161 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1162 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1163 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1165 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1166 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1167 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1168 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1169 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1171 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1172 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1174 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1175 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1176 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1177 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1178 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1180 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1181 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1183 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1184 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1185 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1186 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1187 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1189 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1191 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1193 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1194 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1195 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1196 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1197 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1198 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1199 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1200 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1201 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1203 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1205 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1206 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1210 signer_provider: SP,
1215 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1217 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1218 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1219 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1220 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1221 pub struct ChainParameters {
1222 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1223 pub network: Network,
1225 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1227 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1228 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1231 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1235 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1236 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1239 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1240 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1241 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1242 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1243 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1244 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1246 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1247 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1248 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1249 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1250 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1251 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1253 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1254 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1257 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1258 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1259 /// events to handle.
1261 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1262 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1264 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1265 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1268 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1269 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1270 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1271 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1273 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1274 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1275 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1276 should_persist: move || {
1277 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1278 // processing and return that.
1279 let notify = persist_check();
1280 match (notify, force_notify) {
1281 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1282 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1283 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1284 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1285 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1288 _read_guard: read_guard,
1292 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1293 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1294 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1295 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1296 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1297 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1299 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1300 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1301 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1302 should_persist: persist_check,
1303 _read_guard: read_guard,
1308 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1309 fn drop(&mut self) {
1310 match (self.should_persist)() {
1311 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1312 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1313 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1315 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1316 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1317 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1322 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1323 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1325 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1327 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1328 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1329 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1330 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1331 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1333 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1334 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1336 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1338 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1339 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1340 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1341 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1342 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1343 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1344 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1345 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1346 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1347 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1348 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1349 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1350 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1352 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1353 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1355 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1356 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1357 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1358 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1360 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1361 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1362 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1363 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1364 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1365 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1368 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1370 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1371 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1374 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1376 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1377 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1379 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1380 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1381 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1383 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1384 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1385 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1387 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1388 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1389 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1390 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1392 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1393 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1394 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1396 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1397 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1398 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1400 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1401 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1402 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1403 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1404 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1405 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1406 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1407 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1408 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1409 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1410 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1413 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1414 /// to better separate parameters.
1415 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1416 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1417 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1418 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1419 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1420 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1421 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1422 pub features: InitFeatures,
1423 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1424 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1425 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1427 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1429 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1430 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1431 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1432 /// payments to us through this channel.
1433 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1434 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1435 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1436 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1437 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1438 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1439 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1442 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1444 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1445 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1448 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1449 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1450 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1451 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1452 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1453 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1454 /// lifetime of the channel.
1455 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1456 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1457 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1458 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1459 /// our counterparty already.
1461 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1462 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1463 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1464 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1466 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1467 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1468 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1469 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1471 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1472 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1474 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1475 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1477 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1478 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1479 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1480 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1481 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1482 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1483 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1484 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1485 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1488 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1490 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1491 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1492 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1493 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1494 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1495 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1496 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1498 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1499 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1501 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1502 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1503 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1504 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1505 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1506 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1507 /// this value on chain.
1509 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1511 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1513 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1514 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1515 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1516 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1517 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1518 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1519 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1521 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1522 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1523 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1524 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1525 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1526 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1528 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1529 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1530 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1531 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1532 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1533 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1535 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1536 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1537 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1538 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1539 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1540 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1541 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1542 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1544 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1545 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1546 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1547 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1548 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1549 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1550 /// route which is valid.
1551 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1552 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1553 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1554 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1555 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1556 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1558 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1559 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1560 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1561 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1562 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1563 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1564 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1565 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1566 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1568 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1570 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1571 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1572 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1573 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1574 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1576 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1577 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1578 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1579 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1580 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1581 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1582 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1584 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1585 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1586 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1587 pub is_outbound: bool,
1588 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1589 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1590 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1591 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1592 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1594 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1595 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1596 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1597 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1598 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1599 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1600 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1602 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1603 pub is_usable: bool,
1604 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1605 pub is_public: bool,
1606 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1607 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1608 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1609 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1610 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1611 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1613 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1614 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1617 impl ChannelDetails {
1618 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1619 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1620 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1622 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1623 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1624 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1625 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1628 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1629 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1630 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1632 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1633 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1634 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1635 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1638 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1639 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1640 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1643 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1644 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1646 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1647 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1648 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1650 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1651 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1652 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1653 features: latest_features,
1654 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1655 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1656 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1657 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1658 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1659 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1660 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1661 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1662 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1663 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1665 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1666 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1667 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1668 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1669 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1670 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1671 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1672 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1673 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1674 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1675 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1676 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1677 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1678 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1679 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1680 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1681 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1682 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1683 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1684 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1685 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1686 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1687 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1688 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1689 config: Some(context.config()),
1690 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1695 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1696 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1697 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1698 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1699 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1700 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1701 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1702 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1703 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1705 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1707 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1708 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1710 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1711 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1712 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1713 /// to drop the channel.
1717 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1718 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1719 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1720 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1721 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1723 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1724 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1725 payment_id: PaymentId,
1727 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1729 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1730 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1731 payment_id: PaymentId,
1732 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1734 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1735 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1736 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1739 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1740 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1741 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1743 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1744 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1745 payment_id: PaymentId,
1746 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1747 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1748 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1750 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1751 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1752 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1754 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1755 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1756 payment_id: PaymentId,
1757 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1758 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1762 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1764 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1766 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1767 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1768 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1769 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1771 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1772 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1773 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1776 macro_rules! handle_error {
1777 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1778 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1779 // entering the macro.
1780 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1781 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1785 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1786 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1788 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1789 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1790 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1791 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1795 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1796 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1797 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1798 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1799 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1800 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1805 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1806 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1808 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1809 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1810 action: err.action.clone()
1814 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1815 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1816 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1817 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1818 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1822 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1827 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1830 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1831 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1832 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1838 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1839 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1840 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1841 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1842 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1843 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1845 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1846 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1847 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1848 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1849 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1851 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1852 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1854 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1858 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1859 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1860 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1862 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1863 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1865 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1866 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1868 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1869 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1870 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1871 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1872 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1873 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1875 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1876 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1880 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1881 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1883 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1884 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1886 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1887 match $channel_phase {
1888 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1889 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1891 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1892 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1894 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1895 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1901 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1902 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1906 let key = *$entry.key();
1907 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1909 $entry.remove_entry();
1917 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1918 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1922 let key = *$entry.key();
1923 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1925 $entry.remove_entry();
1933 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1934 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1936 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1937 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1943 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1944 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1945 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1946 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1947 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1949 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1950 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1951 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1952 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1953 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1954 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1955 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1956 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1957 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1958 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1963 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1964 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1965 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1966 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1967 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1968 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1969 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1970 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1971 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1973 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1978 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1979 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1980 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1981 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1982 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1983 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1984 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1985 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1986 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1988 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1993 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1994 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1995 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1996 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1997 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1998 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1999 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2000 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2001 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2002 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2003 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2005 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2006 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2007 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2013 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2014 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2016 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2017 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2018 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2019 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2020 updates.announcement_sigs);
2021 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2022 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2025 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2026 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2027 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2029 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2031 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2032 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2034 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2035 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2036 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2037 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2042 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2043 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
2044 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
2045 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
2046 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2047 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2049 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2050 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2051 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2054 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
2055 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
2056 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2057 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
2058 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
2059 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
2060 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
2061 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
2065 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2071 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
2072 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2073 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2074 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2076 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2077 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = $chan_entry.get_mut() {
2078 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2079 $per_peer_state_lock, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, { $chan_entry.remove() })
2081 // We're not supposed to handle monitor updates for unfunded channels (they have no monitors to
2083 debug_assert!(false);
2084 let channel_id = *$chan_entry.key();
2085 let (_, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, ChannelError::Close(
2086 "Cannot update monitor for unfunded channels as they don't have monitors yet".into()),
2087 $chan_entry.get_mut(), &channel_id);
2088 $chan_entry.remove();
2092 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
2093 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2094 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2095 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2096 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2097 // filter for uniqueness here.
2098 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2099 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2100 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2101 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2103 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2104 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2105 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2107 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2108 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2109 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2113 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2114 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = $chan_entry.get_mut() {
2115 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2116 $per_peer_state_lock, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { $chan_entry.remove() })
2118 // We're not supposed to handle monitor updates for unfunded channels (they have no monitors to
2120 debug_assert!(false);
2121 let channel_id = *$chan_entry.key();
2122 let (_, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, ChannelError::Close(
2123 "Cannot update monitor for unfunded channels as they don't have monitors yet".into()),
2124 $chan_entry.get_mut(), &channel_id);
2125 $chan_entry.remove();
2131 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2132 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2133 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2134 while !processed_all_events {
2135 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2142 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2143 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2144 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2146 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2147 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2148 result = $self.process_background_events();
2150 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2151 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2152 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2153 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2157 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2158 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2159 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2160 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2163 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2165 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2166 $event_to_handle = event;
2168 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2169 post_event_actions.push(action);
2174 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2175 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2176 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2177 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2178 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2179 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2182 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2183 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2184 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2185 processed_all_events = false;
2189 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2190 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2191 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2193 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2194 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2195 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2201 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2203 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2204 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2205 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2206 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2207 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2208 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2212 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2214 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2216 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2217 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2219 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2221 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2222 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2223 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2226 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2227 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2228 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2230 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2231 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2232 current_timestamp: u32,
2234 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2235 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2236 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2237 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2239 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2240 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2241 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2246 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2248 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2249 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2250 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2251 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2252 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2253 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2254 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2255 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2257 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2260 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2261 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2263 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2265 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2267 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2269 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2270 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2271 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2272 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2273 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2275 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2276 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2286 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2287 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2288 &self.default_configuration
2291 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2292 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2293 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2296 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2297 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2299 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2301 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2305 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2310 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2312 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2313 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2314 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2315 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2316 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2318 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2319 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2321 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2322 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2323 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2325 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2326 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2327 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2329 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2330 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2331 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2332 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2333 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2334 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2336 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2337 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2338 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2339 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2340 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2341 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2344 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2345 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2346 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2348 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2350 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2351 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2353 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2355 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2356 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2357 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2358 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2359 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2360 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2364 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2369 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2371 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2372 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2373 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2375 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2377 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2380 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2383 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2384 node_id: their_network_key,
2387 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2390 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2391 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2392 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2393 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2394 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2395 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2396 // the same channel.
2397 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2399 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2400 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2401 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2402 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2403 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2404 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2405 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2406 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2407 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2411 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2412 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2413 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2421 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2422 /// more information.
2423 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2424 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2425 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2426 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2427 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2428 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2429 // the same channel.
2430 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2432 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2433 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2434 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2435 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2436 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2437 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2438 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2439 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2447 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2448 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2450 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2451 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2453 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2454 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2455 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2456 // really wanted anyway.
2457 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2460 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2461 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2462 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2463 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2465 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2466 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2467 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2468 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2469 let context_to_details = |context| {
2470 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2472 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2474 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2475 .map(context_to_details)
2481 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2482 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2484 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2485 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2486 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2488 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2489 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2490 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2491 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2492 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2493 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2495 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2496 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2497 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2499 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2500 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2501 payment_id: *payment_id,
2502 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2503 total_msat: *total_msat,
2506 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2507 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2509 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2510 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2512 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2517 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2518 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2519 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2520 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2521 Some(transaction) => {
2522 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2523 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2528 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2529 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2530 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2531 reason: closure_reason,
2532 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2533 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2537 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2538 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2540 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2541 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2543 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2545 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2546 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2548 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2549 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2551 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2552 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2553 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2554 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2555 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2556 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2557 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2558 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2560 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2561 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2562 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2563 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2564 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2568 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2569 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2570 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2571 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ());
2574 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2575 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2576 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2577 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2581 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2587 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2590 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2591 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2593 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2594 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2597 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2598 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2599 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2600 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2603 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2607 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2608 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2609 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2611 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2612 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2614 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2615 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2616 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2617 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2619 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2621 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2622 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2623 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2626 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2627 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2628 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2629 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2630 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2631 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2634 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2635 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2636 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2638 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2639 /// the channel being closed or not:
2640 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2641 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2642 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2643 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2644 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2645 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2646 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2648 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2649 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2650 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2651 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2653 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2655 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2656 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2657 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2660 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2661 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2662 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2663 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2664 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2665 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2669 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2670 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2671 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2672 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2673 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2674 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2675 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2676 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2678 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2679 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2680 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2681 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2682 // ignore the result here.
2683 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2687 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2688 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2689 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2690 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2691 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2692 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2693 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2694 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2695 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2696 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2697 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2698 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2700 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2702 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2703 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2704 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2705 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2707 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2708 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2709 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2711 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2712 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2713 // Unfunded channel has no update
2714 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2717 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2718 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2719 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2720 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2722 (None, *peer_node_id)
2724 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2727 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2728 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2729 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2734 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2737 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2738 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2739 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2740 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2741 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2742 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2743 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2744 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2745 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2746 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2747 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2748 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2759 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2760 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2761 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2763 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2764 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2765 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2768 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2769 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2770 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2772 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2773 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2774 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2775 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2776 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2779 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2780 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2781 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2782 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2783 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2787 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2788 /// local transaction(s).
2789 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2790 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2791 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2795 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2796 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2797 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2798 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2799 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2800 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2801 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2803 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2804 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2808 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2809 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2810 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2811 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2812 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2813 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2814 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2815 err_data: Vec::new(),
2819 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2820 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2821 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2824 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2825 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2826 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2827 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2828 outgoing_cltv_value,
2829 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2833 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2834 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2835 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2836 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2837 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2838 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2839 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2840 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2842 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2843 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2844 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2846 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2847 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2849 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2850 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2851 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2852 err_data: Vec::new(),
2853 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2857 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2858 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2859 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2860 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2862 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2865 // final_expiry_too_soon
2866 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2867 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2869 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2870 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2871 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2872 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2873 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2874 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2875 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2876 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2877 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2878 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2879 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2882 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2883 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2884 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2886 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2888 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2889 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2893 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2894 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2895 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2896 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2897 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2898 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2899 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2900 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2901 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2902 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2903 err_data: Vec::new(),
2904 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2907 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2908 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2909 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2910 err_data: Vec::new(),
2911 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2914 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2918 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2921 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2922 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2925 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2926 phantom_shared_secret,
2930 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2931 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2932 err_data: Vec::new(),
2933 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2936 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2939 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2940 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2941 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2942 outgoing_cltv_value,
2943 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2947 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2948 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2949 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2950 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2951 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2953 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2954 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2955 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2956 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2957 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2958 failure_code: $err_code,
2964 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2965 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2968 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2969 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2970 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2972 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2973 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2974 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2975 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2976 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2977 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2978 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2979 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2981 macro_rules! return_err {
2982 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2984 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2985 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2986 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2987 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2988 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2989 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2995 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
2996 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
2997 msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3000 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3001 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3003 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3004 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3007 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3008 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3009 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3010 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3013 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3014 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3015 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3017 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3018 // inbound channel's state.
3019 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3020 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3021 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3023 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3027 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3028 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3029 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3030 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3031 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3032 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3033 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3034 // phantom or an intercept.
3035 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3036 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
3037 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
3041 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3044 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3046 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3047 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3048 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3049 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3050 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3052 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3053 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3054 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3055 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3058 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3059 // have no consistency guarantees.
3060 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3064 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3065 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3066 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3067 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3068 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3070 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3071 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3072 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3073 // we don't have the channel here.
3074 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3076 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3078 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3079 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3080 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3081 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3082 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3083 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3084 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3085 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3086 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3087 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3088 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3090 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3093 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3094 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3096 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3097 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3101 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3102 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3103 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3104 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3106 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3113 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3114 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3115 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3116 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3117 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3118 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3120 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3121 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3123 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3124 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3125 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3126 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3127 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3128 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3129 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3130 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3131 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3132 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3138 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3139 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3140 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3141 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3143 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3144 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3146 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3147 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3148 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3150 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3151 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3152 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3153 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3154 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3155 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3156 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3160 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3162 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3165 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3166 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3167 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3168 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3169 macro_rules! return_err {
3170 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3172 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3173 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3174 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3175 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3176 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3177 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3183 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3185 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3186 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3189 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3190 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3191 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3192 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3193 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3195 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3198 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3199 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3200 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3201 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3202 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3208 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3209 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3210 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3212 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3213 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3214 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3216 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3217 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3218 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3219 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3220 return Err(LightningError {
3221 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3222 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3225 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3226 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3228 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3229 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3232 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3233 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3234 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3235 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3237 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3238 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3239 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3241 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3242 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3243 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3244 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3245 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3246 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3250 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3253 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3254 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3255 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3257 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3258 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3259 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3260 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3261 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3264 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3265 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3267 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3268 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3269 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3270 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3271 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3272 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3273 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3274 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3276 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3277 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3278 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3280 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3282 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3289 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3290 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3291 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3292 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3297 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3298 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3299 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3302 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3303 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3305 log_trace!(self.logger,
3306 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3307 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3308 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3309 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3311 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3312 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3313 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3315 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3316 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3318 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3319 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3320 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3321 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3324 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3325 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3326 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3327 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3328 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3329 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3330 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3331 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3332 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3333 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3335 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3336 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3337 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3339 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3340 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3342 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3343 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3344 Some(monitor_update) => {
3345 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry) {
3346 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3348 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3349 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3350 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3351 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3352 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3353 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3354 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3362 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3365 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3366 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3367 // `channel_by_id` map.
3368 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3369 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3374 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3375 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3377 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3382 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3384 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3385 /// fields for more info.
3387 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3388 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3390 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3392 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3393 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3394 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3395 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3396 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3398 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3399 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3400 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3401 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3402 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3404 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3405 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3406 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3407 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3409 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3411 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3412 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3413 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3415 /// In general, a path may raise:
3416 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3417 /// node public key) is specified.
3418 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3419 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3421 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3422 /// relevant updates.
3424 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3425 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3426 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3428 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3429 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3430 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3431 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3432 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3433 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3434 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3435 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3436 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3437 self.pending_outbound_payments
3438 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3439 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3440 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3443 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3444 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3445 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3446 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3447 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3448 self.pending_outbound_payments
3449 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3450 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3451 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3452 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3456 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3457 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3458 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3459 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3460 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3461 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3465 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3466 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3467 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3471 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3472 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3476 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3477 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3478 /// retries are exhausted.
3480 /// # Event Generation
3482 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3483 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3485 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3486 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3487 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3489 /// # Requested Invoices
3491 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`], abandoning the payment prior to receiving the
3492 /// invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`] and prevent any attempts at paying
3493 /// it once received. The other events may only be generated once the invoice has been received.
3495 /// # Restart Behavior
3497 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3498 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3499 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3501 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3502 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3503 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3504 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3507 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3508 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3509 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3510 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3511 /// never reach the recipient.
3513 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3514 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3516 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3517 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3519 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3520 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3521 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3522 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3523 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3524 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3525 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3528 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3529 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3531 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3534 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3535 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3536 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3538 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3539 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3540 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3541 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3544 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3545 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3546 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3547 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3548 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3549 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3550 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3551 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3552 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3555 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3558 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3559 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3562 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3563 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3565 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3566 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3567 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3568 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3569 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3570 let payment_params =
3571 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3573 let route_params = RouteParameters { payment_params, final_value_msat: amount_msat };
3575 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3578 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3579 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3581 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3582 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3583 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3584 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3586 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3587 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3588 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3589 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3590 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3591 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3592 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3593 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3594 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3595 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3597 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3598 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3599 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3600 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3604 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3606 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3607 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3610 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3612 let mut res = Vec::new();
3614 for mut path in route.paths {
3615 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3616 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3617 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3618 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3619 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3622 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3625 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3626 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3628 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3630 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3631 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3636 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3639 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3644 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3645 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3646 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3648 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3649 let used_liquidity =
3650 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3652 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3653 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3655 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3658 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3663 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3664 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3665 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3672 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3673 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3674 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3675 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3676 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3677 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3678 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3679 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3681 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3682 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3683 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3684 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3685 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3687 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3688 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3689 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3690 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3691 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3692 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3693 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3694 } else { unreachable!(); });
3696 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3697 Err((chan, err)) => {
3698 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3699 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3701 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3702 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3703 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3709 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3710 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3712 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3713 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3716 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3717 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3718 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3722 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3723 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3726 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3728 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3730 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3731 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3732 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3733 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3735 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3742 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3743 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3744 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3748 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3750 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3751 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3753 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3754 /// across the p2p network.
3756 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3757 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3759 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3760 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3761 /// keys per-channel).
3763 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3764 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3765 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3767 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3768 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3769 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3771 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3772 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3773 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3774 /// for more details.
3776 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3777 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3778 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3779 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3781 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3782 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3783 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3784 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3785 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3791 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3792 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3793 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3794 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3795 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3796 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3797 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3798 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3802 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3803 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3804 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3805 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3809 let mut output_index = None;
3810 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3811 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3812 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3813 if output_index.is_some() {
3814 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3815 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3818 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3821 if output_index.is_none() {
3822 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3823 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3826 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3830 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3832 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3833 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3834 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3835 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3837 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3838 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3840 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3841 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3843 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3845 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3846 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3847 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3848 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3849 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3850 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3851 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3852 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3853 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3854 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3855 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3856 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3857 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3861 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3862 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3863 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3864 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3865 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3866 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3867 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3868 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3869 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3870 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3874 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3875 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3876 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3877 config.apply(config_update);
3878 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3881 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3882 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3883 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3884 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3885 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3886 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3893 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3894 debug_assert!(false);
3895 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3897 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3898 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3905 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3907 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3908 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3909 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3910 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3912 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3913 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3915 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3916 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3918 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3920 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3921 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3922 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3923 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3924 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3925 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3926 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3927 pub fn update_channel_config(
3928 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3929 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3930 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3933 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3934 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3936 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3937 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3939 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3940 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3941 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3942 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3943 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3945 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3946 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3947 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3950 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3953 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3954 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3955 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3956 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3957 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3958 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3959 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3961 let next_hop_scid = {
3962 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3963 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3964 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3965 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3966 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3967 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3968 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
3969 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3970 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3971 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3974 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3976 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3977 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
3978 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3980 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3981 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}.",
3982 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3987 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3988 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3989 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3992 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3993 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3994 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3996 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3998 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3999 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4000 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4001 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4002 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4005 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4006 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4007 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4008 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4009 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4011 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4015 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4016 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4018 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4021 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4022 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4023 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4025 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4026 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4027 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4030 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4031 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4032 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4033 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4034 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4035 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4036 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4037 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4040 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4041 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4042 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4043 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4048 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4050 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4051 /// Will likely generate further events.
4052 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4053 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4055 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4056 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4057 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4059 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4060 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4062 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4063 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4064 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4066 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4067 match forward_info {
4068 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4069 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4070 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4071 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4072 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4075 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4076 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4077 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4079 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4080 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4081 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4082 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4083 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4084 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4085 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4088 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4089 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4091 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4094 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4095 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4101 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4102 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4104 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4108 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4109 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4111 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4115 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4116 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4117 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
4118 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4119 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4120 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4121 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4124 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4125 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4126 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4127 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4128 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4130 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4132 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4133 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4137 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4138 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4139 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4140 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4142 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4143 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4149 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4152 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4155 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4156 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4157 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4158 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4159 // problem, not ours.
4165 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
4166 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4168 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4172 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4173 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4174 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4175 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4178 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4179 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4180 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4181 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4182 match forward_info {
4183 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4184 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4185 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4186 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4187 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4190 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4191 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4192 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4193 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4194 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4195 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4196 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4197 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4198 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4200 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4201 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4202 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4205 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4206 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4208 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4210 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4211 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4212 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4213 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4218 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4219 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4221 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4222 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4223 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4224 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4226 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4227 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4229 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4231 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4232 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4233 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4240 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4244 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4245 match forward_info {
4246 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4247 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4248 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4249 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4250 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4253 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4254 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4255 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4256 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4257 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4258 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4259 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4261 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4262 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4263 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4267 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4268 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4271 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4274 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4275 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4276 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4277 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4278 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4279 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4280 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4281 phantom_shared_secret,
4283 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4284 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4285 // if routing nodes overpay
4286 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4287 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4289 total_value_received: None,
4290 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4293 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4296 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4298 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4299 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4300 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4301 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4302 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4303 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4305 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4306 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4307 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4308 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4309 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4310 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4311 phantom_shared_secret,
4313 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4314 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4316 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4319 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4320 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4321 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4322 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4323 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4326 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4327 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4328 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4329 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4330 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4331 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4333 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4334 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4335 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4337 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4338 .entry(payment_hash)
4339 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4340 .or_insert_with(|| {
4341 committed_to_claimable = true;
4343 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4346 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4347 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4348 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4349 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4351 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4352 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4353 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4355 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4356 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4357 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4360 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4362 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4363 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4364 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4365 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4366 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4367 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4368 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4370 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4371 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4373 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4375 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4376 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4377 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4378 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4379 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4380 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4382 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4383 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4384 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4385 committed_to_claimable = true;
4387 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4388 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4389 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4390 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4391 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4392 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4393 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4394 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4395 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4396 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4400 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4401 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4402 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4403 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4404 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4406 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4408 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4409 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4411 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4412 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4413 committed_to_claimable = true;
4416 payment_claimable_generated
4420 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4421 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4422 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4423 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4424 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4425 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4426 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4427 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4428 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4429 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4430 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4431 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4432 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4433 Ok(result) => result,
4435 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4436 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4439 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4440 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4441 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4442 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4443 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4444 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4447 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4448 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4449 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4451 check_total_value!(purpose);
4453 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4454 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4455 check_total_value!(purpose);
4459 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4460 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4461 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4462 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4464 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4465 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4466 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4467 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4468 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4469 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4470 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4471 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4473 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4474 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4475 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4477 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4478 if payment_claimable_generated {
4479 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4485 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4486 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4494 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4495 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4496 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4497 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4499 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4500 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4502 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4504 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4505 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4506 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4508 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4510 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4511 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4512 events.append(&mut new_events);
4515 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4517 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4518 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4519 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4521 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4523 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4524 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4525 if background_events.is_empty() {
4526 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4529 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4531 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4532 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4533 // monitor updating completing.
4534 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4536 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4537 let mut updated_chan = false;
4539 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4540 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4541 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4542 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4543 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4544 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4545 updated_chan = true;
4546 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4547 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase).map(|_| ())
4549 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4554 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4555 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4557 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4558 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4559 // however, ensure that.
4561 log_error!(self.logger,
4562 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4564 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4566 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4567 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4568 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4569 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4570 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4571 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4572 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4574 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4575 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4576 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4577 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4578 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4584 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4587 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4588 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4589 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4590 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4591 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4594 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4595 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4596 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4597 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4598 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4599 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4600 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4602 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4603 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4604 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4605 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4607 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4608 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4610 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4611 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4615 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4616 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4617 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4618 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4619 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4620 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4621 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4623 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4624 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4626 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4627 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4628 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4629 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4630 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4631 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4633 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4638 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4639 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4647 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4649 /// This currently includes:
4650 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4651 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4652 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4654 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4655 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4656 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4657 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4659 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4660 /// estimate fetches.
4662 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4663 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4664 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4665 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4666 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4668 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4669 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4671 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4672 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4673 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4675 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4676 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4677 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4678 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4679 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4680 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4682 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4683 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4684 log_error!(self.logger,
4685 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4686 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4687 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4688 self.finish_force_close_channel(context.force_shutdown(false));
4689 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4690 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4691 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4692 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4693 channel_id: *chan_id,
4694 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4705 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4706 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4707 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4708 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4709 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4710 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4711 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4713 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4714 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4719 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4720 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4722 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4723 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4724 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4725 if needs_close { return false; }
4728 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4729 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4730 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4731 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4732 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4733 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4734 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4735 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4737 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4738 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4739 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4740 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4744 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4746 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4749 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4751 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4752 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4753 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4754 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4758 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4760 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4766 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4768 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4769 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4770 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4771 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4772 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4773 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4774 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4775 channel_id: *chan_id,
4776 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4784 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4785 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4786 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4788 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4789 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4790 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4795 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4796 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4797 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4798 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4799 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4800 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4801 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4802 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4808 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4810 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4811 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4816 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4817 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4818 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4819 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4820 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4821 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4822 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4823 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4824 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4825 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4826 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4827 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4828 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4829 // have no channels to the peer.
4830 let remove_entry = {
4831 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4832 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4835 entry.remove_entry();
4838 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4843 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4844 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4845 // This should be unreachable
4846 debug_assert!(false);
4849 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4850 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4851 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4852 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4853 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4854 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4855 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4858 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4859 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4860 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4862 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4863 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4870 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4871 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4872 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4873 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4874 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4877 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4878 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4881 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
4883 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4884 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4885 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4886 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4887 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4894 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4895 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4896 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4898 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4899 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4900 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4901 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4903 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4904 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4905 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4906 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4907 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4908 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4911 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4912 /// reason for the failure.
4914 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4915 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4918 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4919 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4920 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4921 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4922 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4923 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4924 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4929 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4930 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4931 match failure_code {
4932 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4933 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4934 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4935 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4936 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4937 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4939 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4940 let fail_data = match data {
4941 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4944 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4949 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4950 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4952 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4954 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4955 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4956 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4957 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4958 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4959 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4960 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4962 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4964 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4965 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4967 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4972 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4973 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4974 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4975 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4976 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4977 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4978 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4979 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4980 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4981 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4983 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4984 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4985 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4986 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4988 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4989 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4990 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4991 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4992 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4996 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4997 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4998 // be surfaced to the user.
4999 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5000 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5001 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5003 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5004 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5005 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5006 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5007 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5008 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5009 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5010 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5011 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5013 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5014 debug_assert!(false);
5015 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5018 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5020 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5023 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5024 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5025 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5026 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5030 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5031 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5032 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5033 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5034 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5035 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5036 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5037 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5038 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5041 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5042 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5043 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5046 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5047 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5048 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5050 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5051 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5052 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5053 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5054 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5056 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5057 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5058 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5060 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5061 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5062 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5063 push_forward_ev = true;
5065 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5066 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5067 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5069 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5070 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5073 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5074 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5075 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5076 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5077 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5078 failed_next_destination: destination,
5084 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5085 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5087 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5088 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5089 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5090 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5092 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5093 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5094 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5095 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5097 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5098 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5099 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5101 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5102 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5103 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5104 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5105 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5106 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5107 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5108 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5109 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5112 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5113 /// even type numbers.
5117 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5118 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5120 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5121 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5122 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5125 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5126 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5128 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5131 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5132 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5133 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5134 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5135 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5136 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5137 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5138 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5143 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5144 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5145 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5146 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5147 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5149 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5150 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5151 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5155 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5156 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5157 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5158 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5159 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5160 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5161 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5162 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5163 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5164 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5165 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5174 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5176 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5177 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5178 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5179 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5180 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5181 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5182 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5183 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5184 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5185 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5186 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5187 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5188 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5189 debug_assert!(false);
5193 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5195 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5196 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5197 debug_assert!(false);
5201 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5202 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5204 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5205 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5206 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5207 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5210 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5211 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5212 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5213 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5217 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5218 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5219 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5220 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5222 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5223 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5224 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5225 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5226 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5231 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5232 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5233 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5234 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5235 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5236 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5237 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5239 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5242 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5243 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5244 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5245 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5249 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5250 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5251 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5252 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5254 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5255 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5256 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5257 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5260 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5261 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5262 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5263 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5267 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5268 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5269 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5272 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5273 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5274 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5275 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5276 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5277 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5278 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5280 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5281 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5282 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5284 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5287 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5288 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry);
5289 if let Err(e) = res {
5290 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
5291 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
5292 // update over and over again until morale improves.
5293 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
5294 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
5297 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5298 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5299 // monitor update as a background event.
5300 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5301 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5302 counterparty_node_id,
5303 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5304 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5313 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5314 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5315 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5321 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5322 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5323 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5324 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5325 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5326 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5327 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5328 // again on restart.
5329 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5330 payment_preimage, update_res);
5333 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5334 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5336 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5337 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5338 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5339 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5340 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5341 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5342 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5343 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5344 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5345 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5348 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5349 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5350 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5351 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5352 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5353 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5357 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5358 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5361 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5362 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5363 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5366 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5367 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5368 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5369 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5370 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5372 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5373 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5374 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5376 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5377 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5380 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5381 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5382 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5383 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5384 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5385 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5386 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5387 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5390 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5391 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5393 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5394 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5395 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5396 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5398 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
5399 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5400 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5402 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5403 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5404 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5405 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5412 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5413 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5414 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5420 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5421 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5422 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5425 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5426 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5428 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5429 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5430 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5432 payment_purpose: purpose,
5435 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5437 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5441 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5443 sender_intended_total_msat,
5447 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5448 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5450 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5451 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5452 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5459 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5460 /// update completion.
5461 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5462 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5463 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5464 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5465 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5466 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5467 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5468 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5469 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5470 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5471 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5472 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5473 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5475 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5477 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5478 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5479 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5480 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5483 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5484 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5486 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5487 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5488 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5493 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5494 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5495 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5496 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5501 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5502 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5503 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5504 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5505 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5510 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5514 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5520 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5521 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5522 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5526 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5527 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5528 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5534 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5535 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5537 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5538 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5540 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5541 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5542 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5543 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5544 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5549 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5550 let mut peer_state_lock;
5551 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5552 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5553 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5554 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5556 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5559 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5560 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5561 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5562 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5563 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5566 let remaining_in_flight =
5567 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5568 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5571 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5572 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5573 remaining_in_flight);
5574 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5577 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5580 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5582 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5583 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5586 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5587 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5588 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5590 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5591 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5592 /// used to accept such channels.
5594 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5595 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5596 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5597 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5600 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5601 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5603 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5604 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5605 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5607 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5608 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5610 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5611 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5613 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5614 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5616 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5617 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5618 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5619 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5622 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5623 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5625 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5626 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5627 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5628 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5629 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5630 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5631 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5632 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5634 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5635 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5636 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5638 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5639 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5640 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5641 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5642 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5643 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5644 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5646 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5650 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5651 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5652 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5653 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5654 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5655 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5656 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5659 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5660 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5662 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5663 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5664 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5665 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5666 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5667 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5668 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5669 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5672 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5673 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5677 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5678 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5679 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5681 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5682 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5683 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5686 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5691 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5692 /// or 0-conf channels.
5694 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5695 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5696 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5697 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5698 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5699 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5701 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5702 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5703 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5704 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5705 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5706 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5707 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5711 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5714 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5715 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5717 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5718 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5720 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5721 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5722 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5723 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5724 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5726 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5729 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5730 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5731 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5734 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5735 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5740 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5743 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5744 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5745 // likely to be lost on restart!
5746 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5747 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5750 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5751 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5754 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5755 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5756 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5757 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5758 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5760 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5761 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5763 debug_assert!(false);
5764 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5766 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5767 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5769 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5770 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5771 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5772 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5773 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5774 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5776 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5777 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5778 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5781 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5782 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5783 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5784 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5785 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5788 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5789 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5791 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5794 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5795 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5796 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5797 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5798 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5799 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5800 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5801 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5802 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5804 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5805 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5806 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5811 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5812 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5813 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5814 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5815 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5816 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5817 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5820 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5825 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5826 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5827 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5829 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5830 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5833 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5834 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5836 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5837 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5838 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5840 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5844 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5845 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5846 // likely to be lost on restart!
5847 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5848 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5849 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5851 debug_assert!(false);
5852 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5854 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5855 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5856 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5857 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
5858 match phase.get_mut() {
5859 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5860 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
5861 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
5864 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5868 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5871 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5872 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5873 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5874 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5875 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5877 user_channel_id: user_id,
5882 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5883 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5885 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5886 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5888 debug_assert!(false);
5889 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5892 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5893 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5894 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5895 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5896 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
5897 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5899 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5900 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5901 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5902 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5903 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5904 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5905 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5906 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5907 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5911 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
5912 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5914 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5917 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5918 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5919 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5921 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5922 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5923 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5924 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5925 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5926 funding_msg.channel_id))
5928 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5929 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5933 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5934 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5935 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5936 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5937 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5938 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5939 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5943 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5945 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
5946 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5947 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5948 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5950 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5951 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5952 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5953 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5954 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5955 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5956 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5957 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5962 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
5968 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5969 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5970 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5971 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5973 debug_assert!(false);
5974 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5977 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5978 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5979 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5980 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5981 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5982 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
5983 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
5984 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5985 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5986 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5987 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5988 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5989 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5990 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5991 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5992 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5998 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6002 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6006 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6007 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6008 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6009 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6010 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6012 debug_assert!(false);
6013 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6015 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6016 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6017 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6018 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6019 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6020 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6021 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6022 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6023 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6024 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6025 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6026 msg: announcement_sigs,
6028 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6029 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6030 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6031 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6032 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6033 // announcement_signatures.
6034 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6035 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6036 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6037 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6044 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6045 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6050 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6051 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6054 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6055 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6060 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6061 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
6062 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
6063 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6064 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6066 debug_assert!(false);
6067 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6069 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6070 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6071 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6072 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6074 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6075 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6076 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6078 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6081 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6082 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6083 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6084 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6086 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6087 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6088 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6089 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6090 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6091 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6095 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6096 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6097 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6098 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ());
6102 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6103 let context = phase.context_mut();
6104 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6105 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6106 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6107 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6112 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6115 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6116 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6117 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6118 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6124 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6125 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6126 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6128 debug_assert!(false);
6129 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6131 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6132 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6133 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6134 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6135 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6136 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6137 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6138 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6139 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6140 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6145 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6146 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6147 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6148 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6149 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6150 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6151 } else { (tx, None) }
6153 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6154 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6160 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6161 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6162 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6164 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6165 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6166 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6167 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6168 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6172 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6177 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6178 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6179 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6180 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6182 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6183 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6184 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6185 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6187 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6188 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6190 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6191 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6192 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6194 debug_assert!(false);
6195 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6197 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6198 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6199 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6200 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6201 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6202 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6203 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6204 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6205 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6206 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6208 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6209 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6210 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6211 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6212 match pending_forward_info {
6213 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6214 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6215 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6216 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6218 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6219 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6220 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6221 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6222 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6225 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6227 _ => pending_forward_info
6230 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6232 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6233 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6236 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6241 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6243 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6244 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6245 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6247 debug_assert!(false);
6248 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6250 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6251 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6252 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6253 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6254 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6255 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6256 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6257 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6258 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6259 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6261 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6262 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6263 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6264 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6265 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6266 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6267 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6270 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6271 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6274 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6277 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6281 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6282 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6283 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6284 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6285 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6287 debug_assert!(false);
6288 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6290 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6291 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6292 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6293 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6294 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6295 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6297 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6298 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6301 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6306 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6307 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6308 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6309 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6310 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6312 debug_assert!(false);
6313 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6315 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6316 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6317 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6318 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6319 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6320 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6321 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6323 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6324 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6326 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6327 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6331 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6335 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6336 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6337 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6339 debug_assert!(false);
6340 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6342 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6343 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6344 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6345 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6346 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6347 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6348 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6349 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6350 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6351 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ())
6354 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6355 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6358 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6363 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6364 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6365 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6366 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6367 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6368 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6369 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6370 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6371 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6372 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6373 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6375 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6376 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6378 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6379 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6380 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6381 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6382 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6383 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6385 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6386 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6387 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6389 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6390 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6391 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6392 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6393 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6394 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6395 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6396 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6397 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6400 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6401 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6403 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6404 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6405 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6406 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6407 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6408 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6409 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6410 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6411 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6414 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6415 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6416 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6421 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6422 // payments are being processed.
6423 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6424 push_forward_event = true;
6426 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6427 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6434 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6435 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6438 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6439 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6440 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6442 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6446 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6447 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6448 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6449 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6450 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6452 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6453 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6454 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6455 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6456 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6457 // real by taking more time.
6458 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6459 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6460 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6465 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6466 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6467 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6468 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6469 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6470 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6471 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6473 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6474 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6475 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6476 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6477 channel_funding_outpoint,
6478 counterparty_node_id,
6483 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6484 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6485 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6487 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6488 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6489 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6490 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6492 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6493 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6494 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6500 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6501 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6502 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6503 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6505 debug_assert!(false);
6506 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6507 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6508 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6509 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6511 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6512 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6513 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6514 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6515 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6516 *counterparty_node_id)
6518 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6519 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6520 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6521 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6522 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6523 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6524 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ())
6526 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6528 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6529 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6532 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6535 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6539 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6540 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6541 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6543 debug_assert!(false);
6544 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6546 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6547 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6548 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6549 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6550 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6551 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6553 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6554 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6562 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6563 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6564 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6566 debug_assert!(false);
6567 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6569 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6570 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6571 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6572 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6573 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6574 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6575 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6578 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6579 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6580 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6581 msg, &self.default_configuration
6582 ), chan_phase_entry),
6583 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6584 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6585 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6588 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6589 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6592 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6597 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6598 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6599 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6600 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6602 // It's not a local channel
6603 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6606 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6607 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6608 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6609 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6611 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6612 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6613 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6614 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6615 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6616 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6617 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6618 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6619 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6620 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6621 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6623 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6625 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6626 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6627 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6628 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6630 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", chan_id);
6631 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6634 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6635 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6640 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6643 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6645 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6646 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6648 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6650 debug_assert!(false);
6651 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6653 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6654 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6655 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6656 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6657 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6658 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6659 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6660 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6661 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6662 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6663 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6664 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6665 let mut channel_update = None;
6666 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6667 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6668 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6671 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6672 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6673 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6674 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6675 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6676 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6677 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6682 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6683 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6684 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6685 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6686 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6687 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6691 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6692 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6695 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6699 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6700 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6701 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6702 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6705 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6706 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6711 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6712 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6713 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6715 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6716 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6717 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6718 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6719 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6720 match monitor_event {
6721 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6722 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6723 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6724 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6726 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6727 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6728 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6729 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6732 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6733 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6734 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6735 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6737 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6738 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6739 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6740 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6743 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6744 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6745 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6746 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6747 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6748 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6749 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6750 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6751 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6752 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6753 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6757 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6758 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6760 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6762 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6763 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6764 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6765 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6766 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6774 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6775 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6781 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6782 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6785 has_pending_monitor_events
6788 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6789 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6790 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6792 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6793 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6794 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6797 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6798 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6799 /// update was applied.
6800 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6801 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6802 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6803 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6805 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6806 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6807 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6808 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6810 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6811 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6813 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6814 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6815 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
6816 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
6818 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6819 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6820 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6821 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6822 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6823 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6825 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6826 has_monitor_update = true;
6828 let channel_id: ChannelId = *channel_id;
6829 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6830 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6831 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6833 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6835 continue 'peer_loop;
6844 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6845 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6846 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6849 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6850 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6856 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6857 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6858 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6859 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6860 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6861 let mut has_update = false;
6863 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6865 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6866 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6867 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6868 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6869 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
6871 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6872 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6873 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6874 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6876 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6877 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6880 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6881 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6882 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6883 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6884 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6889 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6891 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6892 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6893 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6899 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
6900 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6905 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
6911 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6912 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6918 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6919 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6921 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6922 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6923 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6924 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6925 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6926 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6927 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6928 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6929 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6930 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6931 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6932 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6933 assert!(should_broadcast);
6934 } else { unreachable!(); }
6935 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6936 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6937 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6940 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6944 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6947 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6948 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6950 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6951 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6952 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6953 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6955 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6957 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6958 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6962 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6963 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6965 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6967 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6968 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6970 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6971 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6972 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6973 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6974 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6975 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6976 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6977 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6978 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6979 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6980 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6983 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6984 /// stored external to LDK.
6986 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6987 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6988 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6990 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6991 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6994 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6995 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6996 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6997 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6999 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7000 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7001 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7002 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7003 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7005 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7006 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7007 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7008 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7009 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7011 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7012 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7014 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7015 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7019 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7020 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7022 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7024 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7025 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7027 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7028 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7029 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7030 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7031 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7032 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7033 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7036 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7037 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7039 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7040 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7041 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7044 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7045 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7047 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7048 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7049 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7050 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7052 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7053 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7054 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7055 Some(_) => continue,
7056 None => return scid_candidate
7061 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7063 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7064 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7066 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7067 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7068 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7072 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7073 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7074 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7076 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7077 /// times to get a unique scid.
7078 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7079 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7080 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7082 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7083 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7084 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7085 return scid_candidate
7089 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7090 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7091 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7092 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7094 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7095 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7096 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7097 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7098 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7099 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7101 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7102 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7103 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7112 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7113 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7114 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7115 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7116 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7120 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7121 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7122 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7123 events.push_back((event, None));
7127 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7128 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7129 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7133 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7134 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7138 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7139 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7142 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7143 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7144 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7145 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7146 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7147 let mut errors = Vec::new();
7149 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7150 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7151 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7152 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7154 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7155 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7156 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7157 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7159 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7163 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7164 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7165 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7166 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7167 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7168 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7169 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7173 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7174 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7175 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7176 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7177 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7178 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7179 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7180 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry)
7182 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
7184 if further_update_exists {
7185 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7190 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7191 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7196 log_debug!(self.logger,
7197 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7198 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7202 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
7203 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
7204 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
7208 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7209 for action in actions {
7211 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7212 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7214 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7220 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7221 /// using the given event handler.
7223 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7224 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7228 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7232 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7234 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7235 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7236 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7237 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7238 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7239 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7243 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7244 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7245 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7246 /// is always placed next to each other.
7248 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7249 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7250 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7251 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7253 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7254 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7255 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7256 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7257 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7258 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7259 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7261 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7262 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7263 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7264 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7267 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7268 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7270 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7271 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7274 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7275 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7276 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7277 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7278 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7279 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7280 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7284 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7285 events.replace(pending_events);
7294 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7296 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7297 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7298 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7299 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7300 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7301 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7305 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7307 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7308 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7309 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7311 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7315 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7317 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7318 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7319 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7320 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7321 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7322 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7326 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7328 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7329 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7330 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7331 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7332 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7335 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7336 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7339 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7340 let _persistence_guard =
7341 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7342 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7343 let new_height = height - 1;
7345 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7346 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7347 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7348 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7349 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7350 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7353 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7357 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7359 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7360 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7361 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7362 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7363 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7364 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7368 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7369 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7370 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7371 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7373 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7374 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7376 let _persistence_guard =
7377 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7378 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7379 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7380 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7382 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7383 if height < last_best_block_height {
7384 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7385 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7389 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7390 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7391 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7392 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7394 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7395 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7397 let _persistence_guard =
7398 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7399 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7400 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7402 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7404 macro_rules! max_time {
7405 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7407 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7408 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7409 // having an explicit local time source.
7410 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7411 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7412 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7413 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7414 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7420 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7421 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7422 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7423 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7427 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7428 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7429 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7430 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7431 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7432 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7433 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7434 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7441 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7442 let _persistence_guard =
7443 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7444 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7445 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7446 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7447 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7448 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7449 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7450 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7455 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7457 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7458 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7459 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7460 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7461 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7462 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7466 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7467 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7469 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7470 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7471 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7472 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7473 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7475 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7476 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7478 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7479 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7480 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7481 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7482 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7483 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7485 // Retain unfunded channels.
7486 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7487 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7488 let res = f(channel);
7489 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7490 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7491 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7492 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7493 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7495 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7496 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7497 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7498 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7499 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7500 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7501 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7506 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7511 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7512 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7515 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7516 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7517 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7518 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7519 msg: announcement_sigs,
7521 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7522 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7523 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7525 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7526 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7527 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7532 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7533 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7534 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7535 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7536 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7537 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7538 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7539 // is always consistent.
7540 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7541 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7542 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7543 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7544 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7547 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7548 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7549 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7550 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7551 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7552 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7553 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7557 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7558 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7559 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7560 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7561 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7562 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7563 data: reason_message,
7575 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7576 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7577 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7578 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7579 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7580 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7581 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7582 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7583 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7584 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7586 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7587 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7588 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7592 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7595 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7596 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7597 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7598 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7599 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7600 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7601 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7602 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7603 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7604 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7607 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7608 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7609 _ => unreachable!(),
7611 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7612 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7613 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7614 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7620 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7622 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7623 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7627 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
7628 /// may have events that need processing.
7630 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
7631 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
7633 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7634 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7635 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
7636 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
7639 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7640 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
7641 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
7644 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7645 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7646 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
7649 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7650 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7651 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7652 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7655 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7656 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7657 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7658 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7661 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7662 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7664 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7665 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7666 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7667 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7668 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7671 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7672 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7673 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7674 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7677 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7678 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7679 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7680 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7683 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7684 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7685 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7686 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7690 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7691 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7693 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7694 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7695 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7696 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7697 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7698 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7702 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7703 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7704 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7705 // change to the contents.
7706 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7707 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7708 let persist = match &res {
7709 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
7710 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
7711 NotifyOption::DoPersist
7713 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7715 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7720 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7721 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7722 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7723 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7726 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7727 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7728 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7729 // change to the contents.
7730 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7731 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7732 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
7736 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7737 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7738 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7739 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7742 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7743 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7744 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7747 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7748 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7749 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7752 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7753 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7754 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
7755 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
7756 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
7757 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7758 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7759 let persist = match &res {
7760 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7761 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7763 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7768 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7769 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7770 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7773 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7774 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7775 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7778 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7779 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7780 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7781 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7782 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7783 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7784 let persist = match &res {
7785 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7786 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7787 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7789 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7794 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7795 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7796 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7799 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7800 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7801 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7802 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7803 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7804 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7805 let persist = match &res {
7806 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7807 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7808 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7810 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7815 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7816 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7817 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
7818 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7819 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7820 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7821 let persist = match &res {
7822 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7823 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7824 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7826 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7831 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7832 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7833 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7836 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7837 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7838 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7841 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7842 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7843 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7844 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7845 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7846 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7847 let persist = match &res {
7848 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7849 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7850 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7852 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7857 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7858 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7859 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7862 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7863 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7864 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7867 NotifyOption::DoPersist
7872 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7873 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7874 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7875 let persist = match &res {
7876 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7877 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7878 Ok(persist) => *persist,
7880 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7885 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7886 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
7887 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
7889 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7890 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7892 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7893 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7894 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7895 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7896 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7897 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7898 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7899 let context = match phase {
7900 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7901 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7902 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
7903 if !chan.is_shutdown() {
7908 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
7909 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7912 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7916 // Clean up for removal.
7917 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
7918 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7921 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7922 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7923 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7924 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7926 // V1 Channel Establishment
7927 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7928 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7929 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7930 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7931 // V2 Channel Establishment
7932 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7933 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7934 // Common Channel Establishment
7935 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7936 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7937 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7938 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7939 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7940 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7941 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7942 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7943 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7944 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7945 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7946 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7947 // Channel Operations
7948 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7949 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7950 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7951 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7952 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7953 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7955 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7956 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7957 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7958 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7959 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7960 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7961 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7962 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7963 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7966 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7967 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7968 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7969 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7972 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7974 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7976 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7977 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7981 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7982 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7983 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7987 let mut res = Ok(());
7989 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7990 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7991 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7992 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7993 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7994 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7995 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7998 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7999 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8000 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8001 if inbound_peer_limited {
8003 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8005 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8006 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8007 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8008 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8009 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8010 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8011 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8012 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8016 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8017 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8018 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8020 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8021 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8022 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8023 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8026 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8029 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8030 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8035 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8037 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8038 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8039 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8040 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8041 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8043 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8044 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8045 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8046 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8047 // worry about closing and removing them.
8048 debug_assert!(false);
8052 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8053 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8054 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8059 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8060 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8065 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8066 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8068 match &msg.data as &str {
8069 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8070 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8072 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8073 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8074 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8075 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8076 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8077 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8078 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8079 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8080 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8081 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8082 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8083 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8084 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8085 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8086 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8087 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8091 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8092 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8093 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8094 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8095 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8096 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8098 log_level: Level::Trace,
8108 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8109 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8110 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8111 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8112 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8113 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8114 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8115 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8116 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8117 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8118 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8120 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8121 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8122 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8126 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8127 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8128 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8129 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8130 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8131 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8132 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8133 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8134 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8135 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8143 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8144 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8148 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8149 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8152 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8153 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8156 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8157 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
8160 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8161 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8162 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8163 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8166 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8167 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8168 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8169 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8172 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8173 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8174 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8175 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8178 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8179 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8180 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8181 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8184 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8185 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8186 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8187 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8190 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8191 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8192 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8193 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8196 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8197 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8198 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8199 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8202 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8203 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8204 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8205 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8208 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8209 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8210 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8211 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8215 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8216 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8217 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8218 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8219 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8223 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8224 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8226 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8227 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8228 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8229 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8230 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8233 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8234 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8235 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8236 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8239 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8240 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8241 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8242 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8245 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8246 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8247 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8248 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8249 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8250 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8251 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8252 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8253 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8254 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8255 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8256 features.set_payment_secret_required();
8257 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8258 features.set_wumbo_optional();
8259 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8260 features.set_channel_type_optional();
8261 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8262 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8263 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8264 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8269 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8270 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8272 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8273 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8274 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8275 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8278 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8279 (2, node_id, required),
8280 (4, features, required),
8281 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8282 (8, forwarding_info, option),
8283 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8284 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8287 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8288 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8289 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8290 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8291 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8292 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8293 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8294 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8295 (2, self.channel_id, required),
8296 (3, self.channel_type, option),
8297 (4, self.counterparty, required),
8298 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8299 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8300 (7, self.config, option),
8301 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8302 (9, self.confirmations, option),
8303 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8304 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8305 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8306 (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8307 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8308 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8309 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8310 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8311 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8312 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8313 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8314 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8315 (30, self.is_usable, required),
8316 (32, self.is_public, required),
8317 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8318 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8319 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8320 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8321 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8327 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8328 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8329 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8330 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8331 (2, channel_id, required),
8332 (3, channel_type, option),
8333 (4, counterparty, required),
8334 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8335 (6, funding_txo, option),
8336 (7, config, option),
8337 (8, short_channel_id, option),
8338 (9, confirmations, option),
8339 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8340 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8341 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8342 (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8343 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8344 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8345 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8346 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8347 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8348 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8349 (22, confirmations_required, option),
8350 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8351 (26, is_outbound, required),
8352 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8353 (30, is_usable, required),
8354 (32, is_public, required),
8355 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8356 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8357 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8358 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8359 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8362 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8363 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8364 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8365 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8366 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8368 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
8372 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8374 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8375 outbound_scid_alias,
8379 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8380 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8382 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8383 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8384 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8385 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8386 confirmations_required,
8388 force_close_spend_delay,
8389 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8390 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8391 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8392 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8393 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8394 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8395 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8396 channel_shutdown_state,
8401 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8402 (2, channels, required_vec),
8403 (4, phantom_scid, required),
8404 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8407 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8409 (0, onion_packet, required),
8410 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8413 (0, payment_data, required),
8414 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8415 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8416 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8417 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8419 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8420 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8421 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8422 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8423 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8424 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8428 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8429 (0, routing, required),
8430 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8431 (4, payment_hash, required),
8432 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8433 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8434 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8435 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8439 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8440 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8442 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8444 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8445 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8446 reason.write(writer)?;
8448 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8449 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8452 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8453 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8454 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8455 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8462 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8463 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8464 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8467 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8468 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8469 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8470 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8474 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8475 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8476 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8477 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8478 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8481 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8482 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8483 // messages contained in the variants.
8484 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8485 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8486 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8488 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8489 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8490 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8491 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8492 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8495 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8496 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8497 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8498 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8499 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8501 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8506 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8511 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8512 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8513 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8514 (2, outpoint, required),
8515 (4, htlc_id, required),
8516 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8517 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8520 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8521 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8522 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8523 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8524 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8526 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8527 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8528 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8529 (2, self.value, required),
8530 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8531 (4, payment_data, option),
8532 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8533 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8534 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8535 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8541 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8542 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8543 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8544 (0, prev_hop, required),
8545 (1, total_msat, option),
8546 (2, value_ser, required),
8547 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8548 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8549 (5, total_value_received, option),
8550 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8551 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8552 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8554 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8555 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8556 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8558 if payment_data.is_some() {
8559 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8561 if total_msat.is_none() {
8562 total_msat = Some(value);
8564 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8567 if total_msat.is_none() {
8568 if payment_data.is_none() {
8569 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8571 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8573 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8577 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8580 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8581 total_value_received,
8582 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8584 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8585 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8590 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8591 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8592 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8595 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8596 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8597 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8598 let mut payment_id = None;
8599 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8600 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8601 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8602 (0, session_priv, required),
8603 (1, payment_id, option),
8604 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8605 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8606 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8607 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8609 if payment_id.is_none() {
8610 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8612 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8614 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8615 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8616 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8618 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8619 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8620 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8621 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8625 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8626 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8627 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8629 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8632 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8633 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8638 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8639 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8641 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8643 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8644 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8645 (0, session_priv, required),
8646 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8647 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8648 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8649 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8650 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8651 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8654 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8656 field.write(writer)?;
8663 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8664 (0, forward_info, required),
8665 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8666 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8667 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8668 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8671 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8673 (0, htlc_id, required),
8674 (2, err_packet, required),
8679 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8680 (0, payment_secret, required),
8681 (2, expiry_time, required),
8682 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8683 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8684 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8687 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8689 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8690 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8691 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8692 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8693 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8694 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8698 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8699 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8701 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8703 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8705 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8706 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8707 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8710 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8712 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8713 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8714 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8715 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8716 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8717 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8718 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8721 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8722 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_initiated() } else { false }
8726 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
8728 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8729 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8730 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8731 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
8732 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
8733 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() { Some(channel) } else { None }
8736 channel.write(writer)?;
8742 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8743 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8744 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8745 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8746 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8747 for forward in pending_forwards {
8748 forward.write(writer)?;
8753 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8755 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8756 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8757 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8759 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8760 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8761 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8762 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8763 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8764 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8765 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8766 htlc.write(writer)?;
8768 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8769 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8772 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8773 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8774 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8775 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8776 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8777 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8778 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8781 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8782 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8783 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8784 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8785 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8787 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8788 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8789 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8790 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8791 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8792 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8793 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8798 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8799 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8800 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8801 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8802 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8803 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8804 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8805 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8806 0u64.write(writer)?;
8808 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8809 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8810 event.write(writer)?;
8814 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8815 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8816 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8817 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8818 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8819 0u64.write(writer)?;
8821 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8822 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8823 // likely to be identical.
8824 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8825 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8827 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8828 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8829 hash.write(writer)?;
8830 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8833 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8834 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8835 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8836 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8837 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8840 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8841 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8843 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8844 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8845 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8846 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8849 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
8850 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
8851 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8852 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8856 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8857 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8858 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8860 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8861 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8862 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8868 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8869 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8870 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8871 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8874 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8875 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8876 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8877 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8878 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8881 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8882 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8883 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8884 if !updates.is_empty() {
8885 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8886 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8891 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8892 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8893 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8894 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8895 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8896 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8897 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8898 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8899 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8900 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8901 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8902 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8903 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8910 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8911 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8912 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8913 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8916 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8917 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8918 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8919 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8920 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8921 // check that the event is sane here.
8922 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8923 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8924 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8925 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8931 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8932 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8933 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8934 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8935 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8936 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8939 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8940 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8941 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8942 events.push_back((ev, action));
8943 } else if action.is_some() {
8944 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8951 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8952 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8953 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8954 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8955 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8956 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8959 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8961 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8963 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8964 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8965 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8966 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8967 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8968 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8969 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8970 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8971 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8972 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8973 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8974 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8975 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8977 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8978 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8980 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8981 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8983 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8984 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8985 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8986 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8987 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8988 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8990 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8991 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8993 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8994 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8995 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8996 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8997 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8998 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9002 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9003 pub entropy_source: ES,
9005 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9006 pub node_signer: NS,
9008 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9009 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9011 pub signer_provider: SP,
9013 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9015 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9016 pub fee_estimator: F,
9017 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9019 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9020 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9021 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9022 pub chain_monitor: M,
9024 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9025 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9026 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9027 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9028 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9029 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9031 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9033 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9034 /// deserialization.
9036 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9037 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9038 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9040 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9041 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9043 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9044 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9045 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9046 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9048 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9051 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9052 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9055 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9056 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9058 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9059 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9060 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9061 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9062 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9063 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9067 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9068 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9069 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9070 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9071 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9073 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9074 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9079 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9080 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9081 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9082 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9084 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9085 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9086 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9087 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9088 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9089 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9093 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9094 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9095 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9099 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9100 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9102 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9103 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9104 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9105 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9106 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9107 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9111 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9112 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9114 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9115 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9116 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9118 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9120 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9121 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9122 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9123 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9124 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9125 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9126 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9127 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9128 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9129 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9131 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9132 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9133 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9134 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9135 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9136 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9137 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9138 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9139 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9140 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9141 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9142 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9143 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9145 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9146 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9147 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9149 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9150 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9151 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9153 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9154 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9155 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9157 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9158 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9159 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9160 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9163 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9164 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9165 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9166 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9167 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9168 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9169 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9171 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9172 let mut found_htlc = false;
9173 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9174 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9177 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9178 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9179 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9180 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9181 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9182 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9183 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9184 log_info!(args.logger,
9185 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9186 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9187 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9191 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9192 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9193 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9194 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9195 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9197 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
9198 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9200 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9201 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9202 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9203 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9205 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9206 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9207 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9208 entry.insert(by_id_map);
9212 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9213 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9214 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9215 // safely discard the channel.
9216 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9217 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9218 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9219 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9220 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9221 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9222 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9225 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9226 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9227 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9228 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9229 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9230 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9234 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9235 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9236 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9237 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9238 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9239 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9240 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9242 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9246 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9247 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9248 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9249 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9250 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9251 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9252 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9253 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9254 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9256 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9259 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9260 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9261 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9262 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9263 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9264 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9265 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9266 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9268 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9271 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9274 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9275 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9276 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9277 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9278 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9279 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9280 is_connected: false,
9284 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9285 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9286 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9287 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9288 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9289 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9290 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9291 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9294 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9295 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9296 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9297 for _ in 0..event_count {
9298 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9299 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9304 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9305 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9306 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9308 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9309 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9310 // on-startup monitor updates.
9311 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9312 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9314 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9318 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9319 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9321 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9322 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9323 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9324 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9325 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9329 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9330 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9331 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9332 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9333 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9334 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9335 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9337 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9338 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9342 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9343 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9344 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9345 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9346 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9347 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9348 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9349 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9350 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9351 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9352 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9353 let mut events_override = None;
9354 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9355 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9356 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9357 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9358 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9359 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9360 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9361 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9362 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9363 (8, events_override, option),
9364 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9365 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9366 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9367 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9369 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9370 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9373 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9374 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9377 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9378 pending_events_read = events;
9381 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9382 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9385 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9386 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9387 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9388 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9389 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9390 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9392 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9394 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9395 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9396 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9399 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9400 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9401 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9402 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9403 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9405 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9406 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9407 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9409 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9410 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9411 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9412 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9413 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9415 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9416 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9417 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9418 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9419 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9420 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9421 pending_background_events.push(
9422 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9423 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9424 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9425 update: update.clone(),
9428 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9429 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9430 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9431 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9432 pending_background_events.push(
9433 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9434 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9435 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9438 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9439 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9440 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9442 max_in_flight_update_id
9446 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9447 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9448 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9449 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9450 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9451 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9453 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9454 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9455 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9456 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9457 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9458 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9459 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9460 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9461 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9464 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9465 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9466 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9467 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9468 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9469 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9470 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9471 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9472 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9473 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9474 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9477 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9478 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9479 debug_assert!(false);
9480 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9485 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9486 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9487 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9488 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9489 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9490 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9491 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9492 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9494 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9495 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9496 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9498 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9499 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9500 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9501 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9502 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9503 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9504 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9505 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9510 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9511 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9513 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9514 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9515 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9516 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9519 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9520 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9521 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9522 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9523 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9524 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9525 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9527 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9528 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9529 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9530 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9531 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9532 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9533 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9534 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9537 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9538 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9539 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9540 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9541 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9542 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9543 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9544 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9546 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9547 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9548 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9549 retry_strategy: None,
9550 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9551 payment_params: None,
9552 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9553 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9554 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9555 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9556 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9557 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9558 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9559 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9560 total_msat: path_amt,
9561 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9563 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9564 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9569 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9571 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9572 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9573 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9574 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9576 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9577 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9578 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9579 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9580 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9581 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9582 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9583 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9584 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9585 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9586 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9591 !forwards.is_empty()
9593 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9594 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9595 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9596 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9597 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9598 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9599 intercepted_id != ev_id
9606 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9607 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9608 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9609 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9610 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9611 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9612 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9613 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9614 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9615 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9616 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9618 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9619 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9620 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9622 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9623 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9624 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9631 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9632 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9634 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9636 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9637 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9638 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9639 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9640 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9641 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9642 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9643 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9644 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9645 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9648 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9649 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9650 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9651 // channel still live case here.
9655 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9656 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9661 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9662 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9663 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9664 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9665 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9666 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9667 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9668 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9672 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9673 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9675 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9676 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9677 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9678 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9680 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9681 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9682 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9684 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9685 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9687 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9688 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9690 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9693 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9694 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9695 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9697 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9701 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9702 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9703 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9704 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9705 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9707 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9708 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9709 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9710 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9711 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9712 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9713 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9714 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9716 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9717 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9721 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9723 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9725 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9726 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9728 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9729 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9734 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9735 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9737 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9739 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9741 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9742 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9743 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9744 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9748 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9749 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9750 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9751 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9752 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9753 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9754 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9755 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9757 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9758 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9759 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9761 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9762 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9763 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9764 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9765 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9766 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9768 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9769 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9770 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9771 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9772 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9773 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9777 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9778 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9779 debug_assert!(false);
9780 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9785 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9787 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9788 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9789 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9790 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9791 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9792 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9793 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9794 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9795 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9796 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9797 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9799 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9800 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9802 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9803 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9804 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9805 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9807 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9808 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9809 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9810 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9812 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9813 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9814 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9815 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9817 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9818 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9819 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9820 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9821 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9822 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9823 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9826 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9827 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9830 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9833 purpose: payment.purpose,
9834 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9835 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9836 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9842 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9843 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9844 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9845 for action in actions.iter() {
9846 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9847 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9848 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9850 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9851 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9852 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9853 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9855 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9856 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9857 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9858 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9864 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9866 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9867 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9871 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9873 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9874 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9875 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9876 router: args.router,
9878 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9880 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9881 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9882 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9883 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9885 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9886 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9887 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9888 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9889 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9890 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9892 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9897 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9899 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9901 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9902 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9903 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9904 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9905 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9907 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9908 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
9910 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9911 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9912 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9914 logger: args.logger,
9915 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9918 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9919 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9920 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9921 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9922 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9925 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9926 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9927 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9928 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9929 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9930 downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
9933 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9934 //connection or two.
9936 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9942 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9943 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9944 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9945 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9946 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9947 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9948 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
9949 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9950 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9951 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9952 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9953 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9954 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9955 use crate::util::test_utils;
9956 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9957 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9960 fn test_notify_limits() {
9961 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9962 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9963 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9964 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9965 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9966 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9968 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9969 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9970 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9971 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9972 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9974 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9976 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9977 // to connect messages with new values
9978 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9979 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9980 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9981 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9982 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9983 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9985 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9986 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9987 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9988 // ... but the last node should not.
9989 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9990 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9991 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9992 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9994 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9995 // about the channel.
9996 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9997 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9998 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10000 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10002 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10003 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10004 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10005 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10006 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10007 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10009 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10010 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10011 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10013 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10014 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10015 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10016 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10017 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10018 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10020 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10021 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10022 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10023 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10024 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10025 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10026 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10027 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10029 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10030 // the channel info has updated.
10031 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10032 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10033 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10034 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10035 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10036 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10040 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10041 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10043 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10044 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10045 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10046 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10047 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10049 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10050 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10051 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10052 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10054 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10055 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10056 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10057 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10058 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10059 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10060 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10061 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10063 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10064 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10065 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10067 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10068 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10069 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10071 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10072 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10073 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10074 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10075 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10077 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10078 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10079 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10081 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10082 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10083 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10084 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10085 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10086 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10087 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10088 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10089 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10091 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10092 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10093 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10095 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10096 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10097 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10099 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10100 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10101 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10102 // lightning messages manually.
10103 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10104 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10107 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10108 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10109 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10110 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10112 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10113 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10115 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10116 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10118 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10119 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10120 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10122 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10123 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10124 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10126 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10128 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10130 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10131 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10134 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10135 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10136 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10137 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10139 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10140 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10141 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10142 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10144 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10147 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10148 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10149 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10150 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10152 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10157 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10158 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10159 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10162 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10163 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10164 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10165 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10166 // fails as expected.
10167 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10168 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10169 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10170 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10171 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10172 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10173 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10174 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10175 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10176 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10177 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10178 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10179 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10180 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10181 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10183 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10184 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10185 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10187 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10188 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10189 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10190 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10191 let route = find_route(
10192 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10193 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10195 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10196 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10198 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10199 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10200 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10201 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10202 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10204 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10205 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10206 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10207 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10208 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10210 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10211 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10212 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10213 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10214 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10215 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10216 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10217 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10218 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10220 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10221 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10223 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10224 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10225 let route = find_route(
10226 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10227 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10229 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10230 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10232 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10233 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10234 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10235 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10236 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10238 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10239 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10240 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10241 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10243 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10244 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10245 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10246 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10247 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10249 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10250 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10251 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10253 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10254 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10255 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10256 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10257 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10258 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10259 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10260 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10261 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10263 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10264 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10266 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10267 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10268 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10269 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10271 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10272 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10273 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10274 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10275 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10277 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10278 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10279 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10282 let route = find_route(
10283 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10284 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10286 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10287 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10288 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10290 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10291 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10292 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10293 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10294 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10296 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10297 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10298 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10300 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10301 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10302 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10303 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10304 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10305 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10306 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10307 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10308 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10310 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10311 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10315 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10316 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10317 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10321 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10323 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10324 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10326 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10327 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10328 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10329 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10330 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10331 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10332 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10333 let route = find_route(
10334 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10335 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10338 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10339 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10340 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10341 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10342 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10343 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10346 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10347 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10348 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10349 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10350 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10351 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10352 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10354 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10358 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10359 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10360 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10361 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10362 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10363 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10364 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10365 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10366 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10368 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10369 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10371 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10372 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10373 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10374 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10375 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10376 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10377 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10378 let route = find_route(
10379 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10380 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10383 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10384 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10385 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10386 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10387 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10388 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10389 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10390 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10393 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10394 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10395 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10396 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10397 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10398 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10399 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10401 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10405 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10406 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10407 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10408 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10409 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10411 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10412 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10413 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10414 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10416 // Marshall an MPP route.
10417 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10418 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10419 route.paths.push(path);
10420 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10421 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10422 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10423 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10424 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10425 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10427 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10428 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10430 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10431 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10433 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10438 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10439 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10440 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10441 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10442 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10444 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10446 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10447 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10449 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10450 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10452 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10455 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10456 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10457 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10458 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10459 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10460 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10463 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10466 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10467 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10472 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10473 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10474 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10475 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10476 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10477 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10479 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10480 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10482 total_msat: 100_000,
10485 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10486 // payment verification fails as expected.
10487 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10488 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10489 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10490 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10492 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10496 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10497 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10501 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10502 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10503 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10504 // the channel is successfully closed.
10505 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10506 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10507 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10508 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10510 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10511 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10512 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10513 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10514 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10516 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10517 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10519 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10520 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10521 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10522 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10525 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10527 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10528 // as it has the funding transaction.
10529 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10530 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10531 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10534 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10536 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10538 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10540 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10541 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10542 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10544 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10547 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10548 // as it has the funding transaction.
10549 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10550 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10551 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10554 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10555 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10557 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10558 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10559 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10560 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10562 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10563 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10564 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10565 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10567 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10568 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10570 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10571 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10572 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10573 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10574 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10575 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10576 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10580 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10581 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10582 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10583 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10584 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10585 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10586 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10589 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10591 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10592 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10593 // closing transaction).
10594 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10595 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10596 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10598 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10599 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10600 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10601 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10602 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10605 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10607 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10609 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10610 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10611 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10613 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10615 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10616 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10619 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10620 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10621 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10624 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10625 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10626 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10629 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10631 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10632 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10634 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10635 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10637 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10638 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10643 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10644 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10645 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10646 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10647 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10648 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10649 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10650 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10653 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10654 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10655 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10657 // Test the API functions.
10658 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10660 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10662 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10664 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10666 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10668 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10670 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10674 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10675 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10676 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10677 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10678 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10679 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10681 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10683 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10684 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10686 let mut funding_tx = None;
10687 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10688 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10689 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10692 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10693 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10694 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10695 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10696 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10698 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10700 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10702 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10704 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10706 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10708 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10711 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10712 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10713 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10714 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10715 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10717 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10718 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10720 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10721 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10722 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10723 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10724 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10725 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10726 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10729 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10730 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10731 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10732 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10733 }, true).unwrap_err();
10735 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10736 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10737 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10738 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10739 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10740 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10741 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10743 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10744 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10746 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10747 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10748 }, true).unwrap_err();
10750 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10751 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10752 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10753 }, false).unwrap();
10754 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10756 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10757 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10759 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10760 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10761 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10762 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10763 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10765 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10766 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10767 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10769 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10770 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10771 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10773 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10774 // "protected" and can connect again.
10775 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10776 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10777 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10779 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10781 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10783 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10784 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10788 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10789 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10790 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10791 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10792 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10793 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10795 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10797 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10798 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10800 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10801 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10802 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10803 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10806 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10808 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10809 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10810 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10812 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10813 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10814 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10816 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10817 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10818 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10819 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10823 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10824 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10825 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10826 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10827 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10828 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10829 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10830 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10831 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10833 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10835 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10836 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10838 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10839 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10840 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10841 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10842 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10843 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10846 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10847 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10849 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10850 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10852 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10854 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10855 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10858 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10859 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10860 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10861 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10862 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10864 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10865 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10867 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10868 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10869 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10870 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10874 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10876 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10877 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10879 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10880 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10881 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10883 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10884 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10886 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10888 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10892 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10893 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10894 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10895 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10896 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10897 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10898 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10899 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10901 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10902 payment_metadata: None,
10903 keysend_preimage: None,
10904 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10905 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10907 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10909 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10910 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10911 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10912 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10913 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10915 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10916 } else { panic!(); }
10918 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10919 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10921 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10922 payment_metadata: None,
10923 keysend_preimage: None,
10924 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10925 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10927 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10929 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10930 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10934 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10935 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10936 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10937 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10938 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10940 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10941 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10943 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10944 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10945 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10946 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10947 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10949 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10950 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10952 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10953 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10954 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10955 match &msg_events[0] {
10956 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10957 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10959 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10960 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10961 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10964 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10967 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10968 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10970 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10971 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10972 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10974 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10978 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10979 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10980 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10981 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10982 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10983 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10984 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10985 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10986 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10987 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10988 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10990 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10991 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10992 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10994 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10995 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10997 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10998 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11000 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11003 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11004 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11006 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11007 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11009 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11010 // not have generated any events.
11011 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11015 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11016 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11017 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11018 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11019 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11020 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11021 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11022 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11024 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11025 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11026 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11028 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11029 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11030 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11031 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11032 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11034 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11035 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11038 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11039 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11040 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11042 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11043 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11044 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11045 ..Default::default()
11047 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11048 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11049 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11051 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11052 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11055 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11056 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11057 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11058 ..Default::default()
11060 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11061 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11062 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11063 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11065 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11066 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11069 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11070 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11071 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11072 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11073 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11076 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11077 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11078 ..Default::default()
11080 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11083 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11084 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11085 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11086 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11090 fn test_payment_display() {
11091 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11092 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11093 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11094 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11095 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11096 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11102 use crate::chain::Listen;
11103 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
11104 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
11105 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
11106 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
11107 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11108 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
11109 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
11110 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
11111 use crate::util::test_utils;
11112 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
11114 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11115 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11116 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
11118 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
11120 use criterion::Criterion;
11122 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
11123 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
11124 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
11125 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
11126 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
11127 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
11128 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
11130 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
11131 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
11133 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
11134 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
11136 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
11138 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
11141 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
11142 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
11145 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
11146 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
11147 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
11149 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
11150 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
11152 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
11153 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
11154 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11155 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
11156 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
11158 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
11159 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
11160 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11162 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
11163 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
11164 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
11165 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11167 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11168 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11169 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
11171 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11172 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
11173 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
11174 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
11175 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11177 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11178 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11179 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
11181 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11182 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11184 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11185 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11186 }, false).unwrap();
11187 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11188 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11189 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11192 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
11193 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
11194 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
11196 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11197 } else { panic!(); }
11199 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11200 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11201 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11202 match events_b[0] {
11203 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11204 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11206 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11209 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11210 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11211 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11212 match events_a[0] {
11213 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11214 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11219 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
11221 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
11222 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
11223 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
11225 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11226 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11227 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11228 match msg_events[0] {
11229 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
11230 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
11231 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11235 match msg_events[1] {
11236 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11240 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11241 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11242 match events_a[0] {
11243 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11244 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11249 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11250 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11251 match events_b[0] {
11252 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11253 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11255 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11258 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11259 macro_rules! send_payment {
11260 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11261 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11262 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11263 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11264 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11265 payment_count += 1;
11266 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11267 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11269 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11270 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
11271 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
11272 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
11273 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
11274 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11275 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
11276 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
11277 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11278 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11279 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11281 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
11282 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
11283 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11284 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
11286 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
11287 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
11288 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
11289 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11290 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
11292 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
11295 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
11296 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11297 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11298 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11300 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11304 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11305 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11306 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);