1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PendingOutboundPayment};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysInterface, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, Sign, SignerProvider};
61 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
62 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
63 use crate::util::events;
64 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
65 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
66 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
67 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
68 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
71 use crate::prelude::*;
73 use core::cell::RefCell;
75 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
76 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
77 use core::time::Duration;
80 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
81 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::PaymentSendFailure;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
121 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
122 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
123 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
126 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
131 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
132 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
135 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
138 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
139 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
142 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
143 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
145 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
146 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
147 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
150 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
151 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
153 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
154 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
157 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
158 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
161 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
167 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
168 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
169 short_channel_id: u64,
171 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
172 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
175 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
180 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
182 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
183 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
184 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
187 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
190 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
191 struct ClaimableHTLC {
192 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
194 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
196 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
198 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
202 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
203 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
204 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
205 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
207 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
208 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
213 impl Readable for PaymentId {
214 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
215 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
220 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
221 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
222 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
223 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
225 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
226 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
231 impl Readable for InterceptId {
232 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
233 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
237 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
238 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
239 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
240 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
241 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
244 session_priv: SecretKey,
245 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
246 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
247 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
248 payment_id: PaymentId,
249 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
250 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
253 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
254 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
255 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
257 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
259 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
264 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
265 payment_id.hash(hasher);
266 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
267 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
268 payment_params.hash(hasher);
273 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
276 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
277 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
279 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
280 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
281 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
282 payment_secret: None,
283 payment_params: None,
288 struct ReceiveError {
294 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
296 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
297 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
298 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
299 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
300 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
302 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
303 err: msgs::LightningError,
304 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
305 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
307 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
309 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
311 err: LightningError {
313 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
314 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
321 shutdown_finish: None,
325 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
327 err: LightningError {
329 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
332 shutdown_finish: None,
336 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
337 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
340 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
342 err: LightningError {
344 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
345 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
351 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
352 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
356 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
359 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
362 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
366 log_level: Level::Warn,
369 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
371 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
373 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
375 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
376 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
384 shutdown_finish: None,
389 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
390 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
391 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
392 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
393 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
395 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
396 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
397 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
398 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
399 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
400 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
401 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
403 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
407 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
408 struct ClaimingPayment {
410 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
411 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
413 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
414 (0, amount_msat, required),
415 (2, payment_purpose, required),
416 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
419 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
420 struct ClaimablePayments {
421 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
422 /// failed/claimed by the user.
424 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
425 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
427 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
428 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
429 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
431 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
432 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
433 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
434 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
437 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
438 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
441 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
442 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
443 /// quite some time lag.
444 enum BackgroundEvent {
445 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
446 /// commitment transaction.
447 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
450 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
451 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
452 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
453 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
454 /// event can be generated.
455 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
456 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
457 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
460 /// State we hold per-peer.
461 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: Sign> {
462 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
464 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
465 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
467 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
468 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
469 latest_features: InitFeatures,
470 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
471 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
472 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
475 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
476 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
478 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
481 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
482 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
483 struct PendingInboundPayment {
484 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
485 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
486 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
487 /// this payment being removed.
489 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
490 user_payment_id: u64,
491 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
492 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
493 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
496 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
497 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
498 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
499 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
500 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
501 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
502 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
504 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
505 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
511 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
513 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
518 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
519 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
520 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
521 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
522 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
523 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
524 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
525 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
527 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
528 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
530 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
531 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
533 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
534 /// to individual Channels.
536 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
537 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
538 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
539 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
541 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
542 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
543 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
544 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
545 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
546 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
547 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
549 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
550 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
551 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
552 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
555 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
556 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
557 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
558 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
559 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
561 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
562 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
563 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
564 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
565 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
568 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
569 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
570 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
571 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
572 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
576 // `total_consistency_lock`
578 // |__`forward_htlcs`
580 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
582 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
584 // | |__`claimable_payments`
586 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
588 // | |__`channel_state`
590 // | |__`per_peer_state`
596 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
598 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
602 // | |__`pending_events`
604 // | |__`pending_background_events`
606 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
608 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
609 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
610 K::Target: KeysInterface,
611 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
615 default_configuration: UserConfig,
616 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
617 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
623 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
625 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
627 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
628 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
630 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
631 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
632 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
633 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
634 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
636 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
637 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
638 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
639 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
641 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
642 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
644 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
645 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
646 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
647 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
648 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
649 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
650 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
651 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
653 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
655 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
656 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
658 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
660 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
661 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
662 /// and via the classic SCID.
664 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
665 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
667 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
669 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
671 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
672 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
673 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
675 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
676 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
678 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
679 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
681 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
682 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
684 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
685 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
686 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
687 /// active channel list on load.
689 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
690 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
692 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
694 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
695 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
696 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
698 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
699 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
700 /// the handling of the events.
702 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
703 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
706 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
707 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
708 /// would break backwards compatability.
709 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
710 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
711 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
713 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
714 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
716 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
718 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
719 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
720 /// confirmation depth.
722 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
723 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
724 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
726 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
728 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
730 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
732 our_network_key: SecretKey,
733 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
735 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
737 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
738 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
739 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
741 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
742 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
744 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
745 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
746 /// keeping additional state.
747 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
749 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
750 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
751 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
752 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
754 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (message queues and the like). Currently
755 /// the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer basis, as well as the peer's latest
758 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
759 /// are currently open with that peer.
761 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
762 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
765 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
767 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
768 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
769 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
770 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
771 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
773 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
774 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
775 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
776 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
777 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
778 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
779 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
780 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
781 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
782 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
783 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
785 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
792 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
794 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
795 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
796 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
797 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
798 pub struct ChainParameters {
799 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
800 pub network: Network,
802 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
804 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
805 pub best_block: BestBlock,
808 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
814 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
815 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
816 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
817 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
818 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
819 /// updates are ready for persistence).
821 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
822 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
823 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
824 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
825 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
827 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
828 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
831 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
832 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
833 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
836 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
837 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
839 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
840 persistence_notifier: notifier,
841 should_persist: persist_check,
842 _read_guard: read_guard,
847 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
849 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
850 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
855 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
856 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
858 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
860 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
861 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
862 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
863 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
864 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
866 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
867 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
869 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
871 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
872 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
873 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
874 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
875 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
876 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
877 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
878 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
879 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
880 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
881 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
882 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
883 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
885 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
886 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
888 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
889 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
890 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
891 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
893 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
894 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
895 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
896 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
897 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
898 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
901 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
903 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
904 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
907 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
909 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
910 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
912 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
913 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
914 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
915 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
917 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
918 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
919 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
920 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
921 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
922 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
923 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
924 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
925 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
926 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
927 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
930 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
931 /// to better separate parameters.
932 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
933 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
934 /// The node_id of our counterparty
935 pub node_id: PublicKey,
936 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
937 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
938 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
939 pub features: InitFeatures,
940 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
941 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
942 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
944 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
946 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
947 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
948 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
949 /// payments to us through this channel.
950 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
951 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
952 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
953 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
954 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
955 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
956 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
959 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
960 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
961 pub struct ChannelDetails {
962 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
963 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
964 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
965 /// lifetime of the channel.
966 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
967 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
968 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
969 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
970 /// our counterparty already.
972 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
973 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
974 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
975 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
977 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
978 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
979 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
980 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
982 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
983 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
985 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
986 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
988 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
989 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
990 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
991 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
992 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
993 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
994 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
995 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
996 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
999 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1001 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1002 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1003 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1004 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1005 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1006 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1007 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1009 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1010 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1012 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1013 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1014 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1015 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1016 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1017 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1018 /// this value on chain.
1020 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1022 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1024 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1025 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1026 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1027 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1029 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1030 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1031 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1032 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1034 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1035 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1036 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1037 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1039 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1040 pub balance_msat: u64,
1041 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1042 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1043 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1044 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1046 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1048 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1049 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1050 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1051 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1052 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1053 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1054 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1055 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1057 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1058 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1059 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1060 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1061 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1062 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1063 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1065 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1066 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1067 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1068 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1069 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1070 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1071 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1072 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1073 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1075 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1077 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1078 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1079 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1080 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1081 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1083 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1084 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1085 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1086 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1087 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1088 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1089 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1091 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1092 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1093 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1094 pub is_outbound: bool,
1095 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1096 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1097 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1098 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1099 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1101 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1102 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1103 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1104 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1106 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1107 pub is_usable: bool,
1108 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1109 pub is_public: bool,
1110 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1111 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1112 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1113 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1114 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1115 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1117 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1118 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1121 impl ChannelDetails {
1122 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1123 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1124 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1126 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1127 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1128 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1129 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1132 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1133 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1134 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1136 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1137 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1138 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1139 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1143 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1145 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1147 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1148 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1149 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1150 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1152 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1153 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1154 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1157 macro_rules! handle_error {
1158 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1161 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1162 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1164 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1165 // entering the macro.
1166 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1167 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1168 assert!($self.per_peer_state.try_write().is_ok());
1171 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1173 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1174 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1175 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1176 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1180 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1181 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1182 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1183 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1188 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1189 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1191 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1192 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1193 action: err.action.clone()
1197 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1198 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1199 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1200 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1201 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1203 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1205 if let None = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1206 // This shouldn't occour in tests unless an unkown counterparty_node_id
1207 // has been passed to our message handling functions.
1208 let expected_error_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", $counterparty_node_id);
1210 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1211 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { ref channel_id, ref data }
1214 assert_eq!(*data, expected_error_str);
1215 if let Some((err_channel_id, _user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1216 assert_eq!(*channel_id, err_channel_id);
1219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1225 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1232 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1233 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1234 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1235 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1236 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1237 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1239 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1240 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1241 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1242 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1243 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1245 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1246 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1248 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1252 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1253 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1254 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1256 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1257 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1259 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1260 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1262 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1263 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1264 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1265 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1266 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1267 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1273 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1274 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1278 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1280 $entry.remove_entry();
1288 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1289 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1293 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1295 $entry.remove_entry();
1303 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1304 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1306 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1307 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1313 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1314 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1316 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1317 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1318 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1319 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1320 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1321 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1322 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1323 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1324 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1325 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1326 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1327 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1328 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1329 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1332 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1333 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1334 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1335 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1336 match $action_type {
1337 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1338 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1340 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1341 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1343 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1344 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1345 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1346 if !$resend_commitment {
1347 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1350 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1352 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1353 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1355 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1360 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1361 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1363 $entry.remove_entry();
1367 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1368 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1369 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1371 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1372 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1374 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1375 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1377 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1378 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1380 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1381 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1385 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1386 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1387 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1388 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1389 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1391 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1392 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1393 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1394 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1395 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1396 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1397 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1398 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1399 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1400 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1405 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1406 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1407 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1409 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1410 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1411 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1412 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1413 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1414 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1417 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1422 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
1424 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1425 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1426 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1427 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1431 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1433 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1434 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1436 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1438 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1439 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1440 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1441 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1442 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1443 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1444 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1445 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1447 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1448 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1449 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1454 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1456 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1458 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1459 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1460 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1461 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1462 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1463 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1464 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1465 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1467 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1468 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1471 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1472 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1474 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1476 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1478 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1480 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1481 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1482 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1483 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1491 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1492 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1493 &self.default_configuration
1496 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1497 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1498 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1501 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1502 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1504 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1506 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1510 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1515 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1517 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1518 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1519 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1520 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1521 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1523 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1524 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1526 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1527 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1528 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1530 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1531 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1532 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1533 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1534 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1535 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1537 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1538 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1539 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1540 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1541 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1542 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1545 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1546 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1547 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1549 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1550 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1552 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key);
1553 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1554 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) });
1557 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1559 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1560 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1561 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1562 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1563 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1564 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1568 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1573 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1575 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1576 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1577 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1579 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1581 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1584 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1587 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1588 node_id: their_network_key,
1591 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1594 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1595 let mut res = Vec::new();
1596 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1597 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1598 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1599 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1600 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1601 // the same channel.
1602 res.reserve(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1604 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1605 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1606 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1607 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1608 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1609 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1610 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1611 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1612 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1613 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1614 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1615 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1616 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1617 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1618 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1619 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1620 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1621 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1622 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1623 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1624 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1625 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1626 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1627 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1629 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1630 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1631 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1632 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1633 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1634 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1635 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1636 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1637 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1638 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1639 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1640 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1641 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1642 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1643 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1644 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1645 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1646 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1647 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1648 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1649 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1650 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1651 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1652 config: Some(channel.config()),
1660 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1661 /// more information.
1662 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1663 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1666 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1667 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1669 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1670 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1673 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1674 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1675 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1676 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1677 // really wanted anyway.
1678 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1681 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1682 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1683 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1684 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1685 Some(transaction) => {
1686 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1690 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1691 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1692 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1693 reason: closure_reason
1697 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1698 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1700 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1701 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1702 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1703 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1704 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1706 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
1707 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1708 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
1711 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1712 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1713 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1714 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1715 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1716 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1718 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1719 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1720 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1721 let (result, is_permanent) =
1722 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1724 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1729 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1730 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1734 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1735 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1736 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1737 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1741 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1745 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1749 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1750 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1751 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1752 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1755 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1759 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1760 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1761 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1763 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1764 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1766 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1767 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1768 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1769 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1771 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1773 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1774 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1775 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1776 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1777 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1780 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1781 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1782 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1784 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1785 /// the channel being closed or not:
1786 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1787 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1788 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1789 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1790 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1791 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1792 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1794 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1796 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1797 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1798 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1799 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1800 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1804 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1805 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1806 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1807 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1808 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1809 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1810 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1811 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1813 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1814 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1815 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1816 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1817 // ignore the result here.
1818 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1822 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1823 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1824 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1825 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1826 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1827 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id);
1829 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1830 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) });
1832 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1833 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1834 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1835 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1836 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1838 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1840 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1842 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1845 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1846 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1847 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1848 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1849 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1854 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1857 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1858 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1859 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1860 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1861 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1862 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1863 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1864 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
1865 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1866 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1867 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1868 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1879 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1880 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1881 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1883 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1884 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1885 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1888 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1889 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1890 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1892 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1893 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1894 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1895 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1896 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1899 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1900 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1901 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1902 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1903 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1907 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1908 /// local transaction(s).
1909 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1910 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1911 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1915 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1916 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1918 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1919 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1920 return Err(ReceiveError {
1921 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1923 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
1926 // final_expiry_too_soon
1927 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1928 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1929 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1930 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1931 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1932 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1933 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1934 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
1935 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
1936 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
1937 return Err(ReceiveError {
1938 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
1939 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1942 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1943 return Err(ReceiveError {
1945 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
1946 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1950 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1951 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
1952 return Err(ReceiveError {
1953 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1954 err_data: Vec::new(),
1955 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
1958 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1959 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1960 return Err(ReceiveError {
1961 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1962 err_data: Vec::new(),
1963 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
1965 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1966 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1968 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1969 phantom_shared_secret,
1971 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1972 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1973 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1974 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1975 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1976 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1977 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1978 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
1979 return Err(ReceiveError {
1980 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1981 err_data: Vec::new(),
1982 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
1986 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1988 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1991 return Err(ReceiveError {
1992 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
1993 err_data: Vec::new(),
1994 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
1999 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2002 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2003 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2004 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2005 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2009 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2010 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2011 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2013 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2014 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2015 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2016 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2017 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2018 failure_code: $err_code,
2024 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2025 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2028 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2030 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2031 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2032 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2033 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2034 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2035 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2036 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2037 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2039 macro_rules! return_err {
2040 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2042 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2043 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2044 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2045 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2046 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2047 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2053 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2055 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2056 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2058 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2059 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2063 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2064 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2066 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2068 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2069 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2070 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2071 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2072 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2074 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2077 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2078 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2079 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2081 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2082 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2083 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2086 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2087 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2088 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2089 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2093 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2094 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2095 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2098 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2099 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2100 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2101 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2102 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2107 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2108 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2109 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2110 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2111 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2112 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2113 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2114 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2115 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2116 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2117 // phantom or an intercept.
2118 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2119 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2120 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2124 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2127 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2129 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2130 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2131 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2132 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2133 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2135 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2136 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2137 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2139 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2140 // have no consistency guarantees.
2141 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2145 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2146 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2147 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2148 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2149 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2151 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2152 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2153 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2154 // we don't have the channel here.
2155 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2157 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2159 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2160 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2161 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2162 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2163 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2164 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2165 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2167 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2168 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2170 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2171 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2175 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2176 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2177 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2178 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2180 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2187 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2188 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2189 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2190 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2191 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2192 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2194 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2195 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2197 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2198 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2199 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2200 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2201 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2202 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2203 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2204 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2205 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2206 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2212 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2213 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2214 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2215 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2217 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2218 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2220 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2221 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2222 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2224 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2225 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2226 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2227 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2228 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2229 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2230 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2234 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2239 pending_forward_info
2242 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2243 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2244 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2246 /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
2247 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2248 if !chan.should_announce() {
2249 return Err(LightningError {
2250 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2251 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2254 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2255 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2257 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2258 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2261 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2262 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2263 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2264 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2265 /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
2266 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2267 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2268 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2269 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2273 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2275 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2276 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2277 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2279 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2280 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2282 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2283 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2284 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2285 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2286 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2287 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2288 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2289 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2292 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2293 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2295 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2301 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2302 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2303 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2304 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2305 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2307 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2308 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2309 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2310 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2311 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2313 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2315 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2317 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2318 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2319 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2320 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2323 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2324 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2325 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2326 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2327 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2328 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" });
2330 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2331 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2332 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2334 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2335 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2337 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2338 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2340 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2341 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2343 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2344 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2345 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2348 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2349 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2350 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2352 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2353 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2355 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2356 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2357 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2358 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2359 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2360 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2361 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2362 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2363 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2364 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2366 _ => unreachable!(),
2369 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2370 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2371 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2372 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2373 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2374 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2375 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2376 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2385 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2386 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2387 // `channel_by_id` map.
2388 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2389 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2394 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2395 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2397 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2402 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2404 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2405 /// fields for more info.
2407 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2408 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2409 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2410 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2413 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2414 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2415 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2416 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2417 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2419 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2420 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2422 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2423 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2424 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2426 /// In general, a path may raise:
2427 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2428 /// node public key) is specified.
2429 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2430 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2432 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2433 /// relevant updates.
2435 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2436 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2437 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2439 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2440 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2441 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2442 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2445 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2446 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2447 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2449 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2450 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2451 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2452 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2453 self.pending_outbound_payments
2454 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2455 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2456 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2460 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2461 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2462 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2463 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2464 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2468 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2469 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2470 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height)
2474 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2476 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2477 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2478 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2479 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2480 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2482 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2483 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2484 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2485 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2486 self.pending_outbound_payments.retry_payment_with_route(route, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2487 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2488 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2491 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2493 /// After this method returns, no future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2494 /// are allowed. If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be
2495 /// generated as soon as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2497 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2498 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2499 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2501 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2502 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, the payment may still be in the pending state
2503 /// upon restart. This allows further calls to [`retry_payment`] (and requiring a second call
2504 /// to [`abandon_payment`] to mark the payment as failed again). Otherwise, future calls to
2505 /// [`retry_payment`] will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`].
2507 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
2508 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2509 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2510 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2511 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2512 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2513 if let Some(payment_failed_ev) = self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id) {
2514 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(payment_failed_ev);
2518 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2519 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2520 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2521 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2522 /// never reach the recipient.
2524 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2525 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2527 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2528 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2530 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2532 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2533 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2534 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2535 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2536 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2537 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2540 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2541 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2542 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2543 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2544 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2545 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2546 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2547 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2550 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2553 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2554 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2557 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2558 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2559 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2560 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2561 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2562 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2563 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2564 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
2565 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2566 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })
2569 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2570 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2573 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2575 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2577 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2578 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2579 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2580 } else { unreachable!(); })
2583 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2586 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2587 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2590 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2591 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2596 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2597 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2600 mem::drop(channel_state);
2601 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2602 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2603 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2605 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2606 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2607 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2608 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2617 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2618 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2619 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2623 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2625 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2626 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2628 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2629 /// across the p2p network.
2631 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2632 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2634 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2635 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2636 /// keys per-channel).
2638 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2639 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2640 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2642 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2643 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2644 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2646 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2647 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2648 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2649 /// for more details.
2651 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2652 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2653 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2654 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2656 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2657 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2658 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2659 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2664 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2665 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2666 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2667 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2668 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2669 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2670 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2674 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2675 let mut output_index = None;
2676 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2677 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2678 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2679 if output_index.is_some() {
2680 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2681 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2684 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2685 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2686 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2689 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2692 if output_index.is_none() {
2693 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2694 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2697 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2701 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2703 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2704 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2705 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2706 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2708 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2709 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2711 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2712 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2714 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2716 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2717 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2718 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2719 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2720 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2721 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2722 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2723 pub fn update_channel_config(
2724 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2725 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2726 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2727 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2728 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2732 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2733 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2735 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2736 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2737 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2738 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
2739 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2740 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
2742 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2743 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2744 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2745 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2746 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2747 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2751 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2752 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2753 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2756 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2757 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2758 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2759 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2760 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2768 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2769 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2771 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2772 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2774 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2775 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2776 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2777 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2778 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2780 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2781 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2783 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2786 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2787 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2788 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2789 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2790 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2791 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2793 let next_hop_scid = {
2794 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2795 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id) {
2796 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2797 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2798 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2800 if !chan.is_usable() {
2801 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2802 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2805 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2807 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2808 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2812 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) });
2816 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2817 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2818 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2821 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2822 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2823 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2825 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2827 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2828 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2831 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2832 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2833 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2834 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2835 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2837 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2841 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2842 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2844 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2847 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2848 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2849 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2851 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2852 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2853 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2856 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2857 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2858 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2859 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2860 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2861 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2862 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2865 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2866 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2867 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2868 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2873 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2875 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2876 /// Will likely generate further events.
2877 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2878 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2880 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2881 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2882 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2884 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2885 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
2887 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
2888 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2889 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
2891 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2892 match forward_info {
2893 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2894 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2895 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2896 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
2897 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
2900 macro_rules! failure_handler {
2901 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
2902 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2904 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2905 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2906 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2907 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2908 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2909 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2912 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
2913 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
2915 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
2918 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2919 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
2925 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2926 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2928 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
2932 macro_rules! failed_payment {
2933 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2935 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
2939 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2940 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2941 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
2942 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
2943 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2945 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2946 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2947 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2948 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2949 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2951 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2953 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2954 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2958 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2959 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2960 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2961 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
2967 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2970 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2973 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2974 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2975 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2976 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2977 // problem, not ours.
2983 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
2984 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2986 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2990 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2991 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2992 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2993 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2996 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2997 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2998 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2999 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3000 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3003 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3004 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3005 match forward_info {
3006 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3007 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3008 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3009 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3010 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3013 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3014 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3015 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3016 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3017 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3018 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3019 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3020 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3022 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3023 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3024 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3026 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3027 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3029 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3031 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3032 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3033 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3034 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3039 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3040 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3042 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3043 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3044 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3045 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3047 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3048 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3050 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3052 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3053 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3054 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3063 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3064 match forward_info {
3065 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3066 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3067 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3068 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3071 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3072 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3073 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3074 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3076 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3077 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3079 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3082 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3083 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3084 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3085 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3086 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3087 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3088 phantom_shared_secret,
3090 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3092 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3097 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3098 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3099 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3100 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3101 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3103 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3104 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3105 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3106 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3107 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3108 phantom_shared_secret,
3110 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3111 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3115 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3116 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3117 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3118 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3119 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3122 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3123 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3124 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3126 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3127 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3128 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3131 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3132 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3133 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3136 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3137 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3138 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3139 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3140 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3141 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3145 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3146 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3147 total_value += htlc.value;
3148 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3149 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3150 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3151 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3152 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3153 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3155 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3157 _ => unreachable!(),
3160 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3161 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3162 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3163 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3164 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3165 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3166 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3167 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3168 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3171 amount_msat: total_value,
3172 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3173 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3175 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3177 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3178 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3180 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3182 payment_claimable_generated
3186 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3187 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3188 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3189 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3190 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3191 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3192 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3193 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3195 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3196 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3197 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3198 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3199 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3201 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3205 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3207 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3208 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3209 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3210 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3213 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3214 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3215 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3216 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3217 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3218 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3219 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3221 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3223 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3224 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3227 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3228 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3229 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3235 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3236 if payment_data.is_none() {
3237 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3238 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3241 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3242 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3243 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3244 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3245 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3246 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3247 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3248 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3250 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3251 if payment_claimable_generated {
3252 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3258 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3259 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3267 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3268 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3270 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3272 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3273 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3274 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3276 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3278 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3279 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3280 events.append(&mut new_events);
3283 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3285 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3286 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3288 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3289 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3290 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3291 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3292 if background_events.is_empty() {
3296 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3298 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3299 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3300 // monitor updating completing.
3301 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3308 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3309 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3310 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3311 self.process_background_events();
3314 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3315 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3316 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3317 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3318 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3319 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3320 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3322 if !chan.is_live() {
3323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3324 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3325 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3327 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3328 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3330 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3331 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3335 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3336 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3337 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3338 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3339 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3340 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3341 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3343 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3345 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3346 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3347 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3348 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3349 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3350 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3351 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3359 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3361 /// This currently includes:
3362 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3363 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3364 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3366 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3367 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3369 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3370 /// estimate fetches.
3371 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3372 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3373 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3374 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3376 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3378 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3379 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3381 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3382 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3383 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3384 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3385 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3386 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3387 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3388 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3389 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3390 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3392 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3393 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3394 handle_errors.push((Err(err), *counterparty_node_id));
3395 if needs_close { return false; }
3398 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3399 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3400 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3401 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3402 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3403 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3404 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3405 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3409 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3410 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3412 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3413 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3414 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3418 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3419 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3424 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3431 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3432 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3433 // This should be unreachable
3434 debug_assert!(false);
3437 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3438 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3439 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3440 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3442 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3443 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3444 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3446 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3453 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3454 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3455 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3456 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3457 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3460 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3461 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3464 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3466 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3467 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3468 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3469 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3470 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3477 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3478 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3479 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3481 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3482 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3483 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3484 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3486 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3487 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3488 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3489 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3490 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3491 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3493 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3494 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3495 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3496 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3497 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3498 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3499 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3500 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3501 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3506 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3507 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3509 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3511 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3512 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3513 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3514 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3515 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3516 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3517 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3519 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3521 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3522 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3524 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3529 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3530 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3531 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3532 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3533 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3534 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3535 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3536 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3537 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3538 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3540 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3541 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3542 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3543 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3545 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3546 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3547 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3548 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3549 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3553 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3554 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3555 // be surfaced to the user.
3556 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3557 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3558 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3560 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3561 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3562 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3563 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3564 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3565 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3566 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3567 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3569 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3571 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3574 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3575 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3576 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3577 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3581 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3582 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3583 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3584 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3586 // Ensure that the `channel_state` and no peer state channel storage lock is not held
3587 // when calling this function.
3588 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3589 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` and `per_peer_state` locks,
3590 // which calling this function with the locks aquired would.
3591 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3592 assert!(self.per_peer_state.try_write().is_ok());
3595 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3596 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3597 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3600 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3601 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3602 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3604 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3605 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3607 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3608 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3609 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3611 let mut forward_event = None;
3612 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3613 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3614 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3616 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3617 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3618 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3620 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3621 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3624 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3625 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3626 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3627 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3628 time_forwardable: time
3631 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3632 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3633 failed_next_destination: destination,
3639 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3640 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3642 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3643 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3644 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3646 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3647 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3648 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3649 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3651 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3652 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3653 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3654 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3655 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3656 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3657 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3659 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3662 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3663 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3664 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3665 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3666 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3667 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3668 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3669 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3674 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3675 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3676 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3678 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3679 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3680 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3681 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3686 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3688 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3689 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3690 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3691 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3692 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3694 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3695 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3697 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3698 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3699 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3700 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3701 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3703 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3704 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3705 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3706 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3707 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3708 let mut per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap());
3709 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3710 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3711 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3718 if let None = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3723 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
3724 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3725 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3727 if let None = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id) {
3732 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3733 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3734 debug_assert!(false);
3739 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3740 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3741 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3742 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3743 if sources.len() != 1 {
3744 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3745 debug_assert!(false);
3751 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3753 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3754 mem::drop(channel_state);
3755 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3756 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3757 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3760 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3761 mem::drop(channel_state);
3762 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3763 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3764 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3765 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3769 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3770 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3771 if per_peer_state.is_none() { per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()); }
3772 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.take().unwrap(), per_peer_state.take().unwrap(),
3773 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3774 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3776 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3777 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3778 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3779 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3780 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3784 mem::drop(channel_state);
3785 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3787 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3788 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3789 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3790 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3791 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3792 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3793 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3795 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3798 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3799 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3800 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3801 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3805 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3806 mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>,
3807 per_peer_state_lock: RwLockReadGuard<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
3808 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3809 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3810 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3812 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
3813 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3815 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3816 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
3820 let (found_channel, mut peer_state_opt) = if counterparty_node_id_opt.is_some() && per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).is_some() {
3821 let peer_mutex = per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).unwrap();
3822 let peer_state = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3823 let found_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&chan_id);
3824 (found_channel, Some(peer_state))
3825 } else { (false, None) };
3828 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap();
3829 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3830 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3831 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3832 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3833 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3834 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3835 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3837 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3838 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3839 payment_preimage, e);
3840 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
3841 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3842 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3843 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3844 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3845 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
3848 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3849 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3850 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3851 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3852 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3853 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3854 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3855 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3856 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3857 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3863 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3864 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3865 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3866 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3872 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3873 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3874 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3876 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3877 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3878 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
3879 // again on restart.
3880 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3881 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3882 payment_preimage, e);
3885 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3887 chan.remove_entry();
3889 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3890 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3891 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3892 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3893 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
3897 // We've held the peer_state mutex since finding the channel and setting
3898 // found_channel to true, so the channel can't have been dropped.
3902 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3903 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3904 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3908 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3909 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
3910 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update);
3911 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
3912 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3913 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3914 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
3915 // again on restart.
3916 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3917 payment_preimage, update_res);
3919 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3920 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3921 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3922 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
3923 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
3924 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
3925 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
3926 // `PaymentForwarded`).
3927 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3932 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3933 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
3936 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3938 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3939 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3940 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3942 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3943 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3944 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state_lock, self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(), hop_data, payment_preimage,
3945 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
3946 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3947 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3948 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3951 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
3952 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
3954 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3956 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3962 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
3963 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3964 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3970 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3971 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3972 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3975 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
3976 for action in actions.into_iter() {
3978 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
3979 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3980 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
3981 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
3982 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3986 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
3987 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
3993 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
3994 /// update completion.
3995 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
3996 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
3997 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
3998 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
3999 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4000 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4001 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4003 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4004 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4005 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4006 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4009 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4010 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4012 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4013 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4014 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4019 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4021 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4022 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4023 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4024 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4029 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4030 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4031 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4032 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4033 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4038 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4042 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4048 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4049 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4050 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4056 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4057 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4060 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4061 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4062 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4063 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4064 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4066 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4067 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4068 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4069 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4070 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4075 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4076 let mut peer_state_lock;
4077 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4078 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return }
4079 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4080 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4082 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4083 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4084 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4087 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4091 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4092 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4093 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4094 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4095 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4096 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4098 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4099 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4100 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4105 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4106 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4107 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4110 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4112 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4113 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4115 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4116 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4117 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4118 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4122 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4124 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4125 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4128 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4129 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4130 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4132 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4133 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4134 /// used to accept such channels.
4136 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4137 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4138 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4139 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4142 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4143 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4145 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4146 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4147 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4149 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4150 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4152 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4153 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4155 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4156 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4158 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4159 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4160 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4161 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4164 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4165 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4167 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4168 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4169 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4170 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4171 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4172 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
4174 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4175 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4176 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4178 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4179 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4182 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4183 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4184 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4185 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4186 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4187 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4190 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4191 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4192 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4195 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4196 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4197 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4200 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4201 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4207 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4208 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4209 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4212 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4213 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4216 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4217 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4218 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4220 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4221 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4222 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4223 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4226 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4227 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4231 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4232 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4233 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4234 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4235 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4236 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4238 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4239 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4240 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4241 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4242 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4243 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4245 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4246 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4247 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4248 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4250 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4251 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4252 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4255 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4256 pending_events.push(
4257 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4258 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4259 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4260 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4261 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4262 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4267 entry.insert(channel);
4273 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4274 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4275 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4276 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4277 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4278 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4280 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4281 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4282 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4283 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4284 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4285 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4287 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4290 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4291 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4292 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4293 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4294 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4296 user_channel_id: user_id,
4301 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4302 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4303 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4304 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4305 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4306 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4307 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4309 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4310 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4311 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4312 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4313 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4314 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4315 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4317 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4320 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state
4321 // lock before watch_channel
4322 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4323 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4324 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4325 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4326 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4327 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4328 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4329 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4330 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4331 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4332 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4333 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4334 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4336 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4337 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4338 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4339 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4340 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4341 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4342 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4345 // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the
4346 // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing
4347 // the channel above.
4348 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4349 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4350 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4351 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4352 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4354 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4355 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4356 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4357 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4358 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4359 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4360 funding_msg.channel_id))
4362 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4363 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4366 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4367 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4370 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4371 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4379 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4381 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4382 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4383 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4384 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4385 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4386 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4387 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4390 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4391 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4392 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4393 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4394 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger) {
4395 Ok(update) => update,
4396 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4398 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4399 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4401 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4402 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4403 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4404 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4405 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4406 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4407 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4413 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4414 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4418 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4421 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4422 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4426 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4427 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4428 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4429 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4430 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4431 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4432 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4434 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4435 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4436 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4437 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4438 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4439 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4440 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4441 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4442 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4443 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4444 msg: announcement_sigs,
4446 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4447 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4448 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4449 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4450 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4451 // announcement_signatures.
4452 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4453 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4454 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4455 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4461 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4465 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4469 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4470 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4471 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4472 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4473 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4474 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4475 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4476 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4477 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4479 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4480 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4481 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4482 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4484 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4485 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4486 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4487 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4490 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4491 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4493 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4494 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4495 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4496 let (result, is_permanent) =
4497 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4499 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4504 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4505 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4506 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4516 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4517 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4518 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4519 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4522 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4526 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4527 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4528 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4529 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4530 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4532 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4533 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4534 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4535 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4536 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4537 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4538 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4539 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4540 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4545 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4546 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4547 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4548 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4549 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4550 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4551 } else { (tx, None) }
4553 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4556 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4557 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4558 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4560 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4561 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4562 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4563 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4564 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4568 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4573 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4574 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4575 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4576 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4578 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4579 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4580 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4581 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4583 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4584 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4585 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4586 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4587 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4589 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4590 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4591 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4594 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4595 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4596 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4597 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4598 match pending_forward_info {
4599 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4600 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4601 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4602 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4604 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4605 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4606 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4607 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4608 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4611 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4613 _ => pending_forward_info
4616 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4618 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4623 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4624 let channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4625 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4626 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4627 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4628 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4629 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4631 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4632 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4633 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4634 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4635 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4637 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4640 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4644 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4645 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4646 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4647 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4648 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4650 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4651 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4652 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4653 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4654 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4656 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4661 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4662 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4663 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4664 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4665 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4667 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4668 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4669 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4670 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4671 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4672 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4673 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4675 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4678 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4682 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4683 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4684 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4685 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4686 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4687 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4688 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4690 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4691 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4692 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4693 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4694 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4695 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4696 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4697 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4698 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4699 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4700 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4705 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4706 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4710 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4711 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4712 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4714 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4715 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4716 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4717 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4718 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4719 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4720 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4721 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4723 commitment_signed: msg,
4729 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4734 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4735 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4736 let mut forward_event = None;
4737 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4738 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4739 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4740 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4741 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4742 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4743 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4744 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4746 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4747 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4749 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4750 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4751 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4752 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4753 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4754 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4756 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4757 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4758 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4760 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4761 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4762 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4763 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4764 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4765 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4766 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4767 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4768 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4771 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4772 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4774 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4775 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4776 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4777 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4778 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4779 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4780 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4781 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4784 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4785 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4786 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4791 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4792 // payments are being processed.
4793 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4794 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4796 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4797 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4804 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4805 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4808 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4809 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4810 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4813 match forward_event {
4815 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4816 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4817 time_forwardable: time
4825 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4826 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4828 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4829 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4830 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4831 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4832 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4833 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4835 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4836 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4837 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4838 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4839 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4840 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4841 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4842 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4843 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
4844 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
4845 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4846 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4847 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4848 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4849 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4850 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4852 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4853 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
4854 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4855 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4856 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4857 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4859 } else { unreachable!(); }
4861 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4862 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4863 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4867 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4868 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4869 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4870 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4871 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
4872 chan.get().get_user_id()))
4874 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4877 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4879 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4880 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
4882 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4883 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4884 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4886 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
4887 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4894 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4895 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4896 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4897 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4898 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4900 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4901 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4902 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4903 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4904 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
4906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4911 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4912 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4913 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4914 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4915 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4916 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4917 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4919 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4920 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4921 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4922 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4923 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4924 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4927 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4928 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4929 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
4930 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4931 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4932 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4935 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4940 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4941 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4942 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4943 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4945 // It's not a local channel
4946 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4949 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4950 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
4951 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4952 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4954 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4955 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4956 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4957 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4958 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4959 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4960 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4961 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4962 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4963 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4965 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4967 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4968 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4969 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4970 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4972 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
4973 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
4976 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4978 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4981 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4983 let need_lnd_workaround = {
4984 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4985 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4986 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4988 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4989 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4990 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4992 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4993 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4994 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4995 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4996 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4997 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4998 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4999 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5000 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5001 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5002 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5003 let mut channel_update = None;
5004 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5005 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5006 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5009 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5010 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5011 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5012 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5013 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5014 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5015 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5020 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5021 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5022 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5023 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5024 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5025 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5029 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5033 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5034 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5037 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5038 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5043 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5044 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5045 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5046 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5047 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5048 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5049 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5050 match monitor_event {
5051 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5052 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5053 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5054 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5056 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5057 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5058 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5059 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5062 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5063 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5064 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5065 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5066 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5067 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5069 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5070 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5071 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5072 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5075 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5076 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5077 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5078 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5079 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5080 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5081 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5082 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5083 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5084 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5085 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5089 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5090 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5092 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5094 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5095 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5096 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5097 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5098 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5105 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5106 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5112 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5113 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5116 has_pending_monitor_events
5119 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5120 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5121 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5123 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5124 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5127 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5128 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5129 /// update was applied.
5130 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5131 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5132 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5133 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5135 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5136 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5137 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5139 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5140 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5141 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5142 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5143 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5144 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5145 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5146 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5148 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5150 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5153 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5154 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5155 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5156 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5157 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5158 updates: commitment_update,
5162 has_monitor_update = true;
5163 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5164 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5165 if close_channel { return false; }
5172 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5173 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5174 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5182 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5183 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5184 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5187 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5188 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5194 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5195 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5196 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5197 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5198 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5199 let mut has_update = false;
5201 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5202 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5203 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5205 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5206 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5207 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5208 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5209 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5210 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5211 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5212 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5214 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5215 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5218 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5219 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5220 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5221 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5222 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5227 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5229 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5230 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5231 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5237 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5238 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5246 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5247 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5253 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5254 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5256 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5257 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5258 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5259 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5260 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5261 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5262 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5263 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5264 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5265 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5266 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5267 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5268 assert!(should_broadcast);
5269 } else { unreachable!(); }
5270 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5272 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5276 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5277 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5279 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5280 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5283 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5285 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5286 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5287 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5288 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5289 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5290 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5291 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5292 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5293 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5294 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5295 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5296 // never fail a payment too early.
5297 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5299 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5302 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5307 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5310 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5311 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5313 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5314 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5315 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5317 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5319 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5320 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5324 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5325 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5327 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5329 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5330 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5331 /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5332 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5333 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5334 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5337 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5338 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5340 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5343 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5345 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5347 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5348 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5349 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5350 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5351 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5354 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5355 /// stored external to LDK.
5357 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5358 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5359 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5361 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5362 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5365 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5366 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5367 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5368 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5370 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5371 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5372 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5373 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5374 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5376 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5377 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5378 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5379 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5380 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5382 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5383 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5385 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5386 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5390 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5391 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5393 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5395 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5396 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5397 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5398 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5401 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5402 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5404 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5407 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5409 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5411 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5412 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5415 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5416 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5418 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5419 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5420 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5423 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5424 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5426 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5427 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5428 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5429 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5431 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5432 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5433 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5434 Some(_) => continue,
5435 None => return scid_candidate
5440 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5442 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5443 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5445 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5446 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5447 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5451 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5452 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5453 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5455 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5456 /// times to get a unique scid.
5457 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5458 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5459 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5461 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5462 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5463 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5464 return scid_candidate
5468 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5469 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5470 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5471 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5473 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5474 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5475 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5476 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5477 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5478 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5479 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5480 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5489 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5490 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5491 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5492 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5493 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5498 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5499 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5500 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5504 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5505 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5509 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5510 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5513 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5514 /// using the given event handler.
5516 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5517 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5520 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5521 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5522 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5524 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5526 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5527 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5528 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5529 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5532 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5533 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5534 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5537 for event in pending_events {
5538 handler(event).await;
5541 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5542 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5547 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5549 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5550 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5551 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5552 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5556 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5557 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5558 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5559 /// is always placed next to each other.
5561 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5562 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5563 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5564 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5566 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5567 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5568 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5569 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5570 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5571 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5572 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5574 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5575 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5576 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5577 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5580 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5581 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5583 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5584 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5587 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5588 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5589 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5590 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5591 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5592 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5593 let mut peer_pending_events = Vec::new();
5594 mem::swap(&mut peer_pending_events, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5595 pending_events.append(&mut peer_pending_events);
5599 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5600 events.replace(pending_events);
5609 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5611 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5612 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5613 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5614 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5618 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5620 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5621 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5622 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5623 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5624 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5626 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5627 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5628 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5629 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5632 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5633 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5634 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5637 for event in pending_events {
5638 handler.handle_event(event);
5646 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5648 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5649 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5650 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5651 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5655 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5657 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5658 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5659 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5660 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5661 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5664 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5665 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5668 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5669 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5670 let new_height = height - 1;
5672 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5673 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5674 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5675 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5676 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5677 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5680 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5684 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5686 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5687 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5688 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5689 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5693 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5694 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5695 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5696 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5698 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5699 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5701 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5702 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5703 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5705 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5706 if height < last_best_block_height {
5707 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5708 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5712 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5713 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5714 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5715 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5717 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5718 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5720 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5722 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5724 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5726 macro_rules! max_time {
5727 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5729 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5730 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5731 // having an explicit local time source.
5732 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5733 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5734 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5735 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5736 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5742 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5743 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5744 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5745 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5749 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5750 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5751 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5752 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5753 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5754 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5755 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5756 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
5763 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5764 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5765 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5766 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5767 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5768 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5769 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5770 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5775 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5777 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5778 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5779 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5780 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5784 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5785 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5787 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5788 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5789 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5790 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5791 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5793 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5794 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5796 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5797 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5798 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5799 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5800 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5801 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5802 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5803 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5804 let res = f(channel);
5805 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5806 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5807 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5808 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5809 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5811 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5812 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5813 if channel.is_usable() {
5814 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5815 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5816 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5817 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5822 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5826 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5828 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5829 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5830 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5831 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5832 msg: announcement_sigs,
5834 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5835 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5836 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5838 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5839 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5840 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5845 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5846 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5847 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5848 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5849 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5850 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5851 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5852 // is always consistent.
5853 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5854 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5855 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5856 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5857 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5860 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5861 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5862 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5863 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5864 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5865 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5866 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5870 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5871 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5872 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5873 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5874 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5875 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5876 data: reason_message,
5886 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5887 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5888 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5889 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5890 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5891 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5892 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5893 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5894 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5895 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
5897 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
5898 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5899 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5903 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5906 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5907 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
5908 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5909 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5910 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
5911 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
5912 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5913 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5914 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
5917 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
5918 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5919 _ => unreachable!(),
5921 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
5922 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
5923 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
5924 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
5930 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5932 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5933 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
5937 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5938 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5939 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
5940 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5942 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5944 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5945 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
5946 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5947 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5948 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5949 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5952 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5953 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
5954 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5956 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5957 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5958 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5959 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5962 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
5963 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
5964 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
5965 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
5966 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
5969 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5970 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5971 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
5974 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5975 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5976 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5977 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5981 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
5982 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5984 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5985 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5986 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5987 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5991 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5992 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5993 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5996 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5997 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5998 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6001 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6002 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6003 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6006 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6007 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6008 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6011 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6012 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6013 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6016 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6017 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6018 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6021 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6023 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6026 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6027 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6028 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6031 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6032 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6033 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6036 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6037 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6038 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6041 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6042 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6043 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6046 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6047 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6048 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6051 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6052 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6053 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6056 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6057 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6058 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6061 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6062 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6063 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6066 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6067 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6068 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6071 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6076 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6077 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6078 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6081 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6082 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6083 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6084 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6085 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6086 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6088 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6089 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6090 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6091 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6092 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6093 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6094 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6095 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6096 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6097 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6098 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6101 no_channels_remain = false;
6105 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6107 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6108 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6109 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6110 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6111 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6112 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6113 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6114 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6115 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6116 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6117 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6118 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6119 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6120 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6121 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6122 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6123 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6124 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6125 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6126 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6130 mem::drop(channel_state);
6132 if no_channels_remain {
6133 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6135 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6137 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6138 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6142 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6143 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6144 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6148 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6150 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6153 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6154 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6155 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6156 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6157 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6158 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6159 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6162 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6163 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6168 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6169 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6170 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6172 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6173 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6174 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6175 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6176 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6177 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6178 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6179 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6180 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6181 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6185 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6186 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6187 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6192 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6193 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6194 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6195 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6196 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6205 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6209 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6210 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6212 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6213 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6214 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6215 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6216 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return; }
6217 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6218 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6219 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6221 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6222 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6223 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6227 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6228 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6229 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6230 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6231 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return; }
6232 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6233 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6234 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6235 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6236 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6237 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6245 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6246 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6250 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6251 provided_node_features()
6254 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6255 provided_init_features()
6259 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6260 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6261 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6262 provided_init_features().to_context()
6265 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6266 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6268 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6269 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6270 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6271 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6272 provided_init_features().to_context()
6275 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6276 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6277 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6278 provided_init_features().to_context()
6281 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6282 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6283 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6284 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6285 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6286 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6287 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6288 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6289 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6290 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6291 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6292 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6293 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6294 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6295 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6296 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6297 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6298 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6302 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6303 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6305 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6306 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6307 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6308 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6311 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6312 (2, node_id, required),
6313 (4, features, required),
6314 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6315 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6316 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6317 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6320 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6321 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6322 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6323 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6324 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6325 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6326 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6327 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6328 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6329 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6330 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6331 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6332 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6333 (7, self.config, option),
6334 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6335 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6336 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6337 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6338 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6339 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6340 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6341 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6342 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6343 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6344 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6345 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6346 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6347 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6348 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6349 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6350 (32, self.is_public, required),
6351 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6352 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6353 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6359 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6360 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6361 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6362 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6363 (2, channel_id, required),
6364 (3, channel_type, option),
6365 (4, counterparty, required),
6366 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6367 (6, funding_txo, option),
6368 (7, config, option),
6369 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6370 (9, confirmations, option),
6371 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6372 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6373 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6374 (16, balance_msat, required),
6375 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6376 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6377 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6378 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6379 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6380 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6381 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6382 (26, is_outbound, required),
6383 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6384 (30, is_usable, required),
6385 (32, is_public, required),
6386 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6387 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6388 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6391 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6392 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6393 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6394 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6395 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6399 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6401 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6402 outbound_scid_alias,
6406 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6407 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6409 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6410 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6411 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6412 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6413 confirmations_required,
6415 force_close_spend_delay,
6416 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6417 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6418 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6419 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6420 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6421 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6426 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6427 (2, channels, vec_type),
6428 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6429 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6432 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6434 (0, onion_packet, required),
6435 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6438 (0, payment_data, required),
6439 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6440 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6442 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6443 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6444 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6448 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6449 (0, routing, required),
6450 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6451 (4, payment_hash, required),
6452 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6453 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6454 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6458 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6459 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6461 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6463 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6464 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6465 reason.write(writer)?;
6467 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6468 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6471 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6472 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6473 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6474 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6481 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6482 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6483 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6486 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6487 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6488 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6489 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6493 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6494 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6495 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6496 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6497 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6500 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6501 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6502 // messages contained in the variants.
6503 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6504 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6505 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6507 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6508 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6509 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6510 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6511 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6514 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6515 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6516 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6517 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6518 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6520 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6525 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6530 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6531 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6532 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6533 (2, outpoint, required),
6534 (4, htlc_id, required),
6535 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6538 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6539 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6540 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6541 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6542 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6544 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6545 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6546 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6547 (2, self.value, required),
6548 (4, payment_data, option),
6549 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6550 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6556 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6557 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6558 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6560 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6561 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6562 let mut total_msat = None;
6563 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6564 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6565 (0, prev_hop, required),
6566 (1, total_msat, option),
6567 (2, value, required),
6568 (4, payment_data, option),
6569 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6570 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6572 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6574 if payment_data.is_some() {
6575 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6577 if total_msat.is_none() {
6578 total_msat = Some(value);
6580 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6583 if total_msat.is_none() {
6584 if payment_data.is_none() {
6585 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6587 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6589 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6593 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6596 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6603 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6604 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6605 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6608 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6609 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6610 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6611 let mut payment_id = None;
6612 let mut payment_secret = None;
6613 let mut payment_params = None;
6614 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6615 (0, session_priv, required),
6616 (1, payment_id, option),
6617 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6618 (3, payment_secret, option),
6619 (4, path, vec_type),
6620 (5, payment_params, option),
6622 if payment_id.is_none() {
6623 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6625 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6627 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6628 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6629 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6630 path: path.unwrap(),
6631 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6636 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6637 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6642 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6643 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6645 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6647 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6648 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6649 (0, session_priv, required),
6650 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6651 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6652 (3, payment_secret, option),
6653 (4, *path, vec_type),
6654 (5, payment_params, option),
6657 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6659 field.write(writer)?;
6666 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6667 (0, forward_info, required),
6668 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6669 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6670 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6671 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6674 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6676 (0, htlc_id, required),
6677 (2, err_packet, required),
6682 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6683 (0, payment_secret, required),
6684 (2, expiry_time, required),
6685 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6686 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6687 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6690 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
6692 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6693 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6694 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6695 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6699 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6700 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6702 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6704 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6706 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6707 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6708 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6712 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6713 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6714 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6715 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6716 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6717 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6718 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6719 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6720 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6721 unfunded_channels += 1;
6726 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6728 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6729 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6730 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6731 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6732 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6733 channel.write(writer)?;
6740 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6741 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6742 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6743 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6744 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6745 for forward in pending_forwards {
6746 forward.write(writer)?;
6751 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6752 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6753 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6755 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6756 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6757 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6758 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6759 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6760 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6761 htlc.write(writer)?;
6763 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6766 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6767 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6768 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6769 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6770 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6771 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6774 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6775 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6776 for event in events.iter() {
6777 event.write(writer)?;
6780 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6781 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6782 for event in background_events.iter() {
6784 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6786 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6787 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6792 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6793 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6794 // likely to be identical.
6795 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6796 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6798 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6799 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6800 hash.write(writer)?;
6801 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6804 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6805 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6806 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6807 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6808 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6811 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6812 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6814 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6815 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6816 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6817 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6820 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6821 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6825 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6826 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6827 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6829 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6830 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6831 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6837 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
6838 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6839 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
6840 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
6843 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
6844 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6845 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
6846 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
6847 pending_claiming_payments = None;
6849 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
6852 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6853 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6854 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
6855 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6856 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
6857 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6858 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6859 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6860 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6867 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6869 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6871 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6872 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6873 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6874 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6875 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6876 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6877 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6878 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6879 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6880 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6881 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6882 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6883 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6885 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6886 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6888 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6889 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6891 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6892 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6893 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6894 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6895 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6896 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6898 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6899 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6901 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6902 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6903 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6904 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6908 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6909 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6911 pub keys_manager: K,
6913 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6915 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6916 pub fee_estimator: F,
6917 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6919 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6920 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6921 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6922 pub chain_monitor: M,
6924 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6925 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6926 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6927 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6928 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
6929 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
6931 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
6933 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6934 /// deserialization.
6936 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6937 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6938 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6940 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6941 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6943 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6944 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6945 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6946 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6948 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6951 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6952 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
6955 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6956 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>
6958 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6959 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6960 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6961 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6965 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6966 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6967 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6968 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6969 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
6971 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
6972 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6977 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6978 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6979 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6980 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>>)
6982 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6983 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6984 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6985 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6989 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6990 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6991 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6995 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6996 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>)
6998 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6999 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7000 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7001 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7005 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7006 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7008 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7009 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7010 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7012 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7014 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7015 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7016 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7017 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7018 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7019 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7020 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7021 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7022 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7023 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7024 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7025 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7026 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7027 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7028 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7029 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7030 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7031 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7032 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7033 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7034 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7035 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7036 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7037 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7038 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7039 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7040 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7041 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7042 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7043 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7044 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7045 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7046 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7047 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7048 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7049 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7050 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7051 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7052 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7053 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7055 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7056 let mut found_htlc = false;
7057 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7058 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7061 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7062 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7063 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7064 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7065 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7066 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7067 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7068 log_info!(args.logger,
7069 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7070 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7071 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7075 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7076 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7077 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7079 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7080 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7082 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7083 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7084 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7085 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7087 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7088 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7089 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7090 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7094 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7095 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7096 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7097 // safely discard the channel.
7098 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7099 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7100 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7101 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7102 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7105 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7106 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7107 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7108 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7109 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7110 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7114 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7115 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7116 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7117 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7121 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7122 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7123 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7124 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7125 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7126 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7127 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7128 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7129 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7131 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7134 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7135 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7136 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7137 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7138 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7139 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7140 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7141 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7143 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7146 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7147 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7148 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7149 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7150 let peer_state = PeerState {
7151 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7152 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7153 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7155 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7158 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7159 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7160 for _ in 0..event_count {
7161 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7162 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7167 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7168 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7169 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7170 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7171 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7172 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7176 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7177 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7179 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7180 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7181 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7182 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7183 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7187 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7188 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7189 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7190 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7191 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7192 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7193 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7195 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7196 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7200 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7201 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7202 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7203 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7204 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7205 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7206 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7207 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7208 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7209 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7210 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7211 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7212 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7213 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7214 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7215 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7216 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7217 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7219 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7220 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7223 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7224 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7227 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7228 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7229 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7230 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7231 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7232 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7234 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7236 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7237 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7238 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7239 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7240 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7241 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7242 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7244 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7245 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7246 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7247 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7248 if path.is_empty() {
7249 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7250 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7252 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7253 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7254 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7255 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7256 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7257 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7258 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7259 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7261 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7262 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7263 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7264 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7265 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7267 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7268 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7269 total_msat: path_amt,
7270 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7272 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7273 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7278 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7279 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7280 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7281 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7282 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7284 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7285 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7286 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7287 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7288 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7289 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7290 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7291 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7292 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7293 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7294 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7299 !forwards.is_empty()
7301 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7302 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7303 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7304 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7305 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7306 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7307 intercepted_id != ev_id
7319 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7320 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7321 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7322 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7323 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7324 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7325 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7326 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7330 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7331 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7333 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7334 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7335 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7336 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7338 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7339 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7342 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7343 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7344 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7345 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7346 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7348 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7349 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7350 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7351 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7352 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7353 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7354 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7355 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7357 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7358 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7362 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7364 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7366 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7367 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7369 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7373 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7374 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7376 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7377 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7380 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7382 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7384 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7385 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7386 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7387 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7388 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7392 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7393 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7394 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7395 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7396 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7397 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7398 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7400 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7401 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7402 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7404 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7405 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7406 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7407 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7408 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7409 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7411 if chan.is_usable() {
7412 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7413 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7414 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7415 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7416 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7422 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7424 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7425 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7426 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7427 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7428 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7429 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7430 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7431 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7432 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7433 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7434 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7436 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7437 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7439 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7440 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7441 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7442 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7444 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7445 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7446 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7447 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7449 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7450 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7451 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7452 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7454 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7455 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7456 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7457 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7458 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7459 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7460 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7463 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7464 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7467 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7470 purpose: payment_purpose,
7471 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7477 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7479 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7480 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7481 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7482 router: args.router,
7484 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7486 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7488 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7489 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7490 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()) },
7491 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7493 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7494 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7495 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7496 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7497 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7498 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7500 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7506 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7508 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7510 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7511 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7512 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7513 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7515 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7516 logger: args.logger,
7517 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7520 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7521 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7522 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7523 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7524 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7527 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7528 //connection or two.
7530 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7536 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7537 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7538 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7539 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7540 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
7541 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7542 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
7544 use core::time::Duration;
7545 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7546 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7547 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7548 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7549 use crate::ln::msgs;
7550 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, OptionalField};
7551 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7552 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7553 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7554 use crate::util::test_utils;
7555 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7556 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysInterface};
7559 fn test_notify_limits() {
7560 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7561 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7562 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7563 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7564 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7565 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7567 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7568 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7569 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7570 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7571 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7573 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7575 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7576 // to connect messages with new values
7577 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7578 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7579 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7580 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7582 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7583 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7584 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7585 // ... but the last node should not.
7586 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7587 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7588 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7589 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7591 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7592 // about the channel.
7593 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7594 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7595 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7597 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7599 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7600 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7601 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7602 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7603 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7604 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7606 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7607 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7608 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7610 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7611 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7612 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7613 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7614 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7615 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7617 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7618 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7619 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7620 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7621 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7622 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7623 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7624 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7626 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7627 // the channel info has updated.
7628 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7629 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7630 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7631 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7632 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7633 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7637 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7638 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7640 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7641 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7642 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7643 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7644 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7646 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7647 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7648 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7649 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7651 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7652 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7653 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7654 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7655 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7656 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7658 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7659 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7660 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7662 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7663 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7665 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7666 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7667 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7668 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7669 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7671 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7672 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7673 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7675 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7676 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7677 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7678 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7679 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7680 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7681 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7682 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7683 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7685 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7686 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7688 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7689 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7690 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7692 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7693 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7694 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7695 // lightning messages manually.
7696 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7697 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7700 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7701 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7702 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7704 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7705 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7707 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7708 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7710 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7711 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7712 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7714 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7715 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7716 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7718 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7720 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7722 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7723 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7726 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7727 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7728 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7729 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7731 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7732 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7733 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7734 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7736 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7739 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7740 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7741 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7742 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7747 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7748 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7749 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7750 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7752 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7757 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7758 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7759 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7760 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7761 // fails as expected.
7762 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7763 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7764 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7765 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7766 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7767 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7768 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7770 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7771 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7772 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7774 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7775 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7776 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7777 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7778 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7780 let route = find_route(
7781 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7782 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7784 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7786 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7787 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7788 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7789 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7790 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7792 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7793 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7794 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7795 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7796 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7797 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7798 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7799 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7800 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7801 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7802 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7803 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7804 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7805 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7806 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7808 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7809 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7811 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7812 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7813 let route = find_route(
7814 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7815 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7817 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7819 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7820 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7821 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7822 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7823 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7825 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7826 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7827 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7829 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7830 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7831 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7832 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7833 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7835 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7836 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7837 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7839 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7840 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7841 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7842 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7843 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7844 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7845 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7846 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7847 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7849 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7850 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7854 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7855 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7856 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7857 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7858 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7859 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7860 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7862 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7863 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7864 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7865 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7867 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7868 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7869 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7870 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7871 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7873 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
7874 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7875 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7876 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7877 let route = find_route(
7878 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7879 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7882 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7883 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7884 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7885 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7888 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7889 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7890 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7891 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7892 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7893 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7894 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7896 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7900 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7901 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7902 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7903 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7904 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7905 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7907 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7908 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7909 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7910 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7912 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7913 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7914 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7915 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7916 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7918 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
7919 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7920 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7921 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7922 let route = find_route(
7923 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7924 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7927 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7928 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7929 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7930 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7931 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7934 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7935 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7936 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7937 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7938 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7939 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7940 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7942 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7946 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7947 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7948 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7949 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7950 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7952 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7953 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7954 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7955 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7957 // Marshall an MPP route.
7958 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7959 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7960 route.paths.push(path);
7961 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7962 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7963 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7964 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7965 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7966 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7968 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
7969 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7970 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7971 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7976 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7977 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7978 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7979 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7980 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7981 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7983 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7984 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7986 total_msat: 100_000,
7989 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7990 // payment verification fails as expected.
7991 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7992 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7993 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7994 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7996 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8000 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8001 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8005 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8006 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8007 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8008 // the channel is successfully closed.
8009 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8010 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8011 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8012 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8014 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8015 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8016 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8017 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8018 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8020 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8021 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8023 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8024 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8025 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8026 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8029 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8031 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8032 // as it has the funding transaction.
8033 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8034 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8035 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8037 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8040 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8042 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8044 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8045 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8046 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8048 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8049 // as it has the funding transaction.
8050 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8051 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8052 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8055 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8056 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8057 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8058 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8059 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8060 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8062 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8063 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8064 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8065 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8067 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8068 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8070 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8071 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8072 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8073 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8074 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8075 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8076 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8078 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8079 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8080 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8081 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8082 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8083 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8084 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8087 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8089 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8090 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8091 // closing transaction).
8092 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8093 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8094 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8096 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8097 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8098 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8099 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8100 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8103 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8105 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8107 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8108 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8109 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8111 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8113 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8114 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8117 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8118 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8119 check_api_misuse_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8122 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8123 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8124 check_api_misuse_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8127 fn check_api_misuse_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8129 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8130 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8132 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8133 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8138 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8139 // Tests that our API functions and message handlers that expects a `counterparty_node_id`
8140 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8141 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8142 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8143 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8144 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8145 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8147 // Boilerplate code to produce `open_channel` and `accept_channel` msgs more densly than
8148 // creating dummy ones.
8149 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8150 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8151 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
8152 let accept_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8155 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8156 let signature = Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() });
8157 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8158 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8161 let funding_created_msg = msgs::FundingCreated {
8162 temporary_channel_id: open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id,
8163 funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap(),
8164 funding_output_index: 0,
8165 signature: signature,
8168 let funding_signed_msg = msgs::FundingSigned {
8169 channel_id: channel_id,
8170 signature: signature,
8173 let channel_ready_msg = msgs::ChannelReady {
8174 channel_id: channel_id,
8175 next_per_commitment_point: unkown_public_key,
8176 short_channel_id_alias: None,
8179 let announcement_signatures_msg = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
8180 channel_id: channel_id,
8181 short_channel_id: 0,
8182 node_signature: signature,
8183 bitcoin_signature: signature,
8186 let channel_reestablish_msg = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8187 channel_id: channel_id,
8188 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8189 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8190 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
8193 let closing_signed_msg = msgs::ClosingSigned {
8194 channel_id: channel_id,
8196 signature: signature,
8200 let shutdown_msg = msgs::Shutdown {
8201 channel_id: channel_id,
8202 scriptpubkey: Script::new(),
8205 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
8207 public_key: Ok(unkown_public_key),
8208 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
8212 let update_add_htlc_msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
8213 channel_id: channel_id,
8215 amount_msat: 1000000,
8216 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
8217 cltv_expiry: 821716,
8218 onion_routing_packet
8221 let commitment_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
8222 channel_id: channel_id,
8223 signature: signature,
8224 htlc_signatures: Vec::new(),
8227 let update_fee_msg = msgs::UpdateFee {
8228 channel_id: channel_id,
8229 feerate_per_kw: 1000,
8232 let malformed_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
8233 channel_id: channel_id,
8235 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
8236 failure_code: 0x8000,
8239 let fulfill_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
8240 channel_id: channel_id,
8242 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
8245 let fail_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
8246 channel_id: channel_id,
8248 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
8251 let revoke_and_ack_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
8252 channel_id: channel_id,
8253 per_commitment_secret: [1; 32],
8254 next_per_commitment_point: unkown_public_key,
8257 // Test the API functions and message handlers.
8258 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8260 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&unkown_public_key, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
8262 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&unkown_public_key, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_msg);
8264 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8266 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&unkown_public_key, &funding_created_msg);
8268 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&unkown_public_key, &funding_signed_msg);
8270 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&unkown_public_key, &channel_ready_msg);
8272 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&unkown_public_key, &announcement_signatures_msg);
8274 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8276 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8278 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8280 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8282 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8284 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&unkown_public_key, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &shutdown_msg);
8286 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&unkown_public_key, &closing_signed_msg);
8288 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&unkown_public_key, &channel_reestablish_msg);
8290 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &update_add_htlc_msg);
8292 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&unkown_public_key, &commitment_signed_msg);
8294 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &malformed_update_msg);
8296 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &fail_update_msg);
8298 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &fulfill_update_msg);
8300 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&unkown_public_key, &revoke_and_ack_msg);
8302 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&unkown_public_key, &update_fee_msg);
8306 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8308 use crate::chain::Listen;
8309 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8310 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8311 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8312 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8313 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8314 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8315 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8316 use crate::util::test_utils;
8317 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8318 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8320 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8321 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8322 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8324 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8328 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8329 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8330 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8331 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8332 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8333 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8334 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8335 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8340 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8341 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8344 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8345 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8346 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8348 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8349 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8351 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8352 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8353 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8354 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)));
8356 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8357 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8359 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8360 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8361 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8362 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8364 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8366 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8368 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8369 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8370 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8371 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8372 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8374 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8376 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8378 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8379 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8380 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8381 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8382 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8385 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8386 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8387 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8389 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8390 } else { panic!(); }
8392 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8393 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8395 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8398 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8401 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8402 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8404 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8405 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8406 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8407 match msg_events[0] {
8408 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8409 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8410 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8414 match msg_events[1] {
8415 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8419 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8420 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8422 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8423 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8425 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8428 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8429 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8431 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8432 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8434 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8437 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8439 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8440 macro_rules! send_payment {
8441 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8442 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8443 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8444 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8445 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8446 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8447 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8448 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8449 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8450 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8452 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8453 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8455 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8456 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8458 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8459 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8460 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8461 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8462 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8463 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8464 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8465 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8467 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8468 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8469 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8470 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8472 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8473 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8474 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8475 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8476 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8478 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8481 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8482 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8483 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8484 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8486 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8491 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8492 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);