1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
61 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
73 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
104 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
108 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
109 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
110 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
111 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
112 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
113 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
114 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
119 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
120 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
123 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
126 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
127 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
130 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
132 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
134 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
135 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
136 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
138 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
140 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
144 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
148 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
149 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
150 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
151 short_channel_id: u64,
153 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
155 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
156 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
161 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
162 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
163 /// are part of the same payment.
164 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
165 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
166 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
169 struct ClaimableHTLC {
170 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
173 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
176 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
177 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
178 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
179 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
182 session_priv: SecretKey,
183 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
184 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
185 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
190 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
191 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
193 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
194 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
199 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
200 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
202 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
210 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
212 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
213 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
214 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
215 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
216 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
218 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
219 err: msgs::LightningError,
220 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
222 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
224 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
226 err: LightningError {
228 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
229 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
235 shutdown_finish: None,
239 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
241 err: LightningError {
243 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
245 shutdown_finish: None,
249 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
250 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
253 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
255 err: LightningError {
257 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
258 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
264 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
268 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
271 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
273 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
275 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
277 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
278 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
284 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
286 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
287 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
294 shutdown_finish: None,
299 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
300 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
301 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
302 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
303 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
305 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
306 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
307 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
308 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
309 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
310 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
311 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
313 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
317 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
318 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
319 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
320 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
321 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
322 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
323 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
324 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
325 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
326 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
327 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
328 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
330 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
331 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
332 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
333 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
336 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
337 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
338 /// quite some time lag.
339 enum BackgroundEvent {
340 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
341 /// commitment transaction.
342 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
345 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
346 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
348 latest_features: InitFeatures,
351 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
352 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
354 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
356 struct PendingInboundPayment {
357 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
358 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
359 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
360 /// this payment being removed.
362 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
363 user_payment_id: u64,
364 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
365 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
366 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
369 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
370 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
371 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
372 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
373 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
374 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
375 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
376 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
378 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
379 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
380 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
381 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
382 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
383 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
384 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
385 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
386 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
388 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
389 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
391 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
392 /// to individual Channels.
394 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
395 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
396 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
397 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
399 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
400 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
401 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
402 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
403 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
404 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
405 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
407 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
408 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
409 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
410 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
413 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
414 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
415 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
416 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
417 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
419 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
420 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
421 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
422 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
423 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
424 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
425 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
426 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
427 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
428 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
431 default_configuration: UserConfig,
432 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
438 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
440 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
441 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
443 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
444 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
445 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
446 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
448 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
449 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
450 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
451 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
452 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
453 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
455 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
456 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
457 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
458 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
459 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
460 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
461 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
462 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
464 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
465 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
467 our_network_key: SecretKey,
468 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
470 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
471 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
472 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
474 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
475 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
476 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
477 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
479 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
480 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
481 /// are currently open with that peer.
482 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
483 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
485 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
487 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
488 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
489 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
490 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
491 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
492 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
493 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
494 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
495 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
497 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
504 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
506 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
507 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
508 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
509 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
510 pub struct ChainParameters {
511 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
512 pub network: Network,
514 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
516 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
517 pub best_block: BestBlock,
520 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
526 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
527 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
528 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
529 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
530 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
531 /// updates are ready for persistence).
533 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
534 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
535 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
536 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
537 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
539 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
540 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
543 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
544 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
545 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
548 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
549 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
551 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
552 persistence_notifier: notifier,
553 should_persist: persist_check,
554 _read_guard: read_guard,
559 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
561 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
562 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
567 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
568 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
570 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
572 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
573 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
574 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
575 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
576 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
578 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
579 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
581 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
583 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
584 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
585 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
586 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
587 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
588 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
589 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
591 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
592 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
594 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
595 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
596 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
597 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
599 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
600 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
601 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
602 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
603 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
604 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
607 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
609 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
610 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
613 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
615 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
616 /// to better separate parameters.
617 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
618 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
619 /// The node_id of our counterparty
620 pub node_id: PublicKey,
621 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
622 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
623 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
624 pub features: InitFeatures,
625 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
626 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
627 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
629 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
631 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
632 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
633 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
634 /// payments to us through this channel.
635 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
638 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
639 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
640 pub struct ChannelDetails {
641 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
642 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
643 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
644 /// lifetime of the channel.
645 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
646 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
647 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
648 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
649 /// our counterparty already.
651 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
652 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
653 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
654 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
655 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
656 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
657 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
658 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
659 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
660 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
661 /// this value on chain.
663 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
665 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
667 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
668 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
669 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
671 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
672 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
673 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
674 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
676 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
677 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
678 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
679 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
680 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
681 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
682 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
683 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
684 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
686 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
687 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
688 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
689 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
690 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
691 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
692 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
693 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
694 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
696 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
698 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
699 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
700 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
701 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
702 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
703 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
704 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
705 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
706 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
708 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
709 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
710 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
711 pub is_outbound: bool,
712 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
713 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
714 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
715 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
716 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
718 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
719 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
720 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
721 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
723 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
725 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
729 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
730 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
732 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
733 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
734 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
735 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
736 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
737 ParameterError(APIError),
738 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
739 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
740 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
743 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
745 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
746 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
747 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
748 /// paths than the ones selected).
749 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
750 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
751 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
752 /// in over-/re-payment.
754 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
755 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
756 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
758 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
759 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
760 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
761 /// with the latest update_id.
762 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
765 macro_rules! handle_error {
766 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
769 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
770 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
772 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
773 // entering the macro.
774 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
777 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
779 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
780 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
781 if let Some(update) = update_option {
782 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
788 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
789 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
791 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
792 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
793 action: err.action.clone()
797 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
798 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
801 // Return error in case higher-API need one
808 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
809 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
810 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
812 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
813 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
815 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
816 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
817 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
818 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
820 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
821 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
823 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
824 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
825 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
826 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
828 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
829 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
835 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
836 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
840 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
842 $entry.remove_entry();
850 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
851 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
855 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
857 $entry.remove_entry();
865 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
866 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
867 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
869 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
871 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
872 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
873 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
874 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
876 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
877 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
878 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
879 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
880 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
881 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
882 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
883 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
884 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
885 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
886 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
889 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
890 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
891 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
892 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
894 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
895 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
897 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
898 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
900 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
901 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
902 if !$resend_commitment {
903 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
906 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
908 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
909 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
913 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
914 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
916 $entry.remove_entry();
922 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
923 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
924 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
926 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
927 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
931 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
932 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
933 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
934 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
935 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
938 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
943 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
944 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
945 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
946 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
947 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
948 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
950 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
951 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
953 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
954 if !forwards.is_empty() {
955 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
956 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
959 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
960 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
961 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
962 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
963 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
964 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
965 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
966 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
967 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
968 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
969 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
970 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
973 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
974 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
975 // before it should be allowed to.
976 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
977 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
978 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
981 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
982 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
983 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
984 msg: announcement_sigs,
987 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
990 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
991 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
992 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
993 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
994 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
995 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
996 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
997 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
998 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
999 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1000 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1001 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1002 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1003 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1004 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1005 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1006 let mut order = $order;
1008 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1010 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1014 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1015 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1016 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1017 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1022 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1023 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1024 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1025 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1026 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1031 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1035 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1040 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1041 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1042 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1047 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1048 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1049 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1050 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1051 assert!(res.is_ok());
1054 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1058 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1059 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1060 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1062 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1064 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1065 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1070 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1071 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1072 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1073 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1074 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1077 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1079 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1080 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1082 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1084 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1086 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1087 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1088 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1089 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1090 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1091 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1094 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1095 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1096 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1100 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1102 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1103 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1104 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1105 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1106 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1107 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1109 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1110 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1112 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1113 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1116 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1117 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1119 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1121 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1122 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1123 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1124 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1132 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1133 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1134 &self.default_configuration
1137 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1139 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1140 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1141 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1142 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1143 /// otherwise ignored.
1145 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1146 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1148 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1149 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1151 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1152 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1153 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1154 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1155 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1156 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1159 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1160 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
1161 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1163 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1164 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1165 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1167 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1168 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1169 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1170 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1171 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1173 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1176 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1178 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1179 node_id: their_network_key,
1185 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1186 let mut res = Vec::new();
1188 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1189 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1190 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1191 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1192 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1193 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1194 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1195 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1196 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1197 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1198 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1199 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1200 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1202 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1203 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1204 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1205 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1206 inbound_capacity_msat,
1207 outbound_capacity_msat,
1208 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1209 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1210 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1211 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1212 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1213 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1214 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1218 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1219 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1220 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1221 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1227 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1228 /// more information.
1229 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1230 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1233 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1234 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1236 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1237 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1239 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1240 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1241 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1242 // really wanted anyway.
1243 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1246 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1247 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1248 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1250 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1251 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1252 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1254 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1255 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1256 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1257 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1258 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1259 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager)?;
1260 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1261 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1264 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1265 if let Err(_) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1266 // TODO: How should this be handled?
1270 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1271 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1272 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1274 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1275 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1277 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1280 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1281 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1283 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1284 self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok()
1287 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1288 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1289 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1298 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1299 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1300 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1301 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1302 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1304 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1305 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1306 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1307 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1308 // ignore the result here.
1309 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1313 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1315 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1316 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1317 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1318 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1319 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1320 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1323 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1324 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1326 chan.remove_entry().1
1328 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1331 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1332 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1333 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1334 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1335 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1340 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1343 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1344 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1345 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1346 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1347 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1348 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1349 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1350 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1351 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1352 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1353 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1363 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1364 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1365 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1366 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1367 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1371 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1372 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1373 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1375 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1376 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1377 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1378 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1379 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1380 failure_code: $err_code,
1381 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1386 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1387 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1390 let shared_secret = {
1391 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1392 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1395 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1397 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1398 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1399 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1400 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1401 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1402 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1403 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1404 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1407 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1408 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1409 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1410 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1411 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1414 let mut channel_state = None;
1415 macro_rules! return_err {
1416 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1418 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1419 if channel_state.is_none() {
1420 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1422 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1423 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1424 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1425 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1426 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1431 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1432 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1433 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1434 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1436 let error_code = match err {
1437 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1438 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1439 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1440 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1441 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1443 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1446 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1447 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1448 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1455 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1458 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1459 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1460 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1461 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1462 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1463 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1464 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1465 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1466 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1467 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1468 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1469 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1473 // final_expiry_too_soon
1474 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1475 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1476 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1477 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1478 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1479 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1480 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1482 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1483 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1484 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1486 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1487 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1488 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1491 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1492 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1493 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1494 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1495 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1496 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1497 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1498 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1500 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1502 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1503 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1504 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1505 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1506 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1507 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1508 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1509 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1510 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1513 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1515 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1518 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1523 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1524 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1525 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1526 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1528 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1530 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1531 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1532 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1533 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1536 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1537 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1538 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1540 // Check two things:
1541 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1542 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1543 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1545 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1547 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1548 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1549 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1551 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1553 let blinding_factor = {
1554 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1555 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1556 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1557 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1560 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1562 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1564 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1567 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1568 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1571 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1572 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1573 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1574 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1575 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1579 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1580 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1581 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1584 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1585 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1586 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1587 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1591 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1592 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1593 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1594 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1595 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1596 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1597 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1598 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1599 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1600 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1601 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1603 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1606 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1608 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1609 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1610 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1611 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1612 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1615 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1616 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1617 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1618 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1619 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1620 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1621 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1623 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1624 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1626 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1627 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1628 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1629 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1630 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1632 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1633 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1635 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1636 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1637 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1638 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1639 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1641 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1642 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1644 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1645 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1646 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1647 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1653 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1654 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1655 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1656 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1658 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1659 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1661 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1662 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1663 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1665 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1667 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1672 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1675 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1676 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1677 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1679 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1680 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1681 if !chan.should_announce() {
1682 return Err(LightningError {
1683 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1684 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1687 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1688 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1691 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1692 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1693 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1694 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1695 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1696 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1697 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1698 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1699 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1703 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1705 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1706 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1708 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1709 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1710 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1711 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1712 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1713 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1714 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1715 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1718 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1719 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1721 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1727 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1728 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1729 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1730 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1731 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1732 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1734 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1735 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1736 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1737 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1738 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1740 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1742 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1743 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1745 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1746 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1747 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1748 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1749 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1752 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1753 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1755 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1756 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1758 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1759 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1761 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1763 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1764 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1765 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1767 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1768 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1769 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1770 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1771 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1772 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1773 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1774 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1775 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1778 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1779 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1780 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1781 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1782 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1783 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1784 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1785 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1793 } else { unreachable!(); }
1797 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1798 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1800 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1805 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1807 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1808 /// fields for more info.
1810 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1811 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1812 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1813 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1814 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1815 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1817 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1819 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1820 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1821 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1823 /// In general, a path may raise:
1824 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1825 /// node public key) is specified.
1826 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1827 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1829 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1830 /// relevant updates.
1832 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1833 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1834 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1836 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1837 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1838 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1839 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1841 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1842 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1843 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1844 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1845 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None)
1848 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1849 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1850 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1852 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1853 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1854 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1855 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1856 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1858 let mut total_value = 0;
1859 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1860 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1861 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1862 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1863 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1864 continue 'path_check;
1866 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1867 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1868 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1869 continue 'path_check;
1872 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1873 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1875 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1876 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1879 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1880 let mut results = Vec::new();
1881 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1882 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, &keysend_preimage));
1884 let mut has_ok = false;
1885 let mut has_err = false;
1886 for res in results.iter() {
1887 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1888 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1889 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1890 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1897 if has_err && has_ok {
1898 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1900 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1906 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
1907 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
1908 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
1909 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
1910 /// never reach the recipient.
1912 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
1913 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
1915 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1916 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
1917 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
1919 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
1921 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
1922 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage)) {
1923 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
1928 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1929 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1930 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1931 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1933 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1935 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1937 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1938 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1939 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1940 } else { unreachable!(); })
1943 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1945 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1946 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1949 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1950 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1955 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1956 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1957 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1960 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1961 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1962 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1964 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1972 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1973 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1974 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1978 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1980 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1981 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1983 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1985 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1986 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1987 /// keys per-channel).
1989 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1990 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1991 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1993 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1994 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1995 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1997 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
1998 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1999 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2001 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2002 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2003 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2004 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2008 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2009 let mut output_index = None;
2010 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2011 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2012 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2013 if output_index.is_some() {
2014 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2015 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2018 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2019 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2020 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2023 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2026 if output_index.is_none() {
2027 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2028 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2031 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2035 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2036 if !chan.should_announce() {
2037 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2041 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2043 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2045 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2046 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2048 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2049 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2050 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2051 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2052 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2057 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2058 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2059 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2061 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2064 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2065 // smaller than 500:
2066 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2068 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2069 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2070 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2071 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2072 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2073 /// our network addresses.
2075 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2076 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2078 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2079 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2080 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2081 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2083 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2085 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2086 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2087 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2089 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2090 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2093 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2094 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2095 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2097 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2098 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2099 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2100 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2101 rgb, alias, addresses,
2102 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2103 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2105 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2106 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2108 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2109 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2111 let mut announced_chans = false;
2112 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2113 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2114 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2116 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2121 announced_chans = true;
2123 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2124 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2125 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2129 if announced_chans {
2130 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2131 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2132 signature: node_announce_sig,
2133 contents: announcement
2139 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2141 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2142 /// Will likely generate further events.
2143 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2144 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2146 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2147 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2148 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2150 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2151 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2153 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2154 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2155 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2156 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2158 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2159 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2160 match forward_info {
2161 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2162 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2163 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2164 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2165 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2166 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2167 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2169 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2170 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2173 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2174 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2175 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2176 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2177 // problem, not ours.
2184 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2185 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2186 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2187 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2188 match forward_info {
2189 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2190 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2192 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2193 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2194 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2195 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2196 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2197 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2198 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2199 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2201 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2203 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2204 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2206 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2208 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2209 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2210 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2216 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2218 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2219 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2220 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2221 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2222 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2223 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2224 // this channel currently :/.
2230 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2231 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2233 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2234 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2235 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2237 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2238 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2240 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2242 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2243 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2244 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2247 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2249 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2250 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2251 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2252 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2253 // messages when we can.
2254 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2255 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2256 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2263 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2264 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2267 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2268 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2269 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2270 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2271 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2272 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2274 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2275 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2276 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2277 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2278 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2280 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2282 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2284 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2288 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2289 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2292 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2293 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2294 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2295 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2296 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2297 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2298 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2299 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2300 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2302 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2310 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2311 match forward_info {
2312 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2313 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2314 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2315 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2316 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2317 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2318 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2319 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2321 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2324 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2325 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2326 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2327 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2328 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2329 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2331 value: amt_to_forward,
2336 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2338 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2339 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2340 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2342 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2343 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2344 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2345 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2346 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2348 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2353 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2354 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2355 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2356 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2357 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2358 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2359 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2360 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2361 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2362 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2363 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2364 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2365 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2367 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2368 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2369 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2370 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2371 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2373 amt: amt_to_forward,
2374 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2377 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2378 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2379 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2385 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2387 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2390 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2391 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2394 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2395 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2396 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2397 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2398 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2399 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2400 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2402 let mut total_value = 0;
2403 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2404 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2405 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2406 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2407 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2408 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2412 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2413 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2414 total_value += htlc.value;
2415 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2416 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2417 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2418 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2419 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2420 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2422 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2424 _ => unreachable!(),
2427 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2428 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2429 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2430 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2433 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2434 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2436 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2437 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2438 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2439 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2443 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2444 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2446 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2448 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2449 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2456 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2457 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2465 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2466 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2469 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2470 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2473 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2474 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2475 events.append(&mut new_events);
2478 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2480 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2481 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2483 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2484 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2485 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2486 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2487 if background_events.is_empty() {
2491 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2493 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2494 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2495 // monitor updating completing.
2496 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2503 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2504 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2505 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2506 self.process_background_events();
2509 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2510 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2511 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2513 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2515 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2516 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2517 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2518 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2519 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2521 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2522 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2523 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2524 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2525 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2526 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2527 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2528 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2529 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2530 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2531 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2535 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2536 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2538 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2539 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2540 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2544 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2545 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2555 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2556 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2557 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2558 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2559 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2560 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2561 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2563 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2564 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2565 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2566 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2567 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2568 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2569 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2570 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2571 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2572 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2573 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2579 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2580 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2581 // be surfaced to the user.
2582 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2583 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2585 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2586 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2587 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2588 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2589 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2590 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2592 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2595 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2597 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2598 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2599 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2601 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2603 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2604 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2605 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2607 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2608 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2610 rejected_by_dest: false,
2618 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2625 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2626 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2627 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2628 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2629 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2630 /// still-available channels.
2631 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2632 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2633 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2634 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2637 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2638 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2639 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2641 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2643 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2644 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2645 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2647 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2650 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2651 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2652 match &onion_error {
2653 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2655 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2657 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2658 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2659 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2660 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2661 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2662 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2663 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2668 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2669 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2670 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2671 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2673 error_code: onion_error_code,
2675 error_data: onion_error_data
2679 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2685 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2686 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2687 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2688 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2690 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2691 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2692 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2693 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2694 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2695 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2697 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2699 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2705 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2706 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2707 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2708 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2709 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2710 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2712 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2713 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2714 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2718 let mut forward_event = None;
2719 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2720 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2722 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2723 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2724 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2726 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2727 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2730 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2731 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2732 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2733 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2734 time_forwardable: time
2741 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2742 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2743 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2745 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2746 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2747 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2748 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2750 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2752 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2753 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2754 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2755 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2757 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2759 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2760 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2761 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2762 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2764 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2765 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2766 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2767 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2769 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2770 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2771 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2772 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2773 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2775 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2776 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2777 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2783 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2784 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2785 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2787 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2788 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2789 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2790 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2791 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2792 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2793 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2795 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2797 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2798 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2799 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2800 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2801 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2802 } else { errs.push(e); }
2804 Err(None) => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2805 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2810 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2811 // which were generated.
2812 channel_state.take();
2814 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2815 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2816 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2823 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2824 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2825 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2826 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2827 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2833 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2834 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2835 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
2836 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
2837 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2838 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
2839 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2840 payment_preimage, e);
2842 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2843 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
2846 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2847 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
2848 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2849 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2850 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2851 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2852 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2853 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2854 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2855 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2864 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
2865 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2866 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
2867 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
2868 payment_preimage, e);
2870 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2871 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
2873 chan.remove_entry();
2875 return Err(Some((counterparty_node_id, res)));
2878 } else { unreachable!(); }
2881 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2883 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2884 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2886 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2887 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2888 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2890 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2891 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2895 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
2898 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2899 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2900 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2903 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2904 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2905 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2906 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2909 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2910 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2911 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2912 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2913 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2914 payment_preimage, e);
2918 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2920 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2921 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2922 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2928 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2929 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2930 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2933 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2934 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2937 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2938 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2940 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2941 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2942 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2943 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2945 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2946 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2947 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2948 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2949 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2950 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2951 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2952 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2953 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2954 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2956 let chan_restoration_res;
2957 let mut pending_failures = {
2958 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2959 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2960 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2961 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
2962 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
2964 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2968 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2969 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
2970 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2971 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
2972 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
2973 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
2974 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2975 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2976 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
2979 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
2980 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2981 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2985 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
2986 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2987 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2991 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2992 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2993 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2996 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2997 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2998 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2999 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3000 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3001 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3002 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3003 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3004 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3005 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3007 entry.insert(channel);
3013 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3014 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3015 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3016 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3017 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3018 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3019 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3020 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3022 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
3023 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3025 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3028 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3029 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3030 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3031 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3033 user_channel_id: user_id,
3038 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3039 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3040 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3041 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3042 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3043 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3044 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3045 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3046 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3048 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3050 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3053 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3054 // lock before watch_channel
3055 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3057 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3058 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3059 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3060 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3061 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3062 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3063 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3064 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3065 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3066 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3067 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3069 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3070 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3071 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3072 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3073 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3074 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3078 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3079 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3080 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3081 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3082 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3084 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3085 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3086 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3095 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3097 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3098 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3099 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3100 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3101 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3102 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3103 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3105 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3106 Ok(update) => update,
3107 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3109 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3110 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3114 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3117 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3118 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3122 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3123 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3124 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3125 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3127 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3128 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3130 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3131 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3132 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3133 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3134 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3135 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3136 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3137 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3138 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3139 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3140 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3141 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3142 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3143 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3144 msg: announcement_sigs,
3146 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3147 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3148 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3149 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3154 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3158 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3159 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
3160 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3161 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3163 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3164 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3165 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3166 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3168 let (shutdown, closing_signed, monitor_update, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3169 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3170 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3171 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3175 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3176 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3177 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3181 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3182 if let Err(_) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3183 // TODO: How should this be handled?
3187 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
3188 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3189 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3191 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3192 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
3194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3197 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3198 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3200 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3201 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3202 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3203 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3211 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3212 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3213 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3214 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3215 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3216 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3217 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3218 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3220 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3221 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3222 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3223 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3228 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3229 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3230 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3231 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3232 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3233 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3234 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3236 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3237 } else { (tx, None) }
3239 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3242 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3243 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3244 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3246 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3247 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3248 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3249 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3257 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3258 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3259 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3260 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3262 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3263 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3264 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3265 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3267 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3268 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3270 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3271 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3272 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3273 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3276 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3277 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3278 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3279 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3280 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3281 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3282 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3283 match pending_forward_info {
3284 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3285 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3286 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3287 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3288 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3289 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3290 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3294 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3295 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3296 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3297 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3298 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3299 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3300 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3301 // no problem just calling this
3302 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3303 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3305 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3306 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3307 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3310 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3312 _ => pending_forward_info
3315 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3317 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3322 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3323 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3325 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3326 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3327 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3328 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3329 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3331 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3333 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3336 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
3340 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3341 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3342 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3343 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3344 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3345 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3346 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3348 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3350 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3355 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3356 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3357 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3358 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3359 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3360 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3361 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3363 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3364 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3365 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3367 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3370 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3374 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3375 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3376 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3377 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3378 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3379 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3380 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3382 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3383 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3384 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3385 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3386 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3387 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3388 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3393 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3394 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3395 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3397 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3398 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3399 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3401 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3402 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3403 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3404 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3405 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3406 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3407 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3408 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3410 commitment_signed: msg,
3414 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3415 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3416 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3422 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3427 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3428 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3429 let mut forward_event = None;
3430 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3431 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3432 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3433 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3435 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3436 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3437 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3438 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3439 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3441 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3442 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3443 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3445 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3446 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3447 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3452 match forward_event {
3454 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3455 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3456 time_forwardable: time
3464 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3465 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3467 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3468 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3469 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3471 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3472 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3474 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3475 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3476 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3477 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3478 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3479 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3480 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3481 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3483 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3485 } else { unreachable!(); }
3488 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3489 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3490 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3494 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3495 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3496 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3500 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3502 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3505 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3507 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3508 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3509 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3511 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3518 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3519 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3520 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3521 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3522 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3523 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3524 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3526 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3528 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3533 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3534 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3535 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3537 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3538 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3539 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3540 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3542 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3543 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3546 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3547 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3548 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3549 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3550 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3553 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3558 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3559 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3560 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3561 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3562 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3563 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3565 // It's not a local channel
3566 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3569 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3570 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3571 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3572 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3573 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3574 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3575 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3576 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3578 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3580 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3581 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3582 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3583 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3585 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3588 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3590 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3593 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3594 let chan_restoration_res;
3595 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3596 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3597 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3599 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3600 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3601 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3602 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3604 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3605 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3606 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3607 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3608 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3609 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3610 let mut channel_update = None;
3611 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3612 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3613 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3616 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3617 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3618 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3619 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3620 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3621 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3622 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3625 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3626 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3627 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3628 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3630 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3632 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3635 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3636 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3638 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3639 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3644 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3645 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3646 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3647 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3648 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3650 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3651 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3652 let counterparty_node_id;
3653 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3654 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3655 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3657 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3658 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3659 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3660 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3661 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3663 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3664 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3666 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3667 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3669 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3670 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3671 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3673 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3676 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating fee resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3677 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3678 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3679 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3680 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3681 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3682 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3683 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3684 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3694 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3695 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3696 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3700 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3701 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3702 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3703 let pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3704 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3705 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events {
3706 match monitor_event {
3707 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3708 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3709 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3710 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3712 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3713 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3716 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3717 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3718 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3719 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3720 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3721 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3722 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3723 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3724 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3726 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3727 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3728 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3732 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3733 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3734 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3735 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3743 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3744 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3747 has_pending_monitor_events
3750 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3751 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3752 /// update was applied.
3754 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3755 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3756 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3757 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3758 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3759 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3760 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3761 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3763 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3764 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3765 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3766 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3767 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3769 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3770 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3771 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3772 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3773 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3775 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3776 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3777 has_monitor_update = true;
3778 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3779 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3780 if close_channel { return false; }
3782 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3783 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3784 updates: commitment_update,
3791 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3792 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3799 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
3800 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3801 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3804 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3805 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3811 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3812 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3814 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3815 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3816 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3817 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3818 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3819 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3820 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3821 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3822 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3823 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3824 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3825 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3826 assert!(should_broadcast);
3827 } else { unreachable!(); }
3828 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3830 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3834 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3835 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3837 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3839 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3840 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3841 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3842 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3843 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3844 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3845 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3846 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3847 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3848 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3849 // never fail a payment too early.
3850 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3852 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3855 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3860 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3863 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3864 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3866 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3867 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3868 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3870 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3872 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3873 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3874 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3875 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3876 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3877 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3878 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3881 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3882 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3885 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3886 /// stored external to LDK.
3888 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3889 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3890 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3892 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3893 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3895 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
3896 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3897 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3898 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3899 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3901 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3902 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3903 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3904 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3906 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3907 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3908 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3909 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
3910 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3912 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3913 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3914 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3915 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3916 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3918 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3919 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3920 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3922 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3924 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3925 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3927 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3928 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3929 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
3930 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3931 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3934 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
3935 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
3936 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3937 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
3938 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
3943 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3944 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3945 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3946 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3947 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3950 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3951 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3952 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3953 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3955 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3956 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3957 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3958 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3961 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3962 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3965 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
3966 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3967 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3969 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3970 events.replace(pending_events);
3979 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3981 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3982 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3983 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3984 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3987 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
3989 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
3990 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
3992 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
3993 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
3994 /// restarting from an old state.
3995 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
3996 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3997 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3999 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4000 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4001 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4002 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4005 let mut pending_events = std::mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4006 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4007 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4010 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4011 handler.handle_event(event);
4019 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4021 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4022 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4023 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4024 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4027 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4029 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4030 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4031 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4032 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4033 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4036 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4037 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4038 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4041 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4042 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4043 let new_height = height - 1;
4045 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4046 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4047 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4048 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4049 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4050 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4053 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4057 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4059 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4060 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4061 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4062 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4065 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4066 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4067 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4068 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4070 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4071 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4073 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4074 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4077 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4078 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4079 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4080 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4082 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4083 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4085 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4087 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4089 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4091 macro_rules! max_time {
4092 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4094 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4095 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4096 // having an explicit local time source.
4097 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4098 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4099 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4100 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4101 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4107 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4108 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4109 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4110 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4111 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4115 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4116 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4117 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4118 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4119 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4120 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4126 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4127 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4128 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4129 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4130 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4131 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4132 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4133 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4138 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4140 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4141 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4142 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4143 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4146 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4147 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4149 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4150 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4151 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4152 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4153 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4155 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4156 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4158 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4159 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4160 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4161 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4162 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4163 let res = f(channel);
4164 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4165 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4166 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4167 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4168 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4172 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4173 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4174 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4175 msg: funding_locked,
4177 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4178 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4179 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4180 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4181 msg: announcement_sigs,
4183 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4184 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4185 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4186 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4187 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4190 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4192 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4194 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4195 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4196 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4198 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4199 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4200 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4201 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4202 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4206 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4207 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4208 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4215 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4216 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4217 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4218 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4219 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4220 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4221 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4222 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4223 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4224 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4225 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4226 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4227 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4232 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4237 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4239 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4240 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4244 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4245 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4246 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4248 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4249 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4250 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4251 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4254 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4255 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4257 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4258 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4261 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4262 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4263 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4264 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4265 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4269 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4270 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4271 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4272 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4276 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4277 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4278 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4279 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4280 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4281 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4284 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4285 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4286 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4289 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4290 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4291 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4294 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4296 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4299 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4300 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4301 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4304 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4305 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4306 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4309 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4310 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4311 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4314 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4315 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4316 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4319 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4320 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4321 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4324 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4325 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4326 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4329 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4330 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4331 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4334 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4335 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4336 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4339 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4340 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4341 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4344 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4345 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4346 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4349 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4350 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4351 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4354 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4355 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4356 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4359 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4360 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4361 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4364 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4369 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4370 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4371 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4374 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4375 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4376 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4377 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4379 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4380 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4381 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4382 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4383 if no_connection_possible {
4384 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4385 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4386 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4387 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4388 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4390 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4391 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4392 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4402 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4403 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4404 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4405 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4406 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4407 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4408 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4412 no_channels_remain = false;
4418 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4420 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4421 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4422 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4423 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4424 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4425 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4426 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4427 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4428 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4429 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4430 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4431 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4432 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4433 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4434 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4435 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4436 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4437 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4438 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4439 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4443 if no_channels_remain {
4444 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4447 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4448 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4452 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4453 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4455 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4458 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4459 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4460 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4461 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4462 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4465 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4466 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4471 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4472 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4473 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4474 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4475 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4476 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4477 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4478 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4479 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4483 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4484 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4485 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4491 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4494 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4495 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4497 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4498 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4499 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4500 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4501 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4505 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4506 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4511 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4512 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4513 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4514 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4515 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4516 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4519 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4522 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4528 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4529 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4534 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4535 let result = *guard;
4543 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4544 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4545 let current_time = Instant::now();
4547 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4548 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4553 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4554 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4555 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4556 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4557 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4559 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4560 let result = *guard;
4561 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4565 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4566 None => return result,
4572 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4574 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4575 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4576 *persistence_lock = true;
4577 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4582 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4583 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4585 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4587 (0, onion_packet, required),
4588 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4591 (0, payment_data, required),
4592 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4594 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4595 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4596 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4600 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4601 (0, routing, required),
4602 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4603 (4, payment_hash, required),
4604 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4605 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4608 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4612 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4617 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4618 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4619 (2, outpoint, required),
4620 (4, htlc_id, required),
4621 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4624 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4625 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4626 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
4627 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
4630 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
4631 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
4632 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
4637 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
4638 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
4639 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
4645 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4646 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4647 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4649 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
4650 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
4651 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4655 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
4656 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4657 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
4659 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
4661 if payment_data.is_some() {
4662 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4664 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
4667 if payment_data.is_none() {
4668 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4670 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
4674 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
4682 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4683 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4684 (0, session_priv, required),
4685 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4686 (4, path, vec_type),
4688 (1, PreviousHopData)
4691 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4692 (0, LightningError) => {
4696 (0, failure_code, required),
4697 (2, data, vec_type),
4701 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4703 (0, forward_info, required),
4704 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
4705 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
4706 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
4709 (0, htlc_id, required),
4710 (2, err_packet, required),
4714 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4715 (0, payment_secret, required),
4716 (2, expiry_time, required),
4717 (4, user_payment_id, required),
4718 (6, payment_preimage, required),
4719 (8, min_value_msat, required),
4722 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4723 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4724 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4725 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4726 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4729 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4730 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4732 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4734 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4736 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4737 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4738 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4741 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4742 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4743 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4744 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4745 unfunded_channels += 1;
4748 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4749 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4750 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4751 channel.write(writer)?;
4755 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4756 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4757 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4758 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4759 for forward in pending_forwards {
4760 forward.write(writer)?;
4764 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4765 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4766 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4767 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4768 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4769 htlc.write(writer)?;
4773 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4774 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4775 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4776 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4777 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4778 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4781 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4782 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4783 for event in events.iter() {
4784 event.write(writer)?;
4787 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4788 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4789 for event in background_events.iter() {
4791 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4793 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4794 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4799 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4800 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4802 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4803 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4804 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4805 hash.write(writer)?;
4806 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4809 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4810 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4811 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4812 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4815 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
4821 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4823 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4825 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4826 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4827 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4828 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4829 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4830 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4831 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4832 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4833 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4834 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4835 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4837 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4838 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4840 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4841 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4842 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4843 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4844 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4845 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4846 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4847 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4848 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4849 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4850 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4853 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4854 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4856 pub keys_manager: K,
4858 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4860 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4861 pub fee_estimator: F,
4862 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4864 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4865 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4866 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4867 pub chain_monitor: M,
4869 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4870 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4871 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4872 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4873 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4874 /// deserialization.
4876 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4877 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4878 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4880 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4881 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4883 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4884 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4885 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4886 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4888 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4891 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4892 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4895 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4896 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4897 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4898 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4899 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4900 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4903 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4904 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4905 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4906 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4907 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4909 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4910 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4915 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4916 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4917 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4918 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4919 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4920 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4921 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4922 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4925 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4926 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4927 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4931 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4932 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4933 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4934 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4935 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4936 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4939 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4940 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4942 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4943 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4944 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4946 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4948 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4949 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4950 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4951 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4952 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4953 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4954 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4955 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4956 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4957 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4958 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4959 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4960 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4961 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4962 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
4963 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
4964 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4965 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4966 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4967 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4968 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4969 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4970 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4971 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4972 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4973 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4974 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4975 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4976 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4977 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4979 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4980 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4982 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4985 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4986 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4987 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4988 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4989 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4990 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4994 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4995 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4996 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5000 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5001 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5002 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5003 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5004 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5005 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5006 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5007 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5008 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5010 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5013 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5014 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5015 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5016 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5017 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5018 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5019 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5020 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5022 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5025 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5026 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5027 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5028 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5029 let peer_state = PeerState {
5030 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5032 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5035 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5036 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5037 for _ in 0..event_count {
5038 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5039 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5044 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5045 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5046 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5047 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5048 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5049 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5053 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5054 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5056 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5057 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5058 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5059 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5060 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5064 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5065 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5066 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
5067 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
5068 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5072 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
5074 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5075 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5077 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5079 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5080 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5081 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5083 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5085 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5090 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5092 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5093 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
5095 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5096 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5099 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5100 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5102 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5104 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5105 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5106 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5107 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5109 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5110 logger: args.logger,
5111 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5114 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5115 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5118 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5119 //connection or two.
5121 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5127 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5128 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5129 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5130 use core::time::Duration;
5131 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5132 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5133 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5134 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5136 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5137 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5138 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5139 use util::test_utils;
5143 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5145 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5146 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5147 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5149 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5150 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5151 thread::spawn(move || {
5153 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5154 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5155 *persistence_lock = true;
5158 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5164 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5165 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5167 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5170 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5175 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5177 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5180 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5187 fn test_notify_limits() {
5188 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5189 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5190 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5191 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5192 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5193 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5195 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5196 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5197 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5198 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5199 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5201 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5203 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5204 // to connect messages with new values
5205 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5206 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5207 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5208 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5210 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5211 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5212 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5213 // ... but the last node should not.
5214 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5215 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5216 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5217 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5219 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5220 // about the channel.
5221 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5222 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5223 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5225 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5227 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5228 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5229 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5230 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5231 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5232 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5234 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5235 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5236 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5238 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5239 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5240 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5241 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5242 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5243 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5245 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5246 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5247 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5248 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5249 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5250 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5251 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5252 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5254 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5255 // the channel info has updated.
5256 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5257 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5258 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5259 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5260 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5261 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5265 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5266 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5268 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5269 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5270 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5271 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5272 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5273 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5275 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5276 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5277 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5278 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5279 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5280 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5281 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5282 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5284 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5285 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5286 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5288 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5289 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5291 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5292 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5293 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5294 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5295 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5297 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5298 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5299 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5301 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5302 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5303 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5304 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5305 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5306 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5307 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5308 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5309 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5311 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5312 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5314 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5315 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5316 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5318 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5319 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5320 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5321 // lightning messages manually.
5322 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5324 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5325 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5326 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5328 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5329 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5331 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5332 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5334 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5335 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5336 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5338 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5339 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5340 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5342 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5344 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5346 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5347 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5350 // There's an existing bug that generates a PaymentSent event for each MPP path, so handle that here.
5351 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5353 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5354 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5356 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5359 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5360 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5362 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5367 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5368 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5369 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5370 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5371 // fails as expected.
5372 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5373 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5374 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5375 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5376 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5377 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5379 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5380 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5381 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
5383 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
5384 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5385 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5387 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5388 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5389 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5390 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5391 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5393 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5394 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5395 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5397 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5398 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5399 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5400 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5401 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5402 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5403 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5404 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5405 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5407 // Finally, claim the original payment.
5408 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5410 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
5411 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5412 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5413 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5415 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5416 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5417 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
5418 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
5419 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
5421 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
5422 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5423 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5425 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5426 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5427 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5428 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5429 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5431 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5432 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5433 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5435 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5436 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5437 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5438 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5439 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5440 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5441 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5442 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5443 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5445 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
5446 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5450 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
5451 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
5452 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
5453 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5454 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5455 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5456 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5458 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5459 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5460 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5461 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5463 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5464 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5465 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5466 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5467 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5468 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5470 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5471 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
5472 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5475 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5476 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5477 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5478 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5479 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5480 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5481 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5483 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
5487 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
5488 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
5489 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5490 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5491 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5492 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5494 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5495 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5496 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5497 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5499 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5500 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5501 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5502 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5503 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5504 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5506 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5507 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5508 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
5509 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5512 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5513 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5514 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5515 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5516 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5517 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5518 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5520 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
5524 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5527 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5528 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5529 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5530 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5531 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5532 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5533 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5534 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5535 use routing::router::get_route;
5536 use util::test_utils;
5537 use util::config::UserConfig;
5538 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
5540 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5541 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5542 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5544 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5548 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5549 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5550 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5551 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5552 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5553 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5554 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5559 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5560 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5563 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5564 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5565 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5567 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5568 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5570 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5571 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
5573 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5574 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5576 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5577 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5578 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5579 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5580 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5582 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5584 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5586 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5587 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5588 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5589 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5590 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5592 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5594 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5596 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5597 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5598 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5601 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5602 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5603 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5605 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5606 } else { panic!(); }
5608 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5609 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5611 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5614 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5617 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5618 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5620 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5621 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5622 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5623 match msg_events[0] {
5624 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
5625 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
5626 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
5630 match msg_events[1] {
5631 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5635 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5637 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5638 macro_rules! send_payment {
5639 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5640 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5641 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5642 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5644 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5645 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5647 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5648 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5650 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5651 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5652 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5653 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5654 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5655 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5656 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5657 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5659 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5660 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5661 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5663 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5664 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5665 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5666 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5667 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5669 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5672 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5673 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5674 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5675 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5677 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5682 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5683 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);