1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
116 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
117 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
123 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
124 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
125 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
127 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
128 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
129 /// may overshoot this in either case)
130 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
131 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
136 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
137 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
140 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
141 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
142 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
143 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
144 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
147 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
148 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
150 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
151 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
152 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
158 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
159 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
162 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
163 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
166 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
170 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
171 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
172 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 short_channel_id: u64,
176 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
177 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
179 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
180 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
185 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
187 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
188 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
189 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
191 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
192 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
195 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
196 struct ClaimableHTLC {
197 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
199 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
201 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
202 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
203 sender_intended_value: u64,
204 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
206 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
207 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
208 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
209 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
213 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
215 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
216 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
217 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
219 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
220 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
225 impl Readable for PaymentId {
226 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
227 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
232 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
234 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
235 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
236 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
238 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
239 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
244 impl Readable for InterceptId {
245 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
246 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
251 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
252 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
253 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
254 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
255 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
258 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
260 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
261 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
262 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
264 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
265 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
269 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
270 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
271 (0, short_channel_id, required),
272 (2, htlc_id, required),
274 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
275 (0, session_priv, required),
280 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
281 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
282 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
283 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
284 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
287 session_priv: SecretKey,
288 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
289 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
290 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
291 payment_id: PaymentId,
294 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
295 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
296 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
298 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
300 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
302 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
305 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
306 payment_id.hash(hasher);
307 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
313 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
315 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
316 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
317 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
318 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
319 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
320 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
324 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
325 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
326 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
327 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
328 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
329 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
331 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
337 struct ReceiveError {
343 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
344 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
346 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
347 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
348 pub enum FailureCode {
349 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
350 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
351 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
352 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
353 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
354 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
355 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
356 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
357 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
358 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
359 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
362 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
363 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
364 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
365 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
366 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
368 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
369 err: msgs::LightningError,
370 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
371 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
373 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
375 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
377 err: LightningError {
379 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
380 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
387 shutdown_finish: None,
391 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
392 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
395 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
397 err: LightningError {
399 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
400 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
406 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
407 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
411 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
414 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
416 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
417 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
421 log_level: Level::Warn,
424 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
426 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
428 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
430 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
431 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
439 shutdown_finish: None,
444 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
445 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
446 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
447 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
448 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
450 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
451 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
452 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
453 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
454 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
455 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
456 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
458 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
462 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
463 struct ClaimingPayment {
465 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
466 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
468 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
469 (0, amount_msat, required),
470 (2, payment_purpose, required),
471 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
474 struct ClaimablePayment {
475 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
476 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
477 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
480 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
481 struct ClaimablePayments {
482 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
483 /// failed/claimed by the user.
485 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
486 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
488 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
489 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
490 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
492 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
493 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
494 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
495 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
498 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
499 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
500 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
501 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
502 enum BackgroundEvent {
503 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
504 /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
505 /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
506 /// need the counterparty node_id.
508 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
509 /// are regenerated on startup.
510 ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
511 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
512 /// channel to continue normal operation.
514 /// In general this should be used rather than
515 /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
516 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
517 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
519 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
520 /// are regenerated on startup.
521 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
522 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
523 funding_txo: OutPoint,
524 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
529 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
530 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
531 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
532 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
533 /// event can be generated.
534 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
535 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
536 /// operation of another channel.
538 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
539 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
540 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
541 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
543 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
544 event: events::Event,
545 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
549 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
550 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
551 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
552 (0, event, upgradable_required),
553 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
554 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
555 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
556 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
557 // downgrades to prior versions.
558 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
562 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
563 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
564 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
565 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
566 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
569 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
570 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
571 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
572 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
576 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
577 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
578 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
579 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
580 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
581 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
583 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
584 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
585 channel_id: [u8; 32],
586 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
591 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
593 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
594 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
595 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
596 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
601 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
602 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
606 /// State we hold per-peer.
607 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
608 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
610 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
611 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
613 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
614 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
615 latest_features: InitFeatures,
616 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
617 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
618 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
619 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
620 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
622 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
623 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
624 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
625 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
627 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
628 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
629 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
630 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
631 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
632 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
633 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
634 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
635 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
636 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
637 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
638 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
639 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
640 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
641 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
645 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
646 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
647 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
648 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
649 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
650 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
653 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
657 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
658 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
660 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
663 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
664 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
665 struct PendingInboundPayment {
666 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
667 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
668 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
669 /// this payment being removed.
671 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
672 user_payment_id: u64,
673 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
674 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
675 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
678 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
679 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
680 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
681 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
682 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
683 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
684 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
685 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
687 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
688 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
696 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
698 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
703 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
704 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
705 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
706 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
707 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
708 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
709 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
710 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
711 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
713 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
714 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
716 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
717 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
718 $vis trait AChannelManager {
719 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
720 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
721 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
722 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
723 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
724 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
725 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
726 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
727 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
728 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
729 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
730 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
731 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
732 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
733 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
734 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
735 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
736 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
739 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
740 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
741 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
742 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
743 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
744 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
746 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
747 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
748 ES::Target: EntropySource,
749 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
750 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
751 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
755 type Watch = M::Target;
757 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
759 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
761 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
763 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
764 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
766 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
768 type Router = R::Target;
770 type Logger = L::Target;
772 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
775 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
776 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
778 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
779 /// to individual Channels.
781 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
782 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
783 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
784 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
786 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
787 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
788 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
789 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
790 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
791 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
792 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
794 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
795 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
796 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
798 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
799 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
800 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
801 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
802 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
804 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
805 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
806 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
807 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
809 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
810 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
811 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
813 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
814 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
815 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
816 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
817 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
819 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
820 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
821 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
822 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
823 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
824 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
825 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
826 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
829 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
830 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
831 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
832 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
833 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
837 // `total_consistency_lock`
839 // |__`forward_htlcs`
841 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
843 // |__`per_peer_state`
845 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
847 // | |__`claimable_payments`
849 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
855 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
857 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
861 // | |__`pending_events`
863 // | |__`pending_background_events`
865 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
867 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
868 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
869 ES::Target: EntropySource,
870 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
871 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
872 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
876 default_configuration: UserConfig,
877 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
878 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
884 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
886 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
888 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
889 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
891 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
892 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
893 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
894 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
896 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
897 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
899 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
900 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
901 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
902 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
903 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
904 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
905 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
906 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
908 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
910 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
911 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
913 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
915 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
916 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
917 /// and via the classic SCID.
919 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
920 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
922 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
924 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
926 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
927 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
928 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
930 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
931 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
933 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
934 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
936 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
937 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
939 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
940 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
941 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
942 /// active channel list on load.
944 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
945 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
947 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
949 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
950 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
951 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
953 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
954 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
955 /// the handling of the events.
957 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
958 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
961 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
962 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
963 /// would break backwards compatability.
964 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
965 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
966 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
968 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
969 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
971 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
973 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
974 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
975 /// confirmation depth.
977 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
978 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
979 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
981 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
983 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
985 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
987 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
989 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
991 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
992 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
993 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
995 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
996 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
998 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
999 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1000 /// keeping additional state.
1001 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1003 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1004 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1005 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1006 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1008 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1009 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1011 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1012 /// are currently open with that peer.
1014 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1015 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1018 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1020 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1021 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1022 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1023 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1024 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1026 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1027 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1028 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1029 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1030 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1032 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1033 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1035 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1036 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1037 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1038 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1040 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1041 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1042 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1043 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1044 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1046 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1048 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1050 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1051 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1052 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1053 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1054 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1055 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1056 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1057 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1058 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1060 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1061 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1063 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1067 signer_provider: SP,
1072 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1074 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1075 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1076 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1077 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1078 pub struct ChainParameters {
1079 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1080 pub network: Network,
1082 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1084 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1085 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1088 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1095 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1096 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1097 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1098 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1099 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1100 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1102 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1103 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1104 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1105 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1106 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1108 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1109 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1112 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1113 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1114 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1115 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1117 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1118 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1119 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1120 _read_guard: read_guard,
1125 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1126 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1127 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1128 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1130 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1131 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1132 should_persist: persist_check,
1133 _read_guard: read_guard,
1138 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1139 fn drop(&mut self) {
1140 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1141 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1146 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1147 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1149 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1151 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1152 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1153 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1154 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1155 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1157 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1158 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1160 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1162 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1163 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1164 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1165 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1166 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1167 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1168 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1169 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1170 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1171 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1172 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1173 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1174 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1176 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1177 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1179 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1180 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1181 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1182 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1184 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1185 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1186 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1187 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1188 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1189 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1192 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1194 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1195 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1198 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1200 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1201 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1203 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1204 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1205 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1206 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1208 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1209 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1210 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1212 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1213 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1214 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1216 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1217 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1218 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1219 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1221 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1222 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1223 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1225 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1226 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1227 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1229 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1230 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1231 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1232 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1233 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1234 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1235 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1236 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1237 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1238 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1239 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1242 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1243 /// to better separate parameters.
1244 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1245 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1246 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1247 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1248 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1249 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1250 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1251 pub features: InitFeatures,
1252 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1253 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1254 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1256 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1258 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1259 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1260 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1261 /// payments to us through this channel.
1262 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1263 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1264 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1265 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1266 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1267 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1268 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1271 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1272 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1273 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1274 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1275 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1276 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1277 /// lifetime of the channel.
1278 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1279 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1280 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1281 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1282 /// our counterparty already.
1284 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1285 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1286 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1287 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1289 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1290 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1291 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1292 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1294 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1295 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1297 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1298 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1300 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1301 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1302 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1303 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1304 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1305 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1306 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1307 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1308 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1311 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1313 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1314 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1315 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1316 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1317 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1318 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1319 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1321 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1322 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1324 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1325 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1326 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1327 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1328 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1329 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1330 /// this value on chain.
1332 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1334 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1336 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1337 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1338 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1339 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1341 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1342 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1343 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1345 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1346 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1347 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1348 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1349 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1351 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1352 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1353 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1354 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1356 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1357 pub balance_msat: u64,
1358 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1359 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1360 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1361 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1363 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1365 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1366 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1367 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1368 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1369 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1370 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1371 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1372 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1374 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1375 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1376 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1377 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1378 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1379 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1380 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1382 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1383 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1384 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1385 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1386 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1387 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1388 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1389 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1390 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1392 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1394 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1395 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1396 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1397 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1398 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1400 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1401 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1402 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1403 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1404 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1405 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1406 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1408 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1409 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1410 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1411 pub is_outbound: bool,
1412 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1413 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1414 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1415 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1416 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1418 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1419 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1420 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1421 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1423 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1424 pub is_usable: bool,
1425 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1426 pub is_public: bool,
1427 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1428 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1429 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1430 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1431 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1432 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1434 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1435 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1438 impl ChannelDetails {
1439 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1440 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1441 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1443 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1444 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1445 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1446 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1449 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1450 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1451 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1453 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1454 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1455 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1456 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1459 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1460 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1462 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1463 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1464 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1466 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1467 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1468 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1469 features: latest_features,
1470 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1471 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1472 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1473 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1474 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1475 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1476 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1477 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1478 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1479 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1481 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1482 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1483 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1484 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1485 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1486 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1487 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1488 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1489 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1490 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1491 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1492 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1493 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1494 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1495 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1496 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1497 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1498 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1499 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1500 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1501 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1502 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1503 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1504 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1505 config: Some(channel.config()),
1510 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1511 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1512 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1513 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1514 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1516 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1518 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1519 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1520 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1523 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1524 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1525 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1527 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1528 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1529 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1531 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1532 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1533 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1535 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1536 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1540 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1542 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1544 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1545 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1546 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1547 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1549 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1550 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1551 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1554 macro_rules! handle_error {
1555 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1556 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1557 // entering the macro.
1558 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1559 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1563 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1564 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1566 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1567 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1568 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1569 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1573 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1574 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1575 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1576 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1581 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1582 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1584 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1585 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1586 action: err.action.clone()
1590 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1591 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1592 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1593 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1594 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1598 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1605 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1606 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1607 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1608 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1609 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1610 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1612 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1613 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1614 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1615 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1616 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1618 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1619 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1621 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1625 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1626 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1627 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1629 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1630 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1632 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1633 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1635 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1636 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1637 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1638 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1639 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1640 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1646 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1647 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1651 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1653 $entry.remove_entry();
1661 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1662 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1666 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1668 $entry.remove_entry();
1676 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1677 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1679 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1680 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1686 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1687 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1688 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1689 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1690 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1692 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1693 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1694 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1695 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1696 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1697 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1698 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1699 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1700 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1701 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1706 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1707 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1708 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1709 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1710 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1711 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1712 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1713 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1714 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1716 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1721 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1722 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1723 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1724 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1725 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1726 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1727 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1728 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1729 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1731 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1736 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1737 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1738 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1739 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1740 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1741 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1742 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1743 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1744 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1745 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1746 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1748 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1749 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1750 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1756 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1757 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1759 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1760 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1761 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1762 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1763 updates.announcement_sigs);
1764 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1765 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1768 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1769 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1770 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1772 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1774 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1775 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1777 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1778 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1779 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1780 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1785 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1786 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1787 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1788 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1789 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1790 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1791 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1794 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1795 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1796 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1799 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1800 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1801 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1802 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1803 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1804 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1805 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1806 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1810 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1811 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1812 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1813 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1819 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1820 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1824 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1825 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1826 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1827 while !processed_all_events {
1828 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1832 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1835 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1836 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1837 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1839 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
1840 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
1841 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
1843 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1844 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1845 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1846 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1850 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1851 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1852 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1853 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1856 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1858 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1859 $event_to_handle = event;
1861 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1862 post_event_actions.push(action);
1867 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1868 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1869 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1870 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1873 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1874 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1875 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1876 processed_all_events = false;
1879 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1880 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1886 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1888 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1889 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1890 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1891 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1892 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1893 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1897 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1899 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1900 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1902 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1904 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1905 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1906 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1909 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1910 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1911 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1912 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1913 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1914 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1915 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1916 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1918 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1919 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1920 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1925 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1927 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1928 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1929 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1930 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1931 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1932 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1933 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1934 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1936 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1939 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1940 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1942 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1944 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1946 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1948 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
1949 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1950 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1951 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1952 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1953 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
1954 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1964 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1965 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1966 &self.default_configuration
1969 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1970 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1971 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1974 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1975 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1977 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1979 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1983 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1988 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1990 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1991 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1992 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1993 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1994 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1996 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1997 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1999 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2000 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2001 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2003 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2004 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2005 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2007 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2008 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2009 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2010 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2011 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2012 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2014 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2015 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2016 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2017 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2018 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2019 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2023 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2024 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2026 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2028 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2029 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2031 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2033 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2034 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2035 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2036 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2037 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2038 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2042 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2047 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2049 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
2050 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2051 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2053 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2055 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2058 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2061 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2062 node_id: their_network_key,
2065 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2068 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2069 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2070 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2071 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2072 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2073 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2074 // the same channel.
2075 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2077 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2078 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2079 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2080 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2081 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2082 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2083 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
2084 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2092 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2093 /// more information.
2094 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2095 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
2098 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2099 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2101 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2102 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2104 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2105 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2106 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2107 // really wanted anyway.
2108 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
2111 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2112 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2113 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2114 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2116 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2117 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2118 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2119 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2120 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2123 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2129 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2130 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2132 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2133 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2134 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2136 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2137 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2138 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2139 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2140 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2141 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2142 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2143 total_msat: *total_msat,
2146 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2147 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2149 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2150 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2152 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2157 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2158 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2159 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2160 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2161 Some(transaction) => {
2162 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2163 channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction
2168 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2169 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2170 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2171 reason: closure_reason
2175 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2176 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2178 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2179 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2180 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2182 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2183 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2185 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2186 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2187 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2188 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2189 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2190 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2191 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2192 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2193 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2195 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2196 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2197 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2198 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2199 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2203 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2204 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2205 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2206 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2207 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2210 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2211 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2212 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2213 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2217 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2221 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2225 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2226 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2227 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2228 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2231 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2235 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2236 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2237 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2239 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2240 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2242 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2243 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2244 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2245 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2247 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2249 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2250 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2251 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2254 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2255 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2256 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2257 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2258 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2259 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2262 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2263 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2264 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2266 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2267 /// the channel being closed or not:
2268 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2269 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2270 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2271 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2272 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2273 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2274 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2276 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2277 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2278 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2279 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2281 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2283 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2284 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2285 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2288 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2289 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2290 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2291 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2292 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2293 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2297 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2298 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2299 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2300 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2301 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2302 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2303 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2304 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2306 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2307 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2308 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2309 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2310 // ignore the result here.
2311 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2315 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2316 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2317 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2318 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2319 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2320 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2321 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2323 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2324 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2325 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2326 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2327 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2329 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2331 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2333 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2336 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2337 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2338 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2339 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2340 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2345 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2348 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2349 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2350 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2351 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2352 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2353 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2354 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2355 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2356 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2357 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2358 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2359 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2370 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2371 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2372 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2374 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2375 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2376 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2379 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2380 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2381 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2383 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2384 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2385 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2386 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2387 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2390 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2391 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2392 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2393 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2394 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2398 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2399 /// local transaction(s).
2400 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2401 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2402 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2406 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2407 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2409 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2410 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2411 return Err(ReceiveError {
2412 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2414 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2417 // final_expiry_too_soon
2418 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2419 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2421 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2422 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2423 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2424 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2425 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2426 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2427 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2428 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2429 return Err(ReceiveError {
2430 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2431 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2434 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2435 return Err(ReceiveError {
2437 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2438 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2442 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2443 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2444 return Err(ReceiveError {
2445 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2446 err_data: Vec::new(),
2447 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2450 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2451 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2452 return Err(ReceiveError {
2453 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2454 err_data: Vec::new(),
2455 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2457 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2458 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2461 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2462 phantom_shared_secret,
2464 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2465 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2466 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2467 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2468 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2469 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2470 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2471 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2472 return Err(ReceiveError {
2473 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2474 err_data: Vec::new(),
2475 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2479 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2482 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2485 return Err(ReceiveError {
2486 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2487 err_data: Vec::new(),
2488 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2493 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2496 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2497 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2498 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2499 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2503 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2504 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2505 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2507 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2508 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2509 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2510 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2511 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2512 failure_code: $err_code,
2518 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2519 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2522 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2523 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2524 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2526 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2527 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2528 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2529 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2530 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2531 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2532 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2533 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2535 macro_rules! return_err {
2536 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2538 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2539 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2540 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2541 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2542 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2543 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2549 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2551 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2552 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2554 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2555 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2559 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2560 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2562 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2564 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2565 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2566 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2567 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2568 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2570 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2573 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2574 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2575 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2577 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2578 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2579 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2582 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2583 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2584 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2585 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2589 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2590 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2591 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2594 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2595 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2596 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2597 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2598 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2603 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2604 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2605 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2606 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2607 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2608 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2609 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2610 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2611 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2612 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2613 // phantom or an intercept.
2614 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2615 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2616 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2620 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2623 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2625 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2626 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2627 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2628 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2629 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2631 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2632 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2633 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2635 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2636 // have no consistency guarantees.
2637 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2641 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2642 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2643 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2644 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2645 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2647 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2648 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2649 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2650 // we don't have the channel here.
2651 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2653 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2655 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2656 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2657 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2658 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2659 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2660 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2661 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2662 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2663 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2664 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2665 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2667 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2670 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2671 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2673 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2674 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2678 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2679 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2680 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2681 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2683 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2690 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2691 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2692 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2693 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2694 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2695 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2697 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2698 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2700 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2701 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2702 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2703 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2704 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2705 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2706 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2707 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2708 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2709 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2715 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2716 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2717 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2718 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2720 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2721 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2723 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2724 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2725 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2727 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2728 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2729 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2730 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2731 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2732 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2733 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2737 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2742 pending_forward_info
2745 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2746 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2747 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2749 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2750 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2751 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2753 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2754 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2755 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2756 if !chan.should_announce() {
2757 return Err(LightningError {
2758 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2759 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2762 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2763 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2765 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2766 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2769 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2770 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2771 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2772 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2774 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2775 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2776 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2778 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2779 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2780 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2781 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2782 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2783 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2787 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2789 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2790 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2791 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2793 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2794 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2795 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2796 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2797 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2800 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2801 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2803 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2804 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2805 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2806 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2807 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2808 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2809 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2810 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2812 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2813 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2814 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2816 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2818 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2825 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2826 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2827 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2830 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2831 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2832 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2834 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2835 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2836 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2838 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2839 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2840 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2841 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2842 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2844 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2846 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2847 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2848 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2849 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2853 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2854 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2855 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2856 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2857 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2858 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2859 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2861 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2862 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2863 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2865 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2866 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2868 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2869 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2870 Some(monitor_update) => {
2871 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2872 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2873 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2876 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2877 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2878 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2879 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2880 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2881 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2882 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2883 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2889 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2890 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2891 // `channel_by_id` map.
2892 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2893 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2898 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2899 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2901 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2906 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2908 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2909 /// fields for more info.
2911 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2912 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2914 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2916 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2917 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2918 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2919 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2920 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2922 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2923 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2924 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2925 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2926 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2928 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2929 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2930 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2931 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2933 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2935 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2936 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2937 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2939 /// In general, a path may raise:
2940 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2941 /// node public key) is specified.
2942 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2943 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2945 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2946 /// relevant updates.
2948 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2949 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2950 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2952 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2953 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2954 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2955 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2956 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2957 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2958 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2959 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2960 self.pending_outbound_payments
2961 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2962 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2963 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2966 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2967 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2968 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2969 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2970 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2971 self.pending_outbound_payments
2972 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2973 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2974 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2975 &self.pending_events,
2976 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2977 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2981 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2982 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2983 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2984 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2985 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2986 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2990 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2991 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2992 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2996 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
2997 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3001 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3002 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3003 /// retries are exhausted.
3005 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3006 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3008 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3009 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3010 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3012 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3013 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3015 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3016 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3017 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3018 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3019 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3022 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3023 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3024 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3025 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3026 /// never reach the recipient.
3028 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3029 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3031 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3032 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3034 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
3036 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3037 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3038 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3039 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3040 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3041 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3042 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3043 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3044 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3047 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3048 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3050 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3053 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3054 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3055 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3056 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3057 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3058 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3059 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3060 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3061 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3062 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3065 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3066 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3067 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3068 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3069 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3070 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3071 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3072 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3073 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3076 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3079 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3080 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3083 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3084 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3085 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3086 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3087 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3088 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3089 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3090 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3092 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3093 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3094 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3096 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3098 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3099 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3100 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
3101 } else { unreachable!(); });
3103 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
3105 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3106 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3108 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
3109 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3110 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3116 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3118 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3119 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3124 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3125 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3128 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
3129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3130 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3132 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3133 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3134 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3135 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3144 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3145 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3146 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3150 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3152 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3153 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3155 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3156 /// across the p2p network.
3158 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3159 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3161 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3162 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3163 /// keys per-channel).
3165 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3166 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3167 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3169 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3170 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3171 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3173 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3174 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3175 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3176 /// for more details.
3178 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3179 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3180 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3181 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3183 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3184 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3185 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3186 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3191 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3192 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3193 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3194 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3195 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3196 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3197 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3198 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3202 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3203 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3204 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3205 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3209 let mut output_index = None;
3210 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3211 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3212 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3213 if output_index.is_some() {
3214 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3215 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3218 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3221 if output_index.is_none() {
3222 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3223 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3226 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3230 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3232 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3233 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3234 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3235 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3237 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3238 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3240 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3241 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3243 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3245 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3246 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3247 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3248 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3249 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3250 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3251 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3252 pub fn update_channel_config(
3253 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3254 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3255 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3256 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3257 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3261 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3262 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3263 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3264 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3265 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3266 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3267 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3268 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3269 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3270 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3274 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3275 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3276 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3279 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3280 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3281 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3282 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3283 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3291 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3292 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3294 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3295 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3297 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3298 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3299 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3300 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3301 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3303 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3304 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3306 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3309 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3310 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3311 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3312 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3313 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3314 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3316 let next_hop_scid = {
3317 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3318 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3319 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3320 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3321 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3322 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3324 if !chan.is_usable() {
3325 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3326 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3329 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3331 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3332 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3337 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3338 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3339 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3342 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3343 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3344 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3346 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3348 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3349 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3352 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3353 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3354 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3355 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3356 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3358 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3362 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3363 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3365 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3368 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3369 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3370 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3372 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3373 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3374 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3377 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3378 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3379 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3380 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3381 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3382 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3383 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3386 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3387 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3388 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3389 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3394 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3396 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3397 /// Will likely generate further events.
3398 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3399 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3401 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3402 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3403 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3405 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3406 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3408 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3409 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3410 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3412 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3413 match forward_info {
3414 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3415 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3416 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3417 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3418 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3421 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3422 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3423 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3425 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3426 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3427 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3428 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3429 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3430 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3433 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3434 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3436 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3439 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3440 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3446 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3447 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3449 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3453 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3454 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3456 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3460 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3461 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3462 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3463 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3464 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3466 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3467 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3468 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3469 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3470 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3472 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3474 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3475 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3479 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3480 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3481 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3482 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3488 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3491 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3494 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3495 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3496 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3497 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3498 // problem, not ours.
3504 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3505 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3507 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3511 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3512 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3513 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3514 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3517 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3518 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3519 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3520 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3521 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3524 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3525 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3526 match forward_info {
3527 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3528 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3529 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3530 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3531 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3534 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3535 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3536 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3537 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3538 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3539 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3540 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3541 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3543 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3544 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3545 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3547 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3548 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3550 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3552 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3553 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3554 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3555 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3560 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3561 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3563 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3564 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3565 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3566 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3568 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3569 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3571 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3573 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3574 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3575 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3584 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3585 match forward_info {
3586 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3587 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3588 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3589 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3592 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3593 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3594 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3596 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3597 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3598 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3600 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3601 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3602 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3603 None, None, onion_fields)
3606 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3609 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3610 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3611 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3612 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3613 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3614 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3615 phantom_shared_secret,
3617 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3618 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3619 // if routing nodes overpay
3620 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3621 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3623 total_value_received: None,
3624 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3629 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3631 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3632 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3633 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3634 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3635 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3636 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3638 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3639 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3640 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3641 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3642 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3643 phantom_shared_secret,
3645 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3646 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3648 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3651 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3652 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3653 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3654 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3655 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3658 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3659 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3660 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3662 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3663 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3664 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3667 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3668 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3669 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3671 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3672 .entry(payment_hash)
3673 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3674 .or_insert_with(|| {
3675 committed_to_claimable = true;
3677 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3680 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3681 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3682 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3685 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3687 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3688 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3689 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3690 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3691 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3694 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3695 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3696 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3697 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3698 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3699 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3700 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3701 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3702 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3703 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3704 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3706 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3708 _ => unreachable!(),
3711 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3712 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3713 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3714 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3715 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3716 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3717 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3718 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3719 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3720 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3721 committed_to_claimable = true;
3723 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3724 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3725 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3726 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3727 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3728 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3732 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3733 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3734 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3735 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3737 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3739 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3740 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3742 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3743 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3744 committed_to_claimable = true;
3747 payment_claimable_generated
3751 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3752 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3753 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3754 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3755 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3756 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3757 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3758 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3759 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3760 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3761 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3762 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3763 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3764 Ok(result) => result,
3766 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3767 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3770 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3771 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3772 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3773 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3774 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3775 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3778 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3780 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3781 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3782 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3783 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3785 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3786 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3787 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3788 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3789 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3790 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3791 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3792 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3793 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3794 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3796 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3797 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3798 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3802 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3803 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3805 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3808 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3809 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3810 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3816 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3817 if payment_data.is_none() {
3818 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3819 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3821 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3822 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3823 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3824 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3825 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3826 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3827 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3828 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3830 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3831 if payment_claimable_generated {
3832 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3838 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3839 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3847 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3848 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3849 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3850 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3851 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3852 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3854 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3855 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3857 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3859 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3860 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3861 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3863 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3865 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3866 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3867 events.append(&mut new_events);
3870 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
3872 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3873 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
3874 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
3876 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3877 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3879 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3880 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3881 if background_events.is_empty() {
3882 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3885 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3887 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
3888 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3889 // monitor updating completing.
3890 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3892 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
3893 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3896 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3897 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3898 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3899 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3900 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3901 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3902 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update.update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
3904 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
3908 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
3909 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
3910 // however, ensure that.
3912 log_error!(self.logger,
3913 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
3915 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3919 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3922 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3923 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3924 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3925 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3926 let _ = self.process_background_events();
3929 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3930 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3931 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3932 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3933 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3934 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3935 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3937 if !chan.is_live() {
3938 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3939 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3940 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3942 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3943 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3945 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3946 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3950 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3951 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3952 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3953 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3954 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3955 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3956 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
3958 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3960 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3961 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3962 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3963 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3964 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3965 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3966 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3974 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3976 /// This currently includes:
3977 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3978 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3979 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3981 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3982 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3983 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3985 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3986 /// estimate fetches.
3988 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3989 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3990 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3991 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3992 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
3994 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3996 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3997 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3998 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4000 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4001 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4002 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4003 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4004 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4005 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4006 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4007 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4008 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4010 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4011 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4012 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4013 if needs_close { return false; }
4016 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4017 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4018 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4019 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
4020 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4021 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
4022 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4023 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
4025 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4026 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4027 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4028 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4032 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4034 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4037 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
4039 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4040 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4041 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4042 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4046 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4048 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4054 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4058 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4059 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4064 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4065 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4066 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4067 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4068 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4069 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4070 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4071 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4072 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4073 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4074 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4075 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4076 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4077 // have no channels to the peer.
4078 let remove_entry = {
4079 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4080 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4083 entry.remove_entry();
4086 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4091 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4092 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4093 // This should be unreachable
4094 debug_assert!(false);
4097 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4098 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4099 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4100 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4101 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4102 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4103 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4106 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4107 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4108 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4110 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4111 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4118 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4119 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4120 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4121 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4122 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4125 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4126 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4129 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4131 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4132 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4133 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4134 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4135 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4142 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4143 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4144 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4146 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4147 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4148 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4149 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4151 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4152 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4153 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4154 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4155 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4156 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4159 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4160 /// reason for the failure.
4162 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4163 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4164 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4166 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4167 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4168 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4169 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4170 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4171 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4172 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4177 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4178 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4179 match failure_code {
4180 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4181 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4182 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4183 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4184 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4185 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4190 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4191 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4193 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4195 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4196 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4197 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4198 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4199 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4200 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
4201 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4203 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
4205 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4206 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4208 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4213 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4214 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4215 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4216 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4217 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4218 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4219 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4220 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4221 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4222 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4224 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4225 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4226 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4227 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4229 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4230 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4231 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4232 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4233 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4237 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4238 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4239 // be surfaced to the user.
4240 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4241 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4242 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4244 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4245 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4246 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4247 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4248 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4249 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4250 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4251 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4253 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4255 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4258 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4259 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4260 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4261 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4265 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4266 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4267 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4268 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4269 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4270 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4271 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4272 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4273 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4276 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4277 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4278 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4281 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4282 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4283 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4285 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4286 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4287 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4288 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4289 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4291 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4292 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4293 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4295 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4296 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4297 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4298 push_forward_ev = true;
4300 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4301 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4302 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4304 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4305 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4308 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4309 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4310 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4311 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4312 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4313 failed_next_destination: destination,
4319 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4320 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4322 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4323 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4324 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4325 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4327 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4328 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4329 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4330 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4332 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4333 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4334 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4335 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4336 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4337 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4338 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4339 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4341 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4344 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4345 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4346 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4347 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4348 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4349 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4350 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4351 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4356 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4357 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4358 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4360 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4361 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4362 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4363 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4368 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4370 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4371 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4372 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4373 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4374 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4375 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4376 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4377 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4378 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4379 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4380 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4381 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4382 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4383 debug_assert!(false);
4387 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4389 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4390 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4391 debug_assert!(false);
4395 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4397 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4398 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4399 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4400 if sources.len() != 1 {
4401 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4402 debug_assert!(false);
4408 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4410 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4411 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4412 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4413 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4416 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4417 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4418 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4419 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4423 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4424 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4425 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4426 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4428 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4429 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4430 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4431 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4432 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4437 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4438 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4439 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4440 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4441 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4442 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4443 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4445 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4448 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4449 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4450 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4451 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4455 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4456 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4457 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4458 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4461 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4462 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4463 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4464 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4468 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4469 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4470 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4473 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4474 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4475 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4476 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4477 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4478 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4480 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4481 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4482 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4483 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4484 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4486 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4487 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4488 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4489 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4490 if let Err(e) = res {
4491 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4492 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4493 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4494 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4495 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4502 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4503 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4504 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4508 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4509 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4510 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4511 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4512 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4513 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4514 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4515 // again on restart.
4516 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4517 payment_preimage, update_res);
4519 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4520 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4521 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4522 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4523 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4524 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4528 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4529 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4532 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4534 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4535 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4537 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4538 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4539 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4540 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4541 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4542 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4543 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4546 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4547 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4549 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4550 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4551 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4552 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4554 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4558 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4559 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4560 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4566 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4567 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4568 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4571 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4572 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4574 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4575 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4576 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4577 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4578 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4582 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4583 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
4585 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4586 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
4587 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
4594 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4595 /// update completion.
4596 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4597 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4598 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4599 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4600 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4601 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4602 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4603 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4604 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4605 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4606 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4607 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4608 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4610 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4612 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4613 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4614 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4615 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4618 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4619 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4621 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4622 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4623 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4628 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4629 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4630 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4631 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4636 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4637 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4638 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4639 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4640 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4645 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4649 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4655 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4656 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4657 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4661 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4662 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4663 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4669 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4670 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4672 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4673 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4675 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4676 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4677 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4678 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4679 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4684 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4685 let mut peer_state_lock;
4686 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4687 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4688 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4689 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4691 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4692 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4693 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4696 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4697 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4698 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4701 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4704 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4706 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4707 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4710 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4711 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4712 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4714 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4715 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4716 /// used to accept such channels.
4718 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4719 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4720 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4721 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4724 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4725 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4727 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4728 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4729 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4731 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4732 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4734 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4735 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4737 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4738 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4740 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4741 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4742 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4743 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4746 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4747 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4749 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4750 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4751 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4752 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4753 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4754 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4755 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4756 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4757 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4758 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4759 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4762 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4763 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4764 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4765 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4766 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4767 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4770 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4771 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4772 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4774 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4775 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4776 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4777 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4778 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4779 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4780 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4781 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4784 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4785 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4786 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4790 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4791 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4792 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4795 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4796 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4802 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4803 /// or 0-conf channels.
4805 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4806 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4807 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4808 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4809 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4810 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4812 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4813 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4814 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4815 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4816 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4817 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4818 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4822 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4825 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4826 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4828 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4829 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4830 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4831 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4833 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4836 num_unfunded_channels
4839 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4840 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4841 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4844 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4845 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4848 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4849 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4850 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4851 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4853 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4854 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4855 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4856 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4858 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4859 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4861 debug_assert!(false);
4862 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4864 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4865 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4867 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4868 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4869 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4870 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4871 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4872 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4874 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4875 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4876 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4879 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4880 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4881 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4882 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4883 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4886 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4887 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4888 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4891 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4892 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4896 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4897 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4898 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4899 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4901 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4902 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4903 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4904 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4906 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4907 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4908 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4911 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4912 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4913 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4914 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4915 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4916 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4917 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4921 entry.insert(channel);
4927 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4928 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4929 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4930 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4932 debug_assert!(false);
4933 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4935 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4936 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4937 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4938 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4939 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4940 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4942 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4945 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4946 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4947 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4948 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4949 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4951 user_channel_id: user_id,
4956 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4957 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4959 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4960 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4962 debug_assert!(false);
4963 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4966 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4967 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4968 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4969 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4970 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4971 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4973 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4976 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4977 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4978 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4980 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4981 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4982 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4983 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4984 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4985 funding_msg.channel_id))
4987 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4988 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4992 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4993 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4994 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4995 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4996 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4997 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4998 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5002 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5004 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5005 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5006 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5008 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5009 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5010 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5011 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5012 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5013 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5014 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5015 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5023 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5024 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5026 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5028 debug_assert!(false);
5029 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5032 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5033 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5034 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5035 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5036 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5037 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5038 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5039 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5040 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5041 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5042 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5043 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5044 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5045 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5050 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5054 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5055 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5056 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5058 debug_assert!(false);
5059 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5061 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5062 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5063 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5064 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5065 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5066 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5067 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5068 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
5069 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5070 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5071 msg: announcement_sigs,
5073 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5074 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5075 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5076 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5077 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5078 // announcement_signatures.
5079 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
5080 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5081 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5082 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5089 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5090 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5095 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5099 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5100 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5101 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5102 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5103 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5105 debug_assert!(false);
5106 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5108 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5109 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5110 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5111 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5113 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5114 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5115 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5116 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5119 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
5120 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5121 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5122 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5124 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5125 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5126 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5127 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5128 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5129 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5134 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5135 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5136 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5137 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5138 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5142 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5145 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5146 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5147 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5148 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5154 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5155 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5156 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5158 debug_assert!(false);
5159 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5161 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5162 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5163 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5164 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5165 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5166 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5167 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5168 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5169 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5174 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5175 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5176 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5177 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5178 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5179 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5180 } else { (tx, None) }
5182 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5185 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5186 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5187 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5189 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5190 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5191 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5192 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5193 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5197 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5202 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5203 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5204 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5205 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5207 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5208 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5209 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5210 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5212 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5213 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5214 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5216 debug_assert!(false);
5217 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5219 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5220 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5221 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5222 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5224 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5225 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5226 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5227 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5228 match pending_forward_info {
5229 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5230 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5231 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5232 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5234 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5235 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5236 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5237 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5238 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5241 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5243 _ => pending_forward_info
5246 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5248 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5253 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5254 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5255 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5256 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5258 debug_assert!(false);
5259 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5261 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5262 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5263 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5264 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5265 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5267 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5270 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5274 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5275 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5276 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5278 debug_assert!(false);
5279 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5281 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5282 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5283 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5284 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5285 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5287 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5292 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5293 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5294 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5296 debug_assert!(false);
5297 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5299 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5300 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5301 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5302 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5303 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5304 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5305 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5307 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5310 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5314 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5315 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5316 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5318 debug_assert!(false);
5319 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5321 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5322 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5323 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5324 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5325 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5326 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5327 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5328 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5329 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5330 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5331 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5334 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5339 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5340 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5341 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5342 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5343 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5344 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5345 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5346 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5347 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5348 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5349 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5351 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5352 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5354 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5355 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5356 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5357 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5358 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5359 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5361 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5362 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5363 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5365 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5366 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5367 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5368 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5369 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5370 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5371 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5372 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5373 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5376 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5377 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5379 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5380 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5381 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5382 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5383 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5384 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5385 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5386 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5389 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5390 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5391 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5396 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5397 // payments are being processed.
5398 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5399 push_forward_event = true;
5401 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5402 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5409 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5410 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5413 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5414 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5415 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5417 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5421 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5422 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5423 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5424 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5425 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5427 if !forward_ev_exists {
5428 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5430 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5435 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5436 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other event
5437 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5438 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5439 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5440 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5441 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5443 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5444 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5445 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5446 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5447 channel_funding_outpoint,
5448 counterparty_node_id,
5453 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5454 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5455 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5456 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5458 debug_assert!(false);
5459 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5460 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5461 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5462 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5463 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5464 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5465 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5466 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5467 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5468 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5469 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5470 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5472 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5474 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5477 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5481 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5482 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5483 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5485 debug_assert!(false);
5486 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5488 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5489 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5490 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5491 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5492 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5494 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5499 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5500 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5501 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5503 debug_assert!(false);
5504 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5506 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5507 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5508 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5509 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5510 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5511 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5514 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5515 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5516 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5517 msg, &self.default_configuration
5519 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5520 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5521 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5524 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5529 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5530 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5531 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5532 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5534 // It's not a local channel
5535 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5538 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5539 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5540 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5541 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5543 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5544 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5545 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5547 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5548 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5549 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5550 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5551 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5552 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5554 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5556 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5557 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5558 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5559 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5561 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5562 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5565 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5567 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5570 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5572 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5573 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5575 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5577 debug_assert!(false);
5578 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5580 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5581 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5582 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5583 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5584 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5585 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5586 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5587 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5588 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5589 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5590 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5591 let mut channel_update = None;
5592 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5593 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5594 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5597 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5598 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5599 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5600 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5601 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5602 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5603 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5608 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5609 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5610 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5611 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5612 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5613 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5617 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5621 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5622 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5625 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5626 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5631 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5632 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5633 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5635 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5636 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5637 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5638 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5639 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5640 match monitor_event {
5641 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5642 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5643 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5644 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5646 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5647 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5648 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5649 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5652 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5653 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5654 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5655 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5657 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5658 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5659 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5660 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5663 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5664 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5665 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5666 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5667 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5668 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5669 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5670 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5671 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5672 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5673 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5677 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5678 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5680 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5682 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5683 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5684 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5685 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5686 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5693 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5694 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5700 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5701 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5704 has_pending_monitor_events
5707 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5708 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5709 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5711 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5712 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5713 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5716 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5717 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5718 /// update was applied.
5719 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5720 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5721 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5722 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5724 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5725 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5726 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5727 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5729 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5730 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5732 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5733 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5734 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5735 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5736 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5737 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5738 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5739 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5740 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5742 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5743 has_monitor_update = true;
5745 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5746 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5747 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5748 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5749 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5750 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5751 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5753 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5755 continue 'peer_loop;
5764 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5765 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5766 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5769 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5770 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5776 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5777 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5778 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5779 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5780 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5781 let mut has_update = false;
5783 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5785 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5786 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5787 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5788 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5789 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5790 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5791 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5792 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5794 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5795 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5798 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5799 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5800 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5801 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5802 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5807 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5809 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5810 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5811 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5817 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5818 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5826 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5827 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5833 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5834 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5836 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5837 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5838 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5839 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5840 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5841 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5842 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5843 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5844 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5845 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5846 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5847 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5848 assert!(should_broadcast);
5849 } else { unreachable!(); }
5850 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5851 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5852 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
5855 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5859 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5860 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5862 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5863 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5866 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5868 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5869 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5870 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5872 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5873 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5874 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5875 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5876 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5877 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5878 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5879 // never fail a payment too early.
5880 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5882 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5885 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5890 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5893 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5894 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5896 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5897 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5898 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5899 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5901 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5903 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5904 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5908 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5909 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5911 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5913 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5914 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5916 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5917 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5918 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5919 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5920 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5921 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5922 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5923 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5924 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5925 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5926 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5929 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5930 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5932 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5935 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5937 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5939 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5940 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5941 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5942 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5943 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5946 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5947 /// stored external to LDK.
5949 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5950 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5951 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5953 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5954 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5957 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5958 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5959 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5960 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5962 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5963 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5964 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5965 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5966 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5968 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5969 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5970 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5971 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5972 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5974 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5975 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5977 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5978 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5982 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5983 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5985 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5987 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5988 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5990 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5991 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5992 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5993 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5994 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5995 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5996 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5999 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
6000 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
6002 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
6005 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
6007 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6009 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
6010 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
6013 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6014 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6016 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6017 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6018 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6021 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6022 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6024 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6025 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6026 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6027 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6029 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6030 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6031 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6032 Some(_) => continue,
6033 None => return scid_candidate
6038 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6040 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6041 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6043 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6044 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6045 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6049 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6050 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6051 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6053 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6054 /// times to get a unique scid.
6055 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6056 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6057 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6059 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6060 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6061 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6062 return scid_candidate
6066 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6067 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6068 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6069 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6071 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6072 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6073 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6074 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6075 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6076 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6077 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6078 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6087 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6088 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6089 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6090 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6091 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6095 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6096 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6097 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6098 events.push_back((event, None));
6102 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6103 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6104 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6108 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6109 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6113 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6114 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6117 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6118 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6119 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6120 /// making progress and then any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6121 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6122 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6124 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6125 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6126 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6129 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6130 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6131 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6132 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6134 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6138 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6139 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6140 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6141 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6142 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6143 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6144 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6148 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6149 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6150 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6151 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6152 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6153 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
6154 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
6155 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
6156 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6158 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6160 if further_update_exists {
6161 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6166 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6167 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6171 log_debug!(self.logger,
6172 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6173 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6177 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6178 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6179 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6183 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6184 for action in actions {
6186 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6187 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6189 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6195 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6196 /// using the given event handler.
6198 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6199 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6203 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6207 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6209 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6210 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6211 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6212 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6213 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6214 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6218 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6219 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6220 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6221 /// is always placed next to each other.
6223 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6224 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6225 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6226 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6228 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6229 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6230 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6231 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6232 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6233 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6234 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6236 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6237 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6238 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6239 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6242 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6243 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6245 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6246 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6249 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6250 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6251 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6252 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6253 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6254 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6255 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6259 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6260 events.replace(pending_events);
6269 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6271 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6272 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6273 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6274 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6275 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6276 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6280 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6282 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6283 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6284 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6286 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6290 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6292 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6293 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6294 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6295 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6296 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6297 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6301 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6303 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6304 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6305 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6306 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6307 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6310 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6311 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6314 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6315 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6316 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6317 let new_height = height - 1;
6319 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6320 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6321 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6322 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6323 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6324 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6327 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6331 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6333 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6334 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6335 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6336 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6337 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6338 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6342 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6343 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6344 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6345 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6347 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6348 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6350 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6351 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6352 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6353 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6355 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6356 if height < last_best_block_height {
6357 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6358 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6362 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6363 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6364 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6365 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6367 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6368 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6370 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6371 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6372 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6374 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6376 macro_rules! max_time {
6377 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6379 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6380 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6381 // having an explicit local time source.
6382 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6383 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6384 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6385 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6386 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6392 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6393 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6394 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6395 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6399 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6400 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6401 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6402 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6403 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6404 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6405 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6406 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6413 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6414 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6415 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6416 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6417 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6418 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6419 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6420 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6421 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6426 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6428 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6429 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6430 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6431 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6432 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6433 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6437 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6438 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6440 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6441 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6442 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6443 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6444 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6446 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6447 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6449 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6450 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6451 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6452 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6453 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6454 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6455 let res = f(channel);
6456 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6457 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6458 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6459 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6460 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6462 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6463 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6464 if channel.is_usable() {
6465 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6466 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6467 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6468 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6473 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6478 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6479 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6482 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6483 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6484 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6485 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6486 msg: announcement_sigs,
6488 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6489 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6490 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6492 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6493 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6494 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6499 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6500 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6501 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6502 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6503 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6504 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6505 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6506 // is always consistent.
6507 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6508 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6509 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6510 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6511 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6514 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6515 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6516 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6517 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6518 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6519 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6520 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6524 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6525 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6526 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6527 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6528 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6529 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6530 data: reason_message,
6540 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6541 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6542 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6543 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6544 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6545 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6546 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6547 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6548 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6549 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6551 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6552 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6553 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6557 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6560 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6561 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6562 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6563 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6564 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6565 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6566 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6567 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6568 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6571 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6572 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6573 _ => unreachable!(),
6575 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6576 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6577 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6578 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6584 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6586 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6587 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6591 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6593 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6594 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6596 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6597 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6600 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6601 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6602 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6605 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6606 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6607 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6608 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6611 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6612 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6613 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6614 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6617 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6618 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6620 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6621 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6622 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6623 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6624 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6627 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6628 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6629 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6630 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6633 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6634 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6635 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6636 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6639 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6640 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6641 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6642 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6646 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6647 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6649 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6650 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6651 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6652 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6653 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6654 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6658 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6659 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6660 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6663 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6664 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6665 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6666 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6669 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6671 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6674 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6675 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6676 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6677 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6680 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6681 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6682 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6685 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6686 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6687 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6690 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6691 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6692 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6695 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6696 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6697 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6700 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6701 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6702 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6705 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6706 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6707 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6710 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6711 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6712 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6715 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6716 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6717 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6720 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6721 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6722 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6725 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6726 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6727 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6730 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6731 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6732 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6735 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6736 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6737 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6740 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6741 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6742 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6745 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6746 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6747 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
6748 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6749 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
6751 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6756 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6757 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6758 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6761 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6762 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6763 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6764 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6766 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6767 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6768 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6769 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6770 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6771 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6772 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6773 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6774 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6775 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6776 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6781 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6783 // V1 Channel Establishment
6784 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6785 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6786 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6787 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6788 // V2 Channel Establishment
6789 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6790 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6791 // Common Channel Establishment
6792 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6793 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6794 // Interactive Transaction Construction
6795 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
6796 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
6797 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
6798 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
6799 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
6800 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
6801 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
6802 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
6803 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
6804 // Channel Operations
6805 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6806 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6807 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6808 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6809 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6810 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6812 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6813 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6814 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6815 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6816 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6817 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6818 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6819 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6820 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6823 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6824 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6825 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6826 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6829 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6831 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6833 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6834 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6838 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6839 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6840 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6844 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6846 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6847 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6848 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6849 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6850 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6851 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6854 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6855 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6856 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6857 if inbound_peer_limited {
6860 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6861 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6862 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6863 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6864 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6865 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
6869 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6870 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6871 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6873 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6874 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6875 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6876 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6881 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6882 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6887 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6889 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6890 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6891 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6892 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6893 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6894 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6895 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6896 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6897 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6898 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6899 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6903 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6904 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6905 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6910 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6911 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6912 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6913 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6914 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6923 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6927 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6928 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6930 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6931 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6932 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6933 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6934 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6935 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6936 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6937 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6939 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6940 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6941 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6945 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6946 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6947 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6948 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6949 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6950 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6951 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6952 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6953 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6954 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6962 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6963 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6967 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6968 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6971 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6972 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6975 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
6976 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6977 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6978 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6981 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
6982 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6983 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6984 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6987 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
6988 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6989 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6990 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6993 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
6994 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6995 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6996 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6999 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7000 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7001 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7002 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7005 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7006 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7007 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7008 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7011 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7012 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7013 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7014 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7017 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7018 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7019 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7020 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7023 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7024 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7025 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7026 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7030 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7031 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7032 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7033 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7036 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7037 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7039 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7040 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7041 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7042 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
7043 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7046 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7047 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7048 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7049 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7052 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7053 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7054 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7055 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7058 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7059 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7060 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7061 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7062 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7063 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7064 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7065 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7066 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7067 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7068 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7069 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7070 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7071 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7072 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7073 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7074 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7075 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7077 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
7078 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7079 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7085 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7086 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7088 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7089 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7090 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7091 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7094 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7095 (2, node_id, required),
7096 (4, features, required),
7097 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7098 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7099 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7100 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7103 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7104 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7105 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7106 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7107 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7108 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7109 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7110 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7111 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7112 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7113 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7114 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7115 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7116 (7, self.config, option),
7117 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7118 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7119 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7120 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7121 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7122 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7123 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7124 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7125 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7126 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7127 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7128 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7129 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7130 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7131 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7132 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7133 (32, self.is_public, required),
7134 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7135 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7136 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7137 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7143 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7144 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7145 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7146 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7147 (2, channel_id, required),
7148 (3, channel_type, option),
7149 (4, counterparty, required),
7150 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7151 (6, funding_txo, option),
7152 (7, config, option),
7153 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7154 (9, confirmations, option),
7155 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7156 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7157 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7158 (16, balance_msat, required),
7159 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7160 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7161 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7162 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7163 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7164 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7165 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7166 (26, is_outbound, required),
7167 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7168 (30, is_usable, required),
7169 (32, is_public, required),
7170 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7171 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7172 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7173 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7176 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7177 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7178 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7179 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7180 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7184 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7186 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7187 outbound_scid_alias,
7191 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7192 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7194 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7195 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7196 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7197 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7198 confirmations_required,
7200 force_close_spend_delay,
7201 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7202 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7203 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7204 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7205 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7206 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7207 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7212 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7213 (2, channels, vec_type),
7214 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7215 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7218 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7220 (0, onion_packet, required),
7221 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7224 (0, payment_data, required),
7225 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7226 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7227 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7229 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7230 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7231 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7232 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7236 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7237 (0, routing, required),
7238 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7239 (4, payment_hash, required),
7240 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7241 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7242 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7246 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7247 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7249 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7251 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7252 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7253 reason.write(writer)?;
7255 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7256 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7259 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7260 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7261 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7262 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7269 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7270 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7271 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7274 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7275 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7276 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7277 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7281 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7282 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7283 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7284 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7285 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7288 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7289 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7290 // messages contained in the variants.
7291 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7292 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7293 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7295 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7296 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7297 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7298 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7299 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7302 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7303 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7304 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7305 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7306 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7308 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7313 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7318 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7319 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7320 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7321 (2, outpoint, required),
7322 (4, htlc_id, required),
7323 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7326 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7327 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7328 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7329 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7330 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7332 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7333 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7334 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7335 (2, self.value, required),
7336 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7337 (4, payment_data, option),
7338 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7339 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7340 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7346 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7347 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7348 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7350 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7351 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7352 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7353 let mut total_value_received = None;
7354 let mut total_msat = None;
7355 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7356 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7357 (0, prev_hop, required),
7358 (1, total_msat, option),
7359 (2, value, required),
7360 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7361 (4, payment_data, option),
7362 (5, total_value_received, option),
7363 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7364 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7366 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7368 if payment_data.is_some() {
7369 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7371 if total_msat.is_none() {
7372 total_msat = Some(value);
7374 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7377 if total_msat.is_none() {
7378 if payment_data.is_none() {
7379 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7381 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7383 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7387 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7390 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7391 total_value_received,
7392 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7399 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7400 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7401 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7404 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7405 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7406 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7407 let mut payment_id = None;
7408 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7409 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7410 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7411 (0, session_priv, required),
7412 (1, payment_id, option),
7413 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7414 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7415 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7416 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7418 if payment_id.is_none() {
7419 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7421 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7423 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7424 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7425 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7427 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7428 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7429 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7430 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7434 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7435 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7436 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7438 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7441 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7442 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7447 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7448 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7450 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7452 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7453 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7454 (0, session_priv, required),
7455 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7456 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7457 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7458 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7459 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7460 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7463 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7465 field.write(writer)?;
7472 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7473 (0, forward_info, required),
7474 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7475 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7476 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7477 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7480 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7482 (0, htlc_id, required),
7483 (2, err_packet, required),
7488 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7489 (0, payment_secret, required),
7490 (2, expiry_time, required),
7491 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7492 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7493 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7496 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7498 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7499 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7500 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7501 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7502 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7503 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7507 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7508 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7510 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7512 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7514 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7515 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7516 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7519 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7521 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7522 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7523 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7524 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7525 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7526 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7527 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7528 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7530 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7531 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7532 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7533 unfunded_channels += 1;
7538 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7540 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7541 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7542 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7543 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7544 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7545 channel.write(writer)?;
7552 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7553 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7554 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7555 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7556 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7557 for forward in pending_forwards {
7558 forward.write(writer)?;
7563 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7565 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7566 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7567 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7569 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7570 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7571 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7572 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7573 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7574 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7575 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7576 htlc.write(writer)?;
7578 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7579 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7582 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7583 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7584 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7585 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7586 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7587 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7588 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7591 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7592 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7593 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7594 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7595 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7597 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7598 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7599 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7600 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7601 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7602 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7603 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7608 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7609 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7610 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7611 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7612 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7613 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7614 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7615 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7616 0u64.write(writer)?;
7618 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7619 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7620 event.write(writer)?;
7624 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7625 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7626 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7627 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7628 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7629 0u64.write(writer)?;
7631 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7632 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7633 // likely to be identical.
7634 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7635 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7637 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7638 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7639 hash.write(writer)?;
7640 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7643 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7644 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7645 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7646 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7647 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7650 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7651 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7653 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7654 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7655 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7656 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7659 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7660 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7664 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7665 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7666 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7668 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7669 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7670 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7676 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7677 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7678 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7679 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7682 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7683 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7684 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7685 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7686 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7689 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7690 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7691 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7692 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7693 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7694 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7695 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7696 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7697 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7698 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7699 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7700 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7707 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7708 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7709 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7710 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7713 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7714 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7715 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7716 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7717 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7718 // check that the event is sane here.
7719 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7720 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7721 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7722 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7728 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7729 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7730 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7731 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7732 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7733 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7736 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7737 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7738 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7739 events.push_back((ev, action));
7740 } else if action.is_some() {
7741 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7748 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7750 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7752 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7753 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7754 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7755 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7756 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7757 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7758 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7759 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7760 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7761 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7762 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7763 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7764 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7766 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7767 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7769 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7770 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7772 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7773 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7774 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7775 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7776 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7777 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7779 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7780 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7782 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7783 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7784 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7785 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7786 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7787 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7791 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7792 pub entropy_source: ES,
7794 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7795 pub node_signer: NS,
7797 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7798 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7800 pub signer_provider: SP,
7802 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7804 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7805 pub fee_estimator: F,
7806 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7808 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7809 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7810 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7811 pub chain_monitor: M,
7813 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7814 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7815 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7816 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7817 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7818 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7820 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7822 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7823 /// deserialization.
7825 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7826 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7827 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7829 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7830 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7832 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7833 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7834 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7835 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7837 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7840 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7841 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7844 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7845 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7847 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7848 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7849 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7850 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7851 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7852 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7856 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7857 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7858 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7859 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7860 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7862 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7863 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7868 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7869 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7870 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7871 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7873 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7874 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7875 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7876 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7877 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7878 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7882 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7883 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7884 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7888 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7889 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7891 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7892 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7893 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7894 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7895 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7896 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7900 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7901 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7903 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7904 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7905 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7907 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7909 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7910 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7911 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7912 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7913 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7914 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
7915 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7916 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7917 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7918 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7920 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7921 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7922 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7923 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7924 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7925 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7926 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7927 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
7928 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7929 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7930 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7931 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7932 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7933 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7934 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7935 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7936 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7937 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7938 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7939 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7940 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7941 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7942 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7943 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
7944 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7945 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7948 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7949 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7950 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7951 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7952 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7954 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7955 let mut found_htlc = false;
7956 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7957 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7960 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7961 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7962 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7963 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7964 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7965 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7966 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7967 log_info!(args.logger,
7968 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7969 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7970 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7974 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
7975 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
7976 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
7977 channel.complete_all_mon_updates_through(monitor.get_latest_update_id());
7978 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7979 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7981 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7982 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7984 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7985 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7986 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7987 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7989 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7990 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7991 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7992 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7996 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7997 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7998 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7999 // safely discard the channel.
8000 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
8001 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8002 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
8003 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
8004 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8007 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
8008 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8009 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8010 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8011 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8012 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8016 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8017 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8018 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8019 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8020 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8021 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8022 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8024 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8028 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8029 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8030 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8031 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8032 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8033 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8034 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8035 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8036 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8038 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8041 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8042 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8043 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8044 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8045 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8046 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8047 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8048 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8050 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8053 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8054 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8055 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8056 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8057 let peer_state = PeerState {
8058 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
8059 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
8060 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8061 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8062 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8063 is_connected: false,
8065 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8068 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8069 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8070 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8071 for _ in 0..event_count {
8072 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8073 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8078 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8079 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8080 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8082 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8083 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8084 // on-startup monitor updates.
8085 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8086 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8088 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8092 for (node_id, peer_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8093 let peer_state = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8094 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8095 for update in chan.uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates() {
8096 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
8097 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for channel {}",
8098 update.update_id, log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8099 pending_background_events.push(
8100 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8101 counterparty_node_id: *node_id, funding_txo, update: update.clone(),
8104 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8110 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8111 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8113 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8114 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8115 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8116 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8117 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8121 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8122 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8123 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8124 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8125 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8126 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8127 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8129 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8130 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8134 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8135 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8136 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8137 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8138 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8139 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8140 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8141 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8142 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8143 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8144 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8145 let mut events_override = None;
8146 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8147 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8148 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8149 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8150 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8151 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8152 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8153 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8154 (8, events_override, option),
8155 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8156 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8157 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8159 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8160 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8163 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8164 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8167 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8168 pending_events_read = events;
8171 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8172 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8175 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8176 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8177 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8178 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8179 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8180 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8182 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8184 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8185 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8186 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8190 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8191 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8192 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8193 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8194 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8195 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8196 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8198 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8199 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8200 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8201 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8202 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8203 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8204 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8207 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8208 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8209 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8210 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8211 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8212 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8213 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8214 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8216 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8217 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8218 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8219 retry_strategy: None,
8220 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8221 payment_params: None,
8222 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8223 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8224 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8225 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8226 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8227 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8228 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8229 total_msat: path_amt,
8230 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8232 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8233 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8238 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8240 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8241 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8242 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8243 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8245 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8246 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8247 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8248 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8249 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8250 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8251 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8252 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8253 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8254 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8255 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8260 !forwards.is_empty()
8262 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8263 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8264 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8265 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8266 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8267 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8268 intercepted_id != ev_id
8275 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8276 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8277 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8278 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8279 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8280 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8281 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8282 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8283 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8284 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8285 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8286 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8287 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8296 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8297 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8298 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8299 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8300 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8301 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8302 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8303 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8307 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8308 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8310 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8311 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8312 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8313 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8315 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8316 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8317 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8319 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8320 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8322 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8323 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8325 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8328 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8329 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8330 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8332 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8336 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8337 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8338 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8339 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8340 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8342 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8343 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8344 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8345 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8346 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8347 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8348 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8349 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8351 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8352 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8356 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8358 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8360 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8361 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8363 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8364 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8369 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8370 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8372 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8374 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8376 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8377 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8378 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8379 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8383 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8384 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8385 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8386 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8387 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8388 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8389 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8391 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8392 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8393 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8395 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8396 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8397 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8398 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8399 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8400 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8402 if chan.is_usable() {
8403 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8404 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8405 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8406 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8407 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8413 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8415 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8416 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8417 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8418 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8419 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8420 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8421 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8422 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8423 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8424 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8425 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8427 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8428 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8430 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8431 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8432 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8433 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8435 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8436 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8437 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8438 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8440 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8441 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8442 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8443 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8445 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8446 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8447 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8448 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8449 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8450 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8451 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8454 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8455 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8458 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8461 purpose: payment.purpose,
8462 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8468 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8469 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
8470 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
8471 for action in actions.iter() {
8472 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
8473 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
8474 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
8476 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
8477 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8478 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8479 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
8484 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8486 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8487 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8491 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8493 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8494 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8495 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8496 router: args.router,
8498 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8500 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8501 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8502 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8503 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8505 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8506 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8507 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8508 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8509 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8510 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8512 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8517 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8519 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8521 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8522 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8523 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8524 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8525 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8526 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
8527 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8529 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8530 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8531 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8533 logger: args.logger,
8534 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8537 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8538 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8539 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8540 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8541 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8544 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8545 //connection or two.
8547 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8553 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8554 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8555 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8556 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8557 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8558 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8559 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8560 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8561 use crate::ln::msgs;
8562 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8563 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8564 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8565 use crate::util::test_utils;
8566 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
8567 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8570 fn test_notify_limits() {
8571 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8572 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8573 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8574 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8575 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8576 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8578 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8579 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8580 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8581 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8582 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8584 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8586 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8587 // to connect messages with new values
8588 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8589 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8590 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8591 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8592 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8593 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8595 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8596 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8597 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8598 // ... but the last node should not.
8599 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8600 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8601 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8602 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8604 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8605 // about the channel.
8606 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8607 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8608 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8610 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8612 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8613 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8614 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8615 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8616 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8617 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8619 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8620 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8621 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8623 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8624 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8625 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8626 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8627 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8628 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8630 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8631 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8632 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8633 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8634 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8635 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8636 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8637 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8639 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8640 // the channel info has updated.
8641 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8642 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8643 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8644 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8645 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8646 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8650 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8651 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8653 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8654 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8655 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8656 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8657 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8659 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8660 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8661 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8662 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8664 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8665 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8666 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8667 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8668 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8669 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8670 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8671 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8673 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8674 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8675 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8677 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8678 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8679 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8681 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8682 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8683 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8684 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8685 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8687 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8688 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8689 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8691 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8692 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8693 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8694 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8695 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8696 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8697 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8698 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8699 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8701 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8702 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8703 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8705 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8706 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8707 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8709 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8710 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8711 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8712 // lightning messages manually.
8713 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8714 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8717 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8718 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8719 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8721 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8722 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8724 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8725 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8727 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8728 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8729 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8731 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8732 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8733 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8735 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8737 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8739 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8740 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8743 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8744 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8745 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8746 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8748 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8749 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8750 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8751 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8753 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8756 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8757 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8758 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8759 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8764 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8765 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8766 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8767 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8769 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8774 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8775 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8776 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8777 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8778 // fails as expected.
8779 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8780 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8781 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8782 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8783 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8784 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8785 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8787 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8788 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8789 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8791 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8792 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8793 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8794 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8796 let route = find_route(
8797 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8798 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8800 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8801 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8803 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8804 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8805 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8806 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8807 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8809 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8810 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8811 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8812 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8813 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8815 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8816 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8817 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8818 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8819 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8820 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8821 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8822 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8823 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8825 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8826 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8828 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8829 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8830 let route = find_route(
8831 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8832 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8834 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8835 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8837 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8838 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8839 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8840 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8841 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8843 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8844 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8845 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8846 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8848 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8849 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8850 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8851 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8852 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8854 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8855 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8856 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8858 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8859 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8860 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8861 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8862 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8863 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8864 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8865 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8866 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8868 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8869 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8873 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8874 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8875 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8876 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8877 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8878 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8879 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8881 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8882 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8884 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8885 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8886 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8887 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8889 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8890 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8891 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8892 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8893 let route = find_route(
8894 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8895 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8898 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8899 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8900 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8901 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8902 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8903 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8906 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8907 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8908 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8909 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8910 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8911 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8912 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8914 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8918 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8919 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8920 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8921 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8922 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8923 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8925 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8926 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8928 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8929 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8930 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8931 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8933 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8934 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8935 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8936 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8937 let route = find_route(
8938 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8939 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8942 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8943 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8944 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8945 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8946 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8947 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8948 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8949 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8952 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8953 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8954 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8955 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8956 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8957 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8958 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8960 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8964 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8965 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8966 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8967 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8968 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8970 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8971 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8972 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8973 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8975 // Marshall an MPP route.
8976 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8977 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8978 route.paths.push(path);
8979 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8980 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8981 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8982 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8983 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8984 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8986 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8987 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8989 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8990 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8992 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8997 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8998 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8999 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9000 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9001 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9003 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9005 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9006 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9008 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9009 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9011 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9014 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9015 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9016 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9017 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9018 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9019 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9022 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9025 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9026 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9031 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9032 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9033 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9034 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9035 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9036 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9038 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9039 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9041 total_msat: 100_000,
9044 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9045 // payment verification fails as expected.
9046 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9047 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9048 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9049 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9051 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9055 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9056 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9060 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9061 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9062 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9063 // the channel is successfully closed.
9064 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9065 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9066 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9067 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9069 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9070 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9071 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9072 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9073 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9075 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9076 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9078 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9079 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9080 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9081 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9084 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9086 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9087 // as it has the funding transaction.
9088 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9089 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9090 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9093 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9095 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9097 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9099 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9100 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9101 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9103 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9106 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9107 // as it has the funding transaction.
9108 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9109 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9110 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9113 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9114 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9116 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9117 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9118 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9119 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9121 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9122 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9123 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9124 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9126 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9127 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9129 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9130 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9131 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9132 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9133 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9134 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9135 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9139 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9140 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9141 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9142 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9143 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9144 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9145 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9148 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9150 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9151 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9152 // closing transaction).
9153 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9154 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9155 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9157 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9158 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9159 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9160 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9161 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9164 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9166 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9168 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9169 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9170 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9172 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9174 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9175 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9178 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9179 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9180 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9183 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9184 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9185 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9188 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9190 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9191 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9193 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9194 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9196 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9197 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9202 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9203 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9204 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9205 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9206 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9207 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9208 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9209 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9212 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9213 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9214 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9216 // Test the API functions.
9217 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9219 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9221 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9223 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9225 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9227 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9229 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9233 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9234 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9235 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9236 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9237 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9238 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9240 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9242 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9243 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9245 let mut funding_tx = None;
9246 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9247 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9248 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9251 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9252 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9253 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9254 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9255 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9257 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9259 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9261 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9263 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9265 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9267 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9270 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9271 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9272 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9273 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9274 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9276 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9277 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9279 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9280 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9281 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9282 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9283 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9284 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9285 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9287 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9288 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9289 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9290 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9292 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9293 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9294 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9295 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9296 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9297 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9298 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9300 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9301 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9302 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9303 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9305 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9306 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9307 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9308 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9310 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9311 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9313 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9314 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9315 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9316 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9317 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9319 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9320 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9321 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9323 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9324 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9325 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9327 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9328 // "protected" and can connect again.
9329 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9330 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9331 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9332 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9334 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9336 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9337 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9341 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9342 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9343 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9344 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9345 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9346 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9348 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9350 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9351 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9353 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9354 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9355 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9356 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9359 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9361 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9362 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9363 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9365 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9366 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9367 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9369 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9370 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9371 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9372 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9376 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9377 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9378 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9379 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9380 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9381 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9382 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9383 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9384 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9386 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9388 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9389 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9391 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9392 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9393 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9394 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9395 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9396 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9398 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9399 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9401 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9402 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9404 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9406 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9407 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9410 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9411 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9412 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9413 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9414 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9415 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9416 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9418 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9419 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9420 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9421 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9425 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9427 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9428 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9430 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9431 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9432 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9434 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9435 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9437 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9439 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9444 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9445 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9446 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9447 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9448 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9449 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9450 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9451 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9452 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9453 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9454 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9456 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9457 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9458 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9460 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9461 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9463 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9464 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9466 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9469 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9470 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9472 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9473 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9475 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9479 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
9481 use crate::chain::Listen;
9482 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9483 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9484 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9485 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9486 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9487 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9488 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9489 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9490 use crate::util::test_utils;
9491 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9493 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9494 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9495 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9497 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9501 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9502 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9503 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9504 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9505 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9506 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9507 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9509 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9510 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9512 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9513 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9515 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9517 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9522 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
9523 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9526 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9527 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9528 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9530 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9532 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9533 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9534 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9535 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9536 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9538 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9539 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9541 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9542 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9543 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9544 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9546 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9548 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9550 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9551 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9552 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9553 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9554 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9556 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9558 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9560 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9561 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9562 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9563 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9564 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9567 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9568 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9569 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9571 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9572 } else { panic!(); }
9574 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9575 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9576 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9578 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9579 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9581 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9584 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9585 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9586 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9588 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9589 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9591 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9594 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9597 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9600 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9601 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9603 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9604 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9605 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9606 match msg_events[0] {
9607 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9608 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9609 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9613 match msg_events[1] {
9614 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9618 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9619 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9621 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9622 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9624 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9627 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9628 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9630 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9631 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9636 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9637 macro_rules! send_payment {
9638 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9639 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9640 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9641 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9642 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9644 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9645 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9647 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9648 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9649 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9650 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9651 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9652 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9653 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9654 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9655 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9656 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9657 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9659 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9660 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9661 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9662 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9664 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9665 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9666 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9667 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9668 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9670 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9673 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9674 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9675 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9676 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9678 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9683 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9684 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);