1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
68 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
69 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
70 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
71 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
72 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
73 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
74 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
75 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
76 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
77 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
79 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
80 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
81 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
82 crate::sign::KeysManager,
85 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
88 use crate::prelude::*;
90 use core::cell::RefCell;
92 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
93 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
94 use core::time::Duration;
97 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
98 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
99 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
101 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
103 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
104 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
105 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
107 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
108 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
109 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
110 // before we forward it.
112 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
113 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
114 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
115 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
116 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
118 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
121 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
122 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
124 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
125 /// do with the HTLC.
126 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
127 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
129 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
130 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
131 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
132 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
133 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
134 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
136 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
138 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
139 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
141 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
142 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
143 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
144 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
145 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
147 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
148 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
149 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
150 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
151 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
153 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
154 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
155 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
156 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
158 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
159 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
161 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
162 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
163 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
164 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
165 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
166 requires_blinded_error: bool,
168 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
169 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
170 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
172 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
173 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
175 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
176 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
177 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
178 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
179 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
180 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
181 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
183 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
184 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
185 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
186 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
188 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
189 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
190 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
192 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
193 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
194 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
198 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
199 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
200 pub struct BlindedForward {
201 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
202 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
203 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
204 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
205 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
206 /// the introduction node.
207 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
210 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
211 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
212 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
214 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
215 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
221 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
223 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
224 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
225 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
226 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
227 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
228 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
230 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
231 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
232 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
233 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
236 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
238 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
239 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
240 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
242 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
243 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
244 /// it along another path).
246 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
247 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
248 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
249 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
250 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
251 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
252 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
253 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
254 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
256 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
259 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
261 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
263 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
266 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
267 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
268 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
269 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
272 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
273 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
274 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
275 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
276 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
279 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
280 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
281 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
283 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
284 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
285 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
288 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
289 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
291 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
292 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
295 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
296 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
297 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
300 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
305 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
309 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
310 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
311 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
312 pub enum BlindedFailure {
313 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
314 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
315 FromIntroductionNode,
316 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
317 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
321 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
322 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
323 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
324 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
325 short_channel_id: u64,
326 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
328 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
329 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
330 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
332 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
333 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
338 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
340 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
341 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
342 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
344 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
345 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
348 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
349 struct ClaimableHTLC {
350 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
352 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
354 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
355 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
356 sender_intended_value: u64,
357 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
359 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
360 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
361 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
362 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
364 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
365 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
368 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
369 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
370 events::ClaimedHTLC {
371 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
372 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
373 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
374 value_msat: val.value,
375 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
380 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
381 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
383 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
384 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
385 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
388 /// Number of bytes in the id.
389 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
392 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
393 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
398 impl Readable for PaymentId {
399 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
400 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
405 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
406 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
407 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
411 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
413 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
414 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
415 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
417 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
418 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
423 impl Readable for InterceptId {
424 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
425 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
430 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
431 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
432 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
433 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
434 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
437 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
439 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
440 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
441 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
443 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
444 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
448 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
449 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
450 (0, short_channel_id, required),
451 (2, htlc_id, required),
453 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
454 (0, session_priv, required),
459 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
460 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
461 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
462 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
463 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
466 session_priv: SecretKey,
467 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
468 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
469 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
470 payment_id: PaymentId,
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
475 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
477 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
479 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
481 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
484 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
485 payment_id.hash(hasher);
486 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
492 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
494 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
495 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
496 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
497 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
498 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
499 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
503 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
504 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
505 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
506 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
507 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
508 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
510 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
516 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
517 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
519 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
520 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
521 pub enum FailureCode {
522 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
523 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
524 TemporaryNodeFailure,
525 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
526 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
527 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
528 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
529 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
530 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
531 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
532 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
533 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
534 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
536 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
537 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
538 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
541 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
542 fn into(self) -> u16 {
544 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
545 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
546 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
547 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
552 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
553 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
554 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
555 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
556 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
558 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
559 err: msgs::LightningError,
560 closes_channel: bool,
561 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
563 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
565 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
567 err: LightningError {
569 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
570 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
576 closes_channel: false,
577 shutdown_finish: None,
581 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
582 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
585 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
586 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
587 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
588 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
589 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
590 // commitment upon reconnecting.
591 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
593 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
596 err: LightningError { err, action },
597 closes_channel: true,
598 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
602 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
605 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
607 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
608 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
612 log_level: Level::Warn,
615 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
617 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
619 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
621 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
622 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
629 closes_channel: false,
630 shutdown_finish: None,
634 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
639 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
640 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
641 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
642 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
643 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
645 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
646 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
647 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
648 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
649 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
650 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
651 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
653 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
657 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
658 struct ClaimingPayment {
660 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
661 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
662 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
663 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
665 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
666 (0, amount_msat, required),
667 (2, payment_purpose, required),
668 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
669 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
670 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
673 struct ClaimablePayment {
674 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
675 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
676 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
679 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
680 struct ClaimablePayments {
681 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
682 /// failed/claimed by the user.
684 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
685 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
687 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
688 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
689 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
691 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
692 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
693 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
694 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
697 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
698 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
699 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
700 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
702 enum BackgroundEvent {
703 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
704 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
705 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
706 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
708 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
709 /// are regenerated on startup.
710 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
711 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
712 /// channel to continue normal operation.
714 /// In general this should be used rather than
715 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
716 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
717 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
719 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
720 /// are regenerated on startup.
721 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
722 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
723 funding_txo: OutPoint,
724 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
726 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
727 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
729 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
730 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
731 channel_id: ChannelId,
736 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
737 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
738 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
739 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
740 /// event can be generated.
741 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
742 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
743 /// operation of another channel.
745 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
746 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
747 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
748 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
750 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
751 event: events::Event,
752 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
754 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
755 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
756 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
758 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
759 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
760 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
761 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
762 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
764 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
765 /// stored for later processing.
766 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
767 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
768 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
769 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
773 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
774 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
775 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
776 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
777 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
778 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
779 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
780 (4, blocking_action, required),
782 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
783 (0, event, upgradable_required),
784 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
785 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
786 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
787 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
788 // downgrades to prior versions.
789 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
793 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
794 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
795 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
796 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
797 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
800 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
801 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
802 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
803 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
807 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
808 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
809 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
810 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
811 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
812 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
814 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
815 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
816 channel_id: ChannelId,
817 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
822 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
823 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
824 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
825 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
826 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
831 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
832 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
836 /// State we hold per-peer.
837 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
838 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
840 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
841 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
842 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
844 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
845 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
846 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
847 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
848 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
849 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
850 latest_features: InitFeatures,
851 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
852 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
853 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
854 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
855 /// user but which have not yet completed.
857 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
858 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
859 /// for a missing channel.
860 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
861 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
862 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
864 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
865 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
866 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
867 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
869 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
870 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
871 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
872 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
873 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
874 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
875 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
876 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
877 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
878 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
879 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
880 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
881 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
882 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
883 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
887 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
888 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
889 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
890 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
891 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
892 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
895 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
896 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
897 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
900 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
901 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
902 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
905 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
906 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
907 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
908 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
912 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
913 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
914 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
915 /// The original OpenChannel message.
916 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
917 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
918 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
921 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
922 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
923 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
925 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
926 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
928 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
931 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
932 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
933 struct PendingInboundPayment {
934 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
935 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
936 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
937 /// this payment being removed.
939 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
940 user_payment_id: u64,
941 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
942 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
943 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
946 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
947 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
948 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
949 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
950 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
951 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
952 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
953 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
955 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
956 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
957 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
965 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
968 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
969 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
970 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
975 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
976 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
977 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
978 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
979 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
980 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
981 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
982 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
983 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
985 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
986 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
987 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
996 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
999 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1000 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1001 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1006 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1008 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1010 pub trait AChannelManager {
1011 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1012 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1013 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1014 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1015 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1016 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1017 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1018 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1019 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1020 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1021 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1022 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1023 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1024 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1025 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1026 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1027 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1028 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1029 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1030 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1031 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1032 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1033 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1034 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1035 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1036 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1037 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1038 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1039 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1040 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1041 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1042 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1043 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1044 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1045 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1046 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1049 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1050 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1052 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1053 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1054 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1055 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1056 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1057 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1061 type Watch = M::Target;
1063 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1065 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1067 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1069 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1070 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1072 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1074 type Router = R::Target;
1076 type Logger = L::Target;
1078 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1081 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1082 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1084 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1085 /// to individual Channels.
1087 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1088 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1089 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1090 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1092 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1093 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1094 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1095 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1096 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1097 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1098 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1099 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1100 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1102 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1103 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1104 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1106 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1107 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1108 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1109 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1110 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1112 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1113 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1114 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1115 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1117 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1118 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1119 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1121 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1122 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1123 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1124 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1125 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1127 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1128 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1129 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1130 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1131 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1132 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1133 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1134 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1137 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1138 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1139 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1140 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1141 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1145 // `pending_offers_messages`
1147 // `total_consistency_lock`
1149 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1151 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1153 // |__`per_peer_state`
1155 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1157 // |__`claimable_payments`
1159 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1163 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1165 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1167 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1171 // |__`pending_events`
1173 // |__`pending_background_events`
1175 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1177 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1178 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1179 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1180 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1181 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1182 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1186 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1187 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1188 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1194 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1196 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1198 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1199 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1201 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1202 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1203 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1204 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1206 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1207 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1209 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1210 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1211 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1212 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1213 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1214 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1215 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1216 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1218 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1220 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1221 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1223 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1225 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1226 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1227 /// and via the classic SCID.
1229 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1230 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1232 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1234 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1236 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1237 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1238 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1240 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1241 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1243 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1244 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1246 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1247 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1249 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1250 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1251 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1252 /// active channel list on load.
1254 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1255 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1257 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1259 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1260 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1261 /// the handling of the events.
1263 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1264 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1267 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1268 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1269 /// would break backwards compatability.
1270 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1271 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1272 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1274 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1276 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1278 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1280 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1282 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1283 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1284 /// confirmation depth.
1286 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1287 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1288 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1290 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1292 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1294 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1296 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1298 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1300 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1301 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1302 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1304 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1305 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1307 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1308 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1309 /// keeping additional state.
1310 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1312 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1313 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1314 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1315 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1317 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1318 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1320 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1321 /// are currently open with that peer.
1323 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1324 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1327 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1329 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1330 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1331 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1332 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1333 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1335 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1336 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1337 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1338 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1339 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1341 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1342 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1344 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1345 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1346 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1347 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1348 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1350 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1351 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1353 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1354 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1355 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1356 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1357 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1359 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1361 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1363 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1364 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1365 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1366 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1367 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1368 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1369 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1370 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1371 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1372 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1373 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1375 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1376 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1377 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1379 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1381 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1382 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1384 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1388 signer_provider: SP,
1393 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1395 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1396 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1397 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1398 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1399 pub struct ChainParameters {
1400 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1401 pub network: Network,
1403 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1405 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1406 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1409 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1413 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1414 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1417 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1418 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1419 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1420 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1421 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1422 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1424 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1425 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1426 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1427 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1428 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1429 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1431 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1432 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1435 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1436 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1437 /// events to handle.
1439 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1440 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1442 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1443 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1446 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1447 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1448 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1449 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1451 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1452 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1453 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1454 should_persist: move || {
1455 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1456 // processing and return that.
1457 let notify = persist_check();
1458 match (notify, force_notify) {
1459 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1460 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1461 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1462 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1463 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1466 _read_guard: read_guard,
1470 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1471 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1472 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1473 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1474 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1475 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1477 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1478 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1479 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1480 should_persist: persist_check,
1481 _read_guard: read_guard,
1486 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1487 fn drop(&mut self) {
1488 match (self.should_persist)() {
1489 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1490 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1491 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1493 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1494 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1495 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1500 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1501 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1503 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1505 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1506 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1507 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1508 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1509 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1511 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1512 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1514 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1516 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1517 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1518 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1519 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1520 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1521 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1522 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1523 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1524 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1525 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1526 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1527 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1528 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1530 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1531 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1533 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1534 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1535 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1536 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1538 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1539 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1540 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1541 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1542 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1543 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1545 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1547 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1548 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1550 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1552 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1553 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1555 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1556 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1557 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1559 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1560 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1561 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1563 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1564 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1565 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1566 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1568 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1569 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1570 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1572 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1573 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1574 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1576 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1577 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1578 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1579 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1580 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1581 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1582 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1583 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1584 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1585 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1586 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1589 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1590 /// to better separate parameters.
1591 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1592 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1593 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1594 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1595 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1596 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1597 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1598 pub features: InitFeatures,
1599 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1600 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1601 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1603 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1605 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1606 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1607 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1608 /// payments to us through this channel.
1609 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1610 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1611 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1612 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1613 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1614 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1615 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1618 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1619 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1620 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1621 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1622 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1623 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1624 /// lifetime of the channel.
1625 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1626 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1627 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1628 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1629 /// our counterparty already.
1631 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1632 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1633 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1634 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1636 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1637 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1638 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1639 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1641 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1642 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1644 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1645 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1647 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1648 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1649 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1650 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1651 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1652 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1653 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1654 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1655 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1658 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1660 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1661 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1662 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1663 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1664 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1665 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1666 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1668 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1669 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1671 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1672 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1673 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1674 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1675 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1676 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1677 /// this value on chain.
1679 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1681 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1683 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1684 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1685 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1686 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1687 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1688 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1689 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1691 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1692 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1693 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1694 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1695 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1696 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1698 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1699 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1700 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1701 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1702 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1704 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1705 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1706 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1707 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1709 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1710 pub balance_msat: u64,
1711 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1712 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1713 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1714 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1716 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1718 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1719 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1720 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1721 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1722 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1723 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1724 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1725 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1727 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1728 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1729 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1730 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1731 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1732 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1733 /// route which is valid.
1734 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1735 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1736 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1737 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1738 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1739 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1741 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1742 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1743 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1744 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1745 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1746 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1747 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1748 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1749 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1751 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1753 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1754 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1755 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1756 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1757 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1759 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1760 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1761 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1762 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1763 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1764 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1765 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1767 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1768 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1769 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1770 pub is_outbound: bool,
1771 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1772 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1773 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1774 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1775 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1777 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1778 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1779 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1780 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1781 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1782 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1783 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1785 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1786 pub is_usable: bool,
1787 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1788 pub is_public: bool,
1789 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1790 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1791 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1792 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1793 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1794 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1796 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1797 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1800 impl ChannelDetails {
1801 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1802 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1803 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1805 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1806 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1807 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1808 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1811 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1812 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1813 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1815 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1816 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1817 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1818 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1821 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1822 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1823 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1826 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1827 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1829 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1830 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1831 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1833 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1834 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1835 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1836 features: latest_features,
1837 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1838 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1839 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1840 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1841 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1842 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1843 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1844 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1845 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1846 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1848 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1849 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1850 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1851 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1852 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1853 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1854 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1855 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1856 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1857 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1858 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1859 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1860 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1861 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1862 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1863 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1864 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1865 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1866 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1867 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1868 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1869 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1870 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1871 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1872 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1873 config: Some(context.config()),
1874 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1879 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1880 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1881 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1882 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1883 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1884 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1885 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1886 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1887 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1889 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1891 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1892 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1894 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1895 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1896 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1897 /// to drop the channel.
1901 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1902 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1903 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1904 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1905 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1907 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1908 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1909 payment_id: PaymentId,
1911 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1913 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1914 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1915 payment_id: PaymentId,
1916 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1918 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1919 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1920 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1923 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1924 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1925 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1927 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1928 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1929 payment_id: PaymentId,
1930 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1931 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1932 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1934 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1935 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1936 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1938 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1939 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1940 payment_id: PaymentId,
1941 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1942 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1946 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1948 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1950 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1951 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1952 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1953 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1955 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1956 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1957 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1960 macro_rules! handle_error {
1961 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1962 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1963 // entering the macro.
1964 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1965 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1969 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
1970 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1972 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1973 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
1974 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
1975 let logger = WithContext::from(
1976 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
1978 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
1980 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1981 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1982 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1987 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
1990 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1992 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1993 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1994 action: err.action.clone()
1998 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1999 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2000 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2001 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2002 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2006 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2013 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2014 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2015 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2016 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2018 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2019 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2020 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2022 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2023 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2024 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2025 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2026 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2028 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2029 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2031 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2035 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2036 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2037 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2039 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2040 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2042 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2043 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2045 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2046 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2047 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2048 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2049 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2050 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2052 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2057 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2058 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2060 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2061 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2063 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2064 match $channel_phase {
2065 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2066 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2068 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2069 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2071 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2072 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2078 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2079 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2083 let key = *$entry.key();
2084 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2086 $entry.remove_entry();
2094 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2095 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2099 let key = *$entry.key();
2100 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2102 $entry.remove_entry();
2110 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2111 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2113 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2114 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2120 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2121 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2122 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2123 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2124 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2126 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2127 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2128 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2129 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2130 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2131 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2132 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2133 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2134 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2135 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2140 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2141 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2142 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2143 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2144 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2145 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2146 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2147 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2148 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2150 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2155 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2156 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2157 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2158 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2159 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2160 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2161 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2162 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2163 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2165 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2170 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2171 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2172 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2173 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2174 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2175 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2176 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2177 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2178 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2179 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2180 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2181 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2183 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2184 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2185 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2191 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2192 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2194 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2195 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2196 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2197 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2198 updates.announcement_sigs);
2199 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2200 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2203 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2204 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2205 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2206 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2208 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2209 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2210 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2211 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2212 let mut batch_completed = false;
2213 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2214 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2215 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2216 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2218 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2219 channel_state.2 = true;
2221 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2223 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2225 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2228 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2229 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2230 if batch_completed {
2231 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2232 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2233 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2234 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2235 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2236 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2237 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2238 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2239 chan.set_batch_ready();
2240 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2241 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2245 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2246 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2247 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2252 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2254 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2255 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2257 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2258 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2259 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2260 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2265 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2266 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2267 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2268 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2270 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2271 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2272 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2273 panic!("{}", err_str);
2275 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2276 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2277 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2280 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2286 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2287 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2288 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2290 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2291 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2292 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2293 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2294 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2295 // filter for uniqueness here.
2296 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2297 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2298 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2299 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2301 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2302 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2304 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2305 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2306 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2312 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2313 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2314 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2315 while !processed_all_events {
2316 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2323 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2324 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2325 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2327 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2328 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2329 result = $self.process_background_events();
2331 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2332 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2333 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2334 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2338 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2339 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2340 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2341 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2344 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2346 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2347 $event_to_handle = event;
2349 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2350 post_event_actions.push(action);
2355 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2356 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2357 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2358 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2359 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2360 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2363 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2364 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2365 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2366 processed_all_events = false;
2370 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2371 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2372 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2374 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2375 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2376 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2382 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2384 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2385 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2386 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2387 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2388 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2389 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2393 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2395 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2397 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2398 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2400 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2402 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2403 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2404 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2407 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2408 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2409 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2411 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2412 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2413 current_timestamp: u32,
2415 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2416 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2417 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2418 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2420 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2421 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2422 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2427 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2429 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2430 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2431 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2432 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2433 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2434 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2435 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2436 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2438 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2441 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2442 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2444 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2446 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2448 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2450 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2451 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2452 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2453 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2454 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2455 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2456 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2457 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2459 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2469 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2470 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2471 &self.default_configuration
2474 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2475 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2476 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2479 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2480 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2482 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2484 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2488 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2493 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2495 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2496 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2497 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2498 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2499 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2501 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2502 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2504 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2505 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2506 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2508 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2509 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2510 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2512 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2513 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2515 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2516 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2517 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2518 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2519 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2520 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2522 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2523 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2524 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2525 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2526 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2527 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2530 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2531 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2532 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2534 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2536 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2537 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2539 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2541 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2542 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2543 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2548 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2549 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2550 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2551 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2552 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2553 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2557 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2562 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2564 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2565 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2566 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2568 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2570 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2573 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2576 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2577 node_id: their_network_key,
2580 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2583 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2584 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2585 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2586 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2587 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2588 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2589 // the same channel.
2590 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2592 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2593 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2594 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2595 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2596 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2597 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2598 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2599 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2600 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2604 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2605 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2606 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2614 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2615 /// more information.
2616 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2617 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2618 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2619 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2620 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2621 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2622 // the same channel.
2623 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2625 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2626 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2627 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2628 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2629 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2630 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2631 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2632 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2640 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2641 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2643 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2644 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2646 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2647 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2648 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2649 // really wanted anyway.
2650 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2653 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2654 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2655 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2656 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2658 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2659 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2660 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2661 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2662 let context_to_details = |context| {
2663 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2665 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2667 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2668 .map(context_to_details)
2674 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2675 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2677 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2678 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2679 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2681 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2682 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2683 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2684 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2685 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2686 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2688 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2689 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2690 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2692 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2693 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2694 payment_id: *payment_id,
2695 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2696 total_msat: *total_msat,
2699 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2700 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2702 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2703 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2705 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2710 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2711 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2713 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2714 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2717 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2719 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2720 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2722 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2723 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2725 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2726 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2727 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2728 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2729 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2730 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2731 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2732 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2734 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2735 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2736 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2737 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2738 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2742 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2743 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2745 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2746 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2747 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2748 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2751 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2752 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2755 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2756 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2758 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2759 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2766 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2767 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2768 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2769 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2772 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2773 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2779 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2780 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2781 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2783 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2784 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2786 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2787 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2788 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2789 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2791 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2793 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2794 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2795 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2798 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2799 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2800 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2801 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2802 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2803 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2806 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2807 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2808 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2810 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2811 /// the channel being closed or not:
2812 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2813 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2814 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2815 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2816 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2817 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2818 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2820 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2821 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2822 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2823 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2825 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2827 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2828 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2829 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2832 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2833 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2834 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2835 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2836 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2839 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2840 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2841 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2842 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2843 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2846 let logger = WithContext::from(
2847 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2850 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2851 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2852 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2853 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2854 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2855 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2856 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2858 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2859 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2860 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2861 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2862 // ignore the result here.
2863 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2865 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2866 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2867 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2868 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2869 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2870 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2871 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2872 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2873 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2874 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2875 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2876 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2879 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2882 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2883 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2888 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2889 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2890 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2891 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2892 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2893 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2894 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2895 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2898 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2899 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2900 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2904 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2905 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2909 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2910 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2911 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2912 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2913 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2914 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2915 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2916 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2917 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2918 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2919 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2921 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2923 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2924 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2925 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2926 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2927 mem::drop(peer_state);
2928 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2930 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2931 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2932 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2934 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2935 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2936 // Unfunded channel has no update
2937 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2940 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2941 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2942 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2943 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2945 (None, *peer_node_id)
2947 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2950 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2951 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2952 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2953 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2954 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2955 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2956 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2957 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2958 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2964 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2967 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2968 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2969 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2970 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2971 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2972 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2973 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2974 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2975 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2976 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2977 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2978 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2989 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2990 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2991 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2993 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2994 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2995 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2998 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2999 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3000 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3002 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
3003 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3004 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3005 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3006 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3009 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3010 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3011 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3012 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3013 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3017 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3018 /// local transaction(s).
3019 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3020 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3021 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3025 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3026 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3028 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3030 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3031 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3034 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3035 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3036 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3037 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3043 macro_rules! return_err {
3044 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3047 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3048 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3050 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3051 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3052 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3053 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3054 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3055 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3056 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3060 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3061 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3062 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3063 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3064 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3065 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3066 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3067 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3073 let NextPacketDetails {
3074 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3075 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3076 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3077 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3078 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3081 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3082 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3083 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3084 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3085 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3086 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3087 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3088 // phantom or an intercept.
3089 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3090 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3091 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3095 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3098 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3100 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3101 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3102 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3103 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3104 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3106 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3107 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3108 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3109 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3112 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3113 // have no consistency guarantees.
3114 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3118 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3119 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3120 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3121 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3122 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3124 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3125 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3126 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3127 // we don't have the channel here.
3128 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3130 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3132 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3133 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3134 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3135 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3136 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3137 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3138 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3139 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3140 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3141 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3142 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3144 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3147 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3148 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3150 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3151 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3158 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3160 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3161 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3163 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3164 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3165 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3166 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3167 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3169 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3170 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3176 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3177 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3178 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3179 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3181 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3182 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3184 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3185 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3186 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3188 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3189 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3190 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3191 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3192 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3193 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3194 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3198 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3200 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3203 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3204 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3205 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3206 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3207 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3208 macro_rules! return_err {
3209 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3211 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3212 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3213 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3214 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3215 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3216 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3217 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3218 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3219 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3223 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3224 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3225 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3226 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3227 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3233 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3235 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3236 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3237 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3238 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3241 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3242 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3243 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3244 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3245 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3247 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3250 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3251 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3252 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3253 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3254 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3260 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3261 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3262 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3264 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3265 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3266 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3268 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3269 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3270 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3271 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3272 return Err(LightningError {
3273 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3274 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3277 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3278 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3280 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3281 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3282 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3285 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3286 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3287 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3288 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3290 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3291 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3292 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3294 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3295 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3296 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3297 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3298 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3299 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3300 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3304 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3307 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3308 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3309 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3310 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3312 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3313 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3314 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3315 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3316 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3319 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3320 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3322 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3323 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3324 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3325 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3326 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3327 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3328 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3329 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3331 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3332 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3333 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3335 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3337 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3344 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3345 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3346 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3347 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3352 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3353 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3354 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3357 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3358 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3359 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3360 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3362 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3363 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3364 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3366 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3367 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3371 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3372 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3374 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3375 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3376 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3378 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3381 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3383 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3384 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3386 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3387 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3388 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3389 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3390 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3391 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3392 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3393 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3394 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3395 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3397 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3398 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3399 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3400 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3402 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3403 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3405 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3406 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3407 Some(monitor_update) => {
3408 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3410 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3411 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3412 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3413 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3414 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3415 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3416 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3424 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3427 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3428 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3429 // `channel_by_id` map.
3430 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3431 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3435 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3436 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3438 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3443 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3445 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3446 /// fields for more info.
3448 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3449 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3451 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3453 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3454 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3455 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3456 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3457 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3459 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3460 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3461 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3462 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3463 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3465 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3466 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3467 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3468 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3470 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3472 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3473 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3474 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3476 /// In general, a path may raise:
3477 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3478 /// node public key) is specified.
3479 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3480 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3481 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3482 /// relevant updates.
3484 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3485 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3486 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3488 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3489 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3490 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3491 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3492 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3493 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3494 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3495 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3496 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3497 self.pending_outbound_payments
3498 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3499 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3500 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3503 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3504 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3505 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3506 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3507 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3508 self.pending_outbound_payments
3509 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3510 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3511 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3512 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3516 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3517 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3518 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3519 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3520 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3521 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3525 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3526 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3527 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3531 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3532 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3535 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3536 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3538 self.pending_outbound_payments
3539 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3540 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3541 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3542 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3543 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3547 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3548 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3549 /// retries are exhausted.
3551 /// # Event Generation
3553 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3554 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3556 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3557 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3558 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3560 /// # Requested Invoices
3562 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3563 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3564 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3565 /// once the invoice has been received.
3567 /// # Restart Behavior
3569 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3570 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3571 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3573 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3574 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3576 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3579 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3580 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3581 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3582 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3583 /// never reach the recipient.
3585 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3586 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3588 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3589 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3591 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3592 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3593 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3594 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3595 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3596 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3597 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3600 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3601 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3603 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3606 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3607 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3608 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3609 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3610 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3611 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3612 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3613 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3616 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3617 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3618 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3619 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3620 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3621 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3622 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3623 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3624 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3627 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3630 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3631 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3634 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3635 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3637 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3638 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3639 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3640 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3641 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3642 let payment_params =
3643 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3645 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3647 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3650 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3651 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3653 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3654 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3655 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3656 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3658 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3659 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3660 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3661 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3662 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3663 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3664 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3665 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3666 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3667 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3669 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3670 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3671 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3672 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3676 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3678 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3679 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3682 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3684 let mut res = Vec::new();
3686 for mut path in route.paths {
3687 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3688 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3689 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3690 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3691 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3694 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3697 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3698 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3700 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3702 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3703 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3708 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3711 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3716 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3717 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3718 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3720 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3721 let used_liquidity =
3722 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3724 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3725 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3727 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3730 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3735 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3736 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3737 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3744 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3745 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3746 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3747 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3748 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3749 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3750 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3751 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3752 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3754 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3755 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3757 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3758 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3759 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3761 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3762 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3763 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3764 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3765 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3766 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3767 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3768 } else { unreachable!(); });
3770 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3771 Err((chan, err)) => {
3772 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3773 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3774 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3775 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3776 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3782 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3783 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3785 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3786 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3789 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3790 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3791 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3795 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3796 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3797 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3801 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3802 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3803 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3805 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3806 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3807 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3808 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3809 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3811 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3812 funding_txo, o.get()
3814 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3815 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3816 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3817 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3818 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3819 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3822 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3829 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3830 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3831 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3835 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3837 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3838 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3840 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3841 /// across the p2p network.
3843 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3844 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3846 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3847 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3848 /// keys per-channel).
3850 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3851 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3852 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3854 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3855 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3856 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3858 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3859 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3860 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3861 /// for more details.
3863 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3864 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3865 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3866 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3869 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3871 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3872 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3874 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3875 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3876 /// signature for each channel.
3878 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3879 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3880 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3881 let mut result = Ok(());
3883 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3884 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3885 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3886 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3887 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3892 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3893 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3894 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3898 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3899 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3900 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3901 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3902 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3903 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3904 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3905 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3907 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3908 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3913 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3914 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3915 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3916 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3920 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3921 match states.entry(txid) {
3922 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3923 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3924 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3928 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3931 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3932 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3933 temporary_channel_id,
3934 counterparty_node_id,
3935 funding_transaction.clone(),
3938 let mut output_index = None;
3939 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3940 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3941 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3942 if output_index.is_some() {
3943 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3944 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3947 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3950 if output_index.is_none() {
3951 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3952 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3955 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3956 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3957 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3963 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3964 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3965 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3966 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3967 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3968 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3969 .into_iter().flatten()
3970 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3972 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3973 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3975 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3977 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3978 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3979 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3980 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3981 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3983 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3984 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
3985 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3989 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
3990 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3991 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3997 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3999 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4000 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4001 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4002 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4004 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4005 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4007 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4008 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4010 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4012 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4013 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4014 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4015 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4016 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4017 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4018 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4019 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4020 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4021 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4022 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4023 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4024 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4028 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4029 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4030 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4031 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4032 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4033 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4034 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4035 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4036 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4037 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4041 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4042 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4043 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4044 config.apply(config_update);
4045 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4048 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4049 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4050 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4051 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4052 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4053 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4060 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4061 debug_assert!(false);
4062 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4064 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4065 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4072 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4074 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4075 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4076 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4077 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4079 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4080 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4082 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4083 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4085 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4087 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4088 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4089 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4090 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4091 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4092 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4093 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4094 pub fn update_channel_config(
4095 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4096 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4097 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4100 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4101 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4103 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4104 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4106 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4107 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4108 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4109 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4110 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4112 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4113 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4114 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4117 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4120 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4121 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4122 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4123 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4124 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4125 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4126 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4128 let next_hop_scid = {
4129 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4130 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4131 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4132 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4133 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4134 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4135 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4136 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4137 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4138 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4141 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4143 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4144 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4145 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4148 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4149 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4150 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4151 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4152 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4159 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4160 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4161 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4164 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4165 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4166 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4167 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4170 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4172 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4173 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4174 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4175 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4176 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4179 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4180 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4181 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4182 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4183 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4185 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4189 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4190 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4192 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4195 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4196 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4197 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4199 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4200 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4201 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4204 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4205 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4206 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4207 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4208 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4209 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4210 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4211 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4212 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4215 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4216 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4217 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4218 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4223 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4225 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4226 /// Will likely generate further events.
4227 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4228 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4230 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4231 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4232 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4234 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4235 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4237 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4238 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4239 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4240 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4242 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4243 match forward_info {
4244 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4245 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4246 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4247 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4248 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4251 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4252 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4253 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4254 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4256 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4257 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4258 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4259 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4260 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4261 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4262 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4263 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4266 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4267 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4269 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4272 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4273 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4279 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4280 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4282 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4286 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4287 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4289 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4293 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4294 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4295 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4296 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4297 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4298 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4299 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4302 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4303 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4304 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4305 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4306 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4308 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4310 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4311 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4315 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4316 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4317 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4318 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4319 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4320 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4322 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4323 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4329 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4332 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4335 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4336 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4337 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4338 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4339 // problem, not ours.
4345 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4346 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4347 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4349 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4353 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4354 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4355 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4356 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4357 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4360 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4361 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4362 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4363 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4364 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4365 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4366 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4367 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4368 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4369 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4370 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4371 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4372 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4375 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4376 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4377 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4378 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4379 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4380 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4381 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4382 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4383 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4384 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4386 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4387 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4388 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4389 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4390 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4391 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4394 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4395 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4396 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4399 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4400 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4402 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4404 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4405 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4406 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4407 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4413 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4414 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4416 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4417 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4418 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4420 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4421 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4422 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4423 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4425 Some((res, htlc_id))
4428 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4429 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4430 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4431 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4433 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4435 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4436 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4437 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4443 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4447 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4448 match forward_info {
4449 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4450 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4451 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4452 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4453 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4456 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4457 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4458 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4459 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4460 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4462 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4463 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4464 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4465 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4466 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4468 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4469 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4470 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4474 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4475 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4478 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4481 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4482 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4483 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4484 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4485 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4486 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4487 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4488 phantom_shared_secret,
4491 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4492 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4493 // if routing nodes overpay
4494 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4495 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4497 total_value_received: None,
4498 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4501 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4504 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4506 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4507 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4508 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4509 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4510 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4511 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4513 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4514 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4515 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4516 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4517 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4518 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4519 phantom_shared_secret,
4522 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4523 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4525 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4528 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4529 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4530 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4531 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4532 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4535 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4536 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4537 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4538 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4539 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4540 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4542 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4543 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4544 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4546 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4547 .entry(payment_hash)
4548 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4549 .or_insert_with(|| {
4550 committed_to_claimable = true;
4552 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4555 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4556 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4557 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4558 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4560 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4561 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4562 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4564 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4565 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4566 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4569 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4571 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4572 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4573 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4574 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4575 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4576 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4577 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4578 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4579 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4580 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4582 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4584 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4585 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4586 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4587 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4588 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4589 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4591 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4592 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4593 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4594 committed_to_claimable = true;
4596 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4597 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4598 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4599 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4600 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4601 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4602 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4603 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4604 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4605 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4609 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4610 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4611 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4612 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4613 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4615 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4617 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4618 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4620 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4621 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4622 committed_to_claimable = true;
4625 payment_claimable_generated
4629 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4630 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4631 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4632 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4633 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4634 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4635 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4636 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4637 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4638 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4639 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4640 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4641 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4642 Ok(result) => result,
4644 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4645 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4648 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4649 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4650 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4651 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4652 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4653 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4656 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4657 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4658 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4660 check_total_value!(purpose);
4662 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4663 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4664 check_total_value!(purpose);
4668 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4669 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4670 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4671 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4673 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4674 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4675 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4676 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4677 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4678 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4679 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4680 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4682 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4683 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4684 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4686 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4687 if payment_claimable_generated {
4688 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4694 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4695 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4703 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4704 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4705 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4706 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4708 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4709 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4711 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4713 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4714 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4715 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4717 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4719 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4720 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4721 events.append(&mut new_events);
4724 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4726 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4727 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4728 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4730 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4732 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4733 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4734 if background_events.is_empty() {
4735 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4738 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4740 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4741 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4742 // monitor updating completing.
4743 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4745 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4746 let mut updated_chan = false;
4748 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4749 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4750 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4751 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4752 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4754 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4755 updated_chan = true;
4756 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4757 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4759 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4762 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4767 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4768 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4771 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4772 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4773 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4774 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4775 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4776 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4777 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4779 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4780 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4781 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4782 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4783 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4789 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4792 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4793 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4794 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4795 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4796 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4799 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4800 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4802 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4804 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4805 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4806 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4807 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4808 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4810 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4812 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4813 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4814 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4815 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4817 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4818 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4820 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4821 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4825 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4826 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4827 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4828 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4829 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4830 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4831 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4833 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4834 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4836 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4837 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4838 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4839 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4840 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4841 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4843 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4848 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4849 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4857 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4859 /// This currently includes:
4860 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4861 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4862 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4864 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4865 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4866 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4867 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4868 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4869 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4870 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4871 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4873 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4874 /// estimate fetches.
4876 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4877 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4878 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4879 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4880 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4882 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4883 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4885 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4886 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4887 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4888 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4890 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4891 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4892 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4893 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4894 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4895 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4897 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4898 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4899 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4901 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4902 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4903 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4904 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4905 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4906 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4907 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4908 channel_id: *chan_id,
4909 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4920 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4921 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4922 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4923 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4924 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4925 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4926 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4928 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4929 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4934 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4935 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4937 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4938 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4939 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4940 if needs_close { return false; }
4943 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4944 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4945 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4946 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4947 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4948 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4949 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4950 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4952 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4953 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4954 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4955 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4959 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4961 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4964 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4966 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4967 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4968 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4969 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4973 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4975 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4981 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4983 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4984 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4985 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4986 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4987 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4988 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4989 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4990 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4991 channel_id: *chan_id,
4992 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5000 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5001 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5002 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5004 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5005 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5006 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5011 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5012 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5013 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5014 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5015 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5016 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5017 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5018 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5019 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5025 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5027 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5028 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5033 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5034 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5035 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5036 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5037 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5038 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5039 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5040 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5041 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5042 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5043 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5044 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5045 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5046 // have no channels to the peer.
5047 let remove_entry = {
5048 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5049 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5052 entry.remove_entry();
5055 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5060 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5061 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5062 // This should be unreachable
5063 debug_assert!(false);
5066 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5067 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5068 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5069 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5070 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5071 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5072 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5075 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5076 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5077 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5079 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5080 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5087 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5088 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5089 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5090 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5091 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5094 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5095 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5098 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5099 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5102 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5103 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5104 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5105 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5106 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5107 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5108 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5111 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5112 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5115 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5116 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5117 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5118 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5119 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5126 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5127 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5128 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5130 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5131 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5132 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5133 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5135 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5136 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5137 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5138 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5139 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5140 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5143 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5144 /// reason for the failure.
5146 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5147 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5148 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5150 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5151 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5152 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5153 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5154 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5155 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5156 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5161 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5162 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5163 match failure_code {
5164 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5165 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5166 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5167 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5168 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5169 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5171 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5172 let fail_data = match data {
5173 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5176 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5181 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5182 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5184 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5186 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5187 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5188 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5189 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5190 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5191 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5192 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5194 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5196 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5197 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5199 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5204 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5205 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5206 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5207 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5208 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5209 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5210 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5211 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5212 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5213 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5215 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5216 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5217 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5218 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5220 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5221 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5222 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5223 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5224 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5228 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5229 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5230 // be surfaced to the user.
5231 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5232 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5233 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5235 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5236 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5237 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5238 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5239 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5240 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5241 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5242 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5243 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5245 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5246 debug_assert!(false);
5247 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5250 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5252 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5255 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5256 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5257 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5258 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5262 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5263 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5264 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5265 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5266 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5267 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5268 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5269 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5270 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5271 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5274 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5275 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5276 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5279 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5280 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5281 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5283 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5284 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5285 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5286 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5287 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5289 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5290 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5291 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5294 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5295 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5296 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5298 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5299 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5300 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5301 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5302 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5304 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5306 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5307 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5309 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5310 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5314 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5315 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5317 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5321 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5322 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5323 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5324 push_forward_ev = true;
5326 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5327 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5328 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5330 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5331 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5334 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5335 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5336 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5337 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5338 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5339 failed_next_destination: destination,
5345 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5346 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5348 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5349 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5350 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5351 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5353 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5354 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5355 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5356 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5358 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5359 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5360 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5362 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5363 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5364 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5365 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5366 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5367 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5368 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5369 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5370 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5373 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5374 /// even type numbers.
5378 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5379 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5381 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5382 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5383 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5386 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5387 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5389 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5392 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5393 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5394 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5395 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5396 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5397 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5398 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5399 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5404 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5405 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5406 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5407 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5408 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5410 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5411 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5412 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5416 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5417 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5418 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5419 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5420 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5421 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5422 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5423 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5424 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5425 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5426 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5435 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5437 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5438 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5439 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5440 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5441 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5442 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5443 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5444 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5445 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5446 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5447 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5448 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5449 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5450 debug_assert!(false);
5454 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5456 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5457 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5458 debug_assert!(false);
5462 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5463 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5465 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5466 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5467 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5468 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5471 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5472 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5473 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5474 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5478 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5479 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5480 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5481 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5482 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5483 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5484 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5487 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5488 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5489 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5490 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5491 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5492 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5497 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5498 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5499 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5500 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5501 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5502 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5503 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5505 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5508 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5509 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5510 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5511 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5515 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5516 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5517 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5518 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5520 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5521 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5522 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5523 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5525 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5526 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5527 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5528 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5531 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5532 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5533 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5534 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5538 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5539 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5540 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5543 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5544 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5545 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5546 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5547 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5548 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5549 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5550 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5553 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5554 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5555 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5557 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5560 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5561 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5563 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5564 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5565 // monitor update as a background event.
5566 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5567 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5568 counterparty_node_id,
5569 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5570 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5574 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5575 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5580 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5582 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5584 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5585 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5586 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5587 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5588 blocking_action: blocker,
5590 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5592 debug_assert!(false,
5593 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5596 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5597 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5598 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5599 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5600 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5602 let mut found_blocker = false;
5603 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5604 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5605 // which case we need to only remove the one
5606 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5607 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5608 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5609 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5611 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5614 debug_assert!(false);
5623 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5624 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5625 counterparty_node_id: None,
5626 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5632 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5633 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5634 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5635 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5636 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5637 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5638 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5639 // again on restart.
5640 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5641 payment_preimage, update_res);
5644 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5645 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5647 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5648 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5649 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5650 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5651 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5652 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5653 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5654 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5655 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5656 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5659 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5660 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5661 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5662 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5663 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5664 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5668 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5669 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5672 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5673 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5674 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5677 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5678 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5679 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5680 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5681 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5683 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5684 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5685 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5687 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5688 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5691 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5692 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5693 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5694 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5695 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5696 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5697 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5698 let chan_to_release =
5699 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5700 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5702 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5703 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5704 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5705 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5710 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5711 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5712 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5713 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5714 // in the background.
5715 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5716 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5717 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5718 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5720 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5721 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5722 funding_txo, update, ..
5724 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5725 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5726 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5727 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5729 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5735 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5736 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5737 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5739 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5740 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5742 monitor_update.updates[0],
5743 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5748 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5749 // immediately once we get going.
5750 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5753 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5755 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5758 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5759 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5760 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5761 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5762 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5763 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5767 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5768 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5769 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5772 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5773 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5775 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5776 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5777 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5778 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5780 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5784 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5785 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5786 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5792 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5793 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5794 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5797 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5798 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5799 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5800 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5802 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5804 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5805 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5806 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5808 payment_purpose: purpose,
5811 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5813 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5817 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5819 sender_intended_total_msat,
5823 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5824 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5826 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5827 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5828 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5831 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5832 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5834 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5835 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5836 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5837 Some(blocking_action),
5844 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5845 /// update completion.
5846 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5847 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5848 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5849 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5850 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5851 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5852 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5853 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5854 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5855 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5856 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5857 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5858 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5859 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5861 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5863 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5864 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5865 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5866 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5869 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5870 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5872 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5873 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5874 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5879 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5880 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5881 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5882 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5887 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5888 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5889 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5890 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5891 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5896 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5900 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5906 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5907 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5908 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5912 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5913 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5914 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5920 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5921 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5923 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5924 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5926 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5927 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
5928 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5929 match outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_txo) {
5930 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5935 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5936 let mut peer_state_lock;
5937 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5938 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5939 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5940 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5942 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5945 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5946 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5947 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5948 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5949 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5952 let remaining_in_flight =
5953 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5954 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5957 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5958 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5959 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5960 remaining_in_flight);
5961 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5964 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5967 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5969 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5970 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5973 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5974 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5975 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5977 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5978 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5979 /// used to accept such channels.
5981 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5982 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5983 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5984 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5987 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5988 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5990 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5991 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5992 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5994 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5995 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5997 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5998 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6000 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6001 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6003 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6004 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6005 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6006 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6009 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6011 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6012 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6014 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6015 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6016 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6017 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6019 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6020 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6022 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6024 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6025 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6026 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6028 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6029 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6030 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6032 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6033 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6034 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6035 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6036 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6037 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6038 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| {
6039 let err_str = e.to_string();
6040 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6042 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6046 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6047 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6049 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str })
6054 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6055 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6056 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6057 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6058 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6059 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6060 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6063 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6064 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6065 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6067 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6069 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6070 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6071 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6072 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6073 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6074 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6075 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6076 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6079 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6080 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6081 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6083 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6087 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6088 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6089 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6091 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6092 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6093 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6096 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6101 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6102 /// or 0-conf channels.
6104 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6105 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6106 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6107 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6108 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6109 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6111 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6112 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6113 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6114 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6115 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6116 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6117 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6121 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6124 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6125 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6127 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6128 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6130 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6131 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6132 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6133 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6134 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6136 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6139 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6140 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6141 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6144 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6145 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6150 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6153 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6154 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6155 // likely to be lost on restart!
6156 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6157 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6160 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6161 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6164 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6165 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6166 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6167 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6168 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6170 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6171 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6173 debug_assert!(false);
6174 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6176 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6177 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6179 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6180 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6181 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6182 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6183 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6184 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6186 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6187 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6188 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6191 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6192 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6193 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6194 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6195 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6198 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6199 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6201 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6204 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6205 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6206 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6207 &msg, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6209 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id)
6211 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6212 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6213 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6214 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6215 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6216 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6219 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6220 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6221 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6226 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6227 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6228 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6229 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6230 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6231 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6232 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6235 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6240 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6241 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6242 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6244 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6245 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6248 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6249 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6251 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6252 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6253 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6255 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6259 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6260 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6261 // likely to be lost on restart!
6262 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6263 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6264 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6266 debug_assert!(false);
6267 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6269 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6270 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6271 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6272 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6273 match phase.get_mut() {
6274 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6275 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6276 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6279 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6283 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6286 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6287 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6288 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6289 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6290 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6292 user_channel_id: user_id,
6297 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6298 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6300 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6301 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6303 debug_assert!(false);
6304 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6307 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6308 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6309 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6310 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6311 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6312 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6313 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6315 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6316 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6317 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6318 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6319 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6320 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6321 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6322 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6323 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6327 Some(mut phase) => {
6328 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6329 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6330 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6332 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6335 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6337 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6338 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6339 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6340 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6341 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6342 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6344 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6345 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6346 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6349 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6350 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6351 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6353 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6354 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6355 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6356 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6357 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6359 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6360 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6361 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6362 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6363 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6365 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6366 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6367 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6368 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6369 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6370 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6371 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6376 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6377 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6378 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6380 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6384 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6385 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6386 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6394 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6395 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6396 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6397 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6399 debug_assert!(false);
6400 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6403 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6404 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6405 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6406 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6407 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6408 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6409 let logger = WithContext::from(
6411 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6412 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6415 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6417 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6418 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6419 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6420 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6421 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6422 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6423 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6424 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6425 } else { unreachable!(); }
6428 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6429 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6430 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6431 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6432 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6433 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6434 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6438 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6439 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6440 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6441 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6442 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6443 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6447 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6450 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6454 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6455 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6456 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6457 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6458 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6460 debug_assert!(false);
6461 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6463 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6464 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6465 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6466 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6467 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6468 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6469 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6470 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6471 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6472 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6473 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6474 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6475 msg: announcement_sigs,
6477 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6478 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6479 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6480 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6481 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6482 // announcement_signatures.
6483 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6484 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6485 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6486 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6493 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6494 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6499 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6500 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6503 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6504 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6509 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6510 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6511 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6513 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6514 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6516 debug_assert!(false);
6517 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6519 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6520 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6521 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6522 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6524 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6525 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6526 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6527 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6529 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6532 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6533 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6534 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6535 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6537 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6538 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6539 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6540 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6541 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6542 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6546 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6547 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6548 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6549 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6552 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6553 let context = phase.context_mut();
6554 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6555 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6556 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6557 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6561 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6564 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6565 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6566 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6567 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6569 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6570 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6576 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6577 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6578 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6580 debug_assert!(false);
6581 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6583 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6584 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6585 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6586 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6587 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6588 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6589 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6590 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6591 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6592 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6593 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6598 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6599 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6600 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6601 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6602 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6603 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6604 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6606 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6607 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6610 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6613 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6614 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6615 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6616 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6618 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6619 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6620 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6621 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6622 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6627 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6628 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6629 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6634 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6635 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6636 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6637 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6639 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6640 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6641 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6642 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6644 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6645 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6647 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6648 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6649 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6651 debug_assert!(false);
6652 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6654 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6655 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6656 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6657 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6658 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6659 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6660 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6661 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6662 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6663 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6665 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6667 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6668 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6669 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6670 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6671 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6672 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6673 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6674 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6678 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6679 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6680 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6681 match pending_forward_info {
6682 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6683 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6685 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6686 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6687 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6688 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6689 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6691 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6692 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6693 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6694 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6695 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6698 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6700 _ => pending_forward_info
6703 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6704 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6706 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6707 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6710 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6715 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6717 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6718 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6719 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6721 debug_assert!(false);
6722 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6724 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6725 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6726 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6728 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6729 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6730 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6731 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6733 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6735 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6736 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6737 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6739 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6740 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6741 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6742 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6743 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6744 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6745 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6748 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6749 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6752 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6755 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6759 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6760 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6761 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6762 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6763 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6765 debug_assert!(false);
6766 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6768 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6769 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6770 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6771 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6772 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6773 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6775 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6776 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6779 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6784 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6785 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6786 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6787 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6788 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6790 debug_assert!(false);
6791 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6793 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6794 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6795 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6796 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6797 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6798 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6799 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6801 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6802 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6804 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6805 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6809 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6813 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6814 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6815 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6817 debug_assert!(false);
6818 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6820 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6821 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6822 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6823 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6824 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6825 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6826 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6827 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6828 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6829 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6830 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6834 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6835 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6838 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6843 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6844 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6845 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6846 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6847 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6848 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6849 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6850 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6851 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6852 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6853 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6855 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6856 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6858 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6859 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6860 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6861 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6862 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6863 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6865 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6866 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6867 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6869 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6870 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6871 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6872 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6873 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6874 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6875 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6876 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6877 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6880 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6881 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6884 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6885 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6886 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6887 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6888 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6889 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6890 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6891 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6892 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6893 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6896 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6897 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6898 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6903 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6904 // payments are being processed.
6905 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6906 push_forward_event = true;
6908 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6909 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6916 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6917 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6920 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6921 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6922 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6924 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6928 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6929 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6930 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6931 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6932 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6934 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6935 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6936 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6937 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6938 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6939 // real by taking more time.
6940 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6941 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6942 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6947 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6948 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6949 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6950 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6951 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6952 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6953 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6955 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6956 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6957 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6958 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6959 channel_funding_outpoint,
6960 counterparty_node_id,
6965 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6966 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6967 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6969 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6970 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6971 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6972 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6974 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6975 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6976 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6982 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6983 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6984 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6985 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6987 debug_assert!(false);
6988 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6989 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6990 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6991 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6992 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6993 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6994 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6995 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6996 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6997 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6998 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6999 *counterparty_node_id)
7001 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7002 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7003 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7004 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7005 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7006 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7007 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7011 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7012 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7015 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7018 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7022 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7023 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7024 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7026 debug_assert!(false);
7027 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7029 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7030 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7031 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7032 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7033 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7034 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7035 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7037 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7038 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7041 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7046 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7047 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7048 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7050 debug_assert!(false);
7051 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7053 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7054 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7055 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7056 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7057 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7058 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7059 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7062 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7063 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7064 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
7065 msg, &self.default_configuration
7066 ), chan_phase_entry),
7067 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7068 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7069 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7072 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7073 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7076 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7081 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7082 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7083 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7084 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7086 // It's not a local channel
7087 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7090 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7091 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7092 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7093 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7095 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7096 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7097 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7098 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7099 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7100 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7101 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7102 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7103 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7104 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7105 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7107 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7109 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7110 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7111 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7112 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7114 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7115 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7116 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7117 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7120 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7124 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7125 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7128 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7130 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7133 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7135 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7136 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7138 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7140 debug_assert!(false);
7141 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7142 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7146 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7147 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7148 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7149 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7150 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7151 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7152 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7153 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7154 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7155 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7156 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7157 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7158 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7159 let mut channel_update = None;
7160 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7161 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7162 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7165 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7166 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7167 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7168 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7169 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7170 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7171 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7176 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7177 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7178 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7179 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7180 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7181 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7185 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7186 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7189 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7190 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7192 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7193 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7194 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7195 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7196 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7197 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7199 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7200 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7201 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7202 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7203 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7204 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7205 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7206 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7207 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7208 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7209 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7210 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7211 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7212 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7213 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7214 next_funding_txid: None,
7217 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7218 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7219 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7225 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7226 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7227 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7228 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7231 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7232 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7237 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7238 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7239 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7241 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7242 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7243 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7244 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7245 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7246 match monitor_event {
7247 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7248 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7249 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7250 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7251 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7253 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7254 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7255 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7256 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7259 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7260 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7261 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7263 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7264 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7265 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7266 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7269 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7270 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7271 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7272 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7273 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7274 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7275 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7276 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7277 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
7278 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7279 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7283 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7284 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7285 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7286 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7294 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7295 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7301 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7302 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7305 has_pending_monitor_events
7308 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7309 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7310 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7312 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7313 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7314 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7317 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7318 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7319 /// update was applied.
7320 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7321 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7322 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7324 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7325 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7326 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7327 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7329 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7330 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7332 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7333 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7334 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7335 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7337 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7338 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7339 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7340 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7341 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7342 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7344 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7345 has_monitor_update = true;
7347 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7348 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7349 continue 'peer_loop;
7358 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7359 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7360 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7366 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7367 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7369 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7370 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7372 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7373 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7374 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7375 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7377 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7378 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7380 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7381 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7382 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7383 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7388 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7389 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7394 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7395 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7398 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7399 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7400 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7406 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7410 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7411 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7412 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7413 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7414 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7415 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7416 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7420 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7421 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7422 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7423 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7424 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7430 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7431 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7432 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7433 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7434 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7435 let mut has_update = false;
7436 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7438 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7440 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7441 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7442 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7443 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7444 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7446 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7447 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7448 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7449 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7450 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7452 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7453 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7456 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7457 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7458 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7460 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7461 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7462 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7463 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7464 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7469 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7470 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7471 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7477 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7478 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7483 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7489 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7490 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7493 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7494 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7500 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7501 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7503 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7504 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7505 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7506 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7507 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7508 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7509 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7510 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7511 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7512 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7513 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7514 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7515 assert!(should_broadcast);
7516 } else { unreachable!(); }
7517 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7518 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7519 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7522 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7526 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7527 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7528 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7532 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7533 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7534 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7535 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7536 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7538 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7542 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7547 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7549 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7551 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7552 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7553 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7554 &self, description: String
7555 ) -> Result<OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7556 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7557 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7558 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7559 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7561 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7562 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7563 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7565 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7571 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7572 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7576 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7577 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7579 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7580 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7581 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7584 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7585 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7586 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7588 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7589 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7593 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7594 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7595 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7596 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7597 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7599 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7603 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7604 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7609 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7610 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7611 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7613 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7615 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7616 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7617 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7618 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7619 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7620 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7621 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7622 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7623 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7624 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7625 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7626 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7628 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7629 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7630 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7632 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7633 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7636 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7637 self.pending_outbound_payments
7638 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7639 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7641 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7646 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7647 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7648 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7650 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7651 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7652 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7653 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7654 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7655 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7656 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7658 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7659 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7663 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7664 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7667 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7668 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7669 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7673 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7674 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7675 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7676 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7680 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7681 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7682 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7687 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7688 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7689 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7692 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7693 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7694 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7695 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7696 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7697 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7698 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7699 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7700 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7701 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7702 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7703 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7704 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7705 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7706 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7709 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7710 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7711 let builder = match quantity {
7713 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7715 let builder = match amount_msats {
7717 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7719 let builder = match payer_note {
7721 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7723 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7724 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7726 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7727 self.pending_outbound_payments
7728 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7729 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7731 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7733 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7734 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7735 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7736 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7737 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7740 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7742 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7743 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7744 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7745 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7746 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7747 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7748 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7749 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7750 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7752 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7759 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7762 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7763 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7764 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7768 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7769 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7770 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7771 /// received and no retries will be made.
7775 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply
7776 /// path for the invoice.
7778 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7779 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7780 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7781 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7782 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7784 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7785 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7787 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7788 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7789 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7790 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7792 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7793 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7794 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7796 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7797 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7798 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7800 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7801 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7802 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7804 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7805 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7806 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7808 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7809 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7810 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7811 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7812 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7815 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7817 for path in refund.paths() {
7818 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7819 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7820 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7821 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7823 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7829 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7833 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7836 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7837 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7839 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7840 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7841 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7842 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7844 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7846 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7847 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7851 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7852 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7854 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7856 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7857 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7859 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7860 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7861 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7862 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7863 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7864 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7865 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7866 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7867 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7868 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7869 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7872 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7873 /// stored external to LDK.
7875 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7876 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7877 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7879 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7880 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7883 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7884 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7885 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7886 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7888 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7889 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7890 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7891 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7892 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7894 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7895 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7896 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7897 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7898 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7900 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7901 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7903 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7904 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7908 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7909 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7911 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7913 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7914 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7916 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7917 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7918 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7919 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7920 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7921 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7922 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7925 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7926 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7928 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7929 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7930 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7933 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
7935 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
7936 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
7937 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
7938 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7940 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
7942 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
7943 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
7944 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
7947 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
7948 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
7951 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
7952 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
7953 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
7954 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7955 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
7956 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7958 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
7959 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7960 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
7961 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7962 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7964 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7966 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7969 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
7970 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
7974 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7975 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7977 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7978 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7979 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7980 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7982 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7983 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7984 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7985 Some(_) => continue,
7986 None => return scid_candidate
7991 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7993 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7994 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7996 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7997 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7998 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8002 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8003 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8004 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8006 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8007 /// times to get a unique scid.
8008 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8009 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8010 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8012 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8013 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8014 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8015 return scid_candidate
8019 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8020 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8021 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8022 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8024 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8025 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8026 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8027 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8028 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8029 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8031 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8032 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8033 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8042 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8043 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8044 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8045 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8046 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8050 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8051 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8052 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8053 events.push_back((event, None));
8057 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8058 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8059 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8063 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8064 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8068 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8069 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8072 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8073 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8074 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8075 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8076 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8077 let logger = WithContext::from(
8078 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8081 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8082 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8083 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8084 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8085 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8086 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8087 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8088 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8090 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8094 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8095 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
8096 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8097 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8098 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8099 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8100 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8104 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
8105 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8106 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8107 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8108 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8109 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8110 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8111 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8112 if further_update_exists {
8113 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8118 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8119 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8125 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8126 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8132 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8133 for action in actions {
8135 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8136 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
8138 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
8144 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8145 /// using the given event handler.
8147 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8148 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8152 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8156 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8158 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8159 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8160 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8161 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8162 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8163 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8167 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8168 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8169 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8170 /// is always placed next to each other.
8172 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8173 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8174 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8175 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8177 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8178 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8179 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8180 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8181 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8182 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8183 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8185 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8186 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8187 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8188 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8191 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8192 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8194 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8195 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8198 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8199 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8200 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8201 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8202 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8203 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8204 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8208 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8209 events.replace(pending_events);
8218 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8220 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8221 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8222 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8223 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8224 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8225 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8229 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8231 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8232 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8233 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8235 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8239 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8241 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8242 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8243 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8244 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8245 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8246 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8250 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8252 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8253 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8254 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8255 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8256 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8259 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8260 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8263 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8264 let _persistence_guard =
8265 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8266 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8267 let new_height = height - 1;
8269 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8270 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8271 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8272 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8273 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8274 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8277 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8281 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8283 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8284 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8285 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8286 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8287 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8288 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8292 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8293 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8294 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8295 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8297 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8298 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8300 let _persistence_guard =
8301 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8302 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8303 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8304 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8306 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8307 if height < last_best_block_height {
8308 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8309 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8313 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8314 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8315 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8316 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8318 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8319 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8321 let _persistence_guard =
8322 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8323 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8324 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8326 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8328 macro_rules! max_time {
8329 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8331 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8332 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8333 // having an explicit local time source.
8334 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8335 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8336 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8337 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8338 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8344 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8345 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8346 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8347 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8351 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8352 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8353 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8354 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8355 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8356 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8357 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8358 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8359 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8360 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8361 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8368 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8369 let _persistence_guard =
8370 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8371 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8372 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8373 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8374 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8375 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8376 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8377 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8382 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8384 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8385 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8386 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8387 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8388 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8389 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8393 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8394 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8396 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8397 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8398 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8399 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8400 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8402 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8403 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8405 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8406 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8407 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8408 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8409 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8410 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8412 // Retain unfunded channels.
8413 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8414 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8415 let res = f(channel);
8416 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8417 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8418 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8419 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8420 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8422 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8423 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8424 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8425 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8426 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8427 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8428 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8429 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8434 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8439 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8440 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8443 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8444 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8445 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8446 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8447 msg: announcement_sigs,
8449 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8450 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8451 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8453 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8454 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8455 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8460 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8461 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8462 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8463 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8464 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8465 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8466 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8467 // is always consistent.
8468 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8469 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8470 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8471 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8472 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8475 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8476 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8477 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8478 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8479 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8480 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8481 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8482 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8486 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8487 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8488 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8489 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8490 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8491 data: reason_message,
8504 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8505 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8506 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8507 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8508 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8509 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8510 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8511 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8512 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8513 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8515 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8516 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8517 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8521 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8524 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8525 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8526 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8527 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8528 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8529 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8530 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8531 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8532 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8533 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8534 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8537 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8538 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8539 _ => unreachable!(),
8541 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8542 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8543 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8544 let logger = WithContext::from(
8545 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8547 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8553 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8555 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8556 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8560 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8561 /// may have events that need processing.
8563 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8564 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8566 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8567 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8568 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8569 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8572 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8573 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8574 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8577 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8578 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8579 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8582 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8583 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8584 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8585 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8588 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8589 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8590 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8591 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8594 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8595 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8597 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8598 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8599 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8600 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8601 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8604 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8605 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8606 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8607 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8610 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8611 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8612 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8613 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8616 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8617 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8618 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8619 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8622 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8623 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8624 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8625 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8629 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8630 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8632 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8633 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8634 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8635 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8636 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8637 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8641 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8642 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8643 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8644 // change to the contents.
8645 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8646 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8647 let persist = match &res {
8648 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8649 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8650 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8652 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8654 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8659 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8660 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8661 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8662 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8665 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8666 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8667 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8668 // change to the contents.
8669 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8670 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8671 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8675 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8676 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8677 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8678 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8681 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8682 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8683 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8686 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8687 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8688 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8691 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8692 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8693 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8694 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8695 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8696 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8697 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8698 let persist = match &res {
8699 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8700 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8702 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8707 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8708 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8709 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8710 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8713 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8714 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8715 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8716 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8719 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8720 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8721 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8722 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8725 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8726 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8727 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8728 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8731 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8732 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8733 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8736 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8737 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8738 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8741 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8742 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8743 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8744 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8745 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8746 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8747 let persist = match &res {
8748 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8749 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8750 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8752 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8757 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8758 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8759 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8762 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8763 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8764 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8765 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8766 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8767 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8768 let persist = match &res {
8769 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8770 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8771 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8773 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8778 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8779 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8780 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8781 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8782 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8783 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8784 let persist = match &res {
8785 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8786 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8787 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8789 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8794 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8795 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8796 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8799 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8800 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8801 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8804 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8805 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8806 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8807 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8808 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8809 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8810 let persist = match &res {
8811 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8812 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8813 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8815 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8820 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8821 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8822 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8825 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8826 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8827 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8830 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8835 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8836 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8837 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8838 let persist = match &res {
8839 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8840 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8841 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8843 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8848 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8849 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8850 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8851 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8852 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8855 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8856 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8857 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8859 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8860 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8861 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8862 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8863 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8864 let context = match phase {
8865 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8866 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8867 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8868 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8873 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8874 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8877 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8881 // Clean up for removal.
8882 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8883 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
8886 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8887 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8888 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8889 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8891 // V1 Channel Establishment
8892 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8893 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8894 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8895 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8896 // V2 Channel Establishment
8897 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8898 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8899 // Common Channel Establishment
8900 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8901 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8903 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8905 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8906 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8907 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8908 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8909 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8910 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8911 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8912 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8913 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8914 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8915 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8916 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8917 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8918 // Channel Operations
8919 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8920 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8921 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8922 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8923 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8924 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8926 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8927 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8928 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8929 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8930 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8931 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8932 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8933 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8934 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8937 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8938 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8939 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8940 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8943 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8945 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8947 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8948 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8952 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8953 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8954 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8955 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8959 let mut res = Ok(());
8961 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8962 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8963 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8964 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8965 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8966 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8967 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8970 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8971 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8972 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8973 if inbound_peer_limited {
8975 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8977 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8978 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8979 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8980 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8981 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8982 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8983 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8984 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8988 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8989 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8990 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8992 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8993 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8994 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8995 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8998 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9001 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9002 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9007 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9009 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9010 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9011 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9012 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9013 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9015 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
9016 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9018 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9019 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9020 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9021 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9026 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9027 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9032 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9033 match &msg.data as &str {
9034 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9035 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9037 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9038 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9039 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9040 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9041 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9042 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9043 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9044 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9045 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9047 || -> NotifyOption {
9048 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9049 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9050 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9051 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9052 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9053 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9054 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9055 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9059 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9060 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9061 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9062 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9063 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9064 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9066 log_level: Level::Trace,
9069 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9070 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9071 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9073 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9082 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9084 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9085 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9086 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9087 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9088 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9089 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9090 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9091 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9092 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9093 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9094 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9096 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9097 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9098 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9102 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9103 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9104 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9105 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9106 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9107 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9108 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9109 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9110 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9111 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9119 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9120 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9124 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9125 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9128 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9129 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9132 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9133 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9136 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9137 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9138 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9139 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9142 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9143 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9144 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9145 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9148 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9149 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9150 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9151 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9154 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9155 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9156 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9157 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9160 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9161 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9162 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9163 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9166 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9167 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9168 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9169 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9172 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9173 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9174 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9175 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9178 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9179 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9180 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9181 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9184 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9185 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9186 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9187 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9191 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9192 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9194 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9195 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9196 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9197 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9198 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9199 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9203 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9204 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9205 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9208 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9209 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9212 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9213 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9215 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9216 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9218 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9219 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9223 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9224 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9225 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9227 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9229 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9230 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9234 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9235 amount_msats, payment_secret
9237 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9239 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9240 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9244 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9245 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9246 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9249 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9250 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9251 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9252 payment_paths, payment_hash
9254 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9255 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9256 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9258 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9259 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9260 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9263 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9264 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9265 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9266 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9267 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9269 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9270 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9272 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9273 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9274 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9275 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9277 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9278 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9282 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9283 Err(error) => Some(error),
9287 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9288 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9290 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9292 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9293 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9296 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9297 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9298 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9305 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9306 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9312 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9313 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9317 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9318 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9319 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9320 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9321 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9325 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9326 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9328 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9329 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9330 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9331 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9332 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9335 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9336 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9337 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9338 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9341 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9342 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9343 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9344 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9347 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9348 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9349 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9350 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9353 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9354 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9355 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9356 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9357 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9358 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9359 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9360 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9361 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9362 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9363 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9364 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9365 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9366 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9367 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9368 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9369 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9370 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9371 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9372 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9373 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9378 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9379 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9381 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9382 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9383 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9384 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9387 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9388 (2, node_id, required),
9389 (4, features, required),
9390 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9391 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9392 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9393 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9396 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9397 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9398 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9399 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9400 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9401 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9402 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9403 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9404 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9405 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9406 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9407 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9408 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9409 (7, self.config, option),
9410 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9411 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9412 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9413 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9414 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9415 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9416 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9417 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9418 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9419 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9420 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9421 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9422 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9423 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9424 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9425 (32, self.is_public, required),
9426 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9427 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9428 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9429 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9430 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9436 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9437 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9438 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9439 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9440 (2, channel_id, required),
9441 (3, channel_type, option),
9442 (4, counterparty, required),
9443 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9444 (6, funding_txo, option),
9445 (7, config, option),
9446 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9447 (9, confirmations, option),
9448 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9449 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9450 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9451 (16, balance_msat, required),
9452 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9453 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9454 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9455 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9456 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9457 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9458 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9459 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9460 (26, is_outbound, required),
9461 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9462 (30, is_usable, required),
9463 (32, is_public, required),
9464 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9465 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9466 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9467 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9468 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9471 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9472 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9473 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9474 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9475 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9479 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9481 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9482 outbound_scid_alias,
9486 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9487 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9489 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9490 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9491 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9492 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9493 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9494 confirmations_required,
9496 force_close_spend_delay,
9497 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9498 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9499 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9500 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9501 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9502 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9503 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9504 channel_shutdown_state,
9509 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9510 (2, channels, required_vec),
9511 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9512 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9515 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9516 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9517 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9520 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9522 (0, onion_packet, required),
9523 (1, blinded, option),
9524 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9527 (0, payment_data, required),
9528 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9529 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9530 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9531 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9532 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9534 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9535 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9536 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9537 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9538 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9539 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9543 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9544 (0, routing, required),
9545 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9546 (4, payment_hash, required),
9547 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9548 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9549 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9550 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9554 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9555 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9557 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9559 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9560 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9561 reason.write(writer)?;
9563 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9564 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9567 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9568 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9569 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9570 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9577 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9578 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9579 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9582 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9583 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9584 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9585 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9589 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9590 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9591 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9592 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9593 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9596 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9597 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9598 // messages contained in the variants.
9599 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9600 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9601 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9603 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9604 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9605 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9606 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9607 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9610 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9611 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9612 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9613 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9614 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9616 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9621 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9626 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9627 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9628 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9631 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9632 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9633 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9634 (2, outpoint, required),
9635 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9636 (4, htlc_id, required),
9637 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9638 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9641 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9642 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9643 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9644 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9645 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9647 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9648 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9649 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9650 (2, self.value, required),
9651 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9652 (4, payment_data, option),
9653 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9654 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9655 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9656 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9662 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9663 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9664 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9665 (0, prev_hop, required),
9666 (1, total_msat, option),
9667 (2, value_ser, required),
9668 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9669 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9670 (5, total_value_received, option),
9671 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9672 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9673 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9675 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9676 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9677 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9679 if payment_data.is_some() {
9680 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9682 if total_msat.is_none() {
9683 total_msat = Some(value);
9685 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9688 if total_msat.is_none() {
9689 if payment_data.is_none() {
9690 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9692 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9694 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9698 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9701 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9702 total_value_received,
9703 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9705 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9706 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9711 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9712 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9713 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9716 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9717 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9718 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9719 let mut payment_id = None;
9720 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9721 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9722 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9723 (0, session_priv, required),
9724 (1, payment_id, option),
9725 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9726 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9727 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9728 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9730 if payment_id.is_none() {
9731 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9733 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9735 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9736 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9737 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9739 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9740 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9741 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9742 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9746 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9747 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9748 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9750 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9753 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9754 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9759 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9760 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9762 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9764 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9765 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9766 (0, session_priv, required),
9767 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9768 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9769 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9770 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9771 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9772 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9775 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9777 field.write(writer)?;
9784 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9785 (0, forward_info, required),
9786 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9787 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9788 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9789 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9792 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9793 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9794 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
9796 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
9800 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
9801 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9802 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9803 (0, htlc_id, required),
9804 (2, err_packet, required),
9807 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
9808 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
9809 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
9810 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
9811 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9812 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
9813 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9814 (0, htlc_id, required),
9815 (1, failure_code, required),
9816 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
9817 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
9825 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9826 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9827 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
9829 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
9831 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
9832 (0, htlc_id, required),
9833 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
9834 (2, err_packet, required),
9835 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
9837 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
9838 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
9839 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9841 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
9845 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9846 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
9850 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9855 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9856 (0, payment_secret, required),
9857 (2, expiry_time, required),
9858 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9859 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9860 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9863 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9865 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9866 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9867 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9868 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9869 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9870 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9874 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9875 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9877 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9879 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9881 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9882 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9883 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9886 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9888 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9889 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9890 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9891 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9892 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9893 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9894 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9897 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9898 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9902 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9904 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9905 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9906 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9907 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9908 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9909 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9912 channel.write(writer)?;
9918 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9919 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9920 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9921 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9922 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9923 for forward in pending_forwards {
9924 forward.write(writer)?;
9929 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9931 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9932 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9933 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9935 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9936 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9937 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9938 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9939 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9940 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9941 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9942 htlc.write(writer)?;
9944 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9945 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9948 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9949 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9950 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9951 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9952 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9953 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9954 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9957 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9958 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9959 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9960 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9961 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9963 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9964 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9965 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9966 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9967 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9968 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9969 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9974 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9975 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9976 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9977 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9978 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9979 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9980 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9981 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9982 0u64.write(writer)?;
9984 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9985 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9986 event.write(writer)?;
9990 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9991 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9992 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9993 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9994 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9995 0u64.write(writer)?;
9997 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9998 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9999 // likely to be identical.
10000 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10001 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10003 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10004 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10005 hash.write(writer)?;
10006 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10009 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10010 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10011 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10012 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10013 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10016 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10017 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10019 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10020 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10021 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10022 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10025 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10026 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10027 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10028 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10032 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10033 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
10034 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10036 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10037 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10038 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10044 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10045 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10046 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10047 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10050 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10051 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10052 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10053 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10054 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10057 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10058 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10059 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10060 if !updates.is_empty() {
10061 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
10062 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10067 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10068 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10069 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10070 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10071 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10072 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10073 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10074 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10075 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10076 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10077 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10078 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10079 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10086 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10087 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10088 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10089 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10092 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10093 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10094 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10095 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10096 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10097 // check that the event is sane here.
10098 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10099 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10100 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10101 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10107 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10108 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10109 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10110 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10111 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10112 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10115 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10116 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10117 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10118 events.push_back((ev, action));
10119 } else if action.is_some() {
10120 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10127 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10128 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10129 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10130 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10131 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10132 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10135 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10137 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10139 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10140 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10141 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10142 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10143 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10144 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10145 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10146 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10147 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10148 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10149 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10150 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10151 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10153 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10154 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10156 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10157 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10159 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10160 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10161 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10162 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10163 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10164 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10166 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10167 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10169 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10170 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10171 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10172 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10173 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10174 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10178 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10179 pub entropy_source: ES,
10181 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10182 pub node_signer: NS,
10184 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10185 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10187 pub signer_provider: SP,
10189 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10191 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10192 pub fee_estimator: F,
10193 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10195 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10196 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10197 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10198 pub chain_monitor: M,
10200 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10201 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10202 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10203 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10204 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10205 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10207 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10209 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10210 /// deserialization.
10212 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10213 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10214 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10216 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10217 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10219 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10220 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10221 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10222 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10224 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10227 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10228 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10231 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10232 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10234 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10235 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10236 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10237 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10238 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10239 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10243 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10244 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10245 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10246 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10247 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10249 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10250 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10255 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10256 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10257 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10258 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10260 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10261 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10262 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10263 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10264 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10265 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10269 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10270 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10271 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10275 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10276 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10278 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10279 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10280 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10281 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10282 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10283 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10287 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10288 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10290 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10291 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10292 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10294 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10296 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10297 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10298 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10299 let mut outpoint_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10300 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10301 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10302 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10303 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10304 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10305 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10307 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10308 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10309 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10310 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10311 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10312 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10313 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10314 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10315 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10316 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10317 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10318 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10319 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10320 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10322 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10323 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10324 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10326 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10327 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10328 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10330 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10331 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10332 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10334 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10335 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10336 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10338 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10339 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10340 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10343 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10344 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10345 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10346 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10347 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10348 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10349 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10350 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10352 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10353 let mut found_htlc = false;
10354 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10355 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10358 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10359 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10360 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10361 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10362 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10363 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10364 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10366 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10367 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10368 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10372 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10373 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10374 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10375 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10376 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10378 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10379 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10381 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10382 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10383 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10384 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10386 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10387 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10388 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10389 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10393 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10394 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10395 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10396 // safely discard the channel.
10397 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10398 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10399 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10400 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10401 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10402 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10403 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10404 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10407 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10408 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10409 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10410 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10411 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10412 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10416 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10417 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10418 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10419 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10420 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10421 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10422 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10423 counterparty_node_id: None,
10424 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10426 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10430 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10431 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10432 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10433 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10434 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10435 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10436 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10437 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10438 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10440 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10443 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10444 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10445 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10446 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10447 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10448 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10449 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10450 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10452 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10455 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10458 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10459 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10460 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10461 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10462 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10463 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10464 is_connected: false,
10468 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10469 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10470 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10471 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10472 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10473 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10474 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10475 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10478 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10479 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10480 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10481 for _ in 0..event_count {
10482 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10483 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10488 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10489 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10490 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10492 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10493 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10494 // on-startup monitor updates.
10495 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10496 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10498 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10502 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10503 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10505 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10506 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10507 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10508 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10509 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10513 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10514 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10515 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10516 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10517 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10518 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10519 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10521 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10522 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10526 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10527 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10528 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10529 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10530 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10531 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10532 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10533 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10534 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10535 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10536 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10537 let mut events_override = None;
10538 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10539 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10540 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10541 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10542 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10543 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10544 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10545 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10546 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10547 (8, events_override, option),
10548 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10549 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10550 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10551 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10553 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10554 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10557 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10558 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10561 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10562 pending_events_read = events;
10565 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10566 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10569 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10570 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10571 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10572 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10573 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10574 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10576 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10578 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10579 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10580 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10583 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10584 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10585 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10586 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10587 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10589 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10590 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10591 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10593 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10594 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10595 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10596 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10597 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10599 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10600 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10601 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10602 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10603 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10604 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10605 pending_background_events.push(
10606 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10607 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10608 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10609 update: update.clone(),
10612 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10613 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10614 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10615 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10616 pending_background_events.push(
10617 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10618 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10619 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10622 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10623 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10624 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10626 max_in_flight_update_id
10630 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10631 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10632 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10633 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10634 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10635 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10637 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10639 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10640 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10641 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10642 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10643 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10644 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10645 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10646 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10647 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10650 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10651 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10652 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10653 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10654 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10655 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10656 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10657 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10658 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10659 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10660 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10663 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10664 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10665 debug_assert!(false);
10666 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10671 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10672 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10673 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10674 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10675 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10676 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10677 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10678 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10679 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10681 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10682 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10683 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10685 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10686 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10687 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10688 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10689 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10690 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10691 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10692 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10697 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10698 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10700 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10701 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10702 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10703 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10706 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10707 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10708 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10709 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10710 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10711 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10712 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10714 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10715 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10716 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10717 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10718 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10719 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10720 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10721 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10722 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10725 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10726 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10727 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10728 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10729 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10730 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10731 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10732 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10734 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10735 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10736 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10737 retry_strategy: None,
10738 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10739 payment_params: None,
10740 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10741 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10742 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10743 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10744 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10745 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10746 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10747 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10748 total_msat: path_amt,
10749 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10750 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10752 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10753 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10758 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10759 match htlc_source {
10760 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10761 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10762 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10763 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10765 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10766 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10767 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10768 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10769 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10770 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10771 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10772 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10773 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10774 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10775 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10780 !forwards.is_empty()
10782 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10783 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10784 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10785 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10786 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10787 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10788 intercepted_id != ev_id
10795 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10796 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10797 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10798 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10799 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10800 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10801 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10802 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10803 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10804 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10805 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10807 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10808 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10809 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10811 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10812 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10813 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10820 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10821 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10823 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10825 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10826 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10827 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10828 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10829 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10830 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10831 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10832 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10833 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10834 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10837 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10838 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10839 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10840 // channel still live case here.
10844 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10845 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10850 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10851 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10852 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10853 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10854 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10855 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10856 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10857 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10861 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10862 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10864 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10865 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10866 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10867 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10869 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10870 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10871 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10873 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10874 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10876 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10877 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10879 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10882 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10883 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10884 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10886 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10890 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10891 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10892 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10893 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10894 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10896 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10897 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10898 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10899 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10900 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10901 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10902 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10903 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10905 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10906 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10910 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10912 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10914 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10915 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10917 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10918 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10923 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10924 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10926 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10928 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10930 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10931 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10932 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10933 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10937 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10938 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10939 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10940 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10941 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10942 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10943 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10944 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10945 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10947 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10948 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10949 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10951 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10952 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10953 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10954 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10955 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10956 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10958 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10959 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10960 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10961 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10962 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10963 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10967 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10968 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10969 debug_assert!(false);
10970 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10975 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10977 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10978 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10979 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10980 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10981 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10982 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10983 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10984 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10985 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10986 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10987 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10989 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10990 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10992 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10993 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10994 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10995 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10997 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10998 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10999 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11000 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11002 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11003 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11004 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11005 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11007 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
11008 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11009 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11010 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11011 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11012 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11013 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11014 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11017 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11018 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11021 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11024 purpose: payment.purpose,
11025 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11026 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11027 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11033 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11034 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11035 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11036 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11037 for action in actions.iter() {
11038 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11039 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11040 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
11042 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
11044 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11045 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
11046 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11047 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
11048 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11050 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11051 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11052 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11053 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11057 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11058 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11062 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11064 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11065 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11069 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11071 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11072 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11073 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11074 router: args.router,
11076 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11078 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11079 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11080 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11081 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11083 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11084 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11085 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11086 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11087 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11088 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11090 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11092 our_network_pubkey,
11095 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11097 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11099 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11100 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11101 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11102 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11103 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11105 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11106 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11108 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11110 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11112 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11113 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11114 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11116 logger: args.logger,
11117 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11120 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11121 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11122 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11123 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11124 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11127 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11128 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11129 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11130 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11131 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
11132 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
11135 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11136 //connection or two.
11138 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11144 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11145 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11146 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11147 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11148 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11149 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11150 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11151 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11152 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11153 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11154 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11155 use crate::prelude::*;
11156 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11157 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11158 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11159 use crate::util::test_utils;
11160 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11161 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11164 fn test_notify_limits() {
11165 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11166 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11167 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11168 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11169 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11170 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11172 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11173 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11174 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11175 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11176 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11178 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11180 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11181 // to connect messages with new values
11182 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11183 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11184 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11185 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11186 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11187 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11189 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11190 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11191 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11192 // ... but the last node should not.
11193 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11194 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11195 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11196 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11198 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11199 // about the channel.
11200 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11201 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11202 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11204 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11206 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11207 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11208 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11209 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11210 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11211 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11213 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11214 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11215 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11217 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11218 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11219 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11220 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11221 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11222 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11224 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11225 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11226 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11227 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11228 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11229 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11230 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11231 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11233 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11234 // the channel info has updated.
11235 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11236 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11237 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11238 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11239 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11240 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11244 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11245 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11247 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11248 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11249 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11250 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11251 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11253 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11254 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11255 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11256 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11258 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11259 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11260 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11261 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11262 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11263 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11264 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11265 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11267 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11268 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11269 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11271 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11272 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11273 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11275 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11276 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11277 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11278 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11279 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11281 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11282 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11283 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11285 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11286 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11287 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11288 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11289 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11290 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11291 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11292 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11293 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11295 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11296 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11297 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11299 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11300 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11301 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11303 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11304 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11305 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11306 // lightning messages manually.
11307 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11308 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11311 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11312 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11313 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11314 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11316 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11317 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11319 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11320 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11322 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11323 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11324 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11326 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11327 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11328 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11330 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11332 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11334 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11335 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11338 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11339 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11340 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11341 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11343 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11344 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11345 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11346 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11351 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11352 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11353 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11354 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11356 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11361 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11362 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11363 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11366 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11367 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11368 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11369 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11370 // fails as expected.
11371 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11372 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11373 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11374 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11375 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11376 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11379 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11380 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11381 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11382 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11383 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11384 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11385 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11387 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11388 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11389 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11391 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11392 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11393 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11394 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11395 let route = find_route(
11396 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11397 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11399 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11400 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11402 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11403 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11404 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11405 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11406 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11408 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11409 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11410 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11411 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11412 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11414 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11415 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11416 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11417 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11418 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11419 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11420 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11421 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11422 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11424 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11425 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11427 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11428 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11429 let route = find_route(
11430 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11431 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11433 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11434 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11436 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11437 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11438 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11439 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11440 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11442 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11443 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11444 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11445 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11447 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11448 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11449 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11450 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11451 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11453 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11454 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11455 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11457 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11458 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11459 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11460 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11461 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11462 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11463 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11464 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11465 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11467 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11468 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11470 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11471 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11472 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11473 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11475 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11476 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11477 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11478 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11479 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11481 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11482 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11483 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11486 let route = find_route(
11487 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11488 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11490 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11491 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11492 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11494 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11495 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11496 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11497 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11498 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11500 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11501 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11502 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11503 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11504 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11505 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11506 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11507 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11508 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11509 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11510 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11511 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11512 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11514 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11515 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11519 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11520 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11521 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11522 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11523 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11524 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11525 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11527 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11528 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11530 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11531 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11532 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11533 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11534 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11535 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11536 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11537 let route = find_route(
11538 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11539 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11542 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11543 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11544 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11545 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11546 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11547 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11550 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11551 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11552 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11553 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11554 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11555 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11556 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11558 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11562 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11563 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11564 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11565 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11566 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11567 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11568 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11569 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11570 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11572 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11573 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11575 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11576 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11577 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11578 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11579 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11580 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11581 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11582 let route = find_route(
11583 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11584 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11587 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11588 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11589 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11590 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11591 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11592 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11593 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11594 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11597 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11598 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11599 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11600 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11601 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11602 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11603 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11605 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11609 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11610 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11611 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11612 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11613 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11615 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11616 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11617 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11618 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11620 // Marshall an MPP route.
11621 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11622 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11623 route.paths.push(path);
11624 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11625 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11626 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11627 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11628 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11629 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11631 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11632 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11634 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11635 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11637 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11642 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11646 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11648 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11650 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11651 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11653 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11654 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11656 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11659 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11660 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11661 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11662 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11663 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11664 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11667 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11670 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11671 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11676 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11677 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11678 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11679 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11680 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11681 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11683 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11684 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11686 total_msat: 100_000,
11689 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11690 // payment verification fails as expected.
11691 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11692 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11693 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11694 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11696 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11700 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11701 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11705 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11706 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11707 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11708 // the channel is successfully closed.
11709 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11710 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11711 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11712 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11714 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11715 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11716 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11717 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11718 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11720 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11721 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11723 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11724 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11725 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11726 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11729 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11731 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11732 // as it has the funding transaction.
11733 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11734 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11735 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11738 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11740 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11742 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11744 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11745 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11746 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11748 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11751 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
11752 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
11753 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11754 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11755 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11758 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11759 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11761 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11762 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11763 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11764 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11766 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11767 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11768 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11769 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11771 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11772 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11774 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11775 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11776 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11777 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11778 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11779 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11780 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11784 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11785 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11786 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11787 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
11788 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11789 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11790 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11793 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11795 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11796 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11797 // closing transaction).
11798 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
11799 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11800 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11802 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11803 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11804 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11805 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11806 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11809 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11811 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11813 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
11814 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11815 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11817 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11819 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11820 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11823 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11824 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11825 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11828 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11829 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11830 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11833 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11834 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11835 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11838 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11839 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11840 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11843 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11845 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11846 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11848 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11849 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11851 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11852 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11857 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11858 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11859 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11860 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11861 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11862 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11863 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11864 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11867 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11868 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11869 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11871 // Test the API functions.
11872 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11874 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11876 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11878 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11880 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11882 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11884 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11888 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11889 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11890 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11891 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11892 // the given `channel_id`.
11893 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11894 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11895 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11896 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11898 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11901 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11903 // Test the API functions.
11904 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11906 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11908 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11910 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11912 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11914 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11918 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11919 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11920 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11921 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11922 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11923 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11925 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11927 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11928 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11930 let mut funding_tx = None;
11931 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11932 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11933 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11936 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11937 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11938 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11939 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11940 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11942 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11944 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11946 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11948 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11950 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11952 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11955 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11956 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11957 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11958 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11959 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11961 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11962 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11964 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11965 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11966 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11967 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11968 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11969 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11970 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11973 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11974 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11975 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11976 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11977 }, true).unwrap_err();
11979 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11980 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11981 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11982 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11983 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11984 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11985 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11987 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11988 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11990 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11991 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11992 }, true).unwrap_err();
11994 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11995 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11996 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11997 }, false).unwrap();
11998 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12000 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12001 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12003 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12004 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12005 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12006 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12007 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12009 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12010 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12011 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12013 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12014 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12015 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12017 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12018 // "protected" and can connect again.
12019 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12020 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12021 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12023 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12025 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12027 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12028 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12032 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12033 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12034 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12035 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12036 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12037 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12039 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12041 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12042 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12044 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12045 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12046 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12047 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12050 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12052 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12053 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12054 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12056 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12057 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12058 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12060 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12061 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12062 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12063 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12067 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12068 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12069 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12070 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12071 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12072 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12073 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12074 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12075 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12077 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12079 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12080 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12082 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12083 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12084 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12085 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12086 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12087 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12090 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12091 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12093 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12094 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12096 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12098 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12099 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12102 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12103 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12104 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12105 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12106 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12108 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12109 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12111 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12112 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12113 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12114 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12118 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12120 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12121 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12123 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12124 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12125 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12127 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12128 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12130 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12132 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12136 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12137 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12138 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12139 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12140 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12141 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12142 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12143 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12144 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12145 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12146 payment_metadata: None,
12147 keysend_preimage: None,
12148 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12149 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12151 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12153 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12154 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12155 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12156 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12157 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12158 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12159 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12161 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12162 } else { panic!(); }
12164 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12165 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12166 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12167 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12168 payment_metadata: None,
12169 keysend_preimage: None,
12170 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12171 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12173 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12175 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12176 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12177 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12178 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12182 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12183 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12184 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12185 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12186 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12188 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12189 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12190 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12191 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12192 payment_metadata: None,
12193 keysend_preimage: None,
12194 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12195 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12197 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12198 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12199 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12201 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12202 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12203 // is not satisfied.
12204 assert!(result.is_ok());
12208 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12209 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12210 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12211 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12212 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12214 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12215 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12217 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12218 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12219 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12220 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12221 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12223 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12224 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12226 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12227 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12228 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12229 match &msg_events[0] {
12230 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12231 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12233 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12234 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12235 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12238 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12241 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12242 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12244 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12245 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12248 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12252 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12253 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12254 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12255 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12256 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12257 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12258 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12259 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12260 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12261 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12262 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12264 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12265 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12266 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12268 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12269 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12271 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12272 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12274 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12277 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12278 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12280 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12281 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12283 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12284 // not have generated any events.
12285 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12289 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12290 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12291 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12292 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12293 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12294 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12295 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12296 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12298 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12299 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12300 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12302 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12303 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12304 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12305 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12306 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12308 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12309 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12312 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12313 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12314 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12316 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12317 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12318 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12319 ..Default::default()
12321 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12322 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12323 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12325 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12326 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12329 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12330 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12331 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12332 ..Default::default()
12334 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12335 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12336 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12337 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12339 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12340 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12343 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12344 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12345 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12346 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12347 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12350 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12351 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12352 ..Default::default()
12354 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12357 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12358 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12359 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12360 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12364 fn test_payment_display() {
12365 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12366 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12367 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12368 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12369 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12370 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12374 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12375 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12376 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12377 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12378 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12379 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12381 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12382 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12383 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12384 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12385 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12386 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12387 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12388 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12390 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12391 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12392 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12395 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12396 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12398 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12399 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12401 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12402 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12403 }, false).unwrap();
12404 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12405 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12406 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12408 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12410 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12411 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12412 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12413 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12414 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12415 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12416 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12417 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12418 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12419 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12420 } else { panic!() };
12421 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12422 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12423 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12424 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12426 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12428 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12429 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12430 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12435 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12436 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12437 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12438 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12441 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12442 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12443 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12445 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12446 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12448 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12449 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12452 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12453 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12454 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12456 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12460 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12461 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12462 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12464 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12469 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12470 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
12471 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12472 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12474 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12475 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12476 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12478 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12480 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12481 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12482 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12483 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12485 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12486 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12488 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12494 use crate::chain::Listen;
12495 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12496 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12497 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12498 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12499 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12500 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12501 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12502 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12503 use crate::util::test_utils;
12504 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12506 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12507 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12508 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12509 use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12511 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12513 use criterion::Criterion;
12515 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12516 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12517 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12518 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12519 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12520 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12521 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12523 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12524 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12526 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12527 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12529 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12531 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12534 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12535 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12538 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12539 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12540 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12542 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12543 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12545 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12546 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12547 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12548 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12549 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12551 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12552 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12553 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12555 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12556 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12557 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12558 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12560 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12561 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12562 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12564 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12565 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12566 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12567 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12568 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12570 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12571 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12572 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12574 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12575 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12577 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12578 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12579 }, false).unwrap();
12580 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12581 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12582 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12585 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12586 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12587 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12589 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12590 } else { panic!(); }
12592 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12593 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12594 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12595 match events_b[0] {
12596 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12597 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12602 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12603 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12604 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12605 match events_a[0] {
12606 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12607 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12609 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12612 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12614 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12615 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12616 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12618 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12619 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12620 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12621 match msg_events[0] {
12622 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12623 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12624 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12628 match msg_events[1] {
12629 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12633 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12634 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12635 match events_a[0] {
12636 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12637 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12639 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12642 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12643 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12644 match events_b[0] {
12645 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12646 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12648 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12651 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12652 macro_rules! send_payment {
12653 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12654 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12655 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12656 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12657 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12658 payment_count += 1;
12659 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12660 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12662 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12663 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12664 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12665 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12666 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12667 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12668 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12669 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12670 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12671 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12672 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12674 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12675 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12676 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12677 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12679 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12680 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12681 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12682 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12683 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12685 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12688 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12689 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12690 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12691 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12693 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12697 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12698 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12699 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);