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[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
33
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain;
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events;
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::msgs;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
57 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 #[cfg(test)]
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
61 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
62 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
63 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
78
79 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
80
81 use crate::io;
82 use crate::prelude::*;
83 use core::{cmp, mem};
84 use core::cell::RefCell;
85 use crate::io::Read;
86 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
87 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
88 use core::time::Duration;
89 use core::ops::Deref;
90
91 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
92 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
93 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
94
95 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
96 //
97 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
98 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
99 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
100 //
101 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
102 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
103 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
104 // before we forward it.
105 //
106 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
107 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
108 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
109 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
110 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
111
112 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
115         /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
116         Forward {
117                 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
118                 /// do with the HTLC.
119                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
120                 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
121                 ///
122                 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
123                 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
124                 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
125                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
126                 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
127                 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
128         },
129         /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
130         ///
131         /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
132         /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
133         Receive {
134                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
135                 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
136                 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
137                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
138                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
139                 ///
140                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
141                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
142                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
143                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
144                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
145                 ///
146                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
147                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
148                 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
149                 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
150                 /// instructions.
151                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
152                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
153                 ///
154                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
155                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
156                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
157                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
158                 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
159                 requires_blinded_error: bool,
160         },
161         /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
162         /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
163         /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
164         ReceiveKeysend {
165                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
166                 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
167                 ///
168                 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
169                 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
170                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
171                 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
172                 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
173                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
174                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
175                 ///
176                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
177                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
178                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
179                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
180                 ///
181                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
182                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
183                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
184                 ///
185                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
186                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
187                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
188         },
189 }
190
191 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
192 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
193 pub struct BlindedForward {
194         /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
195         /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
196         /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
197         pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
198         // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
199 }
200
201 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
202         // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
203         fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
204                 // TODO: needs update when we support forwarding blinded HTLCs as non-intro node
205                 match self {
206                         Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
207                         Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
208                         _ => None,
209                 }
210         }
211 }
212
213 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
214 /// should go next.
215 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
216 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
217         /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
218         pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
219         /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
220         ///
221         /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
222         pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
223         /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
224         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225         /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
226         ///
227         /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
228         /// versions.
229         pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
230         /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
231         /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
232         ///
233         /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
234         /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
235         /// it along another path).
236         ///
237         /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
238         /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
239         /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
240         /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
241         pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
242         /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
243         /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
244         pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
245         /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
246         ///
247         /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
248         /// HTLC.
249         ///
250         /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
251         ///
252         /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
253         /// shoulder them.
254         pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
255 }
256
257 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
258 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
259         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
260         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
261 }
262
263 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
264 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
265 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
266         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
267         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
268 }
269
270 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
271         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
272
273         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
274         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
275         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
276         // HTLCs.
277         //
278         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
279         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
280         prev_htlc_id: u64,
281         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
282         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
283 }
284
285 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
286         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
287         FailHTLC {
288                 htlc_id: u64,
289                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
290         },
291 }
292
293 // Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
294 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
295 enum BlindedFailure {
296         FromIntroductionNode,
297         FromBlindedNode,
298 }
299
300 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
301 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
302 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
303         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
304         short_channel_id: u64,
305         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
306         htlc_id: u64,
307         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
308         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
309         blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
310
311         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
312         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
313         outpoint: OutPoint,
314 }
315
316 enum OnionPayload {
317         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
318         Invoice {
319                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
320                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
321                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
322         },
323         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
324         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
325 }
326
327 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
328 struct ClaimableHTLC {
329         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
330         cltv_expiry: u32,
331         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
332         value: u64,
333         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
334         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
335         sender_intended_value: u64,
336         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
337         timer_ticks: u8,
338         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
339         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
340         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
341         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
342         total_msat: u64,
343         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
344         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
345 }
346
347 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
348         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
349                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
350                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
351                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
352                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
353                         value_msat: val.value,
354                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
355                 }
356         }
357 }
358
359 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
360 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
361 ///
362 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
363 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
364 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
365
366 impl PaymentId {
367         /// Number of bytes in the id.
368         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
369 }
370
371 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
372         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
373                 self.0.write(w)
374         }
375 }
376
377 impl Readable for PaymentId {
378         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
379                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
380                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
381         }
382 }
383
384 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
385         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
386                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
387         }
388 }
389
390 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
391 ///
392 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
393 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
394 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
395
396 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
397         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
398                 self.0.write(w)
399         }
400 }
401
402 impl Readable for InterceptId {
403         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
404                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
405                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
406         }
407 }
408
409 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
410 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
411 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
412         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
413         OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
414 }
415 impl SentHTLCId {
416         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
417                 match source {
418                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
419                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
420                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
421                         },
422                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
423                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
424                 }
425         }
426 }
427 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
428         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
429                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
430                 (2, htlc_id, required),
431         },
432         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
433                 (0, session_priv, required),
434         };
435 );
436
437
438 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
439 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
440 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
441 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
442         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
443         OutboundRoute {
444                 path: Path,
445                 session_priv: SecretKey,
446                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
447                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
448                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
449                 payment_id: PaymentId,
450         },
451 }
452 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
453 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
454         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
455                 match self {
456                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
457                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
458                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
459                         },
460                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
461                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
462                                 path.hash(hasher);
463                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
464                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
465                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
466                         },
467                 }
468         }
469 }
470 impl HTLCSource {
471         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
472         #[cfg(test)]
473         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
474                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
475                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
476                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
477                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
478                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
479                 }
480         }
481
482         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
483         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
484         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
485         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
486                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
487                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
488                 } else {
489                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
490                         true
491                 }
492         }
493 }
494
495 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
496 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
497 ///
498 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
499 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
500 pub enum FailureCode {
501         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
502         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
503         TemporaryNodeFailure,
504         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
505         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
506         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
507         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
508         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
509         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
510         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
511         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
512         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
513         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
514         ///
515         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
516         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
517         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
518 }
519
520 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
521     fn into(self) -> u16 {
522                 match self {
523                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
524                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
525                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
526                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
527                 }
528         }
529 }
530
531 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
532 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
533 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
534 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
535 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
536
537 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
538         err: msgs::LightningError,
539         chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
540         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
541         channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
542 }
543 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
544         #[inline]
545         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
546                 Self {
547                         err: LightningError {
548                                 err: err.clone(),
549                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
550                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
551                                                 channel_id,
552                                                 data: err
553                                         },
554                                 },
555                         },
556                         chan_id: None,
557                         shutdown_finish: None,
558                         channel_capacity: None,
559                 }
560         }
561         #[inline]
562         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
563                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
564         }
565         #[inline]
566         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
567                 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
568                 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
569                         // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
570                         // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
571                         // commitment upon reconnecting.
572                         msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
573                 } else {
574                         msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
575                 };
576                 Self {
577                         err: LightningError { err, action },
578                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
579                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
580                         channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
581                 }
582         }
583         #[inline]
584         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
585                 Self {
586                         err: match err {
587                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
588                                         err: msg.clone(),
589                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
590                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
591                                                         channel_id,
592                                                         data: msg
593                                                 },
594                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
595                                         },
596                                 },
597                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
598                                         err: msg,
599                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
600                                 },
601                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
602                                         err: msg.clone(),
603                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
604                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
605                                                         channel_id,
606                                                         data: msg
607                                                 },
608                                         },
609                                 },
610                         },
611                         chan_id: None,
612                         shutdown_finish: None,
613                         channel_capacity: None,
614                 }
615         }
616
617         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
618                 self.chan_id.is_some()
619         }
620 }
621
622 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
623 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
624 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
625 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
626 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
627
628 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
629 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
630 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
631 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
632 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
633 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
634         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
635         CommitmentFirst,
636         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
637         RevokeAndACKFirst,
638 }
639
640 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
641 struct ClaimingPayment {
642         amount_msat: u64,
643         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
644         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
645         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
646         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
647 }
648 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
649         (0, amount_msat, required),
650         (2, payment_purpose, required),
651         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
652         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
653         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
654 });
655
656 struct ClaimablePayment {
657         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
658         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
659         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
660 }
661
662 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
663 struct ClaimablePayments {
664         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
665         /// failed/claimed by the user.
666         ///
667         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
668         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
669         ///
670         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
671         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
672         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
673
674         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
675         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
676         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
677         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
678 }
679
680 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
681 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
682 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
683 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
684 #[derive(Debug)]
685 enum BackgroundEvent {
686         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
687         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
688         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
689         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
690         ///
691         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
692         /// are regenerated on startup.
693         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
694         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
695         /// channel to continue normal operation.
696         ///
697         /// In general this should be used rather than
698         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
699         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
700         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
701         ///
702         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
703         /// are regenerated on startup.
704         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
705                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
706                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
707                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
708         },
709         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
710         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
711         /// on a channel.
712         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
713                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
714                 channel_id: ChannelId,
715         },
716 }
717
718 #[derive(Debug)]
719 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
720         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
721         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
722         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
723         /// event can be generated.
724         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
725         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
726         /// operation of another channel.
727         ///
728         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
729         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
730         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
731         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
732         /// outbound edge.
733         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
734                 event: events::Event,
735                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
736         },
737         /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
738         /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
739         /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
740         ///
741         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
742         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
743         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
744         /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
745         /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
746         ///
747         /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
748         /// stored for later processing.
749         FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
750                 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
751                 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
752                 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
753         },
754 }
755
756 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
757         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
758         // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
759         // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
760         (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
761                 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
762                 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
763                 (4, blocking_action, required),
764         },
765         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
766                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
767                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
768                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
769                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
770                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
771                 // downgrades to prior versions.
772                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
773         },
774 );
775
776 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
777 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
778         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
779                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
780                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
781         },
782 }
783 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
784         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
785                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
786                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
787         };
788 );
789
790 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
791 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
792 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
793 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
794         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
795         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
796         /// durably to disk.
797         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
798                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
799                 channel_id: ChannelId,
800                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
801                 htlc_id: u64,
802         },
803 }
804
805 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
806         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
807                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
808                         channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
809                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
810                 }
811         }
812 }
813
814 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
815         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
816 ;);
817
818
819 /// State we hold per-peer.
820 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
821         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
822         ///
823         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
824         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
825         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
826         ///
827         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
828         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
829         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
830         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
831         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
832         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
833         latest_features: InitFeatures,
834         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
835         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
836         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
837         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
838         /// user but which have not yet completed.
839         ///
840         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
841         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
842         /// for a missing channel.
843         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
844         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
845         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
846         ///
847         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
848         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
849         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
850         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
851         ///
852         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
853         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
854         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
855         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
856         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
857         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
858         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
859         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
860         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
861         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
862         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
863         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
864         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
865         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
866         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
867         is_connected: bool,
868 }
869
870 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
871         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
872         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
873         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
874         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
875                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
876                         return false
877                 }
878                 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
879                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
880                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
881         }
882
883         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
884         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
885                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
886         }
887
888         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
889         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
890                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
891                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
892         }
893 }
894
895 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
896 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
897 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
898         /// The original OpenChannel message.
899         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
900         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
901         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
902 }
903
904 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
905 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
906 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
907
908 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
909 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
910 ///
911 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
912 /// here.
913 ///
914 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
915 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
916 struct PendingInboundPayment {
917         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
918         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
919         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
920         /// this payment being removed.
921         expiry_time: u64,
922         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
923         user_payment_id: u64,
924         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
925         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
926         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
927 }
928
929 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
930 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
931 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
932 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
933 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
934 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
935 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
936 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
937 ///
938 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
939 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
940 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
941         Arc<M>,
942         Arc<T>,
943         Arc<KeysManager>,
944         Arc<KeysManager>,
945         Arc<KeysManager>,
946         Arc<F>,
947         Arc<DefaultRouter<
948                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
949                 Arc<L>,
950                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
951                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
952                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
953         >>,
954         Arc<L>
955 >;
956
957 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
958 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
959 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
960 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
961 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
962 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
963 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
964 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
965 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
966 ///
967 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
968 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
969 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
970         ChannelManager<
971                 &'a M,
972                 &'b T,
973                 &'c KeysManager,
974                 &'c KeysManager,
975                 &'c KeysManager,
976                 &'d F,
977                 &'e DefaultRouter<
978                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
979                         &'g L,
980                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
981                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
982                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
983                 >,
984                 &'g L
985         >;
986
987 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
988 ///
989 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
990 /// languages.
991 pub trait AChannelManager {
992         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
993         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
994         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
995         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
996         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
997         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
998         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
999         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1000         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1001         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1002         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1003         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1004         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1005         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1006         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1007         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1008         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1009         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1010         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1011         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1012         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1013         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1014         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1015         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1016         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1017         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1018         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1019         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1020         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1021         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1022         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1023         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1024         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1025         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1026         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1027         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1028 }
1029
1030 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1031 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1032 where
1033         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1034         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1035         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1036         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1037         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1038         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1039         R::Target: Router,
1040         L::Target: Logger,
1041 {
1042         type Watch = M::Target;
1043         type M = M;
1044         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1045         type T = T;
1046         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1047         type ES = ES;
1048         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1049         type NS = NS;
1050         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1051         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1052         type SP = SP;
1053         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1054         type F = F;
1055         type Router = R::Target;
1056         type R = R;
1057         type Logger = L::Target;
1058         type L = L;
1059         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1060 }
1061
1062 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1063 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1064 ///
1065 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1066 /// to individual Channels.
1067 ///
1068 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1069 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1070 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1071 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1072 ///
1073 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1074 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1075 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1076 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1077 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1078 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1079 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1080 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1081 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1082 ///
1083 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1084 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1085 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1086 ///
1087 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1088 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1089 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1090 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1091 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1092 ///
1093 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1094 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1095 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1096 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1097 ///
1098 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1099 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1100 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1101 ///
1102 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1103 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1104 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1105 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1106 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1107 ///
1108 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1109 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1110 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1111 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1112 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1113 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1114 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1115 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1116 //
1117 // Lock order:
1118 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1119 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1120 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1121 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1122 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1123 //
1124 // Lock order tree:
1125 //
1126 // `pending_offers_messages`
1127 //
1128 // `total_consistency_lock`
1129 //  |
1130 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
1131 //  |   |
1132 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1133 //  |
1134 //  |__`per_peer_state`
1135 //      |
1136 //      |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1137 //          |
1138 //          |__`claimable_payments`
1139 //          |
1140 //          |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1141 //              |
1142 //              |__`peer_state`
1143 //                  |
1144 //                  |__`id_to_peer`
1145 //                  |
1146 //                  |__`short_to_chan_info`
1147 //                  |
1148 //                  |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1149 //                  |
1150 //                  |__`best_block`
1151 //                  |
1152 //                  |__`pending_events`
1153 //                      |
1154 //                      |__`pending_background_events`
1155 //
1156 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1157 where
1158         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1159         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1160         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1161         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1162         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1163         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1164         R::Target: Router,
1165         L::Target: Logger,
1166 {
1167         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1168         chain_hash: ChainHash,
1169         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1170         chain_monitor: M,
1171         tx_broadcaster: T,
1172         #[allow(unused)]
1173         router: R,
1174
1175         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1176         #[cfg(test)]
1177         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1178         #[cfg(not(test))]
1179         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1180         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1181
1182         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1183         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1184         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1185         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1186         ///
1187         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1188         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1189
1190         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1191         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1192         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1193         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1194         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1195         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1196         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1197         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1198         ///
1199         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1200         ///
1201         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1202         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1203
1204         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1205         ///
1206         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1207         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1208         /// and via the classic SCID.
1209         ///
1210         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1211         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1212         ///
1213         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1214         #[cfg(test)]
1215         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1216         #[cfg(not(test))]
1217         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1218         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1219         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1220         ///
1221         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1222         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1223
1224         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1225         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1226         ///
1227         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1228         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1229
1230         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1231         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1232         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1233         /// active channel list on load.
1234         ///
1235         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1236         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1237
1238         /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1239         ///
1240         /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1241         /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1242         /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1243         ///
1244         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1245         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1246         /// the handling of the events.
1247         ///
1248         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1249         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1250         ///
1251         /// TODO:
1252         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1253         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1254         /// would break backwards compatability.
1255         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1256         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1257         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1258         ///
1259         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1260         id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1261
1262         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1263         ///
1264         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1265         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1266         /// confirmation depth.
1267         ///
1268         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1269         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1270         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1271         ///
1272         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1273         #[cfg(test)]
1274         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1275         #[cfg(not(test))]
1276         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1277
1278         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1279
1280         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1281
1282         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1283         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1284         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1285         ///
1286         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1287         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1288
1289         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1290         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1291         /// keeping additional state.
1292         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1293
1294         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1295         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1296         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1297         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1298
1299         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1300         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1301         ///
1302         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1303         /// are currently open with that peer.
1304         ///
1305         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1306         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1307         /// channels.
1308         ///
1309         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1310         ///
1311         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1312         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1313         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1314         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1315         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1316
1317         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1318         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1319         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1320         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1321         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1322         ///
1323         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1324         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1325         ///
1326         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1327         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1328         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1329         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1330         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1331
1332         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1333         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1334
1335         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1336         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1337         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1338         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1339         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1340         ///
1341         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1342         ///
1343         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1344         ///
1345         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1346         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1347         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1348         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1349         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1350         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1351         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1352         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1353         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1354         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1355         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1356         ///
1357         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1358         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1359         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1360
1361         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1362
1363         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1364         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1365
1366         pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1367
1368         entropy_source: ES,
1369         node_signer: NS,
1370         signer_provider: SP,
1371
1372         logger: L,
1373 }
1374
1375 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1376 ///
1377 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1378 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1379 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1380 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1381 pub struct ChainParameters {
1382         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1383         pub network: Network,
1384
1385         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1386         ///
1387         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1388         pub best_block: BestBlock,
1389 }
1390
1391 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1392 #[must_use]
1393 enum NotifyOption {
1394         DoPersist,
1395         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1396         SkipPersistNoEvents,
1397 }
1398
1399 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1400 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1401 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1402 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1403 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1404 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1405 ///
1406 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1407 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1408 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1409 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1410         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1411         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1412         should_persist: F,
1413         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1414         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1415 }
1416
1417 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1418         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1419         /// events to handle.
1420         ///
1421         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1422         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1423         /// isn't ideal.
1424         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1425                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1426         }
1427
1428         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1429         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1430                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1431                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1432
1433                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1434                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1435                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1436                         should_persist: move || {
1437                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1438                                 // processing and return that.
1439                                 let notify = persist_check();
1440                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
1441                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1442                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1443                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1444                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1445                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1446                                 }
1447                         },
1448                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1449                 }
1450         }
1451
1452         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1453         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1454         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1455         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1456         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1457                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1458
1459                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1460                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1461                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1462                         should_persist: persist_check,
1463                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1464                 }
1465         }
1466 }
1467
1468 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1469         fn drop(&mut self) {
1470                 match (self.should_persist)() {
1471                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1472                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1473                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1474                         },
1475                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1476                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1477                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1478                 }
1479         }
1480 }
1481
1482 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1483 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1484 ///
1485 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1486 ///
1487 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1488 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1489 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1490 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1491 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1492
1493 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1494 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1495 ///
1496 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1497 ///
1498 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1499 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1500 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1501 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1502 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1503 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1504 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1505 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1506 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1507 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1508 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1509 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1510 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1511
1512 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1513 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1514 /// this value.
1515 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1516 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1517 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1518 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1519
1520 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1521 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1522 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1523 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1524 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1525 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1526 #[deny(const_err)]
1527 #[allow(dead_code)]
1528 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1529
1530 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1531 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1532 #[deny(const_err)]
1533 #[allow(dead_code)]
1534 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1535
1536 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1537 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1538
1539 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1540 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1541 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1542
1543 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1544 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1545 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1546
1547 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1548 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1549 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1550 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1551
1552 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1553 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1554 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1555
1556 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1557 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1558 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1559
1560 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1561 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1562 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1563         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1564         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1565         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1566         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1567         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1568         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1569         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1570         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1571 }
1572
1573 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1574 /// to better separate parameters.
1575 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1576 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1577         /// The node_id of our counterparty
1578         pub node_id: PublicKey,
1579         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1580         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1581         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1582         pub features: InitFeatures,
1583         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1584         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1585         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1586         ///
1587         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1588         ///
1589         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1590         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1591         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1592         /// payments to us through this channel.
1593         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1594         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1595         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1596         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1597         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1598         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1599         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1600 }
1601
1602 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1603 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1604 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1605         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1606         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1607         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1608         /// lifetime of the channel.
1609         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1610         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1611         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1612         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1613         /// our counterparty already.
1614         ///
1615         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1616         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1617         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1618         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1619         ///
1620         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1621         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1622         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1623         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1624         ///
1625         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1626         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1627         ///
1628         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1629         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1630         ///
1631         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1632         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1633         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1634         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1635         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1636         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1637         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1638         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1639         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1640         /// `Some(0)`).
1641         ///
1642         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1643         ///
1644         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1645         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1646         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1647         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1648         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1649         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1650         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1651         ///
1652         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1653         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1654         ///
1655         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1656         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1657         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1658         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1659         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1660         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1661         /// this value on chain.
1662         ///
1663         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1664         ///
1665         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1666         ///
1667         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1668         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1669         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1670         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1671         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1672         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
1673         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1674         ///
1675         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1676         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1677         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1678         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1679         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1680         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1681         ///
1682         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1683         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1684         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1685         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1686         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1687         ///
1688         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1689         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1690         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1691         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1692         ///
1693         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1694         pub balance_msat: u64,
1695         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1696         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1697         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1698         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1699         ///
1700         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1701         ///
1702         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1703         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1704         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1705         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1706         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1707         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1708         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1709         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1710         ///
1711         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1712         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1713         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1714         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1715         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1716         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1717         /// route which is valid.
1718         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1719         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1720         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1721         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1722         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1723         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1724         ///
1725         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1726         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1727         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1728         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1729         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1730         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1731         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1732         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1733         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1734         ///
1735         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1736         ///
1737         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1738         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1739         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1740         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1741         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1742         ///
1743         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1744         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1745         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1746         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1747         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1748         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1749         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1750         ///
1751         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1752         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1753         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1754         pub is_outbound: bool,
1755         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1756         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1757         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1758         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1759         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1760         ///
1761         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1762         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1763         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1764         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1765         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1766         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1767         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1768         ///
1769         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1770         pub is_usable: bool,
1771         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1772         pub is_public: bool,
1773         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1774         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1775         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1776         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1777         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1778         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1779         ///
1780         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1781         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1782 }
1783
1784 impl ChannelDetails {
1785         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1786         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1787         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1788         ///
1789         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1790         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1791         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1792                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1793         }
1794
1795         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1796         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1797         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1798         ///
1799         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1800         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1801         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1802                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1803         }
1804
1805         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1806                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1807                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1808         ) -> Self
1809         where
1810                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1811                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1812         {
1813                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1814                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1815                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1816                 ChannelDetails {
1817                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1818                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1819                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1820                                 features: latest_features,
1821                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1822                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1823                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1824                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1825                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1826                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1827                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1828                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1829                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1830                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1831                         },
1832                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1833                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1834                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1835                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1836                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1837                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1838                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1839                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1840                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1841                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1842                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1843                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1844                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1845                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1846                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1847                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1848                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1849                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1850                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1851                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1852                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1853                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
1854                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
1855                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1856                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1857                         config: Some(context.config()),
1858                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1859                 }
1860         }
1861 }
1862
1863 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1864 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1865 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1866 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1867 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1868 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1869 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1870 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1871         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1872         NotShuttingDown,
1873         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1874         ShutdownInitiated,
1875         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1876         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1877         ResolvingHTLCs,
1878         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1879         NegotiatingClosingFee,
1880         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1881         /// to drop the channel.
1882         ShutdownComplete,
1883 }
1884
1885 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1886 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1887 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1888 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1889         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1890         AwaitingInvoice {
1891                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1892                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1893                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1894         },
1895         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1896         Pending {
1897                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1898                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1899                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1900                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1901                 /// abandoned.
1902                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1903                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1904                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1905                 total_msat: u64,
1906         },
1907         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1908         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1909         /// payment is removed from tracking.
1910         Fulfilled {
1911                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1912                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1913                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1914                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1915                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1916                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1917         },
1918         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1919         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1920         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1921         Abandoned {
1922                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1923                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1924                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1925                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1926                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1927         },
1928 }
1929
1930 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1931 ///
1932 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1933 #[derive(Clone)]
1934 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1935         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1936         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1937         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1938         /// route hints.
1939         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1940         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1941         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1942 }
1943
1944 macro_rules! handle_error {
1945         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1946                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1947                 // entering the macro.
1948                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1949                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1950
1951                 match $internal {
1952                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1953                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1954                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1955
1956                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1957                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1958                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1959                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1960                                                         msg: update
1961                                                 });
1962                                         }
1963                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1964                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1965                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1966                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1967                                                         counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1968                                                         channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1969                                                 }, None));
1970                                         }
1971                                 }
1972
1973                                 let logger = WithContext::from(
1974                                         &$self.logger, Some($counterparty_node_id), chan_id.map(|(chan_id, _)| chan_id)
1975                                 );
1976                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err.err);
1977                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1978                                 } else {
1979                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1980                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1981                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1982                                         });
1983                                 }
1984
1985                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1986                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1987                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1988                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1989                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1990                                         }
1991                                 }
1992
1993                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1994                                 Err(err)
1995                         },
1996                 }
1997         } };
1998 }
1999
2000 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2001         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2002                 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
2003                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2004                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2005                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2006                 } else {
2007                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2008                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2009                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2010                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2011                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2012                         // stage.
2013                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2014                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2015                 }
2016                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2017         }}
2018 }
2019
2020 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2021 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2022         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2023                 match $err {
2024                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2025                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2026                         },
2027                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2028                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2029                         },
2030                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2031                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2032                                 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2033                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2034                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
2035                                 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
2036                                 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
2037
2038                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
2039                                         shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
2040                         },
2041                 }
2042         };
2043         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2044                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2045         };
2046         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2047                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2048         };
2049         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2050                 match $channel_phase {
2051                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2052                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2053                         },
2054                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2055                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2056                         },
2057                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2058                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2059                         },
2060                 }
2061         };
2062 }
2063
2064 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2065         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2066                 match $res {
2067                         Ok(res) => res,
2068                         Err(e) => {
2069                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2070                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2071                                 if drop {
2072                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2073                                 }
2074                                 break Err(res);
2075                         }
2076                 }
2077         }
2078 }
2079
2080 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2081         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2082                 match $res {
2083                         Ok(res) => res,
2084                         Err(e) => {
2085                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2086                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2087                                 if drop {
2088                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2089                                 }
2090                                 return Err(res);
2091                         }
2092                 }
2093         }
2094 }
2095
2096 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2097         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2098                 {
2099                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2100                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2101                         channel
2102                 }
2103         }
2104 }
2105
2106 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2107         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2108                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2109                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2110                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2111                 });
2112                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2113                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2114                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2115                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2116                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2117                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2118                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2119                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2120                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2121                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2122                 }
2123         }}
2124 }
2125
2126 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2127         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2128                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2129                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2130                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2131                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2132                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2133                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2134                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2135                         }, None));
2136                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2137                 }
2138         }
2139 }
2140
2141 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2142         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2143                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2144                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2145                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2146                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2147                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2148                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2149                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2150                         }, None));
2151                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2152                 }
2153         }
2154 }
2155
2156 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2157         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2158                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2159                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2160                         &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2161                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2162                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2163                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2164                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2165                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2166                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2167                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2168                         // now.
2169                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2170                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2171                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2172                                         msg,
2173                                 })
2174                         } else { None }
2175                 } else { None };
2176
2177                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2178                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2179
2180                 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2181                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2182                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2183                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2184                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2185                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2186                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2187                 }
2188
2189                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2190                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2191                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2192                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2193
2194                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2195                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2196                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2197                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2198                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2199                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2200                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2201                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2202                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2203                                 ));
2204                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2205                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2206                                 } else {
2207                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2208                                 }
2209                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2210                         } else {
2211                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2212                         }
2213
2214                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2215                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2216                         if batch_completed {
2217                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2218                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2219                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2220                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2221                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2222                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2223                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2224                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2225                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2226                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2227                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2228                                                 }
2229                                         }
2230                                 }
2231                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2232                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2233                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2234                                 }
2235                         }
2236                 }
2237
2238                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2239
2240                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2241                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2242                 }
2243                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2244                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2245                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2246                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2247                 }
2248         } }
2249 }
2250
2251 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2252         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2253                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2254                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2255                 match $update_res {
2256                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2257                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2258                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2259                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
2260                         },
2261                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2262                                 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2263                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
2264                                 false
2265                         },
2266                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2267                                 $completed;
2268                                 true
2269                         },
2270                 }
2271         } };
2272         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2273                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2274                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2275         };
2276         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2277                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2278                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2279                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2280                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2281                 // filter for uniqueness here.
2282                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2283                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2284                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2285                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2286                         });
2287                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2288                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2289                         {
2290                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2291                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2292                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2293                                 }
2294                         })
2295         } };
2296 }
2297
2298 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2299         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2300                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2301                 while !processed_all_events {
2302                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2303                                 return;
2304                         }
2305
2306                         let mut result;
2307
2308                         {
2309                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2310                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2311                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2312
2313                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2314                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2315                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
2316
2317                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2318                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2319                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2320                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2321                                 }
2322                         }
2323
2324                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2325                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
2326                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2327                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2328                         }
2329
2330                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2331
2332                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2333                                 $event_to_handle = event;
2334                                 $handle_event;
2335                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2336                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
2337                                 }
2338                         }
2339
2340                         {
2341                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2342                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2343                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2344                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2345                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2346                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2347                         }
2348
2349                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2350                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2351                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2352                                 processed_all_events = false;
2353                         }
2354
2355                         match result {
2356                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2357                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2358                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2359                                 },
2360                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2361                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2362                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2363                         }
2364                 }
2365         }
2366 }
2367
2368 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2369 where
2370         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2371         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2372         ES::Target: EntropySource,
2373         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2374         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2375         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2376         R::Target: Router,
2377         L::Target: Logger,
2378 {
2379         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2380         ///
2381         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2382         ///
2383         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2384         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2385         ///
2386         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2387         ///
2388         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2389         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2390         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2391         /// more details.
2392         ///
2393         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2394         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2395         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2396         pub fn new(
2397                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2398                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2399                 current_timestamp: u32,
2400         ) -> Self {
2401                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2402                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2403                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2404                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2405                 ChannelManager {
2406                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
2407                         chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2408                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2409                         chain_monitor,
2410                         tx_broadcaster,
2411                         router,
2412
2413                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2414
2415                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2416                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2417                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2418                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2419                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2420                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2421                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2422                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2423
2424                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2425                         secp_ctx,
2426
2427                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2428                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2429
2430                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2431
2432                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2433
2434                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2435
2436                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2437                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2438                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2439                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2440                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2441                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2442                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2443                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2444
2445                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2446
2447                         entropy_source,
2448                         node_signer,
2449                         signer_provider,
2450
2451                         logger,
2452                 }
2453         }
2454
2455         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2456         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2457                 &self.default_configuration
2458         }
2459
2460         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2461                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2462                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2463                 let mut i = 0;
2464                 loop {
2465                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2466                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2467                         } else {
2468                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2469                         }
2470                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2471                                 break;
2472                         }
2473                         i += 1;
2474                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2475                 }
2476                 outbound_scid_alias
2477         }
2478
2479         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2480         ///
2481         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2482         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2483         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2484         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2485         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2486         ///
2487         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2488         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2489         ///
2490         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2491         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2492         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2493         ///
2494         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2495         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2496         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2497         ///
2498         /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2499         /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2500         ///
2501         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2502         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2503         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2504         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2505         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2506         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2507         ///
2508         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2509         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2510         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2511         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2512                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2513                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2514                 }
2515
2516                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2517                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2518                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2519
2520                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2521
2522                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2523                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2524
2525                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2526
2527                 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2528                         if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2529                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2530                         }
2531                 }
2532
2533                 let channel = {
2534                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2535                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2536                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2537                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2538                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2539                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2540                         {
2541                                 Ok(res) => res,
2542                                 Err(e) => {
2543                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2544                                         return Err(e);
2545                                 },
2546                         }
2547                 };
2548                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2549
2550                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2551                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2552                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2553                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
2554                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2555                                 } else {
2556                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
2557                                 }
2558                         },
2559                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2560                 }
2561
2562                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2563                         node_id: their_network_key,
2564                         msg: res,
2565                 });
2566                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2567         }
2568
2569         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2570                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2571                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2572                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2573                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2574                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2575                 // the same channel.
2576                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2577                 {
2578                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2579                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2580                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2581                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2582                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2583                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2584                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2585                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2586                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2587                                                 _ => None,
2588                                         })
2589                                         .filter(f)
2590                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2591                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2592                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2593                                         })
2594                                 );
2595                         }
2596                 }
2597                 res
2598         }
2599
2600         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2601         /// more information.
2602         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2603                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2604                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2605                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2606                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2607                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2608                 // the same channel.
2609                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2610                 {
2611                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2612                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2613                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2614                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2615                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2616                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2617                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2618                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2619                                         res.push(details);
2620                                 }
2621                         }
2622                 }
2623                 res
2624         }
2625
2626         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2627         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2628         ///
2629         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2630         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2631         /// are.
2632         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2633                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2634                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2635                 // really wanted anyway.
2636                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2637         }
2638
2639         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2640         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2641                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2642                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2643
2644                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2645                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2646                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2647                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2648                         let context_to_details = |context| {
2649                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2650                         };
2651                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
2652                                 .iter()
2653                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2654                                 .map(context_to_details)
2655                                 .collect();
2656                 }
2657                 vec![]
2658         }
2659
2660         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2661         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2662         ///
2663         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2664         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2665         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2666         ///
2667         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2668         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2669                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2670                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2671                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2672                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2673                                 },
2674                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2675                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2676                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2677                                 },
2678                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2679                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2680                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
2681                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2682                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
2683                                         })
2684                                 },
2685                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2686                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2687                                 },
2688                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2689                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2690                                 },
2691                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2692                         })
2693                         .collect()
2694         }
2695
2696         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2697         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2698                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2699                 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2700                         Some(transaction) => {
2701                                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2702                                         channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2703                                 }, None));
2704                         },
2705                         None => {},
2706                 }
2707                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2708                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2709                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2710                         reason: closure_reason,
2711                         counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2712                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2713                 }, None));
2714         }
2715
2716         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2717                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2718
2719                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2720                 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2721
2722                 {
2723                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2724
2725                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2726                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2727
2728                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2729                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2730
2731                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2732                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2733                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2734                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2735                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2736                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2737                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2738                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2739
2740                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2741                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2742                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2743                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2744                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2745                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
2746                                                 });
2747
2748                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2749                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2750
2751                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2752                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2753                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2754                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2755                                                 }
2756                                         } else {
2757                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan_phase_entry.get().context(), ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2758                                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2759                                                 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2760                                         }
2761                                 },
2762                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2763                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2764                                                 err: format!(
2765                                                         "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2766                                                         channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2767                                                 )
2768                                         });
2769                                 },
2770                         }
2771                 }
2772
2773                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2774                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2775                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2776                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2777                 }
2778
2779                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2780                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2781                 }
2782
2783                 Ok(())
2784         }
2785
2786         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2787         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2788         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2789         ///
2790         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2791         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2792         ///    fee estimate.
2793         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2794         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2795         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2796         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2797         ///
2798         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2799         ///
2800         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2801         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2802         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2803         /// channel.
2804         ///
2805         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2806         /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2807         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2808         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2809         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2810                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2811         }
2812
2813         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2814         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2815         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2816         ///
2817         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2818         /// the channel being closed or not:
2819         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2820         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2821         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2822         ///    fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2823         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2824         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2825         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2826         ///
2827         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2828         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2829         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2830         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2831         ///
2832         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2833         ///
2834         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2835         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2836         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2837         /// channel.
2838         ///
2839         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2840         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2841         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2842         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2843                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2844         }
2845
2846         fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2847                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2848                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2849                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2850                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2851                 }
2852
2853                 let logger = WithContext::from(
2854                         &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2855                 );
2856                 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2857                 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2858                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2859                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2860                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2861                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2862                 }
2863                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2864                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2865                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2866                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2867                         // ignore the result here.
2868                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2869                 }
2870                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2871                 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2872                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2873                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2874                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2875                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2876                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2877                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2878                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2879                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2880                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2881                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2882                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2883                                         }
2884                                 }
2885                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2886                         }
2887                         debug_assert!(
2888                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2889                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2890                         );
2891                 }
2892                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2893                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2894                 }
2895         }
2896
2897         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2898         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2899         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2900         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2901                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2902                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2903                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2904                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2905                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2906                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2907                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2908                         } else {
2909                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2910                         };
2911                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2912                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2913                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2914                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2915                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2916                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
2917                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2918                                 match chan_phase {
2919                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2920                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2921                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2922                                         },
2923                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2924                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2925                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
2926                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2927                                         },
2928                                 }
2929                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2930                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2931                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2932                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2933                                 // events anyway.
2934                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
2935                         } else {
2936                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2937                         }
2938                 };
2939                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2940                         // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2941                         // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2942                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2943                         let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2944                                 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2945                         if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2946                                 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2947                                 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2948                                         msg: update
2949                                 });
2950                         }
2951                 }
2952
2953                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2954         }
2955
2956         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2957                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2958                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2959                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2960                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2961                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2962                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2963                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2964                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2965                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2966                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2967                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2968                                                         },
2969                                                 }
2970                                         );
2971                                 }
2972                                 Ok(())
2973                         },
2974                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2975                 }
2976         }
2977
2978         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2979         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2980         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2981         /// channel.
2982         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2983         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2984                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2985         }
2986
2987         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2988         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2989         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2990         ///
2991         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2992         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2993         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2994         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2995                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2996         }
2997
2998         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2999         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3000         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3001                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3002                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3003                 }
3004         }
3005
3006         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3007         /// local transaction(s).
3008         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3009                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3010                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3011                 }
3012         }
3013
3014         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3015                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3016         ) -> Result<
3017                 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3018         > {
3019                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3020                         msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3021                 )?;
3022
3023                 let is_blinded = match next_hop {
3024                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3025                                 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
3026                         } => true,
3027                         _ => false, // TODO: update this when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
3028                 };
3029
3030                 macro_rules! return_err {
3031                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3032                                 {
3033                                         log_info!(
3034                                                 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3035                                                 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3036                                         );
3037                                         let (err_code, err_data) = if is_blinded {
3038                                                 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3039                                         } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3040                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3041                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3042                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3043                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3044                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3045                                         }));
3046                                 }
3047                         }
3048                 }
3049
3050                 let NextPacketDetails {
3051                         next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3052                 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3053                         Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3054                         // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3055                         None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3056                 };
3057
3058                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3059                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3060                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3061                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3062                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3063                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3064                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3065                                         // phantom or an intercept.
3066                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3067                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3068                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3069                                         {
3070                                                 None
3071                                         } else {
3072                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3073                                         }
3074                                 },
3075                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3076                         };
3077                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3078                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3079                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3080                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3081                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3082                                 }
3083                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3084                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3085                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3086                                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3087                                 ).flatten() {
3088                                         None => {
3089                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3090                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
3091                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3092                                         },
3093                                         Some(chan) => chan
3094                                 };
3095                                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3096                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3097                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3098                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3099                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3100                                 }
3101                                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3102                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3103                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3104                                         // we don't have the channel here.
3105                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3106                                 }
3107                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3108
3109                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3110                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3111                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3112                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3113                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3114                                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3115                                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3116                                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3117                                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3118                                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3119                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3120                                         } else {
3121                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3122                                         }
3123                                 }
3124                                 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3125                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3126                                 }
3127                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3128                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3129                                 }
3130                                 chan_update_opt
3131                         } else {
3132                                 None
3133                         };
3134
3135                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3136
3137                         if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3138                                 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3139                         ) {
3140                                 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3141                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3142                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3143                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3144                                         break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3145                                 }
3146                                 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3147                                 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3148                         }
3149
3150                         break None;
3151                 }
3152                 {
3153                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3154                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3155                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3156                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3157                                 }
3158                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3159                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3160                                 }
3161                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3162                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3163                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3164                                 }
3165                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3166                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3167                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3168                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3169                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3170                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3171                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3172                                 // instead.
3173                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
3174                         }
3175                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3176                 }
3177                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3178         }
3179
3180         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3181                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3182                 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3183                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3184         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3185                 macro_rules! return_err {
3186                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3187                                 {
3188                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3189                                         log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3190                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3191                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3192                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3193                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3194                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3195                                         }));
3196                                 }
3197                         }
3198                 }
3199                 match decoded_hop {
3200                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3201                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3202                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3203                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3204                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3205                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3206                                 {
3207                                         Ok(info) => {
3208                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3209                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3210                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3211                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3212                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3213                                         },
3214                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3215                                 }
3216                         },
3217                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3218                                 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3219                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3220                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3221                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3222                                 }
3223                         }
3224                 }
3225         }
3226
3227         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3228         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3229         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3230         ///
3231         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3232         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3233         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3234         ///
3235         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3236         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3237         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3238                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3239                         return Err(LightningError {
3240                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3241                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3242                         });
3243                 }
3244                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3245                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3246                 }
3247                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3248                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3249                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3250         }
3251
3252         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3253         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3254         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3255         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3256         ///
3257         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3258         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3259         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3260         ///
3261         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3262         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3263         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3264                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3265                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3266                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3267                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3268                         Some(id) => id,
3269                 };
3270
3271                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3272         }
3273
3274         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3275                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3276                 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3277                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3278
3279                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3280                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3281                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3282                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3283                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3284                 };
3285
3286                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3287                         chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3288                         short_channel_id,
3289                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3290                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3291                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3292                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3293                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3294                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3295                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3296                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3297                 };
3298                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3299                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3300                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3301                 // channel.
3302                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3303
3304                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3305                         signature: sig,
3306                         contents: unsigned
3307                 })
3308         }
3309
3310         #[cfg(test)]
3311         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3312                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3313                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3314                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3315                         session_priv_bytes
3316                 })
3317         }
3318
3319         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3320                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3321                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3322                         session_priv_bytes
3323                 } = args;
3324                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3325                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3326                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3327                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3328
3329                 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3330                         &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3331                         payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3332                 ).map_err(|e| {
3333                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3334                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3335                         e
3336                 })?;
3337
3338                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3339                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3340                                 None => {
3341                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3342                                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3343                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3344                                 },
3345                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3346                         };
3347
3348                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3349                         log_trace!(logger,
3350                                 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3351                                 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3352
3353                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3354                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3355                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3356                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3357                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3358                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3359                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3360                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3361                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3362                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3363                                                 }
3364                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3365                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3366                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3367                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3368                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3369                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3370                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3371                                                                 payment_id,
3372                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3373                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3374                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
3375                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3376                                                                         false => {
3377                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3378                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3379                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3380                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3381                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3382                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3383                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3384                                                                         },
3385                                                                         true => {},
3386                                                                 }
3387                                                         },
3388                                                         None => {},
3389                                                 }
3390                                         },
3391                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3392                                 };
3393                         } else {
3394                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3395                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3396                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
3397                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3398                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3399                         }
3400                         return Ok(());
3401                 };
3402                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3403                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3404                         Err(e) => {
3405                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3406                         },
3407                 }
3408         }
3409
3410         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3411         ///
3412         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3413         /// fields for more info.
3414         ///
3415         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3416         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3417         ///
3418         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3419         ///
3420         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3421         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3422         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3423         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3424         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3425         ///
3426         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3427         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3428         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3429         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3430         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3431         ///
3432         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3433         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3434         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3435         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3436         ///
3437         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3438         ///
3439         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3440         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3441         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3442         ///
3443         /// In general, a path may raise:
3444         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3445         ///    node public key) is specified.
3446         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3447         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3448         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3449         ///    relevant updates.
3450         ///
3451         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3452         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3453         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3454         ///
3455         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3456         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3457         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3458         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3459         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3460         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3461         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3462                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3463                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3464                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3465                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3466                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3467                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3468         }
3469
3470         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3471         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3472         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3473                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3474                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3475                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3476                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3477                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3478                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3479                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3480         }
3481
3482         #[cfg(test)]
3483         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3484                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3485                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3486                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3487                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3488                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3489         }
3490
3491         #[cfg(test)]
3492         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3493                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3494                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3495         }
3496
3497         #[cfg(test)]
3498         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3499                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3500         }
3501
3502         pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3503                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3504                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3505                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3506                         .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3507                                 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3508                                 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3509                                 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3510                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3511                         )
3512         }
3513
3514         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3515         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3516         /// retries are exhausted.
3517         ///
3518         /// # Event Generation
3519         ///
3520         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3521         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3522         ///
3523         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3524         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3525         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3526         ///
3527         /// # Requested Invoices
3528         ///
3529         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3530         /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3531         /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3532         /// once the invoice has been received.
3533         ///
3534         /// # Restart Behavior
3535         ///
3536         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3537         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3538         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3539         ///
3540         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3541         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3542                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3543                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3544         }
3545
3546         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3547         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3548         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3549         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3550         /// never reach the recipient.
3551         ///
3552         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3553         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3554         ///
3555         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3556         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3557         ///
3558         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3559         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3560                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3561                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3562                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3563                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3564                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3565         }
3566
3567         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3568         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3569         ///
3570         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3571         /// payments.
3572         ///
3573         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3574         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3575                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3576                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3577                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3578                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3579                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3580                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3581         }
3582
3583         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3584         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3585         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3586         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3587                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3588                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3589                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3590                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3591                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3592         }
3593
3594         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3595         /// payment probe.
3596         #[cfg(test)]
3597         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3598                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3599         }
3600
3601         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3602         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3603         ///
3604         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3605         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3606                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3607                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3608         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3609                 let payment_params =
3610                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3611
3612                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3613
3614                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3615         }
3616
3617         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3618         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3619         ///
3620         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3621         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3622         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3623         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3624         ///
3625         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3626         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3627         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3628         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3629         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3630         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3631         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3632                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3633         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3634                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3635
3636                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3637                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3638                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3639                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3640
3641                 let route = self
3642                         .router
3643                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3644                         .map_err(|e| {
3645                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3646                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3647                         })?;
3648
3649                 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3650
3651                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3652
3653                 for mut path in route.paths {
3654                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3655                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3656                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3657                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3658                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3659                                         break;
3660                                 } else {
3661                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3662                                         log_debug!(
3663                                                 self.logger,
3664                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3665                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3666                                         );
3667                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3668                                         path.hops.pop();
3669                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3670                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3671                                         }
3672                                 }
3673                         }
3674
3675                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3676                                 log_debug!(
3677                                         self.logger,
3678                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3679                                 );
3680                                 continue;
3681                         }
3682
3683                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3684                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3685                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3686                                 }) {
3687                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3688                                         let used_liquidity =
3689                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3690
3691                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3692                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3693                                         {
3694                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3695                                                 continue;
3696                                         } else {
3697                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3698                                         }
3699                                 }
3700                         }
3701
3702                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3703                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3704                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3705                         })?);
3706                 }
3707
3708                 Ok(res)
3709         }
3710
3711         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3712         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3713         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3714                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3715                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3716         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3717                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3718                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3719                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3720
3721                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3722                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3723                 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3724                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3725                                 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3726
3727                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3728                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3729                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3730                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3731                                                 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3732                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3733                                                 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3734                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3735                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
3736                                 match funding_res {
3737                                         Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3738                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
3739                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3740                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3741                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3742                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3743                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3744                                                 });
3745                                         },
3746                                 }
3747                         },
3748                         Some(phase) => {
3749                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3750                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3751                                         err: format!(
3752                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3753                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3754                                 })
3755                         },
3756                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3757                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3758                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3759                                 }),
3760                 };
3761
3762                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3763                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3764                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3765                                 msg,
3766                         });
3767                 }
3768                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3769                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3770                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3771                         },
3772                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3773                                 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3774                                 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3775                                         panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3776                                 }
3777                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3778                         }
3779                 }
3780                 Ok(())
3781         }
3782
3783         #[cfg(test)]
3784         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3785                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3786                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3787                 })
3788         }
3789
3790         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3791         ///
3792         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3793         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3794         ///
3795         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3796         /// across the p2p network.
3797         ///
3798         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3799         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3800         ///
3801         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3802         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3803         /// keys per-channel).
3804         ///
3805         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3806         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3807         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3808         ///
3809         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3810         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3811         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3812         ///
3813         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3814         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3815         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3816         /// for more details.
3817         ///
3818         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3819         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3820         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3821                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3822         }
3823
3824         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3825         ///
3826         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3827         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3828         ///
3829         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3830         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3831         /// signature for each channel.
3832         ///
3833         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3834         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3835                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3836                 let mut result = Ok(());
3837
3838                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3839                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3840                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3841                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3842                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3843                                         }));
3844                                 }
3845                         }
3846                 }
3847                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3848                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3849                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3850                         }));
3851                 }
3852                 {
3853                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3854                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3855                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3856                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3857                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3858                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3859                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3860                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3861                         {
3862                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3863                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3864                                 }));
3865                         }
3866                 }
3867
3868                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3869                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3870                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3871                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3872                 } else {
3873                         None
3874                 };
3875                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3876                         match states.entry(txid) {
3877                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3878                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3879                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3880                                         }));
3881                                         None
3882                                 },
3883                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3884                         }
3885                 });
3886                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3887                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3888                                 temporary_channel_id,
3889                                 counterparty_node_id,
3890                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
3891                                 is_batch_funding,
3892                                 |chan, tx| {
3893                                         let mut output_index = None;
3894                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3895                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3896                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3897                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
3898                                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3899                                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3900                                                                 });
3901                                                         }
3902                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3903                                                 }
3904                                         }
3905                                         if output_index.is_none() {
3906                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3907                                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3908                                                 });
3909                                         }
3910                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3911                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3912                                                 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3913                                         }
3914                                         Ok(outpoint)
3915                                 })
3916                         );
3917                 }
3918                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3919                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3920                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3921                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3922                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3923                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3924                                 .into_iter().flatten()
3925                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3926                         );
3927                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3928                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3929                         );
3930                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3931                         {
3932                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3933                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3934                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3935                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3936                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3937                                                 .map(|mut chan| {
3938                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3939                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3940                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3941                                                 });
3942                                 }
3943                         }
3944                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3945                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3946                         }
3947                 }
3948                 result
3949         }
3950
3951         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3952         ///
3953         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3954         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3955         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3956         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3957         ///
3958         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3959         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3960         ///
3961         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3962         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3963         ///
3964         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3965         ///
3966         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3967         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3968         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3969         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3970         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3971         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3972         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3973         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3974                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3975         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3976                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3977                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3978                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3979                         });
3980                 }
3981
3982                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3983                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3984                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3985                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3986                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3987                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3988                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3989                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3990                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3991                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3992                                 });
3993                         };
3994                 }
3995                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3996                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3997                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3998                                 config.apply(config_update);
3999                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4000                                         continue;
4001                                 }
4002                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4003                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4004                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4005                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4006                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4007                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4008                                                         msg,
4009                                                 });
4010                                         }
4011                                 }
4012                                 continue;
4013                         } else {
4014                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4015                                 debug_assert!(false);
4016                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4017                                         err: format!(
4018                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4019                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4020                                 });
4021                         };
4022                 }
4023                 Ok(())
4024         }
4025
4026         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4027         ///
4028         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4029         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4030         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4031         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4032         ///
4033         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4034         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4035         ///
4036         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4037         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4038         ///
4039         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4040         ///
4041         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4042         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4043         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4044         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4045         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4046         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4047         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4048         pub fn update_channel_config(
4049                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4050         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4051                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4052         }
4053
4054         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4055         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4056         ///
4057         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4058         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4059         ///
4060         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4061         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4062         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4063         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4064         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4065         ///
4066         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4067         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4068         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4069         /// than expected.
4070         ///
4071         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4072         /// backwards.
4073         ///
4074         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4075         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4076         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4077         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4078         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4079         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4080                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4081
4082                 let next_hop_scid = {
4083                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4084                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4085                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4086                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4087                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4088                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4089                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4090                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4091                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4092                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4093                                                 })
4094                                         }
4095                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4096                                 },
4097                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4098                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4099                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4100                                 }),
4101                                 None => {
4102                                         let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4103                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4104                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4105                                         log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4106                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4107                                                 err: error
4108                                         })
4109                                 }
4110                         }
4111                 };
4112
4113                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4114                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4115                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4116                         })?;
4117
4118                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4119                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4120                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4121                                         onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4122                                 }
4123                         },
4124                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4125                 };
4126                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4127                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4128                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4129                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4130                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4131                 };
4132
4133                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4134                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4135                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4136                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4137                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4138                 )];
4139                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4140                 Ok(())
4141         }
4142
4143         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4144         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4145         ///
4146         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4147         /// backwards.
4148         ///
4149         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4150         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4151                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4152
4153                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4154                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4155                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4156                         })?;
4157
4158                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4159                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4160                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4161                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4162                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4163                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4164                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4165                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4166                                 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4167                         });
4168
4169                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4170                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4171                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4172                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4173
4174                 Ok(())
4175         }
4176
4177         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4178         ///
4179         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4180         /// Will likely generate further events.
4181         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4182                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4183
4184                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4185                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4186                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4187                 {
4188                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4189                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4190
4191                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4192                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4193                                         let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4194                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4195                                                 () => {
4196                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4197                                                                 match forward_info {
4198                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4199                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4200                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4201                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4202                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4203                                                                                 }
4204                                                                         }) => {
4205                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4206                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4207                                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4208                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4209
4210                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4211                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4212                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4213                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4214                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4215                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4216                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4217                                                                                                         blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4218                                                                                                 });
4219
4220                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4221                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4222                                                                                                 } else {
4223                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4224                                                                                                 };
4225
4226                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4227                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4228                                                                                                         reason
4229                                                                                                 ));
4230                                                                                                 continue;
4231                                                                                         }
4232                                                                                 }
4233                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4234                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4235                                                                                                 {
4236                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4237                                                                                                 }
4238                                                                                         }
4239                                                                                 }
4240                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4241                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4242                                                                                                 {
4243                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4244                                                                                                 }
4245                                                                                         }
4246                                                                                 }
4247                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4248                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4249                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4250                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4251                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4252                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4253                                                                                                         payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4254                                                                                                 ) {
4255                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
4256                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4257                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4258                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4259                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4260                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4261                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
4262                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4263                                                                                                         },
4264                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4265                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4266                                                                                                         },
4267                                                                                                 };
4268                                                                                                 match next_hop {
4269                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4270                                                                                                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4271                                                                                                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4272                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4273                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4274                                                                                                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4275                                                                                                                 {
4276                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4277                                                                                                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4278                                                                                                                 }
4279                                                                                                         },
4280                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
4281                                                                                                 }
4282                                                                                         } else {
4283                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4284                                                                                         }
4285                                                                                 } else {
4286                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4287                                                                                 }
4288                                                                         },
4289                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4290                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4291                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4292                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4293                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
4294                                                                         }
4295                                                                 }
4296                                                         }
4297                                                 }
4298                                         }
4299                                         let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4300                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4301                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4302                                                 None => {
4303                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4304                                                         continue;
4305                                                 }
4306                                         };
4307                                         forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4308                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4309                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4310                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4311                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4312                                                 continue;
4313                                         }
4314                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4315                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4316                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4317                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4318                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4319                                                         match forward_info {
4320                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4321                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4322                                                                         forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4323                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4324                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4325                                                                                         onion_packet, blinded, ..
4326                                                                                 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4327                                                                         },
4328                                                                 }) => {
4329                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4330                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4331                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4332                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4333                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4334                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4335                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4336                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4337                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4338                                                                                 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
4339                                                                         });
4340                                                                         let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4341                                                                                 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4342                                                                                         Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4343                                                                                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4344                                                                                 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4345                                                                                         &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4346                                                                                 ).ok()
4347                                                                         });
4348                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4349                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4350                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4351                                                                                 &&logger)
4352                                                                         {
4353                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4354                                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4355                                                                                 } else {
4356                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4357                                                                                 }
4358                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4359                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4360                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4361                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4362                                                                                 ));
4363                                                                                 continue;
4364                                                                         }
4365                                                                 },
4366                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4367                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4368                                                                 },
4369                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4370                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4371                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4372                                                                                 htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger
4373                                                                         ) {
4374                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4375                                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4376                                                                                 } else {
4377                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4378                                                                                 }
4379                                                                                 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4380                                                                                 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4381                                                                                 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4382                                                                                 continue;
4383                                                                         }
4384                                                                 },
4385                                                         }
4386                                                 }
4387                                         } else {
4388                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4389                                                 continue;
4390                                         }
4391                                 } else {
4392                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4393                                                 match forward_info {
4394                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4395                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4396                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4397                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4398                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4399                                                                 }
4400                                                         }) => {
4401                                                                 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4402                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4403                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4404                                                                                 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4405                                                                                 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4406                                                                         } => {
4407                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4408                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4409                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4410                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4411                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4412                                                                         },
4413                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4414                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4415                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4416                                                                                         payment_metadata,
4417                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
4418                                                                                 };
4419                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4420                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4421                                                                         },
4422                                                                         _ => {
4423                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4424                                                                         }
4425                                                                 };
4426                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4427                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4428                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4429                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4430                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4431                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4432                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4433                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4434                                                                                 blinded_failure,
4435                                                                         },
4436                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4437                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4438                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
4439                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4440                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4441                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
4442                                                                         total_value_received: None,
4443                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4444                                                                         cltv_expiry,
4445                                                                         onion_payload,
4446                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4447                                                                 };
4448
4449                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4450
4451                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4452                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4453                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4454                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4455                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4456                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4457                                                                                 );
4458                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4459                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4460                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4461                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4462                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4463                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4464                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4465                                                                                                 blinded_failure,
4466                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
4467                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4468                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4469                                                                                 ));
4470                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4471                                                                         }
4472                                                                 }
4473                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4474                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4475                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4476                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4477                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4478                                                                 }
4479
4480                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4481                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
4482                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4483                                                                                 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4484                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4485                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4486                                                                                 };
4487                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4488                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4489                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4490                                                                                 }
4491                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4492                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
4493                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4494                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
4495                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4496                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
4497                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4498                                                                                                 }
4499                                                                                         });
4500                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4501                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4502                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4503                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4504                                                                                 }
4505                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4506                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4507                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4508                                                                                 }
4509                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4510                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4511                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4512                                                                                         }
4513                                                                                 } else {
4514                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4515                                                                                 }
4516                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4517                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4518                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4519                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4520                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4521                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4522                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4523                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4524                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4525                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4526                                                                                         }
4527                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4528                                                                                 }
4529                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4530                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4531                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4532                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4533                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4534                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4535                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
4536                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4537                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4538                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4539                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4540                                                                                         }
4541                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4542                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4543                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4544                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4545                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4546                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4547                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4548                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4549                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4550                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4551                                                                                                 payment_hash,
4552                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
4553                                                                                                 amount_msat,
4554                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4555                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4556                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4557                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4558                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4559                                                                                         }, None));
4560                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
4561                                                                                 } else {
4562                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4563                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4564                                                                                         // MPP parts.
4565                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4566                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4567                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4568                                                                                         }
4569                                                                                 }
4570                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
4571                                                                         }}
4572                                                                 }
4573
4574                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4575                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4576                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4577                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4578                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4579                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4580                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4581                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4582                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4583                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4584                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4585                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4586                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4587                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
4588                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
4589                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4590                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4591                                                                                                         }
4592                                                                                                 };
4593                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4594                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4595                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4596                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4597                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4598                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4599                                                                                                         }
4600                                                                                                 }
4601                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4602                                                                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4603                                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4604                                                                                                 };
4605                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4606                                                                                         },
4607                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4608                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4609                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4610                                                                                         }
4611                                                                                 }
4612                                                                         },
4613                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4614                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4615                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4616                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4617                                                                                 }
4618                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4619                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4620                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4621                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4622                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4623                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4624                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4625                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4626                                                                                 } else {
4627                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4628                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4629                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4630                                                                                         };
4631                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4632                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
4633                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4634                                                                                         }
4635                                                                                 }
4636                                                                         },
4637                                                                 };
4638                                                         },
4639                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4640                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4641                                                         }
4642                                                 }
4643                                         }
4644                                 }
4645                         }
4646                 }
4647
4648                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4649                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4650                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4651                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4652
4653                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4654                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4655                 }
4656                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4657
4658                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4659                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4660                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4661                 // network stack.
4662                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4663
4664                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4665                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4666                 events.append(&mut new_events);
4667         }
4668
4669         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4670         ///
4671         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4672         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4673                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4674
4675                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4676
4677                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4678                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4679                 if background_events.is_empty() {
4680                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4681                 }
4682
4683                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4684                         match event {
4685                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4686                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4687                                         // monitor updating completing.
4688                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4689                                 },
4690                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4691                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
4692                                         {
4693                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4694                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4695                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4696                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4697                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4698                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4699                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4700                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
4701                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4702                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4703                                                                         } else {
4704                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4705                                                                         }
4706                                                                 },
4707                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4708                                                         }
4709                                                 }
4710                                         }
4711                                         if !updated_chan {
4712                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4713                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4714                                         }
4715                                 },
4716                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4717                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4718                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4719                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4720                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4721                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4722                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4723                                                 } else {
4724                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4725                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4726                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4727                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4728                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4729                                                 }
4730                                         }
4731                                 },
4732                         }
4733                 }
4734                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4735         }
4736
4737         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4738         /// Process background events, for functional testing
4739         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4740                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4741                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4742         }
4743
4744         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4745                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4746
4747                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4748
4749                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4750                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4751                         if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4752                                 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4753                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4754                         }
4755                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4756                 }
4757                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4758                         log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4759                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4760                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4761                 }
4762                 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4763                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4764
4765                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4766                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4767         }
4768
4769         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
4770         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4771         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4772         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4773         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4774         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4775                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4776                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4777
4778                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4779                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4780
4781                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4782                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4783                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4784                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4785                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4786                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4787                                 ) {
4788                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4789                                                 anchor_feerate
4790                                         } else {
4791                                                 non_anchor_feerate
4792                                         };
4793                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4794                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4795                                 }
4796                         }
4797
4798                         should_persist
4799                 });
4800         }
4801
4802         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4803         ///
4804         /// This currently includes:
4805         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4806         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4807         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4808         ///    the channel.
4809         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4810         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4811         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4812         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4813         ///  * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4814         ///    or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4815         ///    The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4816         ///    minus two hours in `no-std`.
4817         ///
4818         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4819         /// estimate fetches.
4820         ///
4821         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4822         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4823         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4824                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4825                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4826
4827                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4828                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4829
4830                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4831                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4832                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4833                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4834
4835                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4836                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4837                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4838                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4839                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4840                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4841                         | {
4842                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4843                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4844                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4845                                         log_error!(logger,
4846                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4847                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4848                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4849                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4850                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4851                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4852                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4853                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4854                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4855                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4856                                                         },
4857                                                 },
4858                                         });
4859                                         false
4860                                 } else {
4861                                         true
4862                                 }
4863                         };
4864
4865                         {
4866                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4867                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4868                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4869                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4870                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4871                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4872                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4873                                                 match phase {
4874                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4875                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4876                                                                         anchor_feerate
4877                                                                 } else {
4878                                                                         non_anchor_feerate
4879                                                                 };
4880                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4881                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4882
4883                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4884                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4885                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4886                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
4887                                                                 }
4888
4889                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4890                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4891                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4892                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4893                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4894                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4895                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4896                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4897                                                                                 n += 1;
4898                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4899                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4900                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4901                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4902                                                                                                         msg: update
4903                                                                                                 });
4904                                                                                         }
4905                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4906                                                                                 } else {
4907                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4908                                                                                 }
4909                                                                         },
4910                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4911                                                                                 n += 1;
4912                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4913                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4914                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4915                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4916                                                                                                         msg: update
4917                                                                                                 });
4918                                                                                         }
4919                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4920                                                                                 } else {
4921                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4922                                                                                 }
4923                                                                         },
4924                                                                         _ => {},
4925                                                                 }
4926
4927                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4928
4929                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4930                                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4931                                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4932                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4933                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4934                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4935                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4936                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4937                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4938                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4939                                                                                         },
4940                                                                                 },
4941                                                                         });
4942                                                                 }
4943
4944                                                                 true
4945                                                         },
4946                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4947                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4948                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4949                                                         },
4950                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4951                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4952                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4953                                                         },
4954                                                 }
4955                                         });
4956
4957                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4958                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4959                                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
4960                                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4961                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4962                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4963                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4964                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4965                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4966                                                                         },
4967                                                                 }
4968                                                         );
4969                                                 }
4970                                         }
4971                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4972
4973                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4974                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4975                                         }
4976                                 }
4977                         }
4978
4979                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4980                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4981                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4982                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4983                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4984                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4985                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4986                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4987                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4988                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4989                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4990                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4991                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4992                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
4993                                                         let remove_entry = {
4994                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4995                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4996                                                         };
4997                                                         if remove_entry {
4998                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
4999                                                         }
5000                                                 },
5001                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5002                                         }
5003                                 }
5004                         }
5005
5006                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5007                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5008                                         // This should be unreachable
5009                                         debug_assert!(false);
5010                                         return false;
5011                                 }
5012                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5013                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5014                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5015                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5016                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5017                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5018                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5019                                         {
5020                                                 return true;
5021                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5022                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5023                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5024                                         }) {
5025                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5026                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5027                                                 return false;
5028                                         }
5029                                 }
5030                                 true
5031                         });
5032
5033                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5034                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5035                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5036                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5037                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5038                         }
5039
5040                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5041                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5042                         }
5043
5044                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5045                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5046                         }
5047
5048                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5049                         let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5050                                 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5051                                 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5052                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5053                         let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5054                                 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5055                         );
5056
5057                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5058                                 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5059                         );
5060
5061                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5062                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5063                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5064                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5065                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5066                         }
5067
5068                         should_persist
5069                 });
5070         }
5071
5072         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5073         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5074         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5075         ///
5076         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5077         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5078         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5079         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5080         ///
5081         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5082         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5083         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5084         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5085         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5086                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5087         }
5088
5089         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5090         /// reason for the failure.
5091         ///
5092         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5093         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5094                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5095
5096                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5097                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5098                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5099                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5100                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5101                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5102                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5103                         }
5104                 }
5105         }
5106
5107         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5108         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5109                 match failure_code {
5110                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5111                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5112                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5113                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5114                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5115                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5116                         },
5117                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5118                                 let fail_data = match data {
5119                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5120                                         None => Vec::new(),
5121                                 };
5122                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5123                         }
5124                 }
5125         }
5126
5127         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5128         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5129         ///
5130         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5131         /// forwarding
5132         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5133                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5134                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5135                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5136                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5137                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5138                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5139                 } else {
5140                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5141                 };
5142                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5143                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5144                 } else {
5145                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5146                 }
5147         }
5148
5149
5150         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5151         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5152         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5153                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5154                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5155                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5156                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5157                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5158                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5159                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5160                         }
5161                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5162                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5163                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5164                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5165                 } else {
5166                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5167                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5168                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5169                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5170                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5171                 }
5172         }
5173
5174         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5175         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5176         // be surfaced to the user.
5177         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5178                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5179                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5180         ) {
5181                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5182                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5183                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5184                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5185                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5186                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5187                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5188                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5189                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5190                                                 } else {
5191                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5192                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5193                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5194                                                 }
5195                                         },
5196                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5197                                 }
5198                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5199                 };
5200
5201                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5202                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5203                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5204                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5205                 }
5206         }
5207
5208         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5209         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5210         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5211                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5212                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5213                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5214                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5215                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5216                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5217                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5218                 }
5219
5220                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5221                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5222                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5223                 //timer handling.
5224
5225                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5226                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5227                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5228                 match source {
5229                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5230                                 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5231                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5232                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5233                                 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5234                         },
5235                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5236                                 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5237                                 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5238                         }) => {
5239                                 log_trace!(
5240                                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5241                                         "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5242                                         if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5243                                 );
5244                                 let err_packet = match blinded_failure {
5245                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5246                                                 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5247                                                 blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5248                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5249                                                 )
5250                                         },
5251                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => todo!(),
5252                                         None => {
5253                                                 onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret)
5254                                         }
5255                                 };
5256
5257                                 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5258                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5259                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5260                                         push_forward_ev = true;
5261                                 }
5262                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5263                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5264                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5265                                         },
5266                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5267                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5268                                         }
5269                                 }
5270                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5271                                 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5272                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5273                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5274                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5275                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
5276                                 }, None));
5277                         },
5278                 }
5279         }
5280
5281         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5282         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5283         ///
5284         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5285         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5286         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5287         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5288         ///
5289         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5290         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5291         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5292         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5293         ///
5294         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5295         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5296         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5297         ///
5298         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5299         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5300         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5301         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5302         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5303         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5304         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5305         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5306                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5307         }
5308
5309         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5310         /// even type numbers.
5311         ///
5312         /// # Note
5313         ///
5314         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5315         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5316         ///
5317         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5318         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5319                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5320         }
5321
5322         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5323                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5324
5325                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5326
5327                 let mut sources = {
5328                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5329                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5330                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5331                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5332                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5333                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5334                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5335                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5336                                                 break;
5337                                         }
5338                                 }
5339
5340                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5341                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5342                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5343                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5344                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5345                                 });
5346                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5347                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5348                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5349                                                 &payment_hash);
5350                                 }
5351
5352                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5353                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5354                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5355                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5356                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5357                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5358                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5359                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5360                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5361                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5362                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5363                                                 }
5364                                                 return;
5365                                         }
5366                                 }
5367
5368                                 payment.htlcs
5369                         } else { return; }
5370                 };
5371                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5372
5373                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5374                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5375                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5376                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5377                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5378                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5379                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5380                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5381                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5382                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5383                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5384                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5385                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5386                                 debug_assert!(false);
5387                                 valid_mpp = false;
5388                                 break;
5389                         }
5390                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5391
5392                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5393                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5394                                 debug_assert!(false);
5395                                 valid_mpp = false;
5396                                 break;
5397                         }
5398                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5399                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5400                 }
5401                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5402                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5403                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5404                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5405                         return;
5406                 }
5407                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5408                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5409                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5410                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5411                         return;
5412                 }
5413                 if valid_mpp {
5414                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5415                                 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5416                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5417                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5418                                         |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5419                                                 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5420                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5421                                         }
5422                                 ) {
5423                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5424                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5425                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5426                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5427                                                 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5428                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5429                                 }
5430                         }
5431                 }
5432                 if !valid_mpp {
5433                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5434                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5435                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5436                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5437                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5438                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5439                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5440                         }
5441                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5442                 }
5443
5444                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5445                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5446                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5447                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5448                 }
5449         }
5450
5451         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5452                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5453         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5454                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5455
5456                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5457                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5458                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5459                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5460
5461                 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5462                 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5463                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5464                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5465
5466                 {
5467                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5468                         let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5469                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5470                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5471                                 None => None
5472                         };
5473
5474                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5475                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5476                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5477                         ).unwrap_or(None);
5478
5479                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5480                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5481                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5482                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5483                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5484                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5485                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5486                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5487
5488                                                 match fulfill_res {
5489                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5490                                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5491                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5492                                                                                 chan_id, action);
5493                                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5494                                                                 }
5495                                                                 if !during_init {
5496                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5497                                                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5498                                                                 } else {
5499                                                                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5500                                                                         // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5501                                                                         // monitor update as a background event.
5502                                                                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5503                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5504                                                                                         counterparty_node_id,
5505                                                                                         funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5506                                                                                         update: monitor_update.clone(),
5507                                                                                 });
5508                                                                 }
5509                                                         }
5510                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5511                                                                 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5512                                                                         action
5513                                                                 } else {
5514                                                                         return Ok(());
5515                                                                 };
5516                                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5517
5518                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5519                                                                         chan_id, action);
5520                                                                 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5521                                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5522                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5523                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5524                                                                         blocking_action: blocker,
5525                                                                 } = action {
5526                                                                         (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5527                                                                 } else {
5528                                                                         debug_assert!(false,
5529                                                                                 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5530                                                                         return Ok(());
5531                                                                 };
5532                                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5533                                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5534                                                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5535                                                                                 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5536                                                                                 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5537                                                                         {
5538                                                                                 let mut found_blocker = false;
5539                                                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5540                                                                                         // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5541                                                                                         // which case we need to only remove the one
5542                                                                                         // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5543                                                                                         let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5544                                                                                         if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5545                                                                                         *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5546                                                                                 });
5547                                                                                 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5548                                                                         }
5549                                                                 } else {
5550                                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5551                                                                 }
5552                                                         }
5553                                                 }
5554                                         }
5555                                         return Ok(());
5556                                 }
5557                         }
5558                 }
5559                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5560                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5561                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5562                                 payment_preimage,
5563                         }],
5564                 };
5565
5566                 if !during_init {
5567                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5568                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5569                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5570                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5571                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5572                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5573                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5574                                 // again on restart.
5575                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5576                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
5577                         }
5578                 } else {
5579                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5580                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5581                         // event.
5582                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5583                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5584                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5585                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5586                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5587                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5588                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5589                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5590                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5591                                         prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5592                                 )));
5593                 }
5594                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5595                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5596                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5597                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5598                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5599                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5600                 Ok(())
5601         }
5602
5603         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5604                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5605         }
5606
5607         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5608                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5609                 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5610         ) {
5611                 match source {
5612                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5613                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5614                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5615                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5616                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5617                                 }
5618                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5619                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5620                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5621                                 };
5622                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5623                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5624                                         &self.logger);
5625                         },
5626                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5627                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5628                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5629                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5630                                 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5631                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5632                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5633                                                 let chan_to_release =
5634                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5635                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5636                                                         } else {
5637                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5638                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5639                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5640                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5641                                                                 // closed.
5642                                                                 None
5643                                                         };
5644
5645                                                 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5646                                                         // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5647                                                         // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5648                                                         // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5649                                                         // in the background.
5650                                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5651                                                                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5652                                                                 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5653                                                                 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5654                                                                         match ev {
5655                                                                                 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5656                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5657                                                                                         funding_txo, update, ..
5658                                                                                 } => {
5659                                                                                         if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5660                                                                                                 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5661                                                                                                         if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5662                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5663                                                                                                         } = upd {
5664                                                                                                                 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5665                                                                                                         } else { false }
5666                                                                                                 ), "{:?}", update);
5667                                                                                                 true
5668                                                                                         } else { false }
5669                                                                                 },
5670                                                                                 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5671                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5672                                                                                         (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5673                                                                                 ) => {
5674                                                                                         if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5675                                                                                                 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5676                                                                                                 assert!(matches!(
5677                                                                                                         monitor_update.updates[0],
5678                                                                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5679                                                                                                 ));
5680                                                                                                 true
5681                                                                                         } else { false }
5682                                                                                 },
5683                                                                                 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5684                                                                                 // immediately once we get going.
5685                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5686                                                                                         channel_id, ..
5687                                                                                 } =>
5688                                                                                         *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5689                                                                         }
5690                                                                 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5691                                                         }
5692                                                         None
5693                                                 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5694                                                         if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5695                                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5696                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5697                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5698                                                                         blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5699                                                                 })
5700                                                         } else { None }
5701                                                 } else {
5702                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5703                                                                 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5704                                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5705                                                                 } else { None }
5706                                                         } else { None };
5707                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5708                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5709                                                                         fee_earned_msat,
5710                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5711                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5712                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5713                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5714                                                                 },
5715                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5716                                                         })
5717                                                 }
5718                                         });
5719                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5720                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5721                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5722                                 }
5723                         },
5724                 }
5725         }
5726
5727         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5728         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5729                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5730         }
5731
5732         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5733                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5734                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5735                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5736
5737                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5738                         match action {
5739                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5740                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5741                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5742                                                 amount_msat,
5743                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
5744                                                 receiver_node_id,
5745                                                 htlcs,
5746                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5747                                         }) = payment {
5748                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5749                                                         payment_hash,
5750                                                         purpose,
5751                                                         amount_msat,
5752                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5753                                                         htlcs,
5754                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
5755                                                 }, None));
5756                                         }
5757                                 },
5758                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5759                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5760                                 } => {
5761                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5762                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5763                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5764                                         }
5765                                 },
5766                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5767                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5768                                 } => {
5769                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5770                                                 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5771                                                 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5772                                                 Some(blocking_action),
5773                                         );
5774                                 },
5775                         }
5776                 }
5777         }
5778
5779         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5780         /// update completion.
5781         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5782                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5783                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5784                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5785                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5786         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5787                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5788                 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5789                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
5790                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5791                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5792                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5793                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5794                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5795
5796                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5797
5798                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5799                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5800                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5801                                 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5802                 }
5803
5804                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5805                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5806                 }
5807                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5808                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5809                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5810                                 msg,
5811                         });
5812                 }
5813
5814                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5815                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5816                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5817                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5818                                         updates: update,
5819                                 });
5820                         }
5821                 } }
5822                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5823                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5824                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5825                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5826                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
5827                                 });
5828                         }
5829                 } }
5830                 match order {
5831                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5832                                 handle_cs!();
5833                                 handle_raa!();
5834                         },
5835                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5836                                 handle_raa!();
5837                                 handle_cs!();
5838                         },
5839                 }
5840
5841                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5842                         log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5843                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5844                 }
5845
5846                 {
5847                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5848                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5849                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5850                 }
5851
5852                 htlc_forwards
5853         }
5854
5855         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5856                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5857
5858                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5859                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5860                         None => {
5861                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5862                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5863                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5864                                 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5865                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5866                                         None => return,
5867                                 }
5868                         }
5869                 };
5870                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5871                 let mut peer_state_lock;
5872                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5873                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5874                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5875                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5876                 let channel =
5877                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5878                                 chan
5879                         } else {
5880                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5881                                         .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5882                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5883                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5884                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5885                                 return;
5886                         };
5887                 let remaining_in_flight =
5888                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5889                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5890                                 pending.len()
5891                         } else { 0 };
5892                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5893                 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5894                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5895                         remaining_in_flight);
5896                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5897                         return;
5898                 }
5899                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5900         }
5901
5902         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5903         ///
5904         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5905         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5906         /// the channel.
5907         ///
5908         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5909         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5910         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5911         ///
5912         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5913         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5914         /// used to accept such channels.
5915         ///
5916         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5917         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5918         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5919                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5920         }
5921
5922         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5923         /// it as confirmed immediately.
5924         ///
5925         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5926         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5927         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5928         ///
5929         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5930         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5931         ///
5932         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5933         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5934         ///
5935         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5936         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5937         ///
5938         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5939         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5940         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5941                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5942         }
5943
5944         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5945                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5946
5947                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5948                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5949                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5950                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5951                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5952                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5953                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5954                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5955
5956                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5957                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5958                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5959                 // succeed.
5960                 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5961                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5962                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5963                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5964                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5965                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5966                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5967                         }
5968                         _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5969                 }?;
5970
5971                 if accept_0conf {
5972                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5973                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5974                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5975                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5976                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5977                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5978                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5979                                 }
5980                         };
5981                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5982                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5983                 } else {
5984                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5985                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5986                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5987                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5988                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5989                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5990                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5991                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5992                                         }
5993                                 };
5994                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5995                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5996                         }
5997                 }
5998
5999                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6000                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6001                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6002
6003                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6004                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6005                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6006                 });
6007
6008                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6009
6010                 Ok(())
6011         }
6012
6013         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6014         /// or 0-conf channels.
6015         ///
6016         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6017         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6018         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6019         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6020                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6021                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6022                 {
6023                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6024                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6025                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6026                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6027                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6028                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6029                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6030                                 }
6031                         }
6032                 }
6033                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6034         }
6035
6036         fn unfunded_channel_count(
6037                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6038         ) -> usize {
6039                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6040                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6041                         match phase {
6042                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6043                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6044                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6045                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6046                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6047                                         {
6048                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6049                                         }
6050                                 },
6051                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6052                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6053                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6054                                         }
6055                                 },
6056                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6057                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6058                                         continue;
6059                                 }
6060                         }
6061                 }
6062                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6063         }
6064
6065         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6066                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6067                 // likely to be lost on restart!
6068                 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6069                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6070                 }
6071
6072                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6073                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6074                 }
6075
6076                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6077                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6078                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6079                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6080                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6081
6082                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6083                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6084                     .ok_or_else(|| {
6085                                 debug_assert!(false);
6086                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6087                         })?;
6088                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6089                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6090
6091                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6092                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6093                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6094                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6095                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6096                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6097                 {
6098                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6099                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6100                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6101                 }
6102
6103                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6104                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6105                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6106                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6107                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6108                 }
6109
6110                 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6111                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6112                 if channel_exists {
6113                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6114                 }
6115
6116                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6117                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6118                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6119                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6120                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6121                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6122                                 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6123                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6124                                 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6125                         }, None));
6126                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6127                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6128                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6129                         });
6130                         return Ok(());
6131                 }
6132
6133                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6134                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6135                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6136                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6137                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6138                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6139                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6140                 {
6141                         Err(e) => {
6142                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6143                         },
6144                         Ok(res) => res
6145                 };
6146
6147                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6148                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6149                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6150                 }
6151                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6152                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6153                 }
6154
6155                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6156                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6157
6158                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6159                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6160                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6161                 });
6162                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6163                 Ok(())
6164         }
6165
6166         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6167                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6168                 // likely to be lost on restart!
6169                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6170                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6171                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6172                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6173                                         debug_assert!(false);
6174                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6175                                 })?;
6176                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6177                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6178                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6179                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6180                                         match phase.get_mut() {
6181                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6182                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6183                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6184                                                 },
6185                                                 _ => {
6186                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6187                                                 }
6188                                         }
6189                                 },
6190                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6191                         }
6192                 };
6193                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6194                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6195                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6196                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6197                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
6198                         output_script,
6199                         user_channel_id: user_id,
6200                 }, None));
6201                 Ok(())
6202         }
6203
6204         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6205                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6206
6207                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6208                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6209                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6210                                 debug_assert!(false);
6211                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6212                         })?;
6213
6214                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6215                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6216                 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6217                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6218                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6219                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6220                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6221                                                 Ok(res) => res,
6222                                                 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6223                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6224                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6225                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6226                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6227                                                         let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6228                                                         let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6229                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6230                                                                 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6231                                                 },
6232                                         }
6233                                 },
6234                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6235                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6236                                 },
6237                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6238                         };
6239
6240                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6241                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6242                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6243                                         "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6244                                         chan.context.channel_id()
6245                                 ))
6246                         },
6247                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6248                                 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6249                                 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6250                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6251                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6252                                                         "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6253                                                         chan.context.channel_id()))
6254                                         },
6255                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6256                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6257                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6258                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6259                                                         mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6260
6261                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6262                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6263                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6264                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
6265                                                         if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6266                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6267                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6268                                                                         msg,
6269                                                                 });
6270                                                         }
6271
6272                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6273                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6274                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6275                                                         } else {
6276                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6277                                                         }
6278                                                         Ok(())
6279                                                 } else {
6280                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6281                                                         log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6282                                                         let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6283                                                                 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6284                                                                 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6285                                                         };
6286                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6287                                                                 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6288                                                                 channel_id));
6289                                                 }
6290                                         }
6291                                 }
6292                         }
6293                 }
6294         }
6295
6296         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6297                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6298                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6299                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6300                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6301                                 debug_assert!(false);
6302                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6303                         })?;
6304
6305                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6306                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6307                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6308                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6309                                 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6310                                         let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6311                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
6312                                                 &self.logger,
6313                                                 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6314                                                 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6315                                         );
6316                                         let res =
6317                                                 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6318                                         match res {
6319                                                 Ok((chan, monitor)) => {
6320                                                         if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6321                                                                 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6322                                                                 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6323                                                                 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6324                                                                 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6325                                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6326                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6327                                                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
6328                                                                 Ok(())
6329                                                         } else {
6330                                                                 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6331                                                                 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6332                                                         }
6333                                                 },
6334                                                 Err((chan, e)) => {
6335                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6336                                                                 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6337                                                         // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6338                                                         // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6339                                                         // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6340                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6341                                                 }
6342                                         }
6343                                 } else {
6344                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6345                                 }
6346                         },
6347                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6348                 }
6349         }
6350
6351         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6352                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6353                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6354                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6355                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6356                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6357                                 debug_assert!(false);
6358                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6359                         })?;
6360                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6361                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6362                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6363                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6364                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6365                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6366                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6367                                                 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6368                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6369                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6370                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6371                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6372                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
6373                                                 });
6374                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6375                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6376                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6377                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6378                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6379                                                 // announcement_signatures.
6380                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6381                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6382                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6383                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6384                                                                 msg,
6385                                                         });
6386                                                 }
6387                                         }
6388
6389                                         {
6390                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6391                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6392                                         }
6393
6394                                         Ok(())
6395                                 } else {
6396                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6397                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6398                                 }
6399                         },
6400                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6401                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6402                         }
6403                 }
6404         }
6405
6406         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6407                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6408                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6409                 {
6410                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6411                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6412                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6413                                         debug_assert!(false);
6414                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6415                                 })?;
6416                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6417                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6418                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6419                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6420                                 match phase {
6421                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6422                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6423                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6424                                                         log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6425                                                                 msg.channel_id,
6426                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6427                                                 }
6428
6429                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6430                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6431                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6432                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6433
6434                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6435                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6436                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6437                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6438                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6439                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6440                                                                 msg,
6441                                                         });
6442                                                 }
6443                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6444                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6445                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6446                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6447                                                 }
6448                                         },
6449                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6450                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
6451                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6452                                                 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6453                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6454                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6455                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6456                                         },
6457                                 }
6458                         } else {
6459                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6460                         }
6461                 }
6462                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6463                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6464                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6465                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6466                 }
6467                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6468                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6469                 }
6470
6471                 Ok(())
6472         }
6473
6474         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6475                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6476                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6477                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6478                                 debug_assert!(false);
6479                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6480                         })?;
6481                 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6482                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6483                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6484                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6485                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6486                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6487                                                 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6488                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6489                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6490                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6491                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6492                                                                 msg,
6493                                                         });
6494                                                 }
6495                                                 if tx.is_some() {
6496                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6497                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6498                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6499                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6500                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6501                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6502                                                 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6503                                         } else {
6504                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6505                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6506                                         }
6507                                 },
6508                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6509                         }
6510                 };
6511                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6512                         let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6513                         log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6514                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6515                 }
6516                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6517                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6518                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6519                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6520                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6521                                         msg: update
6522                                 });
6523                         }
6524                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6525                 }
6526                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6527                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6528                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6529                 }
6530                 Ok(())
6531         }
6532
6533         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6534                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6535                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6536                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6537                 //
6538                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6539                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6540                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6541                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6542
6543                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6544                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6545
6546                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6547                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6548                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6549                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6550                                 debug_assert!(false);
6551                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6552                         })?;
6553                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6554                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6555                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6556                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6557                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6558                                         let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6559                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6560                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6561                                                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6562                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6563                                                         ),
6564                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6565                                         };
6566                                         let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6567                                                 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6568                                                 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6569                                                 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6570                                                 match pending_forward_info {
6571                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6572                                                                 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6573                                                         }) => {
6574                                                                 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6575                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6576                                                                 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6577                                                                         let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6578                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6579                                                                 } else {
6580                                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6581                                                                 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6582                                                                 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6583                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6584                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6585                                                                         reason
6586                                                                 };
6587                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6588                                                         },
6589                                                         _ => pending_forward_info
6590                                                 }
6591                                         };
6592                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6593                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6594                                 } else {
6595                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6596                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6597                                 }
6598                         },
6599                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6600                 }
6601                 Ok(())
6602         }
6603
6604         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6605                 let funding_txo;
6606                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6607                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6608                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6609                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6610                                         debug_assert!(false);
6611                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6612                                 })?;
6613                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6614                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6615                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6616                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6617                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6618                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6619                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6620                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6621                                                         log_trace!(logger,
6622                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6623                                                                 msg.channel_id);
6624                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6625                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6626                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6627                                                 }
6628                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6629                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6630                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6631                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6632                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6633                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6634                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6635                                                 res
6636                                         } else {
6637                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6638                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6639                                         }
6640                                 },
6641                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6642                         }
6643                 };
6644                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6645                 Ok(())
6646         }
6647
6648         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6649                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6650                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6651                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6652                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6653                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6654                                 debug_assert!(false);
6655                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6656                         })?;
6657                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6658                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6659                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6660                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6661                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6662                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6663                                 } else {
6664                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6665                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6666                                 }
6667                         },
6668                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6669                 }
6670                 Ok(())
6671         }
6672
6673         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6674                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6675                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6676                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6677                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6678                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6679                                 debug_assert!(false);
6680                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6681                         })?;
6682                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6683                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6684                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6685                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6686                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6687                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6688                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6689                                 }
6690                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6691                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6692                                 } else {
6693                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6694                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6695                                 }
6696                                 Ok(())
6697                         },
6698                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6699                 }
6700         }
6701
6702         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6703                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6704                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6705                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6706                                 debug_assert!(false);
6707                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6708                         })?;
6709                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6710                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6711                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6712                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6713                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6714                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6715                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6716                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6717                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6718                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6719                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6720                                         }
6721                                         Ok(())
6722                                 } else {
6723                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6724                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6725                                 }
6726                         },
6727                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6728                 }
6729         }
6730
6731         #[inline]
6732         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6733                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6734                         let mut push_forward_event = false;
6735                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6736                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6737                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6738                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6739                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6740                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6741                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6742                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6743                                         };
6744                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6745                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6746
6747                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6748                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6749                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6750                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6751                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6752                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6753                                                 },
6754                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6755                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6756                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6757                                                         {
6758                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6759                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6760                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6761                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6762                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6763                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6764                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6765                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6766                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6767                                                                                         intercept_id
6768                                                                                 }, None));
6769                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6770                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6771                                                                         },
6772                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6773                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6774                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6775                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6776                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6777                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6778                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6779                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6780                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6781                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
6782                                                                                         blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6783                                                                                 });
6784
6785                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6786                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6787                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6788                                                                                 ));
6789                                                                         }
6790                                                                 }
6791                                                         } else {
6792                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6793                                                                 // payments are being processed.
6794                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6795                                                                         push_forward_event = true;
6796                                                                 }
6797                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6798                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6799                                                         }
6800                                                 }
6801                                         }
6802                                 }
6803                         }
6804
6805                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6806                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6807                         }
6808
6809                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6810                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6811                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6812                         }
6813                         if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6814                 }
6815         }
6816
6817         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6818                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6819                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6820                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6821                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6822                 ).count();
6823                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6824                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6825                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6826                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6827                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6828                 // real by taking more time.
6829                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6830                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6831                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6832                         }, None));
6833                 }
6834         }
6835
6836         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6837         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6838         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6839         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6840         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6841                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6842                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6843         ) -> bool {
6844                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6845                         .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6846                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6847                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6848                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
6849                                 counterparty_node_id,
6850                         })
6851                 })
6852         }
6853
6854         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6855         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6856                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6857         ) -> bool {
6858                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6859                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6860                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6861                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6862
6863                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6864                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6865                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6866                         }
6867                 }
6868                 false
6869         }
6870
6871         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6872                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6873                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6874                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6875                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6876                                         debug_assert!(false);
6877                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6878                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6879                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6880                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6881                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6882                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6883                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6884                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6885                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6886                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6887                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6888                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
6889                                                 } else { false };
6890                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6891                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6892                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6893                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6894                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6895                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6896                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6897                                                 }
6898                                                 htlcs_to_fail
6899                                         } else {
6900                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6901                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6902                                         }
6903                                 },
6904                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6905                         }
6906                 };
6907                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6908                 Ok(())
6909         }
6910
6911         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6912                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6913                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6914                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6915                                 debug_assert!(false);
6916                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6917                         })?;
6918                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6919                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6920                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6921                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6922                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6923                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6924                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6925                                 } else {
6926                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6927                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6928                                 }
6929                         },
6930                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6931                 }
6932                 Ok(())
6933         }
6934
6935         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6936                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6937                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6938                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6939                                 debug_assert!(false);
6940                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6941                         })?;
6942                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6943                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6944                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6945                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6946                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6947                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6948                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6949                                         }
6950
6951                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6952                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6953                                                         &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6954                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
6955                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
6956                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6957                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6958                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6959                                         });
6960                                 } else {
6961                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6962                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6963                                 }
6964                         },
6965                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6966                 }
6967                 Ok(())
6968         }
6969
6970         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6971         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6972                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6973                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6974                         None => {
6975                                 // It's not a local channel
6976                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6977                         }
6978                 };
6979                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6980                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6981                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6982                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6983                 }
6984                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6985                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6986                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6987                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6988                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6989                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6990                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6991                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6992                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6993                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6994                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6995                                                 }
6996                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6997                                         }
6998                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6999                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7000                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7001                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7002                                         } else {
7003                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7004                                                 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7005                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7006                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7007                                                 // persisting.
7008                                                 if !did_change {
7009                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7010                                                 }
7011                                         }
7012                                 } else {
7013                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7014                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7015                                 }
7016                         },
7017                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7018                 }
7019                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7020         }
7021
7022         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7023                 let htlc_forwards;
7024                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7025                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7026
7027                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7028                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7029                                         debug_assert!(false);
7030                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7031                                                 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7032                                                 msg.channel_id
7033                                         )
7034                                 })?;
7035                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7036                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7037                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7038                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7039                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7040                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7041                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7042                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7043                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7044                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7045                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7046                                                         msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7047                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7048                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
7049                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7050                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7051                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7052                                                                 msg,
7053                                                         });
7054                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7055                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7056                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7057                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
7058                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7059                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7060                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7061                                                                         msg,
7062                                                                 });
7063                                                         }
7064                                                 }
7065                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7066                                                 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7067                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7068                                                         Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7069                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7070                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7071                                                 }
7072                                                 need_lnd_workaround
7073                                         } else {
7074                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7075                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7076                                         }
7077                                 },
7078                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7079                                         log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7080                                                 msg.channel_id);
7081                                         // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7082                                         // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7083                                         // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7084                                         // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7085                                         // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7086                                         // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7087                                         //
7088                                         // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7089                                         // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7090                                         // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7091                                         // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7092                                         // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7093                                         // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7094                                         // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7095                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7096                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7097                                                 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7098                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7099                                                         next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7100                                                         next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7101                                                         your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7102                                                         my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7103                                                         next_funding_txid: None,
7104                                                 },
7105                                         });
7106                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7107                                                 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7108                                                         counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7109                                         )
7110                                 }
7111                         }
7112                 };
7113
7114                 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7115                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7116                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7117                         persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7118                 }
7119
7120                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7121                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7122                 }
7123                 Ok(persist)
7124         }
7125
7126         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7127         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7128                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7129
7130                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7131                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7132                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7133                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7134                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7135                                 match monitor_event {
7136                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7137                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7138                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7139                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7140                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7141                                                 } else {
7142                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7143                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7144                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7145                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7146                                                 }
7147                                         },
7148                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7149                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7150                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7151                                                         None => {
7152                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7153                                                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7154                                                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7155                                                                 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7156                                                         }
7157                                                 };
7158                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7159                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7160                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7161                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7162                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7163                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7164                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7165                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7166                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7167                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7168                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7169                                                                                                 msg: update
7170                                                                                         });
7171                                                                                 }
7172                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7173                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7174                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7175                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7176                                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7177                                                                                         },
7178                                                                                 });
7179                                                                         }
7180                                                                 }
7181                                                         }
7182                                                 }
7183                                         },
7184                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7185                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7186                                         },
7187                                 }
7188                         }
7189                 }
7190
7191                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7192                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7193                 }
7194
7195                 has_pending_monitor_events
7196         }
7197
7198         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7199         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7200         /// update events as a separate process method here.
7201         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
7202         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7203                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7204                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7205         }
7206
7207         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7208         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7209         /// update was applied.
7210         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7211                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7212                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7213
7214                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7215                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7216                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7217                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7218                 'peer_loop: loop {
7219                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7220                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7221                                 'chan_loop: loop {
7222                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7223                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7224                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7225                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7226                                         ) {
7227                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7228                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7229                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7230                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7231                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7232                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7233                                                 }
7234                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7235                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
7236
7237                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7238                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7239                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
7240                                                 }
7241                                         }
7242                                         break 'chan_loop;
7243                                 }
7244                         }
7245                         break 'peer_loop;
7246                 }
7247
7248                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7249                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7250                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7251                 }
7252
7253                 has_update
7254         }
7255
7256         /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7257         /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7258         ///
7259         /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7260         /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7261         ///
7262         /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7263         #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7264                      // actually finish implementing it fully.
7265         pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7266                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7267
7268                 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7269                         let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7270                         match phase {
7271                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7272                                         let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7273                                         if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7274                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7275                                                         node_id,
7276                                                         updates,
7277                                                 });
7278                                         }
7279                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7280                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7281                                                         node_id,
7282                                                         msg,
7283                                                 });
7284                                         }
7285                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7286                                                 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7287                                         }
7288                                 }
7289                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7290                                         if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7291                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7292                                                         node_id,
7293                                                         msg,
7294                                                 });
7295                                         }
7296                                 }
7297                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7298                         }
7299                 };
7300
7301                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7302                 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7303                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7304                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7305                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7306                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7307                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7308                                 }
7309                         }
7310                 } else {
7311                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7312                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7313                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7314                                 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7315                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7316                                 }
7317                         }
7318                 }
7319         }
7320
7321         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7322         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7323         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7324         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7325                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7326                 let mut has_update = false;
7327                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7328                 {
7329                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7330
7331                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7332                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7333                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7334                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7335                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7336                                         match phase {
7337                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7338                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7339                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7340                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7341                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7342                                                                                 has_update = true;
7343                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7344                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7345                                                                                 });
7346                                                                         }
7347                                                                         debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7348                                                                         if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7349                                                                                 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7350                                                                         }
7351                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7352                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7353                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7354                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7355                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7356                                                                                                 msg: update
7357                                                                                         });
7358                                                                                 }
7359
7360                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7361
7362                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7363                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7364                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7365                                                                                 false
7366                                                                         } else { true }
7367                                                                 },
7368                                                                 Err(e) => {
7369                                                                         has_update = true;
7370                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7371                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7372                                                                         !close_channel
7373                                                                 }
7374                                                         }
7375                                                 },
7376                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7377                                         }
7378                                 });
7379                         }
7380                 }
7381
7382                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7383                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7384                 }
7385
7386                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7387                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7388                 }
7389
7390                 has_update
7391         }
7392
7393         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7394         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7395         /// Channel object.
7396         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7397                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7398                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7399                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7400                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
7401                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7402                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7403                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7404                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7405                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7406                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7407                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7408                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
7409                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7410                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7411                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7412                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7413                                         });
7414                         }
7415                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7416                 }
7417         }
7418
7419         /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7420         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7421         /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7422         ///
7423         /// # Privacy
7424         ///
7425         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7426         /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7427         /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7428         /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7429         ///
7430         /// # Limitations
7431         ///
7432         /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7433         /// reply path.
7434         ///
7435         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7436         ///
7437         /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7438         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7439         pub fn create_offer_builder(
7440                 &self, description: String
7441         ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7442                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7443                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7444                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7445                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7446                 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7447
7448                 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7449                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7450                         .path(path)
7451         }
7452
7453         /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7454         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7455         ///
7456         /// # Payment
7457         ///
7458         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7459         /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7460         ///
7461         /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7462         /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7463         /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7464         /// expired.
7465         ///
7466         /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7467         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7468         /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7469         ///
7470         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7471         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7472         ///
7473         /// # Privacy
7474         ///
7475         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7476         /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7477         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7478         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7479         ///
7480         /// # Limitations
7481         ///
7482         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7483         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7484         ///
7485         /// # Errors
7486         ///
7487         /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7488         /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7489         ///
7490         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7491         ///
7492         /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7493         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7494         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7495         pub fn create_refund_builder(
7496                 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7497                 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7498         ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7499                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7500                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7501                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7502                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7503                 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7504
7505                 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7506                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7507                 )?
7508                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7509                         .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7510                         .path(path);
7511
7512                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7513                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7514                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7515                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7516                         )
7517                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7518
7519                 Ok(builder)
7520         }
7521
7522         /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7523         /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7524         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7525         ///
7526         /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7527         /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7528         /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7529         /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7530         ///   [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7531         /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7532         /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7533         ///
7534         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7535         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7536         ///
7537         /// # Payment
7538         ///
7539         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7540         /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7541         /// been sent.
7542         ///
7543         /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7544         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7545         /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7546         ///
7547         /// # Privacy
7548         ///
7549         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7550         /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7551         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7552         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7553         ///
7554         /// # Limitations
7555         ///
7556         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7557         /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7558         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7559         ///
7560         /// # Errors
7561         ///
7562         /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7563         /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7564         ///
7565         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7566         /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7567         /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7568         /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7569         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7570         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7571         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7572         pub fn pay_for_offer(
7573                 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7574                 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7575                 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7576         ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7577                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7578                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7579                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7580
7581                 let builder = offer
7582                         .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7583                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7584                 let builder = match quantity {
7585                         None => builder,
7586                         Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7587                 };
7588                 let builder = match amount_msats {
7589                         None => builder,
7590                         Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7591                 };
7592                 let builder = match payer_note {
7593                         None => builder,
7594                         Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7595                 };
7596
7597                 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7598                 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7599
7600                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7601                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7602                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7603                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7604                         )
7605                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7606
7607                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7608                 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7609                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7610                                 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7611                                 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7612                                 Some(reply_path),
7613                         );
7614                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7615                 } else {
7616                         // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7617                         // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7618                         // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7619                         const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7620                         for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7621                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7622                                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7623                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7624                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7625                                 );
7626                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7627                         }
7628                 }
7629
7630                 Ok(())
7631         }
7632
7633         /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7634         /// message.
7635         ///
7636         /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7637         /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7638         /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7639         ///
7640         /// # Limitations
7641         ///
7642         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7643         /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7644         /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7645         /// received and no retries will be made.
7646         ///
7647         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7648         pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7649                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7650                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7651                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7652
7653                 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7654                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7655
7656                 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7657                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7658                                 let payment_paths = vec![
7659                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7660                                 ];
7661                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7662                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7663                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7664                                 )?;
7665                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7666                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7667                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7668                                 );
7669                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7670                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7671                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7672                                 )?;
7673                                 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7674                                 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7675
7676                                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7677                                 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7678                                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7679                                                 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7680                                                 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7681                                                 Some(reply_path),
7682                                         );
7683                                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7684                                 } else {
7685                                         for path in refund.paths() {
7686                                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7687                                                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7688                                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7689                                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7690                                                 );
7691                                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7692                                         }
7693                                 }
7694
7695                                 Ok(())
7696                         },
7697                         Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7698                 }
7699         }
7700
7701         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7702         /// to pay us.
7703         ///
7704         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7705         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7706         ///
7707         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7708         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7709         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7710         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7711         ///
7712         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7713         ///
7714         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7715         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7716         ///
7717         /// # Note
7718         ///
7719         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7720         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7721         ///
7722         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7723         ///
7724         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7725         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7726         ///
7727         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7728         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7729         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7730         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7731         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7732         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7733         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7734                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7735                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7736                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7737                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7738         }
7739
7740         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7741         /// stored external to LDK.
7742         ///
7743         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7744         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7745         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7746         ///
7747         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7748         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7749         /// payments.
7750         ///
7751         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7752         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7753         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7754         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7755         ///
7756         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7757         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7758         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7759         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7760         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7761         ///
7762         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7763         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7764         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7765         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7766         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7767         ///
7768         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7769         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7770         ///
7771         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7772         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7773         ///
7774         /// # Note
7775         ///
7776         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7777         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7778         ///
7779         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7780         ///
7781         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7782         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7783         ///
7784         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7785         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7786         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7787                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7788                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7789                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7790                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
7791         }
7792
7793         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7794         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7795         ///
7796         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7797         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7798                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7799         }
7800
7801         /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7802         /// node.
7803         fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7804                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7805                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7806                 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7807         }
7808
7809         /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7810         /// node.
7811         fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7812                 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7813         ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7814                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7815                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7816
7817                 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7818                 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7819                 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7820                         payment_secret,
7821                         payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7822                                 max_cltv_expiry,
7823                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7824                         },
7825                 };
7826                 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7827                 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7828                         payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7829                 ).unwrap()
7830         }
7831
7832         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7833         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7834         ///
7835         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7836         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7837                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7838                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7839                 loop {
7840                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7841                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7842                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7843                                 Some(_) => continue,
7844                                 None => return scid_candidate
7845                         }
7846                 }
7847         }
7848
7849         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7850         ///
7851         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7852         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7853                 PhantomRouteHints {
7854                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7855                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7856                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7857                 }
7858         }
7859
7860         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7861         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7862         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7863         ///
7864         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7865         /// times to get a unique scid.
7866         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7867                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7868                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7869                 loop {
7870                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7871                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7872                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7873                         return scid_candidate
7874                 }
7875         }
7876
7877         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7878         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7879         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7880                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7881
7882                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7883                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7884                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7885                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7886                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7887                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7888                         ) {
7889                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7890                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7891                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7892                                         }
7893                                 }
7894                         }
7895                 }
7896
7897                 inflight_htlcs
7898         }
7899
7900         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7901         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7902                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7903                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7904                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7905                 events.into_inner()
7906         }
7907
7908         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7909         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7910                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7911                 events.push_back((event, None));
7912         }
7913
7914         #[cfg(test)]
7915         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7916                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7917                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7918         }
7919
7920         #[cfg(test)]
7921         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7922                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7923         }
7924
7925         #[cfg(test)]
7926         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7927                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7928         }
7929
7930         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7931         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7932         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7933         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7934         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7935                 let logger = WithContext::from(
7936                         &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7937                 );
7938                 loop {
7939                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7940                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7941                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7942                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7943                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7944                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7945                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7946                                                 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7947                                         {
7948                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7949                                         }
7950                                 }
7951
7952                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7953                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7954                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7955                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7956                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7957                                         log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7958                                                 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7959                                         break;
7960                                 }
7961
7962                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7963                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7964                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7965                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7966                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7967                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7968                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7969                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7970                                                         if further_update_exists {
7971                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7972                                                                 // top of the loop.
7973                                                                 continue;
7974                                                         }
7975                                                 } else {
7976                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7977                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7978                                                 }
7979                                         }
7980                                 }
7981                         } else {
7982                                 log_debug!(logger,
7983                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7984                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7985                         }
7986                         break;
7987                 }
7988         }
7989
7990         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7991                 for action in actions {
7992                         match action {
7993                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7994                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7995                                 } => {
7996                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7997                                 }
7998                         }
7999                 }
8000         }
8001
8002         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8003         /// using the given event handler.
8004         ///
8005         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8006         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8007                 &self, handler: H
8008         ) {
8009                 let mut ev;
8010                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8011         }
8012 }
8013
8014 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8015 where
8016         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8017         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8018         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8019         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8020         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8021         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8022         R::Target: Router,
8023         L::Target: Logger,
8024 {
8025         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8026         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8027         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8028         /// is always placed next to each other.
8029         ///
8030         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8031         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8032         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8033         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8034         ///
8035         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8036         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8037         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8038         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8039                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8040                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8041                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8042
8043                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8044                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8045                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8046                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8047                         }
8048
8049                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8050                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8051                         }
8052                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8053                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8054                         }
8055
8056                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8057                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8058                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8059                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8060                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8061                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8062                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8063                                 }
8064                         }
8065
8066                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8067                                 events.replace(pending_events);
8068                         }
8069
8070                         result
8071                 });
8072                 events.into_inner()
8073         }
8074 }
8075
8076 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8077 where
8078         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8079         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8080         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8081         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8082         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8083         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8084         R::Target: Router,
8085         L::Target: Logger,
8086 {
8087         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8088         ///
8089         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8090         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8091         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8092                 let mut ev;
8093                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8094         }
8095 }
8096
8097 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8098 where
8099         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8100         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8101         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8102         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8103         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8104         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8105         R::Target: Router,
8106         L::Target: Logger,
8107 {
8108         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8109                 {
8110                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8111                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8112                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8113                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8114                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8115                 }
8116
8117                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8118                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8119         }
8120
8121         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8122                 let _persistence_guard =
8123                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8124                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8125                 let new_height = height - 1;
8126                 {
8127                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8128                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8129                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8130                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8131                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8132                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8133                 }
8134
8135                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8136         }
8137 }
8138
8139 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8140 where
8141         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8142         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8143         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8144         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8145         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8146         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8147         R::Target: Router,
8148         L::Target: Logger,
8149 {
8150         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8151                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8152                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8153                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8154
8155                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8156                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8157
8158                 let _persistence_guard =
8159                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8160                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8161                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8162                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8163
8164                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8165                 if height < last_best_block_height {
8166                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8167                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8168                 }
8169         }
8170
8171         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8172                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8173                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8174                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8175
8176                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8177                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8178
8179                 let _persistence_guard =
8180                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8181                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8182                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8183
8184                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8185
8186                 macro_rules! max_time {
8187                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
8188                                 loop {
8189                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8190                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8191                                         // having an explicit local time source.
8192                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8193                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8194                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8195                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8196                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8197                                                 break;
8198                                         }
8199                                 }
8200                         }
8201                 }
8202                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8203                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8204                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8205                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8206                 });
8207         }
8208
8209         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8210                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8211                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8212                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8213                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8214                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8215                                 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8216                                 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8217                                 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8218                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8219                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8220                                 }
8221                         }
8222                 }
8223                 res
8224         }
8225
8226         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8227                 let _persistence_guard =
8228                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8229                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8230                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8231                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8232                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8233                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8234                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8235                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8236                 });
8237         }
8238 }
8239
8240 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8241 where
8242         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8243         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8244         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8245         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8246         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8247         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8248         R::Target: Router,
8249         L::Target: Logger,
8250 {
8251         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8252         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8253         /// the function.
8254         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8255                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8256                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8257                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8258                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8259
8260                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8261                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8262                 {
8263                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8264                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8265                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8266                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8267                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8268                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8269                                         match phase {
8270                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
8271                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8272                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8273                                                         let res = f(channel);
8274                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8275                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8276                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8277                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8278                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8279                                                                 }
8280                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8281                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8282                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8283                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
8284                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8285                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8286                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8287                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8288                                                                                                 msg,
8289                                                                                         });
8290                                                                                 }
8291                                                                         } else {
8292                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8293                                                                         }
8294                                                                 }
8295
8296                                                                 {
8297                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8298                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8299                                                                 }
8300
8301                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8302                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8303                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8304                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8305                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
8306                                                                         });
8307                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8308                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8309                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8310                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
8311                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8312                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8313                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8314                                                                                         });
8315                                                                                 }
8316                                                                         }
8317                                                                 }
8318                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8319                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8320                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8321                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8322                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8323                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8324                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8325                                                                                 // is always consistent.
8326                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8327                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8328                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8329                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8330                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8331                                                                         }
8332                                                                 }
8333                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8334                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8335                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8336                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8337                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8338                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8339                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8340                                                                                 msg: update
8341                                                                         });
8342                                                                 }
8343                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8344                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8345                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8346                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8347                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8348                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8349                                                                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8350                                                                                         data: reason_message,
8351                                                                                 })
8352                                                                         },
8353                                                                 });
8354                                                                 return false;
8355                                                         }
8356                                                         true
8357                                                 }
8358                                         }
8359                                 });
8360                         }
8361                 }
8362
8363                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8364                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8365                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8366                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8367                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8368                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8369                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8370                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8371                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8372                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8373
8374                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8375                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8376                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8377                                                 false
8378                                         } else { true }
8379                                 });
8380                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8381                         });
8382
8383                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8384                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8385                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8386                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8387                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8388                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8389                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8390                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8391                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8392                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8393                                                 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8394                                         });
8395
8396                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8397                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8398                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
8399                                         };
8400                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8401                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8402                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8403                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
8404                                                 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8405                                         );
8406                                         log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8407                                         false
8408                                 } else { true }
8409                         });
8410                 }
8411
8412                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8413
8414                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8415                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8416                 }
8417         }
8418
8419         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8420         /// may have events that need processing.
8421         ///
8422         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8423         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8424         ///
8425         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8426         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8427         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8428                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8429         }
8430
8431         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8432         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8433                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8434         }
8435
8436         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8437         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8438                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8439         }
8440
8441         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8442         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8443         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8444                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8445         }
8446
8447         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8448         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8449         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8450                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8451         }
8452
8453         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8454         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8455         ///
8456         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8457         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8458         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8459         pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8460                 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8461         }
8462
8463         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8464         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8465         fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8466                 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8467         }
8468
8469         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8470         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8471         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8472                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8473         }
8474
8475         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8476         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8477         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8478                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8479         }
8480
8481         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8482         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8483         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8484                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8485         }
8486 }
8487
8488 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8489         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8490 where
8491         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8492         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8493         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8494         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8495         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8496         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8497         R::Target: Router,
8498         L::Target: Logger,
8499 {
8500         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8501                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8502                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8503                 // change to the contents.
8504                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8505                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8506                         let persist = match &res {
8507                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8508                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8509                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
8510                                 },
8511                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8512                         };
8513                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8514                         persist
8515                 });
8516         }
8517
8518         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8519                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8520                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8521                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8522         }
8523
8524         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8525                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8526                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8527                 // change to the contents.
8528                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8529                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8530                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8531                 });
8532         }
8533
8534         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8535                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8536                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8537                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8538         }
8539
8540         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8541                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8542                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8543         }
8544
8545         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8546                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8547                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8548         }
8549
8550         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8551                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8552                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8553                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8554                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8555                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8556                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8557                         let persist = match &res {
8558                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8559                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8560                         };
8561                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8562                         persist
8563                 });
8564         }
8565
8566         fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8567                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8568                         "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8569                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8570         }
8571
8572         fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8573                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8574                         "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8575                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8576         }
8577
8578         fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8579                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8580                         "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8581                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8582         }
8583
8584         fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8585                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8586                         "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8587                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8588         }
8589
8590         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8591                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8592                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8593         }
8594
8595         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8596                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8597                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8598         }
8599
8600         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8601                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8602                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8603                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8604                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8605                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8606                         let persist = match &res {
8607                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8608                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8609                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8610                         };
8611                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8612                         persist
8613                 });
8614         }
8615
8616         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8617                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8618                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8619         }
8620
8621         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8622                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8623                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8624                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8625                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8626                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8627                         let persist = match &res {
8628                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8629                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8630                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8631                         };
8632                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8633                         persist
8634                 });
8635         }
8636
8637         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8638                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8639                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8640                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8641                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8642                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8643                         let persist = match &res {
8644                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8645                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8646                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8647                         };
8648                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8649                         persist
8650                 });
8651         }
8652
8653         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8654                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8655                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8656         }
8657
8658         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8659                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8660                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8661         }
8662
8663         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8664                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8665                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8666                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8667                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8668                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8669                         let persist = match &res {
8670                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8671                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8672                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8673                         };
8674                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8675                         persist
8676                 });
8677         }
8678
8679         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8680                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8681                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8682         }
8683
8684         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8685                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8686                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8687                                 persist
8688                         } else {
8689                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8690                         }
8691                 });
8692         }
8693
8694         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8695                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8696                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8697                         let persist = match &res {
8698                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8699                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8700                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8701                         };
8702                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8703                         persist
8704                 });
8705         }
8706
8707         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8708                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8709                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8710                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8711                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8712                 let remove_peer = {
8713                         log_debug!(
8714                                 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8715                                 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8716                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8717                         );
8718                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8719                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8720                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8721                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8722                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8723                                         let context = match phase {
8724                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8725                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8726                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8727                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8728                                                                 return true;
8729                                                         }
8730                                                         &mut chan.context
8731                                                 },
8732                                                 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8733                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8734                                                         &mut chan.context
8735                                                 },
8736                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8737                                                         &mut chan.context
8738                                                 },
8739                                         };
8740                                         // Clean up for removal.
8741                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8742                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8743                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8744                                         false
8745                                 });
8746                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8747                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8748                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8749                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8750                                         match msg {
8751                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
8752                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8753                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8754                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8755                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8756                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
8757                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8758                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8759                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
8760                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8761                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8762                                                 // Quiescence
8763                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8764                                                 // Splicing
8765                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8766                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8767                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8768                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8769                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8770                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8771                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8772                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8773                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8774                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8775                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8776                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8777                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8778                                                 // Channel Operations
8779                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8780                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8781                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8782                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8783                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8784                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8785                                                 // Gossip
8786                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8787                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8788                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8789                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8790                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8791                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8792                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8793                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8794                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8795                                         }
8796                                 });
8797                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8798                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8799                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8800                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8801                 };
8802                 if remove_peer {
8803                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8804                 }
8805                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8806
8807                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8808                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8809                 }
8810         }
8811
8812         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8813                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8814                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8815                         log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8816                         return Err(());
8817                 }
8818
8819                 let mut res = Ok(());
8820
8821                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8822                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8823                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8824                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8825                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8826                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8827                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8828
8829                         {
8830                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8831                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8832                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8833                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
8834                                                         res = Err(());
8835                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8836                                                 }
8837                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8838                                                         channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8839                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8840                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8841                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8842                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8843                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8844                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8845                                                         is_connected: true,
8846                                                 }));
8847                                         },
8848                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8849                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8850                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8851
8852                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8853                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8854                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8855                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8856                                                 {
8857                                                         res = Err(());
8858                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8859                                                 }
8860
8861                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8862                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8863                                         },
8864                                 }
8865                         }
8866
8867                         log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8868
8869                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8870                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8871                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8872                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8873                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8874
8875                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8876                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8877                                                 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8878                                                 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8879                                                 // worry about closing and removing them.
8880                                                 debug_assert!(false);
8881                                                 None
8882                                         }
8883                                 ).for_each(|chan| {
8884                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8885                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8886                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8887                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
8888                                         });
8889                                 });
8890                         }
8891
8892                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8893                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8894                 });
8895                 res
8896         }
8897
8898         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8899                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8900
8901                 match &msg.data as &str {
8902                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8903                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
8904                         {
8905                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8906                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8907                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8908                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8909                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8910                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8911                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8912                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8913                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8914                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8915                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8916                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8917                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8918                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8919                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8920                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8921                                                                 msg,
8922                                                         });
8923                                                 }
8924                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8925                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8926                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8927                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8928                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8929                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8930                                                                 },
8931                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
8932                                                         }
8933                                                 });
8934                                         }
8935                                 }
8936                                 return;
8937                         }
8938                         _ => {}
8939                 }
8940
8941                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8942                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8943                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8944                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8945                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8946                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8947                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8948                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8949                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8950                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8951                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8952                         };
8953                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
8954                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8955                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8956                         }
8957                 } else {
8958                         {
8959                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8960                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8961                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8962                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8963                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8964                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8965                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8966                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8967                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8968                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8969                                                         msg,
8970                                                 });
8971                                                 return;
8972                                         }
8973                                 }
8974                         }
8975
8976                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8977                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8978                 }
8979         }
8980
8981         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8982                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8983         }
8984
8985         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8986                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8987         }
8988
8989         fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8990                 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8991         }
8992
8993         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8994                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8995                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8996                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8997         }
8998
8999         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9000                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9001                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9002                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9003         }
9004
9005         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9006                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9007                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9008                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9009         }
9010
9011         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9012                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9013                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9014                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9015         }
9016
9017         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9018                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9019                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9020                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9021         }
9022
9023         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9024                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9025                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9026                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9027         }
9028
9029         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9030                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9031                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9032                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9033         }
9034
9035         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9036                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9037                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9038                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9039         }
9040
9041         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9042                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9043                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9044                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9045         }
9046 }
9047
9048 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9049 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9050 where
9051         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9052         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9053         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9054         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9055         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9056         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9057         R::Target: Router,
9058         L::Target: Logger,
9059 {
9060         fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9061                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9062                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9063
9064                 match message {
9065                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9066                                 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9067                                         &invoice_request
9068                                 ) {
9069                                         Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
9070                                         Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9071                                 };
9072                                 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9073                                         Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9074                                         Err(()) => {
9075                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9076                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9077                                         },
9078                                 };
9079                                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9080
9081                                 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
9082                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
9083                                                 let payment_paths = vec![
9084                                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9085                                                 ];
9086                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9087                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9088                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash
9089                                                 );
9090                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9091                                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9092                                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9093                                                 );
9094                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9095                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9096                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9097                                                 );
9098                                                 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9099                                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9100                                                         Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9101                                                 }
9102                                         },
9103                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
9104                                                 let payment_paths = vec![
9105                                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9106                                                 ];
9107                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9108                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9109                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9110                                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9111                                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9112                                                 );
9113                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9114                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9115                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9116                                                 );
9117                                                 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9118                                                         .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9119                                                         .and_then(|invoice|
9120                                                                 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9121                                                                         Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9122                                                                         Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9123                                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9124                                                                         )),
9125                                                                         Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9126                                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9127                                                                         )),
9128                                                                 });
9129                                                 match response {
9130                                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9131                                                         Err(error) => Some(error),
9132                                                 }
9133                                         },
9134                                         Err(()) => {
9135                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
9136                                         },
9137                                 }
9138                         },
9139                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9140                                 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9141                                         Err(()) => {
9142                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9143                                         },
9144                                         Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9145                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9146                                         },
9147                                         Ok(payment_id) => {
9148                                                 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9149                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9150                                                         Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9151                                                 } else {
9152                                                         None
9153                                                 }
9154                                         },
9155                                 }
9156                         },
9157                         OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9158                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9159                                 None
9160                         },
9161                 }
9162         }
9163
9164         fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9165                 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9166         }
9167 }
9168
9169 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9170 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9171 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9172         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9173         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9174         node_features
9175 }
9176
9177 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9178 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9179 ///
9180 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9181 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9182 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9183 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9184         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9185 }
9186
9187 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9188 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9189 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9190         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9191 }
9192
9193 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9194 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9195 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9196         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9197 }
9198
9199 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9200 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9201 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9202         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9203 }
9204
9205 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9206 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9207 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9208         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9209         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9210         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9211         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9212         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9213         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9214         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9215         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9216         features.set_payment_secret_required();
9217         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9218         features.set_wumbo_optional();
9219         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9220         features.set_channel_type_optional();
9221         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9222         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9223         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9224                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9225         }
9226         features
9227 }
9228
9229 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9230 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9231
9232 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9233         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9234         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9235         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9236 });
9237
9238 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9239         (2, node_id, required),
9240         (4, features, required),
9241         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9242         (8, forwarding_info, option),
9243         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9244         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9245 });
9246
9247 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9248         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9249                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9250                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9251                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9252                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9253                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9254                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9255                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
9256                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
9257                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
9258                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9259                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9260                         (7, self.config, option),
9261                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9262                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
9263                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9264                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9265                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9266                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9267                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9268                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9269                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9270                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9271                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9272                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9273                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9274                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9275                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
9276                         (32, self.is_public, required),
9277                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9278                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9279                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9280                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9281                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9282                 });
9283                 Ok(())
9284         }
9285 }
9286
9287 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9288         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9289                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9290                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9291                         (2, channel_id, required),
9292                         (3, channel_type, option),
9293                         (4, counterparty, required),
9294                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9295                         (6, funding_txo, option),
9296                         (7, config, option),
9297                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
9298                         (9, confirmations, option),
9299                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9300                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9301                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9302                         (16, balance_msat, required),
9303                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9304                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9305                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9306                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9307                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9308                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9309                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
9310                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9311                         (26, is_outbound, required),
9312                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9313                         (30, is_usable, required),
9314                         (32, is_public, required),
9315                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9316                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9317                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9318                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9319                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9320                 });
9321
9322                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9323                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9324                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9325                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9326                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9327
9328                 Ok(Self {
9329                         inbound_scid_alias,
9330                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9331                         channel_type,
9332                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9333                         outbound_scid_alias,
9334                         funding_txo,
9335                         config,
9336                         short_channel_id,
9337                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9338                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9339                         user_channel_id,
9340                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9341                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9342                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9343                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9344                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9345                         confirmations_required,
9346                         confirmations,
9347                         force_close_spend_delay,
9348                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9349                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9350                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9351                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9352                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9353                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9354                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9355                         channel_shutdown_state,
9356                 })
9357         }
9358 }
9359
9360 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9361         (2, channels, required_vec),
9362         (4, phantom_scid, required),
9363         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9364 });
9365
9366 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9367         (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9368 });
9369
9370 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9371         (0, Forward) => {
9372                 (0, onion_packet, required),
9373                 (1, blinded, option),
9374                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9375         },
9376         (1, Receive) => {
9377                 (0, payment_data, required),
9378                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9379                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9380                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9381                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9382                 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9383         },
9384         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9385                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9386                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9387                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9388                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9389                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9390         },
9391 ;);
9392
9393 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9394         (0, routing, required),
9395         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9396         (4, payment_hash, required),
9397         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9398         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9399         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9400         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9401 });
9402
9403
9404 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9405         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9406                 match self {
9407                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9408                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9409                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9410                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9411                                 reason.write(writer)?;
9412                         },
9413                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9414                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9415                         }) => {
9416                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9417                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9418                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9419                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9420                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9421                         },
9422                 }
9423                 Ok(())
9424         }
9425 }
9426
9427 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9428         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9429                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9430                 match id {
9431                         0 => {
9432                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9433                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9434                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9435                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9436                                 }))
9437                         },
9438                         1 => {
9439                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9440                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9441                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9442                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9443                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9444                                 }))
9445                         },
9446                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9447                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9448                         // messages contained in the variants.
9449                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9450                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9451                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9452                         2 => {
9453                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9454                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9455                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9456                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9457                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9458                         },
9459                         3 => {
9460                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9461                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9462                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9463                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9464                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9465                         },
9466                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9467                 }
9468         }
9469 }
9470
9471 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9472         (0, Forward),
9473         (1, Fail),
9474 );
9475
9476 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9477         (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9478         (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9479 );
9480
9481 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9482         (0, short_channel_id, required),
9483         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9484         (2, outpoint, required),
9485         (3, blinded_failure, option),
9486         (4, htlc_id, required),
9487         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9488         (7, user_channel_id, option),
9489 });
9490
9491 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9492         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9493                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9494                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9495                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9496                 };
9497                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9498                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9499                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
9500                         (2, self.value, required),
9501                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9502                         (4, payment_data, option),
9503                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9504                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9505                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9506                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9507                 });
9508                 Ok(())
9509         }
9510 }
9511
9512 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9513         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9514                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9515                         (0, prev_hop, required),
9516                         (1, total_msat, option),
9517                         (2, value_ser, required),
9518                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9519                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9520                         (5, total_value_received, option),
9521                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9522                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9523                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9524                 });
9525                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9526                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9527                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9528                         Some(p) => {
9529                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
9530                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9531                                 }
9532                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9533                                         total_msat = Some(value);
9534                                 }
9535                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9536                         },
9537                         None => {
9538                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9539                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
9540                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9541                                         }
9542                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9543                                 }
9544                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9545                         },
9546                 };
9547                 Ok(Self {
9548                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9549                         timer_ticks: 0,
9550                         value,
9551                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9552                         total_value_received,
9553                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9554                         onion_payload,
9555                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9556                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9557                 })
9558         }
9559 }
9560
9561 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9562         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9563                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9564                 match id {
9565                         0 => {
9566                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9567                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9568                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9569                                 let mut payment_id = None;
9570                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9571                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9572                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9573                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9574                                         (1, payment_id, option),
9575                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9576                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9577                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9578                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
9579                                 });
9580                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
9581                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9582                                         // instead.
9583                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9584                                 }
9585                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9586                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9587                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9588                                 }
9589                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9590                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9591                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9592                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9593                                                 }
9594                                         }
9595                                 }
9596                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9597                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9598                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
9599                                         path,
9600                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9601                                 })
9602                         }
9603                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9604                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9605                 }
9606         }
9607 }
9608
9609 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9610         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9611                 match self {
9612                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9613                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9614                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9615                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9616                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9617                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9618                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9619                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9620                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9621                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9622                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9623                                  });
9624                         }
9625                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9626                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9627                                 field.write(writer)?;
9628                         }
9629                 }
9630                 Ok(())
9631         }
9632 }
9633
9634 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9635         (0, forward_info, required),
9636         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9637         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9638         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9639         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9640 });
9641
9642 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9643         (1, FailHTLC) => {
9644                 (0, htlc_id, required),
9645                 (2, err_packet, required),
9646         };
9647         (0, AddHTLC)
9648 );
9649
9650 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9651         (0, payment_secret, required),
9652         (2, expiry_time, required),
9653         (4, user_payment_id, required),
9654         (6, payment_preimage, required),
9655         (8, min_value_msat, required),
9656 });
9657
9658 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9659 where
9660         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9661         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9662         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9663         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9664         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9665         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9666         R::Target: Router,
9667         L::Target: Logger,
9668 {
9669         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9670                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9671
9672                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9673
9674                 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9675                 {
9676                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9677                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9678                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9679                 }
9680
9681                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9682                 {
9683                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9684                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9685                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9686                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9687                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9688                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9689                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
9690                                 }
9691
9692                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9693                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9694                                 ).count();
9695                         }
9696
9697                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9698
9699                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9700                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9701                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9702                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9703                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9704                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9705                                         } else { None }
9706                                 ) {
9707                                         channel.write(writer)?;
9708                                 }
9709                         }
9710                 }
9711
9712                 {
9713                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9714                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9715                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9716                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9717                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9718                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
9719                                         forward.write(writer)?;
9720                                 }
9721                         }
9722                 }
9723
9724                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9725
9726                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9727                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9728                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9729
9730                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9731                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9732                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9733                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9734                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9735                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9736                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9737                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
9738                         }
9739                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9740                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9741                 }
9742
9743                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9744                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9745                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9746                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9747                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9748                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
9749                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9750                 }
9751
9752                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9753                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9754                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9755                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9756                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9757                         // no channels.
9758                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9759                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9760                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9761                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9762                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9763                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9764                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9765                                 }
9766                         }
9767                 }
9768
9769                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9770                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9771                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9772                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9773                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9774                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9775                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9776                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
9777                         0u64.write(writer)?;
9778                 } else {
9779                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9780                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9781                                 event.write(writer)?;
9782                         }
9783                 }
9784
9785                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9786                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9787                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9788                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9789                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9790                 0u64.write(writer)?;
9791
9792                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9793                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9794                 // likely to be identical.
9795                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9796                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9797
9798                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9799                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9800                         hash.write(writer)?;
9801                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9802                 }
9803
9804                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9805                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9806                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9807                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9808                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9809                         }
9810                 }
9811                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9812                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9813                         match outbound {
9814                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9815                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9816                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9817                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9818                                         }
9819                                 }
9820                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9821                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9822                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9823                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9824                         }
9825                 }
9826
9827                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9828                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9829                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9830                         match outbound {
9831                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9832                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9833                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9834                                 },
9835                                 _ => {},
9836                         }
9837                 }
9838
9839                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9840                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9841                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9842                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9843                 }
9844
9845                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9846                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9847                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9848                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9849                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
9850                 }
9851
9852                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9853                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9854                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9855                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
9856                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9857                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9858                                 }
9859                         }
9860                 }
9861
9862                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9863                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9864                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9865                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9866                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9867                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9868                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9869                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9870                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9871                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9872                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9873                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9874                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9875                 });
9876
9877                 Ok(())
9878         }
9879 }
9880
9881 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9882         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9883                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9884                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9885                         event.write(w)?;
9886                         action.write(w)?;
9887                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9888                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9889                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9890                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9891                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9892                                 // check that the event is sane here.
9893                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9894                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9895                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9896                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9897                         }
9898                 }
9899                 Ok(())
9900         }
9901 }
9902 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9903         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9904                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9905                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9906                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9907                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9908                         len) as usize);
9909                 for _ in 0..len {
9910                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9911                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9912                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9913                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
9914                         } else if action.is_some() {
9915                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9916                         }
9917                 }
9918                 Ok(events)
9919         }
9920 }
9921
9922 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9923         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9924         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9925         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9926         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9927         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9928 );
9929
9930 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9931 ///
9932 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9933 /// is:
9934 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9935 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9936 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9937 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9938 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9939 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9940 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9941 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9942 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9943 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9944 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9945 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9946 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9947 ///    the next step.
9948 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9949 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9950 ///
9951 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9952 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9953 ///
9954 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9955 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9956 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9957 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9958 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9959 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9960 ///
9961 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9962 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9963 where
9964         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9965         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9966         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9967         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9968         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9969         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9970         R::Target: Router,
9971         L::Target: Logger,
9972 {
9973         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9974         pub entropy_source: ES,
9975
9976         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9977         pub node_signer: NS,
9978
9979         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9980         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9981         /// signing data.
9982         pub signer_provider: SP,
9983
9984         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9985         ///
9986         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9987         pub fee_estimator: F,
9988         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9989         ///
9990         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9991         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9992         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9993         pub chain_monitor: M,
9994
9995         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9996         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9997         /// force-closed during deserialization.
9998         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9999         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10000         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10001         ///
10002         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10003         pub router: R,
10004         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10005         /// deserialization.
10006         pub logger: L,
10007         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10008         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10009         pub default_config: UserConfig,
10010
10011         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10012         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10013         ///
10014         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10015         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10016         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10017         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10018         ///
10019         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10020         /// this struct.
10021         ///
10022         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10023         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10024 }
10025
10026 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10027                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10028 where
10029         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10030         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10031         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10032         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10033         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10034         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10035         R::Target: Router,
10036         L::Target: Logger,
10037 {
10038         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10039         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10040         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10041         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10042                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10043                 Self {
10044                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10045                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10046                 }
10047         }
10048 }
10049
10050 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10051 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10052 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10053         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10054 where
10055         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10056         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10057         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10058         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10059         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10060         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10061         R::Target: Router,
10062         L::Target: Logger,
10063 {
10064         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10065                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10066                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10067         }
10068 }
10069
10070 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10071         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10072 where
10073         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10074         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10075         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10076         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10077         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10078         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10079         R::Target: Router,
10080         L::Target: Logger,
10081 {
10082         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10083                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10084
10085                 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10086                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10087                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10088
10089                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10090
10091                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10092                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10093                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10094                 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10095                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10096                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10097                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10098                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10099                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10100                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10101                         ))?;
10102                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10103                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10104                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10105                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10106                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10107                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10108                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10109                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10110                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10111                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10112                                         log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10113                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10114                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10115                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10116                                         }
10117                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10118                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10119                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10120                                         }
10121                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10122                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10123                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10124                                         }
10125                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10126                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10127                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10128                                         }
10129                                         let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10130                                         if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10131                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10132                                         }
10133                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10134                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10135                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10136                                                 });
10137                                         }
10138                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10139                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10140                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10141                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10142                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10143                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10144                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10145                                         }, None));
10146                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10147                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
10148                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10149                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10150                                                 }
10151                                                 if !found_htlc {
10152                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10153                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10154                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10155                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10156                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10157                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10158                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10159                                                         log_info!(logger,
10160                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10161                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10162                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10163                                                 }
10164                                         }
10165                                 } else {
10166                                         log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10167                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10168                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10169                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10170                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10171                                         }
10172                                         if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10173                                                 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10174                                         }
10175                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10176                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10177                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10178                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10179                                                 },
10180                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10181                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10182                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10183                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
10184                                                 }
10185                                         }
10186                                 }
10187                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10188                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10189                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10190                                 // safely discard the channel.
10191                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10192                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10193                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10194                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10195                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10196                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10197                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10198                                 }, None));
10199                         } else {
10200                                 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10201                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10202                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10203                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10204                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10205                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10206                         }
10207                 }
10208
10209                 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10210                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10211                                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10212                                 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10213                                         &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10214                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10215                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10216                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10217                                 };
10218                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10219                         }
10220                 }
10221
10222                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10223                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10224                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10225                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10226                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10227                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10228                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10229                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10230                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10231                         }
10232                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10233                 }
10234
10235                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10236                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10237                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10238                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10239                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10240                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10241                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10242                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10243                         }
10244                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10245                 }
10246
10247                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10248                         PeerState {
10249                                 channel_by_id,
10250                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10251                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10252                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10253                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10254                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10255                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10256                                 is_connected: false,
10257                         }
10258                 };
10259
10260                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10261                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10262                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10263                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10264                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10265                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10266                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10267                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10268                 }
10269
10270                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10271                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10272                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10273                 for _ in 0..event_count {
10274                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10275                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10276                                 None => continue,
10277                         }
10278                 }
10279
10280                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10281                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10282                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10283                                 0 => {
10284                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10285                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10286                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
10287                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10288                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10289                                 }
10290                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10291                         }
10292                 }
10293
10294                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10295                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10296
10297                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10298                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10299                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10300                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10301                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10302                         }
10303                 }
10304
10305                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10306                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10307                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10308                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10309                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10310                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10311                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10312                         };
10313                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10314                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10315                         };
10316                 }
10317
10318                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10319                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10320                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10321                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10322                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10323                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10324                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10325                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10326                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10327                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10328                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10329                 let mut events_override = None;
10330                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10331                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10332                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10333                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10334                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10335                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10336                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10337                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10338                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10339                         (8, events_override, option),
10340                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10341                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10342                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10343                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10344                 });
10345                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10346                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10347                 }
10348
10349                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10350                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10351                 }
10352
10353                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10354                         pending_events_read = events;
10355                 }
10356
10357                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10358                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10359                 }
10360
10361                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10362                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10363                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10364                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10365                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10366                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10367                         }
10368                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10369                 }
10370                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10371                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10372                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10373                 };
10374
10375                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10376                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10377                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10378                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10379                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10380                 //
10381                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10382                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10383                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10384                 //
10385                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10386                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10387                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10388                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10389                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10390                         ) => { {
10391                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10392                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10393                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10394                                         log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10395                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10396                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10397                                         pending_background_events.push(
10398                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10399                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10400                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10401                                                         update: update.clone(),
10402                                                 });
10403                                 }
10404                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10405                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10406                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10407                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10408                                         pending_background_events.push(
10409                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10410                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10411                                                         channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10412                                                 });
10413                                 }
10414                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10415                                         log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10416                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10417                                 }
10418                                 max_in_flight_update_id
10419                         } }
10420                 }
10421
10422                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10423                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10424                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10425                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10426                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10427                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10428
10429                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10430                                         // discarded.
10431                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10432                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10433                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10434                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10435                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10436                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10437                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10438                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10439                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10440                                                 }
10441                                         }
10442                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10443                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10444                                                 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10445                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10446                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10447                                                 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10448                                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10449                                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10450                                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10451                                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10452                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10453                                         }
10454                                 } else {
10455                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10456                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10457                                         debug_assert!(false);
10458                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10459                                 }
10460                         }
10461                 }
10462
10463                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10464                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10465                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10466                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10467                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10468                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10469                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10470                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10471                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10472                                         });
10473                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10474                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10475                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10476                                 } else {
10477                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10478                                         log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10479                                                 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10480                                         log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10481                                         log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10482                                         log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10483                                         log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10484                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10485                                 }
10486                         }
10487                 }
10488
10489                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10490                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10491
10492                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10493                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10494                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10495                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10496
10497                 {
10498                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10499                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10500                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10501                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10502                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10503                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10504                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10505                         // 0.0.102+
10506                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10507                                 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10508                                 let chan_id = monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id();
10509                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10510                                         let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10511                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10512                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10513                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
10514                                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10515                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10516                                                         }
10517
10518                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10519                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10520                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10521                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10522                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10523                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10524                                                                         log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10525                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10526                                                                 },
10527                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10528                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10529                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10530                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
10531                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10532                                                                                 payment_params: None,
10533                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10534                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10535                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10536                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10537                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10538                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10539                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10540                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10541                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
10542                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10543                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10544                                                                         });
10545                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10546                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10547                                                                 }
10548                                                         }
10549                                                 }
10550                                         }
10551                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10552                                                 match htlc_source {
10553                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10554                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10555                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10556                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10557                                                                 };
10558                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10559                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10560                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10561                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10562                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10563                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10564                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
10565                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10566                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10567                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10568                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10569                                                                                                 false
10570                                                                                         } else { true }
10571                                                                                 } else { true }
10572                                                                         });
10573                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
10574                                                                 });
10575                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10576                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10577                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10578                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10579                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10580                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10581                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
10582                                                                                         } else { true }
10583                                                                                 });
10584                                                                                 false
10585                                                                         } else { true }
10586                                                                 });
10587                                                         },
10588                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10589                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10590                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10591                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10592                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10593                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10594                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10595                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10596                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10597                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10598                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10599                                                                         let compl_action =
10600                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10601                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10602                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10603                                                                                 };
10604                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10605                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10606                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10607                                                                 }
10608                                                         },
10609                                                 }
10610                                         }
10611                                 }
10612
10613                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10614                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10615                                 // payments.
10616                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10617                                         .into_iter()
10618                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10619                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10620                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10621                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10622                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10623                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10624                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10625                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10626                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10627                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10628                                                         } else { None }
10629                                                 } else {
10630                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10631                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10632                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10633                                                         // channel still live case here.
10634                                                         None
10635                                                 }
10636                                         });
10637                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10638                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10639                                 }
10640                         }
10641                 }
10642
10643                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10644                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10645                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10646                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10647                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10648                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10649                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10650                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10651                         }, None));
10652                 }
10653
10654                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10655                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10656
10657                 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10658                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10659                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10660                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10661                         }
10662                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10663                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10664                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10665                                 }
10666                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10667                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10668                                 {
10669                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10670                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10671                                         });
10672                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10673                                 }
10674                         } else {
10675                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10676                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10677                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10678                                         });
10679                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10680                                 }
10681                         }
10682                 } else {
10683                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10684                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10685                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10686                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10687                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10688                                 }
10689                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10690                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10691                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10692                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10693                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10694                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10695                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10696                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10697                                                                                 Err(()) => {
10698                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10699                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10700                                                                                 }
10701                                                                         }
10702                                                                 },
10703                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10704                                                         }
10705                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10706                                         },
10707                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10708                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10709                                 };
10710                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10711                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10712                                 });
10713                         }
10714                 }
10715
10716                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10717                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10718
10719                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10720                         Ok(key) => key,
10721                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10722                 };
10723                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10724                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10725                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10726                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10727                         }
10728                 }
10729
10730                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10731                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10732                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10733                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10734                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10735                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10736                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10737                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10738                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10739                                                 loop {
10740                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10741                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10742                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10743                                                 }
10744                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10745                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10746                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10747                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10748                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10749                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10750                                         }
10751                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
10752                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10753                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10754                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10755                                                         log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10756                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10757                                                 }
10758                                         }
10759                                 } else {
10760                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10761                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10762                                         debug_assert!(false);
10763                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10764                                 }
10765                         }
10766                 }
10767
10768                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10769
10770                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10771                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10772                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10773                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10774                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10775                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10776                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10777                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10778                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10779                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10780                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10781                                         }
10782                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10783                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10784
10785                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10786                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10787                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10788                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10789                                                 //
10790                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10791                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10792                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10793                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10794                                                 // reason to.
10795                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10796                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10797                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10798                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10799                                                 // restart.
10800                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10801                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10802                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10803                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10804                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10805                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10806                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10807                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
10808                                                         }
10809                                                 }
10810                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10811                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10812                                                 }
10813                                         }
10814                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10815                                                 receiver_node_id,
10816                                                 payment_hash,
10817                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
10818                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10819                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10820                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10821                                         }, None));
10822                                 }
10823                         }
10824                 }
10825
10826                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10827                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10828                                 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10829                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
10830                                         for action in actions.iter() {
10831                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10832                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10833                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10834                                                 } = action {
10835                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10836                                                                 log_trace!(logger,
10837                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10838                                                                         blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10839                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10840                                                                         .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10841                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10842                                                         } else {
10843                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10844                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10845                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10846                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10847                                                                 // anymore.
10848                                                         }
10849                                                 }
10850                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10851                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10852                                                 }
10853                                         }
10854                                 }
10855                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10856                         } else {
10857                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10858                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10859                         }
10860                 }
10861
10862                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10863                         chain_hash,
10864                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10865                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10866                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10867                         router: args.router,
10868
10869                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10870
10871                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10872                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10873                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10874                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10875
10876                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10877                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10878                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10879                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10880                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10881                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10882
10883                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10884
10885                         our_network_pubkey,
10886                         secp_ctx,
10887
10888                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10889
10890                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10891
10892                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10893                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10894                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10895                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10896                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10897
10898                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10899                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10900
10901                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10902
10903                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10904
10905                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10906                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
10907                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10908
10909                         logger: args.logger,
10910                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
10911                 };
10912
10913                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10914                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10915                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10916                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10917                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10918                 }
10919
10920                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10921                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10922                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10923                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10924                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10925                                 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10926                 }
10927
10928                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10929                 //connection or two.
10930
10931                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10932         }
10933 }
10934
10935 #[cfg(test)]
10936 mod tests {
10937         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10938         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10939         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10940         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10941         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10942         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10943         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10944         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10945         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10946         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10947         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10948         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10949         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10950         use crate::util::test_utils;
10951         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10952         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10953
10954         #[test]
10955         fn test_notify_limits() {
10956                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10957                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10958                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10959                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10960                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10961                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10962
10963                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10964                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10965                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10966                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10967                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10968
10969                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10970
10971                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10972                 // to connect messages with new values
10973                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10974                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10975                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10976                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10977                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10978                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10979
10980                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10981                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10982                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10983                 // ... but the last node should not.
10984                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10985                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10986                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10987                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10988
10989                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10990                 // about the channel.
10991                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10992                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10993                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10994
10995                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10996                 // parties.
10997                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10998                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10999                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11000                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11001                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11002                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11003
11004                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11005                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11006                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11007
11008                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11009                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11010                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11011                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11012                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11013                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11014
11015                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11016                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11017                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11018                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11019                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11020                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11021                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11022                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11023
11024                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11025                 // the channel info has updated.
11026                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11027                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11028                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11029                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11030                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11031                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11032         }
11033
11034         #[test]
11035         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11036                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11037                 // expected.
11038                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11039                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11040                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11041                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11042                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11043
11044                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11045                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11046                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11047                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11048
11049                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11050                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11051                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11052                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11053                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11054                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11055                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11056                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11057                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11058                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11059                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11060                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11061
11062                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11063                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11064                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11065                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11066                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11067                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11068                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11069                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11070                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11071                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11072                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11073                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11074                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11075                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11076                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11077                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11078                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11079                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11080                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11081                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11082                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11083                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11084                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11085
11086                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11087                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11088                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11089                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11090                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11091                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11092                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11093
11094                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11095                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11096                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11097                 // lightning messages manually.
11098                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11099                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11100                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11101
11102                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11103                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11104                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11105                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11106                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11107                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11108                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11109                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11110                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11111                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11112                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11113                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11114                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11115                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11116                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11117                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11118                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11119                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11120                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11121                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11122                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11123                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11124                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11125                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11126                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11127                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11128
11129                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11130                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11131                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11132                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11133                 match events[0] {
11134                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11135                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11136                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11137                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11138                         },
11139                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11140                 }
11141                 match events[1] {
11142                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11143                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11144                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11145                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11146                         },
11147                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11148                 }
11149         }
11150
11151         #[test]
11152         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11153                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11154                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11155         }
11156
11157         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11158                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11159                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11160                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11161                 //      fails as expected.
11162                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11163                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11164                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11165                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11166                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11167                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11168                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11169                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11170                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11171                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11172                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11173                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11174                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11175                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11176                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11177
11178                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11179                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11180                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11181
11182                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11183                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11184                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11185                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11186                 let route = find_route(
11187                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11188                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11189                 ).unwrap();
11190                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11191                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11192                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11193                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11194                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11195                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11196                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11197                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11198                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11199                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11200                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11201                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11202                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11203                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11204                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11205                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11206                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11207                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11208                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11209                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11210                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11211                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11212                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11213                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11214
11215                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11216                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11217
11218                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11219                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11220                 let route = find_route(
11221                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11222                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11223                 ).unwrap();
11224                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11225                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11226                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11227                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11228                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11229                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11230                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11231                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11232
11233                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11234                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11235                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11236                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11237                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11238                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11239                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11240                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11241                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11242                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11243                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11244                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11245                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11246                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11247                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11248                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11249                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11250                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11251                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11252                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11253                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11254                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11255                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11256                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11257
11258                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11259                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11260
11261                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11262                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11263                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11264                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11265                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11266                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11267                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11268                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11269                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11270                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11271
11272                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11273                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11274                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11275                         100_000
11276                 );
11277                 let route = find_route(
11278                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11279                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11280                 ).unwrap();
11281                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11282                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11283                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11284                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11285                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11286                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11287                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11288                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11289                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11290                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11291                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11292                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11293                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11294                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11295                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11296                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11297                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11298                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11299                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11300                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11301                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11302                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11303                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11304
11305                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11306                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11307         }
11308
11309         #[test]
11310         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11311                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11312                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11313                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11314                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11315                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11316                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11317
11318                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11319                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11320
11321                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11322                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11323                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11324                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11325                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11326                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11327                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11328                 let route = find_route(
11329                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11330                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11331                 ).unwrap();
11332
11333                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11334                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11335                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11336                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11337                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11338                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11339                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11340
11341                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11342                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11343                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11344                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11345                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11346                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11347                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11348
11349                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11350         }
11351
11352         #[test]
11353         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11354                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11355                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11356                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11357                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11358                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11359                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11360                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11361                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11362
11363                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11364                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11365
11366                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11367                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11368                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11369                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11370                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11371                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11372                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11373                 let route = find_route(
11374                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11375                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11376                 ).unwrap();
11377
11378                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11379                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11380                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11381                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11382                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11383                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11384                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11385                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11386                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11387
11388                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11389                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11390                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11391                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11392                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11393                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11394                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11395
11396                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11397         }
11398
11399         #[test]
11400         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11401                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11402                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11403                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11404                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11405
11406                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11407                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11408                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11409                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11410
11411                 // Marshall an MPP route.
11412                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11413                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11414                 route.paths.push(path);
11415                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11416                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11417                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11418                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11419                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11420                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11421
11422                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11423                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11424                 .unwrap_err() {
11425                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11426                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11427                         },
11428                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11429                 }
11430         }
11431
11432         #[test]
11433         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11434                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11435                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11436                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11437                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11438
11439                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11440
11441                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11442                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11443
11444                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11445                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11446                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11447                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11448
11449                 {
11450                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11451                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11452                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11453                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11454                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11455                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11456                 }
11457
11458                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11459
11460                 {
11461                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11462                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11463                 }
11464         }
11465
11466         #[test]
11467         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11468                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11469                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11470                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11471                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11472                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11473
11474                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11475                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11476                         payment_secret,
11477                         total_msat: 100_000,
11478                 };
11479
11480                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11481                 // payment verification fails as expected.
11482                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11483                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11484                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11485                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11486                         Err(()) => {
11487                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11488                         }
11489                 }
11490
11491                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11492                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11493         }
11494
11495         #[test]
11496         fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11497                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11498                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11499                 // the channel is successfully closed.
11500                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11501                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11502                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11503                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11504
11505                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11506                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11507                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11508                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11509                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11510
11511                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11512                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11513                 {
11514                         // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11515                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11516                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11517                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11518                 }
11519
11520                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11521                 {
11522                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11523                         // as it has the funding transaction.
11524                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11525                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11526                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11527                 }
11528
11529                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11530
11531                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11532
11533                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11534                 {
11535                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11536                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11537                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11538                 }
11539                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11540
11541                 {
11542                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11543                         // as it has the funding transaction.
11544                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11545                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11546                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11547                 }
11548                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11549                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11550                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11551                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11552                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11553                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11554                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11555                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11556
11557                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11558                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11559                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11560                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11561
11562                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11563                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11564                 {
11565                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11566                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11567                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11568                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11569                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11570                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11571                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11572                 }
11573
11574                 {
11575                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11576                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11577                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11578                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11579                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11580                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11581                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11582                 }
11583
11584                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11585                 {
11586                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11587                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11588                         // closing transaction).
11589                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11590                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11591                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11592
11593                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11594                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11595                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11596                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11597                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11598                 }
11599
11600                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11601
11602                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11603                 {
11604                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11605                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11606                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11607                 }
11608                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11609
11610                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11611                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11612         }
11613
11614         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11615                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11616                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11617         }
11618
11619         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11620                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11621                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11622         }
11623
11624         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11625                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11626                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11627         }
11628
11629         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11630                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11631                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11632         }
11633
11634         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11635                 match res_err {
11636                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11637                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11638                         },
11639                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11640                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11641                         },
11642                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11643                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11644                 }
11645         }
11646
11647         #[test]
11648         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11649                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11650                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11651                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11652                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11653                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11654                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11655                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11656
11657                 // Dummy values
11658                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11659                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11660                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11661
11662                 // Test the API functions.
11663                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11664
11665                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11666
11667                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11668
11669                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11670
11671                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11672
11673                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11674
11675                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11676         }
11677
11678         #[test]
11679         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11680                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11681                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11682                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11683                 // the given `channel_id`.
11684                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11685                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11686                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11687                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11688
11689                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11690
11691                 // Dummy values
11692                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11693
11694                 // Test the API functions.
11695                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11696
11697                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11698
11699                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11700
11701                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11702
11703                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11704
11705                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11706         }
11707
11708         #[test]
11709         fn test_connection_limiting() {
11710                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11711                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11712                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11713                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11714                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11715
11716                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11717
11718                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11719                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11720
11721                 let mut funding_tx = None;
11722                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11723                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11724                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11725
11726                         if idx == 0 {
11727                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11728                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11729                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11730                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11731                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11732
11733                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11734                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11735                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11736
11737                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11738
11739                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11740                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11741                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11742                         }
11743                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11744                 }
11745
11746                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11747                 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11748                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11749                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11750                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11751
11752                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11753                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11754                 // limit.
11755                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11756                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11757                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11758                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11759                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11760                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11761                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11762                         }, true).unwrap();
11763                 }
11764                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11765                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11766                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11767                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11768                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11769
11770                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11771                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11772                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11773                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11774                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11775                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11776                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11777                 }
11778                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11779                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11780                 }, true).unwrap();
11781                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11782                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11783                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11784
11785                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11786                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11787                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11788                 }, false).unwrap();
11789                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11790
11791                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11792                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11793                 // open channels.
11794                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11795                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11796                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11797                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11798                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11799                 }
11800                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11801                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11802                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11803
11804                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11805                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11806                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11807
11808                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11809                 // "protected" and can connect again.
11810                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11811                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11812                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11813                 }, true).unwrap();
11814                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11815
11816                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11817                 // last_random_pk.
11818                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11819                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11820         }
11821
11822         #[test]
11823         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11824                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11825                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11826                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11827                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11828                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11829
11830                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11831
11832                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11833                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11834
11835                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11836                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11837                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11838                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11839                 }
11840
11841                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11842                 // rejected.
11843                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11844                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11845                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11846
11847                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11848                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11849                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11850
11851                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11852                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11853                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11854                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11855         }
11856
11857         #[test]
11858         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11859                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11860                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11861                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11862                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11863                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11864                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11865                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11866                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11867
11868                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11869
11870                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11871                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11872
11873                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11874                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11875                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11876                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11877                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11878                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11879                         }, true).unwrap();
11880
11881                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11882                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11883                         match events[0] {
11884                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11885                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11886                                 }
11887                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11888                         }
11889                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11890                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11891                 }
11892
11893                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11894                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11895                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11896                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11897                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11898                 }, true).unwrap();
11899                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11900                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11901                 match events[0] {
11902                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11903                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11904                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11905                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11906                                         _ => panic!(),
11907                                 }
11908                         }
11909                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11910                 }
11911                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11912                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11913
11914                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11915                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11916                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11917                 match events[0] {
11918                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11919                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11920                         }
11921                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11922                 }
11923                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11924         }
11925
11926         #[test]
11927         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11928                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11929                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11930                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11931                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11932                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11933                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11934                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11935                         amt_msat: 100,
11936                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11937                         payment_metadata: None,
11938                         keysend_preimage: None,
11939                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11940                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11941                         }),
11942                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11943                 };
11944                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11945                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11946                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11947                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11948                         create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11949                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11950                                 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
11951                 {
11952                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11953                 } else { panic!(); }
11954
11955                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11956                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11957                         amt_msat: 100,
11958                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11959                         payment_metadata: None,
11960                         keysend_preimage: None,
11961                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11962                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11963                         }),
11964                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11965                 };
11966                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11967                 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11968                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11969                         current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
11970         }
11971
11972         #[test]
11973         fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11974                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11975                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11976                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11977                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11978
11979                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11980                 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11981                         amt_msat: 100,
11982                         outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11983                         payment_metadata: None,
11984                         keysend_preimage: None,
11985                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11986                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11987                         }),
11988                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11989                 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
11990                         node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
11991
11992                 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11993                 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11994                 // is not satisfied.
11995                 assert!(result.is_ok());
11996         }
11997
11998         #[test]
11999         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12000                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12001                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12002                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12003                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12004
12005                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12006                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12007
12008                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12009                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12010                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12011                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12012                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12013
12014                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12015                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12016
12017                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12018                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12019                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12020                 match &msg_events[0] {
12021                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12022                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12023                                 match action {
12024                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12025                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12026                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12027                                 }
12028                         }
12029                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12030                 }
12031
12032                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12033                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12034                 match events[0] {
12035                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12036                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12037                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12038                 }
12039                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12040         }
12041
12042         #[test]
12043         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12044                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12045                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12046                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12047                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12048                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12049                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12050                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12051                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12052                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12053                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12054
12055                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12056                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12057                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12058
12059                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12060                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12061                 match events[0] {
12062                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12063                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12064                         }
12065                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12066                 }
12067
12068                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12069                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12070
12071                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12072                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12073
12074                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12075                 // not have generated any events.
12076                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12077         }
12078
12079         #[test]
12080         fn test_update_channel_config() {
12081                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12082                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12083                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12084                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12085                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12086                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12087                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12088
12089                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12090                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12091                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12092
12093                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12094                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12095                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12096                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12097                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12098                 match &events[0] {
12099                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12100                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12101                 }
12102
12103                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12104                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12105                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12106
12107                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12108                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12109                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12110                         ..Default::default()
12111                 }).unwrap();
12112                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12113                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12114                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12115                 match &events[0] {
12116                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12117                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12118                 }
12119
12120                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12121                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12122                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12123                         ..Default::default()
12124                 }).unwrap();
12125                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12126                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12127                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12128                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12129                 match &events[0] {
12130                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12131                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12132                 }
12133
12134                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12135                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12136                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12137                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12138                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12139                 assert!(
12140                         matches!(
12141                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12142                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12143                                         ..Default::default()
12144                                 }),
12145                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12146                         )
12147                 );
12148                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12149                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12150                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12151                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12152         }
12153
12154         #[test]
12155         fn test_payment_display() {
12156                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12157                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12158                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12159                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12160                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12161                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12162         }
12163
12164         #[test]
12165         fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12166                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12167                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12168                 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12169                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12170                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12171
12172                 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12173                 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12174                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12175                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12176                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12177                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12178                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12179                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12180                 {
12181                         let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12182                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12183                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12184                 }
12185
12186                 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12187                 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12188                 // their side.
12189                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12190                         features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12191                 }, true).unwrap();
12192                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12193                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12194                 }, false).unwrap();
12195                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12196                 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12197                         nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12198                 );
12199                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12200
12201                 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12202                 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12203                 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12204                 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12205                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12206                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12207                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12208                         assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12209                         assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12210                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12211                 } else { panic!() };
12212                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12213                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12214                 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12215                         err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12216                 };
12217                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12218                 {
12219                         let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12220                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12221                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12222                 }
12223         }
12224 }
12225
12226 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
12227 pub mod bench {
12228         use crate::chain::Listen;
12229         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12230         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12231         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12232         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12233         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12234         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12235         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12236         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12237         use crate::util::test_utils;
12238         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12239
12240         use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12241         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12242         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12243         use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12244
12245         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12246
12247         use criterion::Criterion;
12248
12249         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12250                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12251                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12252                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12253                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12254                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12255                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12256
12257         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12258                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12259         }
12260         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12261                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12262                 #[inline]
12263                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12264                 #[inline]
12265                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12266         }
12267
12268         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12269                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12270         }
12271
12272         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12273                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12274                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12275                 // calls per node.
12276                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12277                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12278
12279                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12280                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12281                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12282                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12283                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12284
12285                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12286                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12287                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12288
12289                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12290                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12291                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12292                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12293                         network,
12294                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12295                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12296                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12297
12298                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12299                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12300                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12301                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12302                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12303                         network,
12304                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12305                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12306                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12307
12308                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12309                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12310                 }, true).unwrap();
12311                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12312                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12313                 }, false).unwrap();
12314                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12315                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12316                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12317
12318                 let tx;
12319                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12320                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12321                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12322                         }]};
12323                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12324                 } else { panic!(); }
12325
12326                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12327                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12328                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12329                 match events_b[0] {
12330                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12331                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12332                         },
12333                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12334                 }
12335
12336                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12337                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12338                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12339                 match events_a[0] {
12340                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12341                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12342                         },
12343                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12344                 }
12345
12346                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12347
12348                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12349                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12350                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12351
12352                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12353                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12354                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12355                 match msg_events[0] {
12356                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12357                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12358                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12359                         },
12360                         _ => panic!(),
12361                 }
12362                 match msg_events[1] {
12363                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12364                         _ => panic!(),
12365                 }
12366
12367                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12368                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12369                 match events_a[0] {
12370                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12371                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12372                         },
12373                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12374                 }
12375
12376                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12377                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12378                 match events_b[0] {
12379                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12380                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12381                         },
12382                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12383                 }
12384
12385                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12386                 macro_rules! send_payment {
12387                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12388                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12389                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12390                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12391                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12392                                 payment_count += 1;
12393                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12394                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12395
12396                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12397                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12398                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12399                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12400                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12401                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12402                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12403                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12404                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12405                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12406                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12407
12408                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12409                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12410                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12411                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12412
12413                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12414                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12415                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12416                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12417                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12418                                         },
12419                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12420                                 }
12421
12422                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12423                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12424                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12425                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12426
12427                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12428                         }
12429                 }
12430
12431                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12432                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12433                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
12434                 }));
12435         }
12436 }